Memorandum from the Royal Aeronautical
Society
INTRODUCTION
1. The Royal Aeronautical Society (RAeS)
is the Learned Society for the Aerospace and Aviation community.
Based in London, it has a worldwide membership of over 19,000,
with over 13,000 in the UK. Its Fellows and Members represent
all levels of the aeronautical community both active and retired
with around a half of these as professional engineers. In addition,
the Society has over 120 organisations that are members of its
Corporate Partners scheme. It has Airpower and UAV Specialist
Groups, with members drawn from industry, academia and the services.
BACKGROUND
2. The term UAV (Unmanned Aerial Vehicle)
is now being replaced by both North American and European authorities
by the term Unmanned Aircraft (UA) System (UAS) for two main reasons:
If UAVs are to file and fly alongside manned aviation in non-segregated
airspace, they must be equivalent to and regarded as aircraft;
the key feature of a UAS is the `system', which may comprise several
UAVs, control stations and launch and recovery elements.
3. The UAV is not a new concept and early
UAV work dates from the pioneering days of powered flight. The
US Military used target drones fitted with cameras for aerial
surveillance during the Viet Nam conflict. Israel pioneered the
development and military use of a new generation of UAVs, but
it was the US that rapidly adopted the technology and is now investing
heavily in advanced platforms and associated payload technologies.
The US armed forces have accumulated considerable operational
experience and have deployed armed UAVs in Iraq and Afghanistan.
The US alone intends to invest over $2 billion in UAS research
and procurement over the next five years.
4. Currently over 39 countries have developed
or are developing UAVs of varying sizes and with varying levels
of technical sophistication. A 2005 census revealed some 400 UAV
programmes in existence or under development.
UK EXPERIENCE WITH
UNMANNED AIRCRAFT
SYSTEMS
5. The UK experience with UAV technology
has not been entirely happy, pace the Phoenix programme. However,
procurement of the Watchkeeper for tactical surveillance missions
and the UOR-procured US Reaper armed ISTAR asset, marked an important
shift in the priority attached to unmanned platforms. Further
training and operational experience in UAS operation has been
obtained in cooperation with the US. UK forces are flying Predator
over Afghanistan (and possibly also Iraq) with RAF pilots based
at Nellis Air Force Base near Las Vegas. According to anecdotal
evidence, this has been highly successful, and through very close
integration with the US operators there, a great deal has been
learned. UK Forces on the ground have been using the Lockheed
Martin Desert Hawk to excellent effect for short range ISTAR.
For local commanders, it is extremely useful to have an integral
asset giving an "over the horizon" view and again, anecdotal
evidence suggests that UK forces have learned much from the experience.
The BAE SYSTEMS Herti UAV has also been deployed operationally
in Afghanistan.
6. In the longer term, industry-government
support for projects such as the Taranis UCAS demonstrator will
facilitate UK national technology acquisition in advanced unmanned
combat platforms, with advanced propulsion systems and increased
capacity for autonomous operation.
7. In general, the MoD and the UK armed
services were perhaps slow to appreciate the potential of unmanned
systems and the value of UAS operations is still only beginning
to be recognised in MoD and only in specialised areas. However,
it is evident from the Afghanistan deployment and commitment of
research funds to technology acquisition in this area that the
general awareness of UAS is very much better than before and improving
at a pace. The Society believes that ISTAR is one of the specialised
areas where UASs are being taken seriously and that MoD ISTAR
planning has been and is being further reassessed as a result
of UAS experience.
UAS AND ISTAR
8. The advantages of the UA for any mission
can be summarised under the rubric "dull, dirty and dangerous".
The use of unmanned platforms for ISTAR missions would certainly
conform to the "dull" specification and, in many circumstances,
would be classed as "dangerous". Use in contaminated
conflict environments (such as those caused by chemical or nuclear
weapons) is considered "dirty".
Persistence
9. The particular benefit of a UA approach
to ISTAR is the persistence offered by long endurance vehicles.
Endurance can now be measured in days rather than hours. An Israeli
UAS will be deployed later this year in a maritime surveillance
role capable of 50-hour autonomous missions. A comparable manned
patrol aircraft would have a six to eight hour endurance, with
higher operational and maintenance costs.
10. The persistence characteristic applies
equally to the "piloting" functions as well as the "observer"
function. Personnel can be rotated during the course of a mission
reducing the effects of fatigue on real-time observation and analysis.
Equally valuable, a "second opinion" can be sought to
verify targets and to take offensive action if required.
Vulnerability
11. UAs are also largely invisible and inaudible
from the ground, which when combined with persistence makes them
a formidable capability especially over difficult and hostile
terrain. However, should the platform be located, it is potentially
more vulnerable to counter measures as reaction to ground fire
may be slower, and the system intrinsically less able to evade
hostile action.
Cost
12. Although the smaller UAs do offer savings
in terms of operational and maintenance costs, they should not
be seen as a cheap option, nor are they necessarily expendable
in anything other than human terms. This may be more valid for
the smaller tactical UA platforms currently deployed by US forces
in tactical, platoon level operations, but not in the case of
the more sophisticated platforms such as Reaper. The larger more
sophisticated UASs are costly to acquire and also need an extensive
support and operational team both within the theatre of operations
and at the centre of operations. Although the requirement for
trained pilots to `fly' UA platforms such as Predator and Reaper,
it is a sensible and pragmatic way forward now.
Autonomy
13. Much is being learned from operation
by the much more autonomous Global Hawk by US forces and by German
and Australian forces through their assessment of it. More autonomous
systems may reduce the operational costs of UAS operation. It
will also reduce the bandwidth communication requirements that
under intense battlefield conditions can cause problems for other
users and applications. However, autonomous operation with armed
UA vehicles raises questions about rules of engagement. It is
likely that weapons release will still require human intervention.
Reliability issues
14. UA vehicles, while undoubtedly more
reliable than even five years ago, are also more prone to failure
and to pilot error (exacerbated by the difficulties of responding
quickly to flying conditions and landing the vehicle under problematic
weather conditions). Weather may generally set lower levels of
availability, with tighter restrictions on landing and take-off
conditions.
Performance considerations and new roles and applications
15. Since a UA does not have a human pilot
(nor—at present—human payloads) their performance
need not be constrained by human health and safety considerations.
In addition to persistence, a UA can climb, dive and turn faster
and more tightly than manned aircraft ("pull more G force"),
giving them superior aerobatic capabilities. This has led the
US Air Force to call for Unmanned Combat Aircraft Systems (UCAS),
which are confidently predicted to outperform future manned combat
aircraft in the next decade or two. Such UCAS will also deliver
ISTAR capabilities. Several European countries, including the
UK, are pursuing the early stages of UCAS programmes.
The nature of UAS and compatibility with Network
Enabled Capability (NEC)
16. As the level of automation increases
in UAS, there is an ever-increasing dependence on information
and communications technology (ICT). Smaller, more powerful computing
infrastructure with lower power requirements, rapidly evolving
automation software, and robust and secure telecommunication bandwidth
are enabling ever greater operational capabilities for UAS. Increasing
software sophistication and its widespread replication not only
give economies of scale (as with many ICT systems) but also reduce
the training burden on operators. Robust, mature and certified
software delivers predictable responses under a wide range of
conditions.
17. The system nature of a UAS, heavily
based on ICT, can be designed to be highly compatible with NEC.
The UA and the UAS can be regarded as (ISTAR) nodes in the NEC
Network. Systems designed to comply with emerging NEC standards
will enhance interoperability and synergy. For this to be possible,
the management of UAS ISTAR requirements has to take a range of
different functional views from project level up to enterprise
level, which is entirely consistent and compatible with the procurement
approach recommended for all NEC-related projects and programmes.
UAS-ISTAR as a "purple" asset
18. One of the main objectives of NEC is
the provision of a relevant, common operational picture (COP)
to every Defence user. For this to be possible, several requirements
exist; including sensor systems conforming to NEC interface standards,
a suitable infrastructure and dynamic rule set to construct the
numerous relevant COPs and the ability to distribute them to the
respective users. This is not unique to UAS—all ISTAR assets
face the same challenges. The most important thing is for ISTAR
projects, including UAS, to be designed to meet the enterprise-level
requirements of NEC.
19. Inter-service rivalry in the development
and deployment of UAS-ISTAR assets is a persistent issue, certainly
for the US military. However, while the current UK experience
appears to be somewhat better the Phoenix was a Royal Artillery
(RA) -sponsored project and was seen as a RA Reconnaissance and
Target Acquisition system (possibly also with battle damage assessment
(BDA) capability. Any suggestion that it might be used for surveillance
and intelligence purposes was fiercely contested. In summary,
the other challenge is a cultural and organisational need to take
an enterprise level view of capability management. It is vital
that the UK should continue to develop a cross-service approach
to this asset, particularly for the wider battlespace and strategic
perspective. Currently, the Reaper is operated by the RAF, while
Watchkeeper will be deployed by the Army. While there is no reason
to suppose that use of these assets and the data they obtain will
not be well coordinated, the MoD should ensure that all UAV assets
are developed and deployed according to an overall strategy for
UAV-related activities.
Cooperation between allies
20. There is good cooperation at many levels
internationally and in the unmanned systems community generally,
there is good sharing of common operational experience (although
the Israelis seem guarded about some aspects). Bilateral, multilateral,
NATO and EDA groups all share their experience, and the US-UK
relationship has been particularly fruitful. International professional
organisations make a point of encouraging the sharing of experience
at conferences and workshops. The Royal Aeronautical Society is
part of this community and provides a context and a forum for
the discussion of evolving UAS technology and operations.
Integration into controlled airspace
21. The US and European militaries, as well
as potential civil operators, have an urgent requirement to access
controlled non-segregated airspace. This is essential for transit
from continental bases to fulfil time-sensitive mission needs,
as well as for training activities. This has been defined as the
"file and fly" requirement to operate UAS vehicles alongside
conventional manned aviation without the need for special clearance
and flight-control protocols. At a minimum, UAs will need to be
provided the capability for routine separation assurance and integration
into Air Traffic Management (ATM) procedures but will also need
an effective and reliable "sense and avoid system" for
last minute collision avoidance, These capabilities may be both
onboard the UA and as part of the mission control system.
22. In many cases, UA operation in the US
still requires a Special Military Operations order to fly a UAS
in controlled airspace. This can take up to two months to implement.
However, in 2003, the Air Force received a national certificate
of authorization (COA) allowing Global Hawk UAVs to fly in unrestricted
airspace. Flights still require five days' notice to the Federal
Aviation Authority, however.
23. Work is continuing in both the US and
Europe to establish protocols for operating UASs in controlled
non-segregated airspace, and the necessary technical solutions
and regulatory changes are expected to emerge within the next
five years. In Europe, several national aviation authorities,
including the UK CAA, are working with EASA and EUROCONTROL to
coordinate the necessary work. The CAA is about to release the
second version of CAP722, the document that deals with the operation
of both civilian and military UASs lighter than 150kg in UK airspace.
European groups are basing their approach to UA lighter than 150kg
on the UK CAA CAP722, which is regarded as a leading source of
guidance.
24. For the Military, EUROCONTROL, NATO
and EDA are developing management papers. On the civilian side,
the European Organisation for Civil Aviation Equipment (EUROCAE)
established Working Group 73 in April 2006 to develop the necessary
standards for consideration by the authorities. WG73 work is progressing
in coordination with both Military and other international organisations.
It is predicted that there will be a strong growth in civil applications
of "light UAS" (ie those under 150kg) under national
arrangements in advance of definitive EASA and EUROCONROL regulations
for UA of more than 150kg. This reflects the extensive use by
deployed UK forces of the light `Desert Hawk' UAS for close range
ISTAR.
Training and testing issues
25. There are European test ranges (for
example, NEAT in Sweden and another above the Arctic circle in
Finland) where UA operation has little impact on civilian air
traffic. However, for much of Europe it is difficult to find suitable
airspace for training purposes. There is limited but still useful
segregated airspace at Parc Aberporth in Wales, which is already
being used by some UA companies. Extension to the Parc Aberporth
segregated airspace is currently under consideration. This would
be greatly welcomed by the UK UAS community
26. Once the EASA and EUROCONTROL regulations
are in place, training with certified UA will be easier. However,
UA R&D will still require segregated airspace and this will
need to be found anywhere that is accessible, practical and affordable.
If UK/Europe wishes to compete in the global UAS market place
this will have to be made available as a matter of urgency.
INDUSTRIAL ISSUES
27. The importance of UAS technology is
well noted in the Defence Technology Strategy (DTS) and also reflected
in subsequent R&D investment by the MoD and Industry. The
Society also appreciates the need to address Urgent Operational
Requirements as in the Reaper acquisition. However, there are
two consequences of reverting to a US solution by default. First,
it cannot be assumed that technology will be shared from participation
in future US programmes nor is it likely that it will come from
commercial aerospace developments. Secondly, a typical UAV reconnaissance
payload for both military and civil applications might consist
of a miniaturized Synthetic Aperture radar slaved autonomously
to an Electro-optic sensor. These are both technologies that were
identified in DIS 1 as being ones over which the UK needed to
maintain operational sovereignty. However, by resorting to a US
solution by default, there is no incentive for industry to invest
PV funding in these key technologies and maintain the capability
in the UK. The related technology trajectory will thus be fractured.
The same is true in propulsion where design of advanced stealthy
UAS platforms will be dictated by the engine, and where the needs
of electrical power generation and heat dissipation management
is leading to consideration of an Integrated Power System, provided
by a single supplier.
28. In the longer term, military UAVs will
need to be capable of `swarming' such that clusters of them can
undertake complex tasks (both attack and reconnaissance) in dangerous
circumstances on day one of the war. This capability, which is
already within the grasp of US UCAVs, is unlikely to be exported
in any transparent way that allows operational sovereignty to
be exercised by the UK on these classes of platforms. As a result,
the UK MoD will need to fund the necessary research to create
an on-shore capability in mission system design. In addition,
airframe-engine combinations will probably reach their design
limit ahead of that of systems, sensors and software which have
the potential (as in the fixed-wing fast jet case) continually
to evolve and thus provide affordable, incremental capability
upgrade. Again, this needs to be an area of investment for the
UK MoD.
29. Overall, the arrival of the UAS is also
effecting a change to the industrial landscape. New suppliers
at all levels of the supply chain are being drawn into the market
to provide novel technical and cost-effective solutions. This
trend was to some extent noted in the Defence Industry Strategy;
but the MoD should continue to monitor these developments and
to make the necessary adjustments in acquisition and industry
strategy in order to encourage the evolution of an effective UK
based UAS capability.
17 April 2008
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