Memorandum from Intellect
BACKGROUND
Intellect is the UK trade association for the
IT, telecoms and electronics industries. Its members account for
over 80% of these markets and include blue-chip multinationals
as well as early stage technology companies. These industries
together generate around 10% of UK GDP and 15% of UK trade. Intellect
is a vital source of knowledge and expertise on all aspects of
the hi-tech industry.
The following paper provides the initial views
of Intellect member companies on the UK's use of Unmanned Aerial
Vehicles (UAVs) within UK Intelligence, Surveillance, Target Acquisition
and Response (ISTAR) capability. A high proportion of Intellect's
members are active in Defence, and this submission draws on their
views. This paper addresses those aspects specified in the Committee's
call for evidence, and also raises issues that Intellect believes
it is important to address in this inquiry.
Intellect welcomes the opportunity to provide
input to the committee and is keen to engage with the committee,
the Ministry of Defence, and UK Armed Forces to ensure progress
on the issues raised in this submission.
INTRODUCTION
In 1998 a UAV crossed the Atlantic for the first
time, covering 3270 kilometers in 26 hours and 45 minutes, and
using a gallon and a half of fuel. To a casual observer, boundaries
around aircraft effectiveness and efficiency had been shattered
by this exciting new technology, which offered the potential to
greatly reduce the exposure of aircrew to risk and to greatly
expand military ISTAR capabilities. Subsequently, UK and allied
forces have been able to exploit UAS for the benefit of operations
and intelligence gathering, bringing immediate upgrades to tactical
and strategic ISTAR capability.
Intellect recognises the various pressures which
have surrounded the development of the UK's UAS capability up
to this point, and those operational and financial constraints
which continue to play a role. Given these challenges, UAS have
in many ways been a success story for MoD, in terms of rapidly
delivering increased capability to the front line. The committee's
inquiry now offers the opportunity to step back and assess how
well these technologies are being exploited, integrated with wider
Defence capabilities, and developed for the future.
This paper does not address in detail the challenges
to UAV capability which may arise from any future roles—for
example weaponisation—and instead concentrates on the contribution
that UAVs make to the UK's current and future ISTAR enterprise
at the capability level.
INTELLECT'S
POSITION
Intellect believes that UAVs—and the Unmanned
Aerial Systems (UAS) capability to which UAVs contribute—are
an important example of the benefits which successful exploitation
of technology in Defence can bring. As well as offering reduced
risk for UK personnel, UAS have the potential to greatly expand
the ISTAR capability available to the Armed Forces, and can often
enable real efficiencies in terms of time and cost when compared
to traditional alternatives.
Intellect believes that the challenges the UK
now faces in seeking to improve on existing capabilities are as
much cultural and conceptual as they are technical, and that to
successfully exploit the potential of UAS within ISTAR a capability
approach to its acquisition and employment is required.
As UAS become increasingly commonplace and experience
of their utility in theatre grows, there will inevitably be increasing
levels of demand for them to be deployed in a wide range of roles
and environments. The future development of UAS must have flexibility
as its first principle—both for the UAV platforms and the
systems which enable them—so that this innovative new technology
can bring benefit across UK Defence.
CURRENT UK UAV PROVISION
In recent years UAVs have become an increasingly
important part of MoD's ISTAR approach. A number of different
UAV assets have been procured and have generated operational benefits—both
in terms of effectiveness and lower human risk. Present deployments
of UAVs deliver benefits in terms of force protection and situational
awareness, broader data gathering through a range of sensors,
and persistence.
The MoD has three types of UAV operating in
the TELIC (Iraq) and HERRICK (Afghanistan) theatres, predominantly
operating as collectors at various organisational and operational
levels. Specifically:
— the strategic Reapers are tasked
at Division level (and above) and controlled from a distance.
Reapers are being deployed with the RAF;
— the Hermes 450s are a tactical
asset, tasked at Brigade level, and under local control;
— the hand-launched Desert Hawk
is tasked and controlled at Company/Platoon level. Both the Hermes
450s and Desert Hawks are deployed with the Army; and
— the long established Phoenix
system should also be noted, having given good service in theatre
and provided experience in the use and deployment of UAVs.
Intellect's membership believes that whilst
the acquisition of UAVs has been beneficial, and has the potential
to significantly upgrade the UK's ISTAR capability in future,
this improvement will be stunted if the UK emphasises the acquisition
of platform-based collectors over other parts of the system which
allows intelligence to be effectively exploited.
Moreover, the four phases of the UK's intelligence
processes—Direct, Collect, Process and Disseminate—must
be adequately provisioned and balanced in order to deliver an
optimal ISTAR capability. Intellect's members believe, however,
that the tangibility and accessibility of UAV assets—which
are effectively limited to the "collect" function—can
lead to an imbalanced focus on these platforms. Whilst a vital
collector, the UAV can only form one component of the wider UAS
capability, and it is this capability which must be holistically
developed in order to improve the UK's ISTAR provision.
Procurement and funding
The MoD has two parallel procurement streams
in this area, the first of which is using the MoD's Equipment
Programme (EP) to develop and procure "Watchkeeper",
an advanced UAS incorporating both infrastructure and collectors,
and will come onstream in 2010. At a cost of around £700m,
Watchkeeper is the largest European UAV programme, and—laudably—is
designed to provide not only the collector platforms but also
the exploitation and dissemination systems which enable benefit
to be derived from gathered information. At present, the Watchkeeper
procurement is believed to be running to requirement, time and
budget.
The majority of current UAS assets, however,
have been not been acquired through the mainstream EP, but are
the result of Urgent Operational Requirement (UOR) purchases.
UORs have so far provided three Reapers (under a USAF managed
Foreign Military Sales programme), twelve Hermes 450s (under the
Lydian H450 service provision programme) and twelve Desert Hawk
systems (each system with eight aircraft).
Some of the UAS UOR programmes have strayed
from the traditional asset acquisition model of procurement: both
the Hermes 450s and the Desert Hawks are provided as a managed
service, where the MoD is procuring `ISTAR by the hour'. This
alternative—and overtly capability based—model may
provide useful lessons for the future delivery of UAS.
The UOR programmes have brought immediate and
vital benefits, delivering assets into theatre within a short
timescale and enabling increased force protection via improved
ISTAR capability. Industry believes, however, that some UORs are
being funded by bringing money allocated to the DABINETT programme
forward—a measure which may generate future difficulties,
as this programme was intended to provide a balanced capability
across the Direct, Collect, Process and Disseminate phases. Using
part of this funding to instead procure greater numbers of collector
devices, in the form of UAVs, has created some unease within industry
at a perceived expenditure imbalance between the gathering of
information and its effective analysis and use.
CHALLENGES
Intellect's members believe the UK has made
significant progress in the exploitation of UAS, but that much
of the potential of this system has yet to be tapped. There are
a number of challenges, some of which are cultural, which must
be overcome if the UK is to move from owning a collection of disparate
UAV assets to deploying a truly strategic UAS capability.
It should be noted that whilst the UK's achievements
in this area are some distance behind the advanced use of UAS
by the US and Israel, comparisons with France—which has
similar resources and aspirations for UAS—show that many
of these difficulties are not unique to the UK. Contextual factors
also exacerbate some of these issues, including UAS technology's
relative novelty and the stresses and strains of ongoing operations.
Intellect believes that one significant challenge
to effective exploitation of ISTAR—and indeed to wider Network
Enabled Capability—is the lack of an integrated and cohesive
UAS capability, incorporating legacy systems, current assets and
future programmes. Whilst the growing collection of UAV assets
offer an immediate low level of ISTAR support, the absence of
effective integration prevents the UK's UAS assets operating as
a true capability, and creates bottlenecks which prevent information
from flowing freely between collection, decision and processing
agents.
Specifically, this includes:
| technical interoperability (assets and networks);
|
| |
| operational sovereignty;
|
| |
| organisational interoperability;
|
| |
| ownership of ISTAR assets;
|
| |
| prioritising command and control of UAS;
|
| |
| mission/command tradeoffs; and
|
| |
| integration of UOR-procured assets.
|
MoD has recognised that the integration of UAS capability
is a critical need, and its work to ensure interoperability on
Watchkeeper shows positive intent to ensure relevant EP programmes
are framed within an overall capability. What remains unknown,
however, is how the UOR programme—which is likely to remain
a feature of MoD procurement for some time—can be adjusted
to ensure that COTS assets are similarly interoperable, and how
ownership and tasking can best be arranged to manage UAS at a
capability rather than service level.
As touched on in the previous section, industry believes
that the perceived imbalance between collection and DPD presents
a significant challenge. A bias towards the acquisition of increasing
numbers of platform/collection assets rather than developing holistic
UAS runs the risk of consistently gathering vast mountains of
data which cannot then be analysed.
For example, Intellect's members are aware of an analysis
which claims that 80% of the ISTAR gathering in support of Operation
TELIC took place to acquire material which had in fact been collected
previously, but was either not accessible or not known to be available.
The operational and personnel risk and financial cost associated
with re-gathering this material could potentially have been avoided
had a more effective and holistic ISTAR capability been available.
Parts of MoD have repeatedly recognised that such an imbalance
is nonsensical, but spending patterns have not significantly altered
to rectify the shortfall. Despite assurances to industry that
the Direct, Process and Decide (DPD) elements of the intelligence
cycle should have priority over the Collect function, in the past
year more money has been spent on UOR procurement of (mostly)
collectors than on conventional procurement of ISTAR systems.
There is clearly a mismatch between declared intent and actual
procurement, which is further exacerbated by poor differentiation
between intelligence requirements and collection requirements.
EXPLOITING CURRENT
ISTAR CAPABILITY
Given the challenges highlighted above, the full exploitation
of current UAS provision is—in Intellect's view—dependent
upon the successful integration of existing assets into an overall
ISTAR capability. Members believe that better enabling the rapid
management, analysis and dissemination of intelligence through
interoperable components (including collectors) would enable greater
exploitation of the information generated by UAS. This could,
for example, make an immediate contribution to operational support
areas like situational awareness.
In order to create this integrated capability, issues of
organisational and management fragmentation need to be addressed.
Intellect believes that unifying the disparate UAS ownership into
an enterprise-level capability view would enable more strategic
decision making, and facilitate better management of the different
drivers and priorities within the UK's relatively limited UAS
provision. A capability view would also enable an overall understanding
of current expenditure, and thus facilitate a rebalancing of spending
priorities to improve the previously underprioritised Direct,
Process and Disseminate functions.
Development of doctrine and concept is needed to reflect
the advanced capabilities of modern UAS, and to enable the structuring
of the capability level management of UAS. In particular, the
development of information exploitation and information assurance
concepts should be an immediate priority. The further development
of some evolving concepts around "non-traditional ISTAR",
for example, could identify opportunities to draw other useful
assets into the ISTAR envelope. Cross-fertilisation of training
requirements and provision across the capability would also benefit
from and contribute to an effective integration regime.
The NEC architecture which MoD is developing has the potential
to enable the necessary technical integration. The architecture
could allow ISTAR information to be created once and stored for
use many times, so that the wealth of tactical information being
generated by existing UAS assets is more consistently analysed
and disseminated. The reduction of duplication in data collection
and its associated costs would enable current UAS capability to
support a wider range of operations in a wider variety of roles.
Integration through this architecture would allow exploitation
capabilities to be shared more widely and enable greater scaleability
and lower barriers to innovation. Open standards would also go
some distance towards preventing proprietary lock-in and therefore
enable a wider range of existing technologies to be brought to
bear.
The establishment of an integrated capability could also
allow the exploitation of additional sources of information, including
for example data inputs from platforms such as attack helicopter,
MSTAR, and sensors and sights on armoured vehicles. Future platforms,
such as the Joint Combat Aircraft, could also integrate to provide
data for ISTAR use.
Gradual improvements in UAS technology are inevitable given
the relative youth of this area, and clarity on the integration
and governance would essentially provide an overall roadmap for
UK UAS, enabling incrementally developed technologies to be brought
into the capability toolset.
Programmes already in development—notably Watchkeeper—
show that the next generation of UAVs will offer substantial technological
improvements over current models. Existing provision could, however,
be improved by widening the range of sensors carried by UAS—currently
this is limited to EO/IR and video, but members suggest the addition
of complementary fielded airborne sensors such as radar and ES
which can operate in adverse weather conditions and at longer
ranges.
THE UK'S
APPROACH TO
FUTURE ISTAR
Partly because of the legacy of fragmented procurement and
management of UAS programmes, a certain amount of confusion exists
within industry over MoD's overall vision for future ISTAR. What
is clear is that MoD and the services understand the potential
benefits which can be derived from UAS, and across the board different
programmes are being taken forward to deliver greater ISTAR capability
to their owners. Notable by its absence, however, is a consistent
strategic approach to the development of future UAS/ISTAR capability.
This lack of overall direction manifests itself through apparently
contradictory developments. For example, MoD has stated that no
further Reapers will be procured until the current fleet is brought
into core programme management. However, there are no funded plans
to do so, and the US has disclosed that it approved the UK's purchase
of another ten platforms. Industry is thus unsighted about integration
of current and future Reapers into the core programme, and also
unsure as to why, again, stated intent and actual procurement
seem to be at odds. Other UAS programmes (such as the Naval ISTAR
UAV) have been initiated only to later be cancelled by MoD due
to a lack of Departmental buy-in, leaving industry to question
why time and resource was spent developing a programme without
an agreed role in the overall capability.
Whilst some sensitivities remain in MoD around the perceived
threat that UAS poses to manned aircraft programmes, the UK's
continuing financial commitment demonstrates that the ISTAR community
intends to continue developing UAS capabilities.
HOW TO
BEST DEVELOP
FUTURE ISTAR/UAV CAPABILITY
Intellect believes that the exploitation (rather than solely
the gathering) of information must be the focus of the UK's future
development of ISTAR capability. The future of UK UAS capability
is as a key part of overall ISTAR, acting in concert with other
components and capabilities across a range of roles and scenarios.
Integration, both organisationally and technically, is the key
which enables UAS to be deployed more flexibly, taking on more
"dull, dirty and dangerous" collection tasks and allowing
personnel to effectively exploit intelligence from its own and
other sources.
Development of future ISTAR capability must therefore not
be automatically conducted through the traditional—platform-based—procurement
channels and processes. Acquiring and improving a capability throughout
its life is a very different proposition to the one off purchase
of a platform, and Intellect therefore reiterates its support
for MoD's development of Through Life Capability Management (TLCM)
processes. The Hermes 450 "ISTAR by the hour" procurement
model shows that exploration of alternative acquisition approaches
will be a large part of future ISTAR development—use of
a "business services orientated" approach (for example)
could incentivise innovation in service delivery, as well as unlocking
MoD from the sort of platform or technology dependency which can
result from procuring specific end solutions.
One key challenge which TLCM may only partly address is how
to reconcile EP-procured UAS capabilities with the piecemeal approach
delivered by UORs. The development of future UAS must, of course,
respond to operational needs and provide the best possible capabilities
for the personnel in theatre, and the unpredictable nature of
UORs is no friend to overall capability planning. Looking forwards,
however, development of UAS must incorporate the UOR process and
be able to take a view across the full spectrum of capability.
It is no use for MoD's development plans to only include a fraction
of UAS projects and expenditure.
The flexibility of UAS means that there are many roles and
capabilities which could be developed in future. Intellect's members
drew particular attention to the development of mini-UAVs as one
interesting example, because of their low unit cost, portability
and suitability for difficult environments such as urban areas.
High Altitude, Long Endurance (HALE) UAVs are also under development
at present, and industry believe that the UK is well placed to
deliver world-leading capabilities in this area, through projects
like Zephyr.
Enthusiasm for the use of UAS outside theatre is likely to
grow, and with this comes a further degree of complexity around
the development of future assets. As has been well documented,
certain of the UK's current UAS platform assets cannot be used
in UK airspace (except in a very small number of test sites) and
if MoD's overall vision of UAS capability includes use in non-segregated
airspace then greater attention will need to be paid to the development
of "sense and avoid" technology, redundancies and other
safety measures, extended range, and different communications
systems.
One role which looks set to be a part of the UK's UAS capability
is that of armed or Strike UAS. Development of offensive UAS platforms—such
as Taranis—is likely to be a focus for in the future, and
doing so presents significant potential issues around how to manage
the transition from ISTAR-focused single role UAS to strike-enabled
dual role UAS. Many of the issues around management of the overall
capability will need to be revisited—including ownership,
command & control and doctrine—and there may also be
sensitivities around using some alternative acquisition strategies
for armed assets.
The development of autonomous UAS capability has also been
the subject of much attention, and there are potentially significant
efficiency benefits from self-tasking and self-managing systems,
such as decreased risk from human error. Industry recognises,
however, that the concept of introducing autonomous assets to
theatre carries its own risks—both operational and political—and
the successful deployment of this capability will depend heavily
on the development of robust and accepted governance.
Information management is the most effective way to leverage
available defence resource into optimum capability, and is therefore
the key to the UK's ISTAR and wider NEC future. Intellect strongly
believes that the development of future ISTAR capability needs
to be conducted in partnership with industry. The technology industry
which Intellect represents is a vital stakeholder in the future
of UK defence, and is able to contribute cutting edge experience
and expertise not only from UK defence but from work in other
sectors.
CONCLUSION
Compared to the photogenic and iconic platform assets which
have long dominated the public image of Defence, ISTAR is a relatively
low profile capability, short on political saliency and long on
thorny technological and management issues. It is, regardless,
one of the most strategically important parts of future Defence
capability—information superiority over adversaries is a
critical need for UK forces in all types of warfare and peacemaking.
Intellect believes therefore that the effective exploitation of
information needs to be close to the top of MoD's priority list.
A unified approach to ISTAR assets' deployment and management
needs to be considered, and whilst drawing this together from
different Services, procurement methods and command layers may
be uncomfortable, that it could be the key to enabling UK ISTAR
to reach its full potential.
As MoD develops its future UAS, improving the exploitation
of the information they provide must be as much of a priority
as improving the UAV itself. Industry has confidence that this
is recognised within MoD, but once the current Planning Round
is settled will be keen to see that future actions match the abundant
statements of good intent.
Intellect believes that technology offers HM Government the
best opportunity to leverage the available resource into the optimum
military effect, and UAS offer a clear example of technology being
used to expand capability and lessen human risk through the exploitation
of industry's expertise for the good of UK Defence.
21 April 2008
| 
