Select Committee on Defence Fifth Report


2  Annual Performance Report

Overall performance against PSA Targets

6. The Annual Performance Report provides a summary of performance against the 2004 Spending Review Public Service Agreement (PSA) Objectives and Targets.[12] There are three overarching objectives: Achieving success in the Military Tasks we undertake at home and abroad; Be ready to respond to the tasks that might arise; and Build for the future. The three objectives are supported by six targets, set by the 2004 Spending Review, which run until March 2008. For these targets the MoD provides an interim assessment of its expected performance. There is also a 2004 Spending Review Efficiency Target which also runs until March 2008.[13] We examine the performance against this target later in this part of the report (paragraphs 70-74).

7. The MoD's assessment of its expected achievements against the six PSA targets, as set out in the Annual Report and Accounts 2005-06 (subsequently referred to as 'the previous year's Annual Report and Accounts'),[14] the Annual Report and Accounts 2006-07 (subsequently referred to as 'the latest Annual Report and Accounts')[15] and the MoD Public Service Agreement Performance Report: Quarter 1 2007-2008 (subsequently referred to as the 'Quarter 1 2007-08 Report'),[16] is provided in Table 1.

8. In the previous year's Annual Report and Accounts, the MoD reported that it was 'on course' to achieve all six PSA targets. However, as Table 1 shows, in the latest Annual Report and Accounts, the MoD reported that: two PSA targets (Targets 4 and 6) were 'on course'; two PSA targets (Targets 1 and 5) were "on course with some risk"; one PSA target (Target 2) was "broadly on course with minor slippage"; and one PSA target (Target 3) was assessed as "some risk". In its Quarter 1 2007-08 Report, the MoD reported a deterioration in its assessment of its expected performance against three of the six PSA targets: PSA Target 3 was assessed as "unlikely to be met"; PSA Target 5 was assessed as "slippage"; and PSA Target 6 was assessed as "some slippage".[17]Table 1: MoD's assessment of its expected achievements against the 2004 Spending Review Public Service Agreement (PSA) Targets
PSA Target Annual Report 2005-06


July 2006

Annual Report 2006-07


July 2007

MoD PSA Performance Report: Quarter 1 2007-2008

November 2007

Objective I: Achieve success in the Military Tasks we undertake at home and abroad
1. Achieve the objectives established by Ministers for Operations and Military Tasks in which the United Kingdom's Armed Forces are involved, including those providing support to our civil communities. On courseOn course with some risk On course with some risk
2. By 2008, deliver improved effectiveness of UK and international support for conflict prevention by addressing long-term structural cases of conflict, managing regional and national tension and violence, and supporting post-conflict reconstruction, where the UK can make a significant contribution, in particular Africa, Asia, Balkans and the Middle East. (Joint target with the Foreign and Commonwealth Office and the Department for International Development). On courseBroadly on course with minor slippage Broadly on course with minor slippage
Objective II: Be ready to respond to the tasks that might arise
3. Generate forces which can be deployed, sustained and received at the scales of effort required to meet the Government's strategic objectives. On courseSome risk Unlikely to be met
4. Play a timely role in the development of the European Security Agenda, and enhance capabilities to undertake timely and effective security operations, by successfully encouraging a more efficient and effective NATO, a more coherent and effective European Security and Defence Policy (ESDP) operating in strategic partnership with NATO, and enhanced European defence capabilities. (Joint target with the Foreign and Commonwealth Office). On courseOn course On course
5. Recruit, train, motivate and retain sufficient military personnel to provide the military capability necessary to meet the Government's strategic objectives. On courseOn course with some risk Slippage
Objective III: Build for the future
6. Deliver the equipment programme to cost and time. On courseOn course Some slippage

Source: Ministry of Defence

9. Mr Jeffrey told us that on the PSA targets the MoD was "in a worse position than we were earlier this year". He said that:

    The two areas that are problematic are the question of readiness, which is target three, and it is very much a consequence of existing high levels of deployment. The measures that we apply to assess the readiness of our forces for future conflict have been declining and we now think it is unlikely that we can hit the target by next April. Also for manning [PSA Target 5] where, for different reasons, two of the three services are now thought unlikely to come in within manning balance. It is a less good position than it was earlier in the year, but if you look at all six targets there are some that are on course as well.[18]

10. We asked how many of the PSA targets would be achieved by March 2008. Mr Jeffrey told us that "the assumption is that the position by next March will not change greatly from the position as reported in our PSA related material[19] that we sent the Committee for this hearing".[20] For the PSA targets which were assessed as not likely to be met, MoD was "taking action all the time".[21] However, Mr Jeffrey emphasised that "one has to make a realistic assessment of what is achievable in this sort of business over these sorts of timescales".[22]

11. Some two weeks following our evidence session, the MoD published its Autumn Performance Report 2007-2008 (subsequently referred to as the Autumn Performance Report).[23] This covers the period July-September 2007 and provides an updated assessment of the MoD's expected achievements against the six PSA targets. The MoD's assessment of its expected achievements against PSA targets 1-4 had not changed since the Quarter 1 2007-08 Report. However, the MoD's assessment of its expected achievements against PSA Targets 5 and 6 had deteriorated further. PSA Targets 5 and 6 are now assessed as "likely only to be partly met".[24]

12. We are very concerned to learn that the MoD's assessment of its expected achievements against its six 2004 Spending Review Public Service Agreement (PSA) targets, which run until March 2008, has started to travel in the wrong direction. In its previous Annual Report and Accounts published in July 2006, the MoD reported that it was on course to achieve all six PSA targets. However, at the end of 2007, the MoD did not expect to achieve the PSA target relating to force readiness, and expected "only partly" to meet the PSA targets relating to recruitment and retention, and defence equipment procurement. We note that the MoD considers that not achieving the force readiness target is a consequence of the "high levels of deployment". We recommend that, in its response to our report, the MoD identifies the key factors which have led to the deterioration in its expected achievements against its PSA targets and sets out what action it is taking as a result.

13. In our examination of the MoD's expected achievements against the individual PSA Targets, we have focussed on PSA Targets 3, 5 and 6. These are the targets where the MoD's assessment of its expected achievements has deteriorated most sharply in 2007.

Readiness

14. PSA Target 3 is to "Generate forces, which can be deployed, sustained and recovered at the scales of effort required to meet the Government's strategic objectives". In the latest Annual Report and Accounts, the MoD's assessment was that there was "some risk" in achieving the target. It explains that: "It has not been possible to maintain the high level of readiness achieved in 2005-06, and it is uncertain whether readiness will recover to the target level by April 2008. This does not mean that the Armed Forces cannot support their current operational commitments, but their ability to take on additional operations that are more than Small Scale Focused Intervention is now limited".[25]

15. In the Quarter 1 2007-08 Report, the MoD assessed PSA Target 3 as "unlikely to be met" and states that "The continuing high level of operational commitment means that we do not now expect to reach the target level by April 2008".[26] The Autumn Performance Report confirms that PSA Target 3 is "unlikely to be met" and states that:

    The Armed Forces…. have been operating at or above the level of concurrent operations they are resourced and structured to deliver for seven of the last eight years, and for every year since 2002. In doing so they have consistently and reliably provided substantial forces at immediate readiness for those operations…. In such circumstances it is not possible for the Armed Forces simultaneously to be ready for the full range of potential contingent operations provided for in planning assumptions.[27]

PEACETIME READINESS

16. The MoD uses two performance indicators to assess Target 3. The first indicator is "By 2008, ensure more than 73% of force elements show no serious or critical weakness against their required peacetime readiness levels". The Quarter 1 2007-08 Report states that on average from July 2006 to June 2007, 65% of force elements reported no critical or serious weaknesses against their required peacetime readiness levels. The proportion of force elements reporting no critical or serious weaknesses declined from 69% in April-June 2006 to 63% in April-June 2007. [28]

17. The Autumn Performance Report shows that the first performance indicator used to assess PSA Target 3 has deteriorated further since the position set out in the Quarter 1 2007-08 Report. On average, from August 2006 to September 2007, 61% of force elements reported no critical or serious weaknesses against their required peacetime readiness levels. The proportion of force elements reporting no critical or serious weaknesses declined from 68% in July-September 2006 to 54% in July-September 2007.[29]

PEACETIME TO IMMEDIATE READINESS

18. The second performance indicator is "By 2008, ensure that more than 71% of force elements report no serious or critical weaknesses against the ability to generate from peacetime readiness to immediate readiness for deployment on operations".[30] On average, from June 2006 to July 2007, 58% of force elements reported no critical or serious weaknesses for deployment on operations. The Quarter 1 2007-08 Report states that:

    As explained in the Annual Report and Accounts 2006-07, this reflects the pressure on the Armed Forces resulting from operating above Defence Planning Assumptions, and the constraints on conducting collective training over and above that required for current operations until commitments return to the levels within Defence Planning Assumptions. [31]

19. The Autumn Performance Report shows that the second performance indicator used to assess PSA Target 3 has deteriorated further since the position set out in the Quarter 1 2007-08 Report. On average, from August 2006 to September 2007, 55.5% of force elements reported no critical or serious weaknesses against their ability to generate from peacetime readiness to immediate readiness for deployment on operations.[32]

20. The MoD does not expect to meet the PSA Target relating to generating forces by the end of March 2008. The performance on both of the performance indicators underpinning PSA Target 3 has continued to deteriorate. We note that the MoD considers that this reflects the pressure on the Armed Forces which have been operating above the level of concurrent operations they are resourced and structured to deliver. This causes us deep concern. We fully acknowledge the pressures on our Armed Forces and the commitment they have demonstrated. We recommend that, in its response to our report, the MoD and the three Service chiefs set out how they plan to reduce the pressures on our Armed Forces and when they expect to see improvements relating to generating forces.

Recruitment and retention

21. PSA Target 5 is to "Recruit, train, motivate and retain sufficient military personnel to provide the military capability necessary to meet the Government's strategic objectives". In the latest Annual Report and Accounts, the MoD's assessment was that the target was "on course with some risk". The latest Annual Report and Accounts states that "At the end of the year [2006] all three Services were outside Manning Balance, and there is some risk that they may not return to within Manning Balance by 1 April 2008. Pinch points remained in all three Services. Recruiting increased in a challenging environment, and Voluntary Outflow rates remained broadly stable".[33]

22. The Quarter 1 2007-08 Report assessed PSA Target 5 as "slippage" and states that "Operational commitments and the changes in Service personnel numbers announced in the July 2004 White Paper mean that meeting manning balance targets has slipped. In particular, slower than expected progress in reducing Royal Navy manning requirements and a continuing difficult environment for Army recruitment and retention means that they are unlikely to meet the target by April 2008. The complexities of managing the reduction in the size of the Royal Air Force set out in the 2004 Future Capabilities White Paper pending completion of that programme in 2008 have also produced unavoidable interim shortfalls. The high continuing level of operations continued to prevent achievement of personal and unit harmony guidelines, particularly in the Army and parts of the Royal Air Force".[34]

MANNING BALANCE

23. The first supporting performance indicator for PSA Target 5 is to achieve "manning balance", defined as "between -2% and +1% of the requirement".[35] The MoD's performance since 2004 is shown in Table 2 below.Table 2: Percentage of overall requirement for each of the three Services
Percentage of overall requirement
1 April 2004 1 April 20051 April 2006 1 April 2007
Royal Navy / Royal Marines 96.8%95.1% 96.3%94.9%
Army 97%98.3% 98.8%97.5%
RAF 98.5%101% 99.2%96.8%

Source: Ministry of Defence

24. As at 1 April 2007, there was a 5.1% shortfall against requirement in the Royal Navy / Royal Marines (-3.1% below manning balance target); a 2.5% shortfall against requirement in the Army (-0.5% below the manning balance target); and a 3.2% shortfall against requirement in the RAF (-1.2% below the manning balance).[36] The Quarter 1 2007-08 Report showed that, as at the end of June 2007, the shortfall against the requirement in the Royal Navy / Royal Marines and the Army had deteriorated. There was a 5.4% shortfall against requirement in the Royal Navy and Royal Marines (-3.4% below the manning balance target) and a 3.2% shortfall against requirement in the Army (-1.2% below the manning balance target). The position in the RAF had not changed since April 2007.[37]

25. Mr Jeffrey told us that the issue of the manning balance target was complicated because "it reflects not only the actual state of manpower but the requirement itself, and it varies as between the three Services". The MoD's earlier assessment was that it would get into manning balance by the end of March 2008. However, it had become clear that for different reasons, two of the Services were unlikely to meet the target. For the Royal Navy / Royal Marines the reason was that "the requirement is not falling as rapidly as had been assumed". For the Army, the reason was "a mixture of equipment and retention issues". Mr Jeffrey said that for the RAF, the MoD thought that it would meet the manning balance target, but it was by no means certain. The uncertainty reflected "to a large extent the fact that the RAF requirement is falling and the next significant fall is at the beginning of the next financial year".[38]

26. The Autumn Performance Report showed that, as at 1 October 2007, there had been a slight improvement in the Royal Navy / Royal Marines (-2.6% below the manning balance target) and a slight deterioration in the Army (-1.6% below the manning balance target). The position in the RAF had not changed since April 2007. The Autumn Performance Report states that "we do not expect the Royal Navy or Army to achieve manning balance by April 2008" and explains that "the challenge of implementing the changes in Service personnel numbers announced in the July 2004 White Paper while sustaining the high operational tempo means that meeting manning balance targets has slipped".[39]

27. We note that the MoD does not expect, for different reasons, to achieve manning balance in the Royal Navy / Royal Marines and the Army by the end of March 2008. We recommend that, in response to our report, the MoD sets out how it plans to achieve manning balance in the future for the Royal Navy / Royal Marines and the Army.

MANNING PINCHPOINTS

28. The latest Annual Report and Accounts states that there are continuing shortages within some specialist groups in all three Armed Services.[40] This is an issue we examined in our report Ministry of Defence Annual Report and Accounts 2005-06 and we noted that the number of trades experiencing shortages of personnel had increased since 2004-05. We were concerned that "the growing number of manning pinchpoints risk impacting on long-term effectiveness".[41]

29. The latest Annual Report and Accounts states that in 2006-07 there was a continuing shortage of "Intelligence Analysts and Linguists across defence". The Annual Report and Accounts provides details of the manning pinchpoints which include:

  • "In the Royal Navy the shortages previously identified in Royal Marines Other Ranks, Mine Warfare Petty Officers, Warfare Leading Hands, and Air Engineering Technicians continued to be of concern during 2006-07, as did shortages of Divers, MERLIN personnel including Aircrew, and Fast Jet Pilots which have arisen during the year….
  • The Army had 18 Manning Pinch Point trades in 2006-07 (24 in 2005-06). This included the Infantry, which is of particular concern, as well as Intelligence Operators and Unmanned Air Vehicle operators. Mitigation plans to manage the impact of these shortfalls are in place and the Army continued to work to reduce the total number of Pinch Points to nine by the end of 2008-09….
  • The Royal Air Force continued to manage a period of deficit manning as the drawdown programme proceeded…..There were 22 critically manned Airmen trades, including…. Fire-Fighters, Gunners, and Weapon System Operators."[42]
  • Within the Defence Medical Service there "were continuing critical shortages in some specialist disciplines including Anaesthetics, Psychiatry, and Emergency Medicine and Intensive Therapy Care Nurses."[43]

30. In its memorandum to the inquiry, the MoD provided a list of pinchpoint trades in each of the three Services. There were: 11 pinchpoint trades in the Royal Navy; 27 pinchpoint trades in the Army; and 14 pinchpoint trades in the RAF. Most worrying was the shortfall in the Army Medical Service which included: an 80% shortfall in Radiologists; a 62% shortfall in Orthopaedic Surgeons; and a 46% shortfall in Anaesthetists. In its memorandum the MoD states that it:

    has put in place a range of short and long term measures to ameliorate this situation. This includes training and recruitment initiatives, financial retention and re-engagement incentives….. and regular reviews of force levels required for each operation. Reducing force levels in Iraq should also help relieve some pressure.[44]

31. The MoD continues to experience shortages within some specialist groups in all three Armed Services, including substantial shortages within the Army Medical Service and elsewhere. The MoD have put in place measures to try and reduce the number of manning pinchpoints. We note that the MoD also expects that force level reductions in Iraq will reduce some of the pressure in these specialist groups. We recommend that, in its response to our report, the MoD provides us with an update on the position relating to manning pinchpoints and its assessment of the success of the measures introduced to reduce their number.

RETENTION AND VOLUNTARY OUTFLOW

32. The MoD describes Voluntary Outflow as "the number of Service personnel voluntarily leaving the Forces before the end of their agreed term".[45] The latest Annual Report and Accounts states that the target is to "achieve stable Voluntary Outflow rates for each Service". It states that: "Voluntary Outflow rates [are] stable; the RN continued to exceed the stable long term goal rate".[46] The voluntary exit rates for each Service are shown in Table 3 below.Table 3: Voluntary Outflow Rates
Target As at 31.3.07 As at 31.3.06 As at 31.3.05
Naval Service Officers 2.0%3.0% 3.0%2.5%
Naval Service Other Ranks 5.0%6.0% 6.0%6.4%
Army Officers 4.1%4.3% 4.3%3.9%
Army Other Ranks 6.2%5.8% 5.5%5.7%
RAF Officers 2.5%3.0% 2.5%2.4%
RAF Other Ranks 4.0%4.9% 4.8%3.8%

Source: Ministry of Defence

33. The latest Annual Report and Accounts state that "Overall Voluntary Outflow rates have varied little over the last few years, with only a small increase from 2005-06 to 2006-07, and a reasonable level of retention is being maintained across the Armed Forces". However, it also notes that there are some specific areas "where the outflow rate would be too high if sustained over time. These are monitored closely to assess whether further action is necessary".[47]

34. The MoD published updated Armed Forces manning figures on 22 November 2007 which showed that the number of people leaving the trained strength of the Armed Forces in the year to 30 September 2007 increased by 1%, compared with the year to 30 September 2006.[48] We asked Mr Jeffrey if he was concerned by the increase in the number of people leaving. He said that the position on voluntary departure "is that it has been pretty steady for all three Services at around four and a half to five per cent with some variation between the services and between officers and other ranks for some years". He added that:

    The suggestion that we are losing people in very much larger numbers than before is certainly not true. There have, however, been some signs of an increase in voluntary departure in the Army; the voluntary departure of other ranks in the Army has been running in the recent months at around 5.8% per cent which is a bit more than the five per cent we would normally assume. These are small but significant factors; we certainly keep a close watch on them.[49]

35. We sought further details about Voluntary Outflow in the Army. Mr Jeffrey said that that "if you look across the other services and at the officer ranks the early departure…. is remarkably steady". However, in the Army there were signs that "early departure for other ranks is creeping up a little". He added that in the RAF, there were "some signs that people are not extending for a further engagement to quite the extent that they were in the past". He did not want to exaggerate this issue, although he acknowledged that "there are certainly aspects in which we are feeling some concern". [50]

36. We are concerned that there are signs that voluntary departure in the Armed Forces, in particular the Army, is increasing and that in the RAF personnel are not extending for a further engagement to the extent that had happened in the past. This may well reflect the pressure that our Armed Forces continue to experience. We look to the MoD to monitor this issue closely.

HARMONY GUIDELINES

37. A further supporting performance indicator for PSA Target 5 relates to performance against Harmony Guidelines. The latest Annual Report and Accounts sets out the performance against the Individual Separated Service and Unit Tour Interval Harmony Guidelines.[51] The performance is set out in Table 4 below. Table 4: Performance against Harmony Guidelines
Guidelines Performance
Levels of Individual Separated Service
Royal Navy / Royal Marines In any 36 month period, no one to exceed 660 days separated service At 31 March 2007 fewer than 1% of the Royal Navy had exceeded the guidelines
Army In any 30 month period, no one to exceed 415 days separated service At 31 March 2007, 13.4% of the Army personnel on current trained strength had exceeded guidelines
RAF Not greater than 2.5% of personnel exceeding more than 140 days of detached duty in 12 months At 31 March 2007, 6.2% of the RAF had exceeded the guidelines
Unit Tour Intervals
Royal Navy Fleet Units to spend maximum of 60% deployed in a 3 year cycle The Royal Navy continues broadly to meet its Unit Tour Interval Harmony Guidelines
Army 24 month average interval between unit tours Infantry average tour interval of 21.0 months; Royal Artillery 20.7 months; Royal Engineers 21.2 months; Royal Signals 18.4 months; Royal Logistics Corps 23.3 months
RAF Unit tour intervals to be no less than 16 months Unit Tour Intervals are not easily measured for the RAF. However, RAF Regiment Field Squadrons average tour intervals around 10.5 months; Air Combat and Service Support units also breaching guidelines; Nimrod, Air Transport and Air-to-Air Refuelling squadrons heavily tasked

Source: Ministry of Defence

38. The latest Annual Report and Accounts states that "the continuing high operational tempo meant that the Army and the RAF did not meet individual or unit harmony guidelines in 2006-07". [52]

39. The Quarter 1 2007-08 Report provided updated information relating to performance against Individual Separated Service and Unit Tour Interval Harmony Guidelines. For the Individual Separated Service Harmony Guidelines: the performance of the Royal Navy / Royal Marines remained the same (fewer than 1% of personnel exceeding the guidelines); the performance of the Army had slightly improved (10.3% of personnel exceeded the guidelines); and the performance of the RAF had slightly deteriorated (6.7% of personnel exceeding the guidelines). For the Unit Tour Interval Harmony Guidelines: the performance of the Royal Navy remained the same (continuing to broadly meet the guidelines); the performance of the Army had deteriorated for the Infantry, Royal Artillery and Royal Engineers (Infantry average tour interval of 15.8 months, Royal Artillery 19.2 months, Royal Engineers 18.3 months); and the performance of the RAF appears to have deteriorated. The Quarter 1 2007-08 Report states that "the high continuing level of operations continued to prevent achievement of personnel and unit harmony guidelines, particularly in the Army and parts of the RAF".[53]

40. We asked Mr Jeffrey how long the MoD could expect Service personnel to continue working at the current operational tempo and not meeting the harmony guidelines. He told us that the harmony guidelines were important and that it was an issue which was of concern to "ministers, the service chiefs" and himself. He added that it was an "inevitable consequence of operational deployment at the current level". For the Army, where he acknowledged that the problem was most significant, he said that:

    the percentage of individuals exceeding the harmony guidelines has reduced from just over 18 per cent in the fourth quarter of 2003-04 to just over ten per cent in the final quarter of last year. That is not satisfactory and it bears unduly hard on some particular units which are more deployed than others.[54]

41. We pressed Mr Jeffrey further and asked how the MoD planned to improve its performance and meet the harmony guidelines, as the current performance was not acceptable. He said that the "best prospect" for improving the position was "some reduction in the pressure that we face" and that "as one looks forward there are signs of the scale of the current operational commitment reducing". He added that:

    The Prime Minister has made it clear that he expects us to go down to about 2,500 in Iraq by the Spring…. The ending of the major operation in Northern Ireland has helped the army in particular. We are scaling down and have scaled down in the Balkans. There are some signs that the operational pressure will ease over the next year or so. We certainly hope so.[55]

42. The Autumn Performance Report shows that the overall performance against the Individual Separated Service and Unit Tour Interval Harmony Guidelines was broadly the same as that reported in the Quarter 1 2007-08 Report. However, for the Individual Separated Service Harmony Guidelines, 9.2% of RAF personnel exceeded the harmony guidelines (compared to 6.7% in the Quarter 1 2007-08 Report).

43. We note that the Army and the RAF are failing to meet both individual and unit harmony guidelines, and that the percentage of RAF personnel exceeding the individual harmony guidelines has risen sharply during 2007. We find the reported performance against Unit Tour Interval harmony guidelines for the RAF much less precise than for the other two Services, with some RAF squadrons just reported as "heavily tasked". We look to the MoD to identify how the setting and measuring of Unit Tour Interval harmony guidelines for the RAF can be improved.

44. We are very disappointed with the failure to meet harmony guidelines in the Army and RAF. This is another clear indicator of the pressure on our Armed Forces from the continuing high level of operations. The MoD expects the position to improve with a reduction in the current operational pressure. We certainly hope so, as we find the continuing failure to meet harmony guidelines unacceptable. In its response to our report, we expect the MoD to set out what impact the failure to meet harmony guidelines is having, such as the impact on the retention of Service personnel.

DIVERSITY

45. In our report on the MoD's Annual Report and Accounts 2005-06, we highlighted the MoD's failure to meet most of its targets relating to women, people from ethnic minorities and disabled people both in MoD itself and in the Armed Forces:

46. Mr Jeffrey insisted in evidence in October 2006 that he was personally committed to achieving increased black and ethnic minority representation in the Services; and the Government Response responded in some detail setting out how the MoD was tackling the issue.[57] The latest Annual Report and Accounts sets out the performance against the ethnic minority targets:

    Overall Service ethnic minority strength (including Commonwealth recruits) increased to 5.8% at 1 April 2007 (5.5% at 1 April 2006) against target of 8% by 2013. UK ethnic minority intake:

    RN 2.1% (target 3.5%, 2005-06 intake 2.0%)

    Army 3.8% (target 4.1%, 2005-06 intake 3.6%)

    RAF 1.6% (target 3.6%, 2005-06 intake 1.5%)[58]

As at 1 October 2007, 5.9% of Service personnel were from ethnic minorities, of which some 60% were from the Commonwealth.[59]

47. All three Services missed their targets for ethnic minority recruitment in 2006-07. We asked the MoD what action was being taken to improve performance and why the RAF appeared to have a particular problem. In its memorandum to our inquiry the MoD provided further information on its diversity targets. The MoD has an annual Action Plan with specific diversity targets to increase UK ethnic minority recruits by 0.5% above the previous year's achievement, or rolling forward the previous year's target where this would provide a greater challenge.[60]

48. The Armed Forces have a programme to improve recruiting among the UK's ethnic minority communities. Each Service has a dedicated team raising awareness of Armed Forces careers amongst the UK's minority ethnic and faith communities. Activities include:

  • presentations in schools, colleges and to Community and Faith leaders;
  • providing role models to young members of ethnic minorities and faith communities;
  • organising and operating Personal Development Courses;
  • attending careers fairs, and cultural and religious festivals and events;
  • Community Liaison Officers working within regional networks to engage potential recruits and their gatekeepers;
  • arranging visits for ethnic minorities to military bases.[61]

49. The MoD acknowledged that there are a number of factors which can affect ethnic minority recruitment. These include "commonly held aspirations of young members of ethnic minorities; prevalent views on current operations amongst ethnic minority communities; and concerns about ethnic imbalances and racism in the Armed Forces in general". The RAF's recruitment patterns have been most affected in recent years by the personnel reductions set out in the July 2004 Future Capabilities White Paper. The MoD told us that recruitment opportunities in the RAF have been "particularly limited, reducing the overall number of new RAF recruits and the number of new ethnic minority recruits and thus constraining the scope for change in the proportion of personnel from ethnic minorities across the RAF as a whole". Also, members of ethnic minority communities with "high aspirations and the necessary educational qualifications for RAF entry have not generally considered the Armed Forces as a career of first choice, and awareness and knowledge of RAF careers in ethnic minority communities has traditionally been poor compared with the Army and Royal Navy". The RAF marketing campaign and the work of the RAF Motivational Outreach Team are seeking to address these recruitment challenges.[62]

50. Following the evidence session, the MoD provided further details of how it is seeking to increase black and ethnic minority representation, and in particular to address the problem of black and ethnic minority recruitment in the RAF. In its written evidence the MoD states that:

    Over the last year (1 October 2006 to 1 October 2007), the proportion of members of the Armed Forces from ethnic minority backgrounds has increased from 5.7% to 5.9% of total strength. Although recruitment outcomes are still short of requirements, this is not for want of effort and the quality of the Armed Forces' programmes is reflected by the consistently very high ranking that are awarded by external assessors.[63]

The RAF is introducing Area Outreach Managers into the seven recruitment areas to "enhance coordination of outreach programmes, improve planning and to measure success".[64]

51. We continue to be extremely disappointed and concerned to learn that all three Services missed their targets for UK ethnic minority recruitment and that the RAF performed particularly poorly against its target. Our concern is strengthened by the fact that we considered this in our report on the Annual Report and Accounts 2005-06 and the figures appear to have worsened. The fact that some 60% of ethnic minority Service personnel come from outside the UK, serves to heighten our concern. We acknowledge that the three Services have put in place arrangements to improve recruitment. We look to the MoD to ensure that the planned recruitment activities of the three Services are adequately funded so that the expected improvements in UK ethnic minority recruitment are delivered. We expect the MoD to address this matter both in response to our report and in its command papers to be delivered in the spring.

52. In our report on the MoD's Annual Report and Accounts 2005-06 we acknowledged the recent increases in the number of women entering the Services and that it would take time for this to impact on the number of women in senior ranks.[65] As of 1 April 2007, women comprised 9.3% of UK Regular Forces (9.1% on 1 April 2006) and 11.2% of 2006-07 intake (9.6% in 2005-06).[66] The latest Annual Report includes a table setting out the statistics for women in the Armed Forces by Service and by rank. Women now represent 11.6% of officers and 8.8% of other ranks. However, the percentage of women at the higher ranks remains low.[67]

53. The MoD has targets for the proportion of women, ethnic minority and disabled civilian staff in three civil service bands: Senior Civil Servants (SCS); Band B; and Band D. The latest Annual Report and Accounts states that:

    Proportion of women grew at SCS and Band B level, but fell at Band D level. Proportion of ethnic minorities fell at SCS level, grew at Band B level and stable at Band D level. Proportion of disabled fell at SCS and Band B level and grew at Band D level. Department only meeting diversity targets for disabled at SCS level and women at Band B level.[68]

54. We are disappointed that the MoD only met two of its nine diversity targets in relation to civilian personnel. We recommend that in response to our report, the MoD sets out how it plans to improve its performance in this area, particularly given that the MoD has announced that there are to be substantial civilian job losses.

Defence Procurement

55. PSA Target 6 is to "Deliver the Equipment Programme to cost and time". In the latest Annual Report and Accounts the MoD's assessment was that it was "on course" to meet the target. The latest Annual Report and Accounts state that "for the second year running the Department met or exceeded its Public Service Agreement targets for equipment procurement, despite them being more demanding than those for 2005-06".[69] They also state that "The Defence Procurement Agency (DPA) met all of its Key Targets in 2006-07 for the second consecutive year".[70] The DPA ceased to exist on 31 March 2007 when it merged with the Defence Logistics Organisation (DLO) to form Defence Equipment & Support (DE&S).

56. The Quarter 1 2007-2008 Report assessed PSA Target 6 as "some slippage". For the three performance indicators underpinning the target:

  • "Category A-C post-Main Gate pre-ISD projects are currently forecasting to achieve 100% [target of 97%] of the customer's key requirements".
  • "Category A-C post-Main Gate pre-ISD projects are currently reporting an average in-year variation of forecast cost increase of 0.2% [target of less than 0.2% in 2007-08]. This mainly reflects cost growth within the Nimrod MRA4 project".
  • "Category A-C post-Main Gate pre-ISD projects are currently reporting an average in-year variation of forecast ISD of 0.8 months [target of no more than 0.4 months in 2007-08]". [71]

57. The MoD Autumn Performance Report 2007, assessed PSA Target 6 as "likely only to be partly met". It states that "in 2007-08 we expect to meet the targets for delivery of Key User Requirements and in-year variation of forecast costs. We do not expect to meet the 2007-08 target for in-year variation of In Service Dates, in part reflecting a deliberate decision to delay deployment of the Beyond Visual Range Air-to-Air Missile on Typhoon". The Autumn Performance Report also states that the "major programme showing cost growth at present continues to be Nimrod".[72]

COST INCREASES

58. For our current Defence Equipment inquiry the MoD provided us with a memorandum in late October 2007 which included details of the progress of a selection of major equipment projects.[73] Some of the major equipment projects have experienced substantial changes since the Major Projects Report 2006.[74] Details of the forecast cost increases on the Astute submarine and Type 45 destroyer programmes are provided in Table 5.Table 5: Cost variation on the Astute submarine and Type 45 destroyer programmes since the Major Projects Report 2006
Programme Approved cost at Main Gate Current Forecast cost Variation Variation since MPR 2006
Astute submarine £2,578m £3,798m

(MPR 2006: £3,656m)

+£1,220m

(MPR 2006: +£1,078m)

+£142m
Type 45 destroyer £5,475m£6,464m

(MPR 2006: £6,110)

+£989m

(MPR 2006: +£635m)

+£354m

Source: Ministry of Defence

59. We asked why we were once again seeing large cost increases, some £500 million forecast cost variation since the Major Projects Report 2006 on the Astute submarine and Type 45 destroyer programmes. Mr Jeffrey said that both these programmes were what the former Chief of Defence Procurement referred to as "toxic legacy" programmes and that "much of the cost in the papers we sent you relates to these earlier years". However, he said that was not to say "that there had been no cost growth recently". He acknowledged that both had been "problematic programmes all the way through". The forecast cost increases during the course of the last year were mainly:

    a result of some further efforts by the teams concerned with BAE Systems in particular to understand the cost base of Astute and to identify with them ways of resourcing the Type 45 programme more efficiently. What we have now done is to re-negotiate the contracts on both of these on a more fixed price basis and there is good reason I believe to say that the costs on both programmes are now more under control.[75]

He added that "the big figures that come out of that memorandum we sent you are principally the result of the cost growth in the early part of the programme".[76] While it is true that a substantial proportion of the forecast increases on these programmes arose in earlier years, the forecast costs on these two programme have risen by some £500 million since the end of March 2006.

60. On the cost increase on the Nimrod MRA4 aircraft programme, Mr Jeffrey said that it was "certainly giving rise to in-year pressure this year". He told us that it was the "one significant area that we are having to attend to now".[77] We asked whether, given the problems on the Nimrod MRA4 programmes, consideration should be given to an alternative solution. Mr Jeffrey considered that "the current programme is seen as a more forward looking one than the question would imply".[78]

61. We note that the latest Annual Report and Accounts state that for the second year running the MoD "met or exceeded its Public Service Agreement targets for equipment procurement, despite them being more demanding than those for 2005-06", and that the Defence Procurement Agency met all its Key Targets in 2006-07 for the second consecutive year. The Defence Procurement Agency and the Defence Logistics Organisation merged on 1 April 2007 to form Defence Equipment and Support. We hope that the new organisation will maintain this momentum.

62. We are concerned to learn that the Astute submarine and the Type 45 destroyer programmes have experienced further forecast cost increases, totalling some £500 million, since the Major Projects Report 2006. While we note that the Permanent Under Secretary says that much of the cost in the papers we received relates to the "toxic legacy" of earlier years, we note his admission that costs have risen by some £500 million since the end of March 2006. He attributes this to work to understand the cost base of the Astute and to resource the Type 45 programme more efficiently with subsequent renegotiation of fixed price contracts which he says there is good reason to believe will now control the costs of both programmes. It is, nevertheless, disappointing that the MoD has failed to limit further cost growth on these programmes which had already experienced forecast cost increases totalling some £1.7 billion.

63. Yet again there have been problems with the Nimrod MRA4 programme which is experiencing further cost growth. We note that the MoD recognises it has to "attend" to these problems now and we look to the MoD to do this as a matter of some urgency given the current pressures on the defence budget. We look to the MoD to undertake a review of the Nimrod MRA4 programme in order to ensure that best value for money is achieved in maintaining this important capability, both in quality and quantity of platforms.

IN SERVICE DATE SLIPPAGE

64. The memorandum provided by the MoD for our current Defence Equipment inquiry, showed that the current forecast in-service date for the Type 45 destroyer programme had slipped 11 months since the Major Projects Report 2006. The current forecast in-service date is three years later than the in-service date approved at Main Gate.[79] The A400M transport aircraft, which we examined in our Strategic Lift inquiry, has also experienced in-service date slippage. The Government Response to our report states that "since the release of the Defence Committee report on Strategic Lift, there has been slippage to the start of aircraft [A400M] final assembly in Seville, which has now commenced (August 2007, five months later than the contract schedule), and Airbus Military have announced delay to the aircraft's first flight, which is now planned for Summer 2008."[80]

65. We asked Mr Jeffrey about the slippage on the Type 45 and A400M programmes. He acknowledged that there "had been some slippage in the A400M programme which is the subject of discussion with the contractors".[81] Following the evidence session the MoD provided us with an update on the Type 45 and A400M programmes.

66. On the Type 45 programme, the MoD was disappointed with the further delay on this programme. In order to place the programme on "a more stable footing", the MoD has worked with the contractor on a "significant re-orientation programme focused on risk quantification and incentivising delivery". On the A400M programme, the MoD acknowledges that the announcement by Airbus, the contractor for the programme, that initial aircraft deliveries are likely to be delayed by between 6 to 12 months "has placed the UK's In-Service Date of March 2011…. at significant risk". The MoD is working with Airbus to "understand better any potential scope for schedule recovery and identify whether there are any actions we can take to help the company deliver in accordance with the agreed terms of the contract".[82]

67. It is disappointing that there has been further in-service date slippage relating to the Type 45 destroyer programme and that further delays are likely on the A400M transport aircraft programme. We are particularly concerned about the delays on the A400M programme as new transport aircraft are desperately needed by our Armed Forces who are already having to use ageing transport aircraft. We look to the MoD to continue to work closely with the contractors on these programmes to reduce the risk of any further delays and, where possible, to identify ways to recover some of the forecast delays. We look to the MoD to undertake a review of the A400M programme given the problems experienced to date.

DEFENCE EQUIPMENT AND SUPPORT ORGANISATION

68. When we took evidence from Mr Jeffrey two years ago for our inquiry into the MoD Annual Report and Accounts 2004-05, he told us that one of his priorities was "the whole question of how we procure and acquire equipment for defence".[83] We asked what progress had been made in this area. Mr Jeffrey considered that the MoD had made progress in the last few years and he thought that the merger of the DPA and the DLO to form DE&S had "produced an organisation which is becoming more capable and is beginning to give effect to the through life capability management principles that Lord Drayson (the former Minister for Defence Equipment and Support) did much to advance". He was optimistic that the MoD could carry on improving in this area. However he said that:

    It turns a great deal on the issue…. of skills. We have some very highly skilled staff involved in this but we need to make sure that they are all at that level. It is certainly something we are giving attention to.[84]

69. We note that the MoD's Permanent Under Secretary considers that progress has been made over the last few years to improve the way the MoD procures and acquires defence equipment and that the Defence Equipment and Support (DE&S) organisation, formed in April 2007, is becoming more capable. We welcome the recognition by the Permanent Under Secretary that much depends on making sure that the necessary skills exist at all levels. We are examining the progress made by DE&S in our current Defence Equipment inquiry.

Value for Money

2004 SPENDING REVIEW EFFICIENCY TARGET

70. As part of the Spending Review 2004, the MoD agreed that it would realise total annual efficiency gains of at least £2.8 billion by 2007-08, of which "three quarters will be cash releasing". As part of this programme the MoD was, by 31 March 2008, to:

71. In its latest Annual Report and Accounts the MoD assessed its performance against the 2004 Spending Review Efficiency target as "on course". The MoD "remained on course to deliver the efficiency gains and the personnel reductions and relocations agreed in the 2004 Spending Review. By 31 March 2007 over £2Bn efficiencies had been delivered, civilian staff numbers had fallen by over 11,000, military posts by some 10,000 and 1,885 posts had been relocated out of London and the South East". [86]

72. We asked which elements were contributing to the forecast £2.8 billion efficiency gains. Mr Woolley said that the largest single contribution was "in procurement and logistics where we are predicting about £1.7 billion". The other areas contributing to the total efficiency gains included: corporate services (forecast savings of £250 million); manpower savings (forecast savings of £550 million); and "force structure changes that were introduced in 2004" (forecast savings of £400 million).[87] Following the evidence session, the MoD provided us with details of the main areas and elements which had contributed to the £2.8 billion efficiency savings.[88] The Autumn Performance Report states that by September 2007, "£2,506M of efficiencies had been achieved…. We remain on track to deliver our £2.8Bn target by end 2007-08".[89]

73. We asked about the progress in reducing the number of civilian staff. Mr Jeffrey said that by September 2007 the number of civilian staff had been reduced by 13,843 against the target of 10,000.[90] On the target of reducing the number of military posts in administrative and support functions, the Autumn Performance Report states that the number of military personnel will reduce by over 10,000 by April 2008, "enabling over 5,000 military administrative and support posts to be abolished. 3,891 were disestablished by 30 September 2007".[91] The MoD remains on track "to deliver a net reduction of 3,900 posts in London and the South East by 2010". By 30 September 2007, 2,812 posts had been relocated.[92]

74. We congratulate the MoD on the progress it has made against the 2004 Spending Review Efficiency Target. We note that the MoD expects to meet all four targets which underpin the overall Efficiency Target by 31 March 2008, and to exceed three of these four targets.

FINANCIAL SAVINGS

75. In June 2007 the MoD announced that a Defence Equipment and Support (DE&S) project team had combined the MoD's office supplies requirement with those of eight other Government departments "in the biggest ever public sector reverse auction". This had generated combined savings of £100 million over the next four years and a saving of £50 million for the MoD over the life of the contract.[93]

76. We asked the MoD whether it was working with other Government departments to identify other areas where a similar approach might deliver financial savings. The MoD told us that its "Category Management approach extends beyond office supplies to a range of commodity categories and services that apply not only pan-defence but also pan-Government". The MoD is an "active member" of the Office of Government Commerce's pan-Government Commodity procurement stakeholder groups and "is planning further collaboration" with a number of Government departments across a range of categories. Existing arrangements include:

  • MoD's Information Communications Systems catalogue has been used by other Departments for several years with savings "in the region of 20%".
  • MoD's Print Contract is open to use for any other Department.
  • MoD is collaborating with the Office of Government Commerce Buying Solutions (OGC b.s.) on furniture, where the MoD's "spending power adds weight to OGC b.s.' overall ability to leverage the market".[94]

77. We welcome the news that the MoD is expected to save some £50 million by combining its office supplies requirement with those of other Government departments. We note that the MoD is planning further collaboration with other Government departments across a range of categories and look to the MoD to make quick progress in this area so that potential savings can be delivered as soon as possible.

Defence Agencies and Trading Funds

AGENCY STATUS

78. The MoD Annual Report and Accounts 2004-05 provided details of 26 'on-vote' Defence Agencies and their performance against their key targets[95], and the MoD Annual Report and Accounts 2005-06 provided details of 20 'on-vote' Defence Agencies and their performance against their key targets.[96] During 2006-07 there were 17 'on-vote' Defence Agencies.[97] The MoD has continued with its policy to rationalise the number of 'on-vote' Defence Agencies and, from 1 April 2007, Agency status was removed from: British Forces Post Office; Defence Bills Agency; Defence Communication Services Agency; Defence Estates; Defence Procurement Agency; Defence Transport and Movements Agency; Disposal Services Agency; and the Duke of York's Royal Military School.[98] On 1 April 2007, the Armed Forces Personnel Administration Agency merged with the Veterans Agency to form the Service Personnel and Veterans Agency. A list of the eight 'on-vote' Defence Agencies operating in 2007-08 is provided in Table 6.Table 6: Defence Agencies operating in 2007-08
Defence Agencies
Defence Analytical Services Agency

Defence Medical Education and Training Agency

Defence Storage and Distribution Agency

Defence Vetting Agency

MoD Police and Guarding Agency

People, Pay and Pensions Agency

Service Children's Education

Service Personnel and Veterans Agency

Source: Ministry of Defence

79. In its response to our concerns about the reduction in Defence Agencies and the potential loss of information and accountability set out in our report Ministry of Defence Annual Report and Accounts 2005-06[99], the MoD stated that the "number of agencies in the Department continues to fall as the benefits derived from agency status have become embedded in the Department's overall business processes".[100] The MoD assured us that it was not its intention to reduce Parliamentary scrutiny of defence business by reducing the number of agencies. In response to our recommendation that former Agencies should continue to publish an account of their annual activities, the MoD stated that:

    In the context of producing the Department's and Agencies Annual Reports over the coming months we will therefore consider how best we can respond to the Committee's reasonable wish that the amount and quality of our public reporting should not be materially reduced as a result of any removals of Agency status and make further proposals.[101]

80. Of particular interest to us is Defence Equipment and Support (DE&S) which was formed on 1 April 2007 following the merger of the Defence Procurement Agency (which was a Defence Agency) and the Defence Logistics Organisation (which was not a Defence Agency). DE&S does not have Defence Agency status. In April 2007, DE&S had around 29,000 staff and an annual spend of £16 billion, representing some 43 per cent of the defence budget.[102]

81. In our Defence Procurement 2006 report we expressed our concern that DE&S would not have Agency Status, and recommended that DE&S "publish an annual report so as to allow proper public accountability, and parliamentary scrutiny in particular".[103] In its response to our report, the MoD stated that:

    The activities and performance of DE&S will be fully reported on as part of the MoD Annual Report and Accounts. In addition, the annual Major Projects Report to Parliament will continue to cover major aspects of DE&S business.[104]

82. We have no objection to the budgets of former agencies being included in the MoD's main vote, because in our view that is a straightforward way of dealing with public money. We continue however to be concerned to ensure that Defence Equipment and Support (DE&S), which is responsible for procuring equipment and managing it through-life, should not reduce the scope for proper accountability and parliamentary scrutiny. We note that the MoD intends to report on the activities and performance of DE&S in its Annual Report and Accounts 2007-08, but it remains to be seen whether this course of action, rather than the publication of a separate annual report from DE&S, will best meet our objectives. We will consider this matter closely when we examine the next MoD Annual Report and Accounts.

AGENCY PERFORMANCE

83. The performance of the 17 Defence Agencies operating in 2006-07 against their key targets is set out in a table in the Annual Report and Accounts. Of the 17 Defence Agencies:

84. The MoD Police and Guarding Agency met 40% (4 of 10) of its targets in 2006-07. The Agency met 38% (3 of 8) of its targets in 2005-06 and 44% (4 of 9) of its targets in 2004-05. [106] The MoD Annual Report and Accounts states that:

    This has been a challenging year for the Agency to continue to deliver an effective policing and guarding service to the MoD estate in a climate of increased budget restrictions and where a major gap in Agency finances had been identified. Work is on going to close this with assistance from customers and stakeholders.

    The crime detection rate increased substantially from 39% to 72%, whilst customer satisfaction also increased markedly, although falling short of the target.[107]

85. The Foreword by the Chief Constable and Chief Executive in the MoD Police and Guarding Agency Annual Report and Accounts 2006-07, provides some more detail on the funding problems facing the agency:

    We have been trying to resolve a significant shortfall in the budget allocation. The programme of work to close this funding gap should bear fruit by the end of the Financial Year 2009-10. In essence we need to find sensible efficiencies and explore smarter ways of working rather than expect a funding deal to restore the imbalance.[108]

86. We note that in 2006-07 Defence Agencies have generally performed well against their targets with over 40% of the agencies meeting all their targets. However, the one exception is the MoD Police and Guarding Agency which met only 40% of its targets, a similar level of performance to that achieved in 2005-06 and 2004-05.

87. We are concerned to learn that "a major gap" in the funding of the MoD Police and Guarding Agency has been identified and that it is unlikely that the funding gap will be closed until the end of 2009-10. In its response to our report, we expect the MoD to provide us with a full account of why this funding gap has arisen and what effect it is expected to have on the services expected by the Agency's customers. We also look to the MoD to set out the reasons why the Agency has continued to perform so poorly against its targets and the action being taken to improve performance and plug any security deficiencies that may have arisen as a consequence of the funding gap.

TRADING FUNDS

88. During 2006-07, there were five Defence Trading Funds, which are set out in Table 7.[109] Table 7: Defence Trading Funds operating in 2006-07
Defence Trading Funds
ABRO

Defence Aviation Repair Agency (DARA)

Defence Science and Technology Laboratory (DSTL)

Met Office

UK Hydrographic Office (UKHO)

Source: Ministry of Defence

89. On 22 May 2007, the MoD announced that a new defence support group would be created by merging "ABRO, retained DARA business units and certain other defence support facilities". The new support group, operating as a Trading Fund, is to begin operating by April 2008.[110]

90. On 6 December 2007, the MoD announced that, following a review, the United Kingdom Hydrographic Office (UKHO) should retain its Trading Fund status. The MoD had previously announced that UKHO would remain in Taunton. The review had indicated that "a total net headcount reduction in the UKHO of between 250 and 300 permanent posts over the next five years may be required in order to focus resources on the core business". The MoD hoped that the net reduction could be achieved through "natural wastage and the full use of wider MoD restructuring arrangements".[111]


12   MoD, HC 697, pp 13-22 Back

13   Ibid, p 23 Back

14   Ministry of Defence, Annual Report and Accounts 2005-06, HC 1394, pp 12-21 (Hereafter referred to as MoD, HC 1394) Back

15   MoD, HC 697, pp 13-22 Back

16   Ministry of Defence, Public Service Agreement Report: Quarter 1 2007-2008 Back

17   Ibid Back

18   Q 83 Back

19   Ministry of Defence, Public Service Agreement Report: Quarter 1 2007-2008 Back

20   Q 84 Back

21   Q 86 Back

22   Ibid Back

23   Ministry of Defence, Autumn Performance Report 2007-08  Back

24   Ministry of Defence, Public Service Agreement Report: Quarter 1 2007-2008 Back

25   MoD, HC 697, p 16 Back

26   Ministry of Defence, Public Service Agreement Report: Quarter 1 2007-2008 Back

27   Ministry of Defence, Autumn Performance Report 2007-08. Back

28   Ministry of Defence, Public Service Agreement Report: Quarter 1 2007-2008 Back

29   Ministry of Defence, Autumn Performance Report 2007-08  Back

30   MoD HC 697, p 16 Back

31   Ministry of Defence, Public Service Agreement Report: Quarter 1 2007-2008 Back

32   Ministry of Defence, Autumn Performance Report 2007-08  Back

33   MoD, HC 697, p 19 Back

34   Ministry of Defence, Public Service Agreement Report: Quarter 1 2007-2008 Back

35   MoD, HC 697, p 19 Back

36   Ibid Back

37   Ministry of Defence, Public Service Agreement Report: Quarter 1 2007-2008 Back

38   Q 7 Back

39   Ministry of Defence, Autumn Performance Report 2007-08.  Back

40   MoD, HC 697, p 19 Back

41   HC (2005-06) 57, para 51 Back

42   MoD, HC 697, para 299 Back

43   Ibid, para 300 Back

44   Ev 18-19 Back

45   HC (2005-06) 57, para 42 Back

46   MoD, HC 697, p 160 Back

47   Ibid, para 303 Back

48   Ministry of Defence website, Defence News, 22 November 2007, "Armed Forces manning figures released" Back

49   Q 90 Back

50   Q 91 Back

51   MoD, HC 697, p 21 Back

52   MoD, HC 697, p 21 Back

53   Ministry of Defence, Public Service Agreement Report: Quarter 1 2007-2008 Back

54   Q 92 Back

55   Q 93 Back

56   HC (2005-06) 57, para 74 Back

57   Defence Committee, Seventh Special Report of Session 2006-07, Ministry of Defence Annual Report and Accounts 2005-06: Government Response to the Committee's Second Report of Session 2006-07, HC 376, pp 10-12 Back

58   MoD, HC 697, p 160 Back

59   Ev 33 Back

60   Ev 20 Back

61   Ev 20 Back

62   Ibid Back

63   Ev 32 Back

64   Ev 33 Back

65   HC (2005-06) 57, para 77 Back

66   MoD, HC 697, p 160 Back

67   Ibid, p 167 Back

68   Ibid, p 160 Back

69   Ibid, p 22 Back

70   Ibid, para 161 Back

71   Ministry of Defence, Public Service Agreement Report: Quarter 1 2007-2008 Back

72   Ministry of Defence, Autumn Performance Report 2007-08 Back

73   Memorandum from the Ministry of Defence (DEQ 03), published on the Defence Committee's website: http://www.publications.parliament.uk/pa/cm/cmdfence.htm#memo Back

74   National Audit Office, Ministry of Defence Major Projects Report 2006 Project Summary Sheets, HC 23-11 Session 2006-07, 24 November 2006 Back

75   Q 96 Back

76   Ibid Back

77   Q 97 Back

78   Q 98 Back

79   Memorandum from the Ministry of Defence (DEQ 03), published on the Defence Committee's website: http://www.publications.parliament.uk/pa/cm/cmdfence.htm#memo Back

80   Defence Committee, Fourteenth Special Report of Session 2006-07, Strategic Lift: Government Response to the Committee's Eleventh Report of Session 2006-07, HC 1025, para 14 Back

81   Q 99 Back

82   Ev 34 Back

83   Defence Committee, Sixth Report of Session 2005-06, Ministry of Defence Annual Report and Accounts 2004-05, HC 822 Q 1 Back

84   Q 100 Back

85   MoD, HC 697, p 23 Back

86   Ibid Back

87   Q 69 Back

88   Ev 31 Back

89   Ministry of Defence, Autumn Performance Report 2007-08 Back

90   Q 68 Back

91   Ministry of Defence, Autumn Performance Report 2007-08  Back

92   Ibid Back

93   Ministry of Defence website, Defence News, 27 June 2007, "MoD team helps £100 million Government saving" Back

94   Ev 23 Back

95   Ministry of Defence, Annual Report and Accounts 2004-05, HC 464, pp 210-211 Back

96   MoD, HC 1394, p 259  Back

97   MoD, HC 697, p 308 Back

98   Ibid Back

99   HC (2005-06) 57, paras 92-97 Back

100   HC 2006-07) 376, para 26 Back

101   HC (2006-07) 376, para 27 Back

102   Ministry of Defence, DE&S in brief, April 2007 Back

103   Defence Committee, First Report of Session 2006-07, Defence Procurement 2006, HC 56, para 38 Back

104   Defence Committee, Fifth Special Report of Session 2006-07, Defence Procurement 2006: Government Response to the Committee's First Report of Session 2006-07, HC 318, para 14 Back

105   MoD, HC 697, p 308 Back

106   Ibid Back

107   MoD, HC 697, p 311 Back

108   Ministry of Defence Police and Guarding Agency, Annual Report and Accounts 2006-07, HC 624, p 6 Back

109   MoD, HC 697, p 312 Back

110   HC Deb, 22 May 2007,Cols 67WS-68WS Back

111   HC Deb, 6 December 2007, Cols 82WS-83WS Back


 
previous page contents next page

House of Commons home page Parliament home page House of Lords home page search page enquiries index

© Parliamentary copyright 2008
Prepared 28 January 2008