Operation Charge of the Knights
9. The turning point in the security situation in
Basra seems to have come in March 2008. Lieutenant-General Mohan
al-Furayji had been appointed head of the Basra Operational Command
(BaOC) in 2007, thereby assuming control of all Iraqi Army forces
in southern Iraq. One of his key decisions was the raising of
the 14th Division of the Iraqi Army, based on 5 Brigade,
10th Division, as a unit specifically recruited from
outside Basra (the soldiers of the locally-raised 10th
Division had been subject to intimidation and infiltration by
Basrawi militias). He also began preparations for a major offensive
against the militias in Basra, telling one British journalist
at the time of the transition to PIC that "The lawlessness
in Basra is an insult to the Iraqi people and an insult to the
Iraqi government. It simply cannot be tolerated".[3]
10. Moqtada al-Sadr and his followers in Jaish al-Mahdi
(JAM) had renewed their ceasefire in February 2008, but the detention
of so-called rogue members of JAM in the weeks following brought
the stability of the ceasefire into question. In March, General
Mohan warned his troops that decisive action against the militias
would soon be necessary.[4]
We were told during our visit that the operation, dubbed Saulat
al-Fursan or "Charge of the Knights", had been planned
for the summer months, in order to be concluded before the beginning
of Ramadan in September and the provincial elections in Basra
later in the autumn, but that the timeline was accelerated at
the behest of the Iraqi Prime Minister, Nouri al-Maliki.
11. On 25 March 2008, Prime Minister al-Maliki arrived
in Basra to oversee Operation Charge of the Knights personally.
Full details of the tactical operations over the following days
are not publicly known, nor is this the place to rehearse or speculate
on them. However, according to reports in the press, JAM called
for a ceasefire on March 30, with discussions being held in Iran.[5]
By the following day, JAM units had ceased to appear openly on
the streets and a semblance of normality had begun to return to
Basra.
12. We visited the Basra Operational Command at the
Shatt-al-Arab hotel during our recent visit, and met both Major-General
Mohammed Juwad Huwaidi, who succeeded General Mohan as commander
of Iraqi forces in May 2008, and the UK BaOC mentor, Colonel Richard
Iron. We were told that Operation Charge of the Knights had resulted
in a seismic shift in the balance of power between the ISF and
the militias, and that a large part of its importance, apart from
straightforward military success, lay in the fact that it had
been conducted with Iraqi soldiers in the lead. There is no doubt
that Coalition Forces provided essential support, both in terms
of training, and in terms of heavy weapons and air cover, but
the fact remained that it was Iraqi Security Forces which restored
stability and security to the streets of Basra.
13. It is true that US Marines were also on the streets
of Basra during this offensive, but this was not as an independent
force. Prime Minister al-Maliki ordered in the Iraqi 1st
Division as reinforcement. The US Military Transition Teams were
embedded with the 1st Division, and providing additional
operational planning, artillery support and tactical air support,
significantly enhancing Iraqi military capability. This victory
achieved a step change in Iraqi military self-confidence and transformed
Prime Minister al-Maliki's political prestige. Moreover, the embedded
US Marines were greeted by Basrawis, not as part of an occupying
force, but as supporters of an increasingly capalble Iraqi Army.
14. Operations under the umbrella of Charge of the
Knights continue. Some parts of Basra are still outside the full
control of the ISF. Moreover, a new insurgency is likely to develop
as militia groups adjust to the changing security situation. However,
the ISF are creating increasingly sophisticated counter-insurgency
tactics and apparatus, and economic growth in Basra is also likely
to erode the appeal of the militias. The influence of Iran, however,
remains a key factor. It is likely that Iran's strategic objectives
in southern Iraq include keeping Coalition forces preoccupied
with Iraq rather than with broader regional issues. We were told
that these objectives have not been altered by the success of
Operation Charge of the Knights, and the fact that the border
between southern Iraq and Iran remains porous allows militias
and weaponry to flow easily from one country to another.
15. However, it will be increasingly difficult for
JAM and the Sadrist movement to re-establish its former dominance.
The provincial elections in southern Iraq, due late this year,
offer Moqtada al-Sadr an opportunity to establish a political
power base in and around Basra, but he and his movement cannot
participate in the elections while JAM remains an avowed militia
movement. Sadr therefore must find a way to distance himself from
JAM or change the identity of JAM if he is to engage in the political
process.
16. We are reassured that Operation Charge of
the Knights has been broadly successful, and has substantially
weakened the power of the militias in Basra. While some areas
of the city are not yet fully under the control of the ISF, a
high degree of security has been restored and the preconditions
are in place for political progress and economic recovery. There
is no doubt that more remains to be done. The UK Government must
ensure that it continues to provide support to the ISF to ensure
that the progress which has been made is not lost and that Basra
does not slip back into instability.
Divisional Internment Facility
17. We visited the UK-run Divisional Internment Facility
(DIF) in the COB. This has been a continuing matter of interest
to us. We were told that the facility operates in accordance with
international and domestic law. Those being held are a mixture
of internees and detainees. The DIF is scrutinised by the International
Committee of the Red Cross and by the Army's Provost Marshal,
and complaints are dealt with by the Special Investigation Branch.
18. The power to intern derives from United Nations
Security Council Resolution 1637. If there is no resolution after
the current one expires in December 2008, the UK will stop the
internment process. However, the improving security situation
in Basra is likely to make the process much less necessary. The
future of the DIF is uncertain, but it may be that an arrangement
can be reached bilaterally with the Iraqi government or under
the aegis of the Long-Term Security Arrangement being negotiated
by the United States.
2 HC (2007-08) 110, para 41 Back
3
"New Iraq receiving baptism of fire in Basra", The
Daily Telegraph, 30 March 2008, www.telegraph.co.uk Back
4
"The final battle for Basra is near, says Iraqi general",
The Independent, 20 March 2008, www.independent.co.uk Back
5
"Iraqi political effort targets al-Sadr", USA Today,
6 April 2008, www.usatoday.com Back
