Select Committee on Defence Fifteenth Report


3  Development of the Iraqi Security Forces

19. It is clear to us that one of the most important tasks now facing UK and Coalition Forces in southern Iraq is the development of the capability of the Iraqi Security Forces. The Prime Minister told the House of Commons in October last year that "in the Spring of next year [2008] […] we plan to move to a second stage of overwatch where […] the main focus would be on training and mentoring".[6] This is undertaken in three main areas: the training and development of the Iraqi Army, of the Iraqi Police Service, and of the Iraqi Navy.

Military Transition Teams

20. UK Forces undertake the training and development of the Iraqi Army in southern Iraq through the use of Military Transition Teams (MiTTs). These teams, usually of 20-30 UK Service personnel, work alongside the Iraqi units. In July 2007, we visited the MiTT which was working with the 10th Iraqi Division and was based inside the COB. We heard that the 10th Division was already largely recruited, partly accommodated, largely equipped, partially sustained and largely trained, and that equipment shortfalls were due to difficulties in extracting resources from the Iraqi Ministry of Defence (IMOD). The Commanding Officer of the MiTT stressed to us then that its work was done within the COB and that members of the team did not go out on operations with the Iraqi army units, because it was not possible to provide force protection for them.

21. We encountered a transformed situation in June of this year. The Commanding Officer of the MiTT Group told us that there were currently 11 MiTTs, comprising around 1,000 personnel drawn from the Royal Scots Dragoon Guards, 4th Battalion, The Royal Regiment of Scotland, 2nd Battalion, The Royal Anglian Regiment, and 9th/12th Royal Lancers. The MiTTs are a combination of a core of 20-30 trainers, headed by a major or a lieutenant-colonel, and a small force protection unit of around 60 which allow the teams to deploy operationally alongside the Iraqi units which they are training. Crucially, the UK MiTTs are now based with their 'parent' Iraqi units outside the COB.

22. The approach of the MiTTs is two-fold: to help develop the Iraqi Army's capabilities, and to help defeat the militias. This second strand has only been possible because of the improved security situation, which has allowed the MiTTs to operate outside the COB without requiring unmanageable levels of force protection. An important aspect of the first strand is enhancing the Iraqi Army's own training capability, referred to as "training the trainer". The MiTTs have found that Iraqi personnel tend to mimic the behaviour they see in the UK personnel training them. It is also important to try to move towards the Iraqis taking a lead in training and mentoring to avoid creating a culture of dependency.

23. We were also briefed by the Commander Force Support. He explained that UK Forces were helping to foster the development of a capable ISF logistics system through the use of Logistics Training and Advisory Teams within MiTTs. During Operation Charge of the Knights, the UK had provided considerable logistical support to the ISF, including water, food, petrol, diesel and JP8 jet fuel. The new Commander of Multi-National Corps-Iraq, Lieutenant-General Lloyd J. Austin III, had made it clear that he did not want logistics problems to inhibit ISF operations. Progress had so far been slow, and there were particular problems in terms of long-term maintenance of equipment by the Iraqis. However, these problems were not unique to the ISF and were being addressed. The Logistics Training and Advisory Teams were beginning to have an effect, though second-line ISF logistics units were yet to be generated.

24. The UK MiTTs are doing an excellent job in enhancing the capacity and self-sufficiency of the Iraqi Army. Their work is vital to the future of the Iraqi Security Forces and therefore to stability in southern Iraq. The contrast with what we saw last year is stark and profound, and the MoD must continue to support the MiTTs in what will inevitably be a medium-to long-term project. The larger the military training commitment we can maintain, the greater will be UK influence in Iraq, and in the region as a whole, as Iraq recovers its position as a wealthy and powerful Middle East nation. The UK has an opportunity to maintain a substantial position of influence for the common good in southern Iraq, if we can commit the military capacity to do so.

The Iraqi Police Service

25. When we visited Iraq in July 2007, we were told that, while the Iraqi Army was progressing reasonably well, substantial shortcomings remained in the Iraqi Police Service (IPS). There were high levels of corruption and militia infiltration in the IPS, and the fact that UK and Coalition Forces were all-but confined to the COB made any real progress very difficult. The Iraqi government had demonstrated its determination to improve the situation by appointing Major-General Abdul Jalil Khalaf as Chief of Police in Basra, but he had not at the time of our visit been able to make much headway. He told a British journalist later that year that he was exposed to almost daily assassination attempts.[7]

26. Operation Charge of the Knights put Basra in the spotlight both nationally and internationally. We heard anecdotal claims that the performance of the IPS had been patchy at best, and that perhaps as little as a third of the police in Basra had stood its ground and defended the police stations against militia attacks. We were also told that, in the wake of Charge of the Knights, significant numbers of IPS personnel had been dismissed for collaboration and corruption, including a large number of senior officers.

27. A new Chief of Police, Major-General Adel Dahaam, was appointed in April 2008. We were told that, although he comes from a military background, he wears a police rather than army uniform, unlike his predecessor, and we were briefed on his plans to reform the IPS apparatus in Basra.

28. The UK Police Mission in Iraq, based in Baghdad and Basra, has switched its focus from a tactical level to a strategic, national project to help build capacity in the IPS and the Iraqi Minister of the Interior. Its priorities are:

  • Strategic development, including the devolving of power where appropriate;
  • Tackling corruption and working with the Iraqi Department of Internal Affairs to improve its capabilities;
  • Leadership training at Shaibah Police College, using a Danish model of training which has been employed successfully in Kosovo and other places, and
  • The development of forensic capabilities, including the opening of a national crime laboratory in Basra.

29. An important feature of the UK effort, because of its small size, is cooperation with the US mission and the creation of a common plan across Multi-National Force-Iraq. This is delivered through the Civilian Police Assistance Training Team, based in Baghdad. However, one limitation on the UK Police Mission is the resources available to it. The UK lacks a gendarmerie-style police force and so cannot deliver the full range of training and support which the IPS needs. The US, by contrast, will employ some Military Police units to provide training.

30. The UK Police Mission is a small component of Coalition efforts in developing the IPS. We were impressed by the work it is doing and by the systematic and organised nature of its plans, and hope it can continue to provide valuable support to the IPS. We also hope that the Police Mission can extend its reach and enhance its training capacity as the security situation in Basra becomes more stable.

Joint Security Stations

31. An important part of the security strategy for the ISF in southern Iraq is the Joint Security Station concept. These 'hub-and-spoke' establishments will be based on existing IPS command-and-control units, and will incorporate elements from the IPS, the Iraqi Army, MiTTs and Police Transition Teams. They are intended to allow the IPS to use the Iraqi Army as an 'enabler' and to enhance the counter-insurgency capabilities of the ISF. Importantly, they build on existing capabilities and provide a post-Coalition framework for the development of the ISF.

Naval Training Team

32. The UK-led Naval Training Team (NaTT) based within the Iraqi Navy compound at the southern Iraqi port of Umm Qasr is made up of around 75 personnel from all three UK Services, the US Navy and the US Marine Corps. Its mission is to mentor, monitor and train the Iraqi Maritime Forces, both Navy and Marines. Umm Qasr has vital strategic and economic importance to Iraq. It is the country's only deep-water port, and the Iraqi Navy's only significant gateway to the Northern Arabian Gulf.

33. When we visited the NaTT in July 2007, we were briefed on ambitious plans to expand the Iraqi Navy to more than double its size in terms of personnel by 2010 and to undertake a major procurement project. When we returned in June 2008, we were told that the plans, while challenging, were still broadly on course. The Iraqi Navy's current capability was described as adequate with the vessels and equipment already in Iraqi hands. There are also plans to redevelop the base at Umm Qasr. This will be a vital part of enhancing the Iraqi Navy's capabilities, as many of the buildings are currently in poor condition.

34. The two main challenges facing the Iraqi Maritime Forces are the undefined nature of Iraq's territorial waters, especially in relation to Iran, and the protection of the two off-shore oil platforms, the al-Basra Oil Terminal (ABOT) and the Khawr al-Amaya Oil Terminal (KAAOT). These are vital to the economic success of Iraq, as they account for around 90% of the country's revenue.

35. The issue of Iraq's territorial waters is complex and contentious. Under United Nations Security Council Resolution 1723, the UK is mandated to patrol the Shatt-al-Arab waterway and the mouth of the Northern Arabian Gulf. This brings them into close contact with Iranian naval units, Iran disputing the border of its territorial waters with Iraq. There have been two major clashes with Iranian units, in June 2004 and March 2007, which have led to the seizure of UK personnel by Iranian forces.[8]

36. We visited the smaller KAAOT platform during our recent visit to the Gulf and were briefed on the strategic and economic importance of the oil platforms as well as the security measures in place to protect them. While the principal burden of providing defence falls on UK personnel, the Iraqi Maritime Forces are assuming an increasing share of the responsibility. We saw how Iraqi Marines work alongside UK and US Forces in defending the oil platforms. We consider this further in Chapter 4, below.

37. The UK-led Naval Training Team is performing a vital role in training and mentoring the Iraqi Navy, and we pay tribute to the excellent work which UK Forces are doing at Umm Qasr. It is clear to us that the mission of the NaTT is a long-term one, and, while we understand that the UK Government may not wish to make public pronouncements on future dispositions in Iraq, we encourage the MoD to consider how a UK presence can be maintained in Umm Qasr beyond any drawdown of forces in Basra.


6   HC Deb, 8 October 2007, col 23 Back

7   "Basra: The Legacy", BBC News Online, 17 December 2007, www.bbc.co.uk Back

8   For the latter, see Defence Committee, Fourth Report of Session 2007-08, The Iran hostages incident: the lessons learned, HC 181 and Foreign Affairs Committee, Sixth Report of Session 2006-07, Foreign Policy Aspects of the Detention of Naval Personnel by the Islamic Republic of Iran, HC 880 Back


 
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