Memorandum submitted by the Royal Society
for the Protection of Birds
SUMMARY
The RSPB considers human-induced climate change,
poses the biggest long-term threat to global biodiversity. To
avoid a catastrophe for wildlife, anthropogenic greenhouse gas
emissions need to be cut hard and rapidly, with global emissions
peaking within the next ten years and then declining steeply,
in the UK by at least 3% annually. We therefore support policies
and measures that do so, in the UK, EU and internationally. In
summary, the RSPB believes:
The Kyoto Protocol is still highly
relevant and is the only international climate regime that we
have until the end of 2012.
The Bali Action Plan agreed by all
countries, including the USA, was an important outcome even though
it should have included emissions from aviation and shipping.
It will be difficult for some emerging
economics such as South Africa, China and Brazil to fully come
on board in the absence of effort from the USA, although this
situation has the potential change as each of the main US presidential
candidates appear committed to the global 50% reduction goal.
The Asia-Pacific partnership has
been damaged by the Bali agreement and its influence is likely
to diminish.
Development of mechanisms to tackle
emissions from deforestation should include elements of both market-based
and fund-based approaches.
INTRODUCTION
The RSPB has a long history of involvement in
the international climate change debate and works with BirdLife
International Partners in to pilot projects, which aim to reduce
emissions from deforestation in developing countries (REDD). We
have saved 100,000 hectares of tropical lowland rain forest in
Sumatra, Indonesia (one of the most biodiverse and one of the
most threatened places in the world) from almost certain conversion
to oil palm or timber plantations. This groundbreaking project,
Harapan Rainforest, is the result of years of lobbying for a change
in the Indonesian Forestry law and is the first forestry concession
in the country that is managed for conservation and restoration,
rather than for timber production. Similarly, together with the
Government in Sierra Leone, we have saved the Gola Forest from
being logged for timber. Instead, we have reached an agreement
with the local communities that they get compensation payments
in return for allowing the Gola Forest to be designated as National
Park.
In this submission we respond to questions 1,
2, 3, 4, 7 and 8 posed by the Committee.
Is the Kyoto Protocol still a relevant and effective
mechanism and how successful was the Bali conference?
1. The Kyoto Protocol is still highly relevant
and, indeed, is the only international climate regime that we
have until the end of 2012. It contains sound, well thought out
mechanisms on which many national and regional policy instruments
are based or make use of, for example, the EU Emissions Trading
Scheme and the Clean Development Mechanism. Just a few weeks into
its first commitment period it is hard to say how effective Kyoto
will be but it has already had a huge influence with its almost
global membership.
2. Kyoto would undoubtedly have been much
improved by the participation of the United States. Even at the
time it was agreed 10 years ago, it was only regarded as a first
step in terms of its emission reduction commitments which are
clearly inadequate to tackle climate change, hence the need for
a successful outcome in Bali.
3. In our opinion, the Bali conference was
successful in that it set up the inclusive, comprehensive process
contained in the Bali Action Plan. An indicator of success is
that in the run up to Bali, the EU proposed eight "building
blocks" that it considered would be needed in a successful
agreement and seven of these are included in the Action Plan,
the exception being emissions from international aviation and
shipping. Whilst this is an important omission, the key issue
in Bali was to establish the right process and there is a good
chance of adding more substance later.[1]
The main subject headings are in place in the Plan: the need for
an overall objective, the need for action on mitigation by both
developed and developing countries, adaptation, technology transfer
and financing. This is, in principle, enough to lead to a post-Kyoto
agreement that adequately addresses the climate change challenge.
4. Draft text in Bali contained reasonable
long and medium term objectives for emission reductions that were
removed, mainly at the instigation of the USA, although the IPCC
report from which they were taken remains referenced in a footnote.[2]
Given that these objectives were widely discussed during the course
of 2007 at a series of international meetings, we anticipate that
something along these lines will eventually be agreed, although
we may have to wait for a new US Administration.
5. A key feature, if not the key feature,
of the Bali Action Plan is that it was agreed by all countries
including, rather grudgingly, the USA. On balance, its weaknesses
in terms of substance were probably worth trading for its inclusivity,
bearing in mind that all likely candidates for the next US President
are in favour of action on climate change.
What needs to be done between now and Potznan?
6. This year, there will be four meetings
of the ad hoc working group on the Bali Action Plan at roughly
quarterly intervals, with the fourth being in parallel with the
Poznan meeting. There will also be at least one workshop on reducing
emissions from deforestation in developing countries (REDD). Taken
in conjunction with other related meetings, such as the UNFCCC
ad hoc working group on developing country commitments, the G8
and Gleneagles meetings, the major emitters meetings and so on,
this represents a very busy schedule for negotiators.
7. logically, the Bali Action Plan group
should first consider the overall objective but should this prove
difficult with, for example, the USA, it would be easy to begin
meaningful discussion on any one of the other major topics on
the Action Plan list.
8. Consideration also needs to be given
to the types of mitigation policy mechanisms that the post-2012
regime will contain. For example, whilst it should continue to
place binding targets on developed countries, continue the Kyoto
carbon markets and continue to recognise CDM credits, it is an
open question as to how to accommodate reducing emissions from
deforestation in developing countries (REDD) and more broadly,
ways in which developing countries might limit their emissions.
For example, Papua New Guinea (PNG) proposes a sectoral commitment
for REDD and this concept might be adopted for other sectors.
China might opt to take on an emission limitation commitment for
its electricity generation sector.
9. Emissions from international aviation
and shipping should be included in the debate but although the
politics of their inclusion are likely to be difficult, the mechanics
should be fairly simple. In the past, a lot of fuss has been made
about the difficulties of, for example, determining where to allocate
responsibility of emissions and how to deal with uncertainty.
In fact, there is little option but to allocate responsibility
for emissions to the point of sale of the fuel and there is uncertainty
associated with all emission estimates that can be dealt with
using existing IPCC methodologies.
How can "common but differentiated responsibilities"
be decided in such a way that ensures the engagement of all parties?
10. Although significant effort has been
made by both NGOs and some governments to develop fair and equitable
frameworks for emission reductions, these have for various reasons
had little traction in the global climate negotiations to date.
In part, this is because there are always some governments that
simply refuse to go down this route. For the past seven years
the US Administration has exemplified this position but it is
shown to some degree by many countries. For example, at present
India is less willing than South Africa, Brazil and China to take
an active part in discussions on what developing countries might
contribute to a post-2012 regime. In part, the situation also
arises because it is very hard to devise a truly comprehensive
framework that fits all. Some years ago, Brazil made a proposal
on how to account for historical responsibility which has a lot
of goodwill, resulted in some interesting discussions but which
has still to come to a conclusion.
11. In very general terms, a degree of fairness
and equity is acknowledged. All countries agree that developed
countries should take the lead in tackling climate change (as
enshrined in the Convention). They also agree that the poorest
countries that emit almost nothing should not have to do anything
on mitigation. There are, however, several large grey areas where
who needs to do what is unclear and the waters are muddied by
bad behaviour by a few. The emerging economies, especially South
Africa, China and Brazil, recognise that if climate change is
to be tackled then they need to take some action; the problem
simply will not be solved otherwise. Yet is it politically hard
for them to act in the absence of effort from the USA.
12. Having said this, there is now considerable
agreement on the sorts of emission reduction that are needed globally
and that may help shape the negotiations. Over the past year or
so there have been a series of meetings at which an increasing
number of nations have converging on agreeing on global emission
pathways, if not individual national ones. In terms of the global
pathways required, this emerging consensus largely built upon
the third assessment report of the IPCC and, in terms of shorter
term developed country targets, upon the proposals of the EU,
which were in turn based upon science. On 13 December, two days
prior to the conclusion of the Bali Action Plan, the draft Plan
stated that " . . . the Fourth Assessment Report of the IPCC
requires global emissions of greenhouse gases to peak in the next
10 to 15 years and be reduced to very low levels, well below half
of 2000 levels by 2050 . . . " It also stated that "
. . . recognising that much deeper cuts in emissions by developed
country Parties will be required and that Parties to the Kyoto
Protocol are considering the indicative range of emissions of
Parties included in Annex I to the Convention with a commitment
inscribed in Annex B of the Kyoto Protocol, as a group, of 25-40%
below 1990 levels by 2020 . . ."
13. Whilst this text was stripped out of
the final agreement, largely by the USA, reference is still made
in the Plan to the relevant pages of the IPCC text, the 50% reduction
goal was largely agreed in the Ad Hoc Working Group on developed
country commitments under Kyoto, and it is consistent with what
the main US Presidential candidates have been saying or is in
their election manifestos. It is thus likely that any final agreement
in Copenhagen in 2009 will contain similar text on the overall
objectives.
How might an agreement be reached with emerging
economies to ensure that their emissions trajectories move into
line with the need to reduce global emissions?
14. It has been clear for some time that
at least some of the major emerging economies appreciate that
they need to take action, certainly in the cases of Brazil, South
Africa and China, all of whom adopted positive stances in Bali.
Indeed, on some issues such as REDD, all of the major emerging
economies showed willingness for action. PNG led on REDD, Indonesia
played a very helpful role together with Brazil, and both India
and China constructive. Bearing in mind that tropical deforestation
accounts for about 20% of global emissions (roughly the same as
the USA) it was encouraging that all of the nations with such
forests were keen to act to stop these emissions.
15. Whilst poorer nations might make use
of the Clean Development Mechanism to limit their emissions, it
is clear that the CDM is inadequate to make serious inroads on
the emissions of large nations whose economies are growing rapidly.
China, for example, has the lion's share of CDM projects but their
effect on the Chinese economy is marginal. Access to far greater
financial flows is needed. In our opinion, such access would best
be gained by means of sectoral commitments. In such an agreement,
a developing nation would voluntarily undertake to limit its emissions
and obtain credit for any cut below this limit, in a very similar
way to that proposed for REDD by Papua New Guinea. This could
potentially unleash substantial amounts of money, if the carbon
market is driven by tight caps on developed countries.
16. Under such an approach developed countries
would essentially be paying developing countries to limit their
emissions which, at least in principle, is fair in terms of historical
responsibility. It is unlikely to be completely equitable, however,
in that larger countries with burgeoning economies would be likely
to benefit mostbut then they are also the countries with
the fastest growing emissions and thus need to receive the most
encouragement.
Is the Asia-Pacific partnership a complement or
a rival to the Kyoto Protocol? How is it likely to develop and
what is it likely to achieve?
17. The Partnership is not a rival because
its membership is limited and it has multiple objectives, encompassing
energy security, air pollution more generally, poverty reduction
and sustainable economic growth, as well as climate change.[3]
Also, its remit is limited to certain economic sectors, mainly
heavy industry. However, the partnership is both powerful and
influential because its members represent about half of the world's
economy, population and energy use, and they produce about 65%
of the world's coal, 48% of the world's steel, 37% of world's
aluminium, and 61% of the world's cement.
18. At times during the last few years,
the USA has clearly tried to establish the Partnership as a rival
to Kyoto but it has equally clearly failed, with even the Howard
government in Australia backing off. With new governments in Australia
and soon the USA, we suspect that the influence of the Partnership
is likely to be more benign, or at least less potentially harmful.
How might mechanisms to tackle emissions from
deforestation be developed?
19. A variety of proposals have been made
as to how the REDD regime might develop, ranging from a full market-based
approach by PNG to a fund-based approach from Brazil with several
limited market approaches in between. It is at present unclear
which option is likely to be agreed or, indeed, if another option
may emerge. The question foremost in most negotiators minds is
how to ensure that sufficient resources are delivered to negate
the drivers of deforestation and which mechanism would serve best
in this regard, rather than an in-principle preference for certain
types of mechanism. A widespread view is that market mechanisms
could deliver most money, but only if there are tight caps on
developed country emissionswhich cannot be assured. Voluntary
funds, on the other hand, have a poor record of delivering large
sums of money over long periods. (More than US$5 billion per year
are likely to be needed to make a significant impact on deforestation).
20. In our view, a single policy approach
may well be inappropriate and a step-by-step approach involving
different mechanisms might be more effective. This is simply because
most nations would find it very hard to implement a national sectoral
commitment in the near future, requiring far more capacity building
for several decades. Alternatively, a hybrid mechanism may work
best, with a limited market feeding money into a fund.[4]
How can we ensure that such mechanisms contribute
to wider sustainable development aims? Will such mechanisms deal
with the need to ensure the protection of indigenous people, land
use rights and governance?
21. We consider that it will be hard to
address wider socio-environmental concerns adequately. This is
because the negotiations take place in a United Nations treaty
on climate change. The UN believes absolutely in national sovereignty
and neither the treaty nor negotiators have a mandate to conclude
agreements on social justice or any other domestic matter within
states, other than those relating to climate change.
22. However, if there are existing international
agreements, especially UN agreements such as the Convention on
Biological Diversity, covering issues other than climate change
then it is a relatively simple matter to have the climate regime
recognise them and ask for them to be taken into account in its
legal texts. If there is no such agreement then it is perhaps
rather too much to expect the climate change regime to address
the problem. In fact, the REDD agreement from Bali does specifically
recognises that " . . . the needs of local and indigenous
communities should be addressed when action is taken to reduce
emissions from deforestation and degradation in developing countries
. . ."although this is not legally binding. We, of
course, will be arguing that biodiversity protection should also
be advanced through any REDD deal.
How might forest degradation be dealt with?
23. It was agreed in Bali to include degradation
in the negotiations. Whilst it was right to include degradation,
because it is often a precursor to deforestation and a significant
source of emissions in its own right, it is harder to estimate
the extent of changes in carbon stocks due to degradation than
to deforestation. Clear-cut deforestation can largely be assessed
by remote sensing, with some ground-truthing, but this is more
difficult for degradation where ground-based measurement is probably
generally required. Also, there are many different types of degradation
with many different definitions.
24. However, the negotiating group on REDD
has largely agreed that IPCC methodologies and good practice guidelines
should be employed for emission estimates and the higher (more
accurate) "tiers" of these are preferred. These employ
national definitions and methodologies, thus avoiding the need
for any new international ones. Moreover the IPCC guidelines,
overall, promote the so-called conservative approach, in which
credit is only given for what can be accurately estimated, ensuring
the reliability of estimates and encouraging nations to improve
their inventories. Nevertheless, estimating changing in carbon
stocks due to degradation remains a significant challenge.
Are additional mechanisms required to enable the
creation of carbon sinks?
25. It was agreed in Bali, at the insistence
of India, that the REDD negotiations should now include not only
reducing emissions from deforestation but also enhancement of
carbon stocks too; in other words, take into account carbon sequestration.
It is not yet clear precisely what this means but India clearly
intends that it should allow credit for reforestation, which India
is about to undertake, having already "stabilised" deforestation,
and which both China and Costa Rica are already doing.
26. Whilst it is many ways rational to include
all forest-related activities in one mechanism, this will complicate
the negotiations, if only because there is already a mechanism
for addressing afforestation and reforestation under the CDMthe
prospects of which now look uncertain. Also, the inclusion of
reforestation raises concerns about biodiversity; reducing emissions
from deforestation is always likely to be beneficial to the conservation
of "natural forests" but whilst reforestation would
benefit regeneration of such forests, significant money is likely
to be channelled into fast-growing monoculture plantations that
could give more immediate carbon benefit but do little or nothing
for wildlife.
January 2008
1 International transport emissions are not ruled out
and there are a number of items in the agreement where they could
be addressed. It should be noted, however, that there is significant
opposition to their inclusion by countries with major transport
hubs, including the USA. It was the Clinton not the Bush Presidency
that excluded them from Kyoto. Back
2
The draft text said that global greenhouse gas emissions should
peak and decline in the next 10-15 years and be cut to half of
2000 levels by 2050. It also said that developed country parties
to the Kyoto Protocol should cut their emissions by between 25
and 40% by 2020. Back
3
APP partners are Australia, Canada, China, India, Japan, Republic
of Korea, and the United States. Back
4
There are several proposals on this type of approach, including
from Greenpeace and the Centre for Clean Air Policy. Back
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