Select Committee on Environmental Audit Written Evidence


Memorandum submitted by the Royal Society for the Protection of Birds

SUMMARY

  The RSPB considers human-induced climate change, poses the biggest long-term threat to global biodiversity. To avoid a catastrophe for wildlife, anthropogenic greenhouse gas emissions need to be cut hard and rapidly, with global emissions peaking within the next ten years and then declining steeply, in the UK by at least 3% annually. We therefore support policies and measures that do so, in the UK, EU and internationally. In summary, the RSPB believes:

    —  The Kyoto Protocol is still highly relevant and is the only international climate regime that we have until the end of 2012.

    —  The Bali Action Plan agreed by all countries, including the USA, was an important outcome even though it should have included emissions from aviation and shipping.

    —  It will be difficult for some emerging economics such as South Africa, China and Brazil to fully come on board in the absence of effort from the USA, although this situation has the potential change as each of the main US presidential candidates appear committed to the global 50% reduction goal.

    —  The Asia-Pacific partnership has been damaged by the Bali agreement and its influence is likely to diminish.

    —  Development of mechanisms to tackle emissions from deforestation should include elements of both market-based and fund-based approaches.

INTRODUCTION

  The RSPB has a long history of involvement in the international climate change debate and works with BirdLife International Partners in to pilot projects, which aim to reduce emissions from deforestation in developing countries (REDD). We have saved 100,000 hectares of tropical lowland rain forest in Sumatra, Indonesia (one of the most biodiverse and one of the most threatened places in the world) from almost certain conversion to oil palm or timber plantations. This groundbreaking project, Harapan Rainforest, is the result of years of lobbying for a change in the Indonesian Forestry law and is the first forestry concession in the country that is managed for conservation and restoration, rather than for timber production. Similarly, together with the Government in Sierra Leone, we have saved the Gola Forest from being logged for timber. Instead, we have reached an agreement with the local communities that they get compensation payments in return for allowing the Gola Forest to be designated as National Park.

  In this submission we respond to questions 1, 2, 3, 4, 7 and 8 posed by the Committee.

Is the Kyoto Protocol still a relevant and effective mechanism and how successful was the Bali conference?

  1.  The Kyoto Protocol is still highly relevant and, indeed, is the only international climate regime that we have until the end of 2012. It contains sound, well thought out mechanisms on which many national and regional policy instruments are based or make use of, for example, the EU Emissions Trading Scheme and the Clean Development Mechanism. Just a few weeks into its first commitment period it is hard to say how effective Kyoto will be but it has already had a huge influence with its almost global membership.

  2.  Kyoto would undoubtedly have been much improved by the participation of the United States. Even at the time it was agreed 10 years ago, it was only regarded as a first step in terms of its emission reduction commitments which are clearly inadequate to tackle climate change, hence the need for a successful outcome in Bali.

  3.  In our opinion, the Bali conference was successful in that it set up the inclusive, comprehensive process contained in the Bali Action Plan. An indicator of success is that in the run up to Bali, the EU proposed eight "building blocks" that it considered would be needed in a successful agreement and seven of these are included in the Action Plan, the exception being emissions from international aviation and shipping. Whilst this is an important omission, the key issue in Bali was to establish the right process and there is a good chance of adding more substance later.[1] The main subject headings are in place in the Plan: the need for an overall objective, the need for action on mitigation by both developed and developing countries, adaptation, technology transfer and financing. This is, in principle, enough to lead to a post-Kyoto agreement that adequately addresses the climate change challenge.

  4.  Draft text in Bali contained reasonable long and medium term objectives for emission reductions that were removed, mainly at the instigation of the USA, although the IPCC report from which they were taken remains referenced in a footnote.[2] Given that these objectives were widely discussed during the course of 2007 at a series of international meetings, we anticipate that something along these lines will eventually be agreed, although we may have to wait for a new US Administration.

  5.  A key feature, if not the key feature, of the Bali Action Plan is that it was agreed by all countries including, rather grudgingly, the USA. On balance, its weaknesses in terms of substance were probably worth trading for its inclusivity, bearing in mind that all likely candidates for the next US President are in favour of action on climate change.

What needs to be done between now and Potznan?

  6.  This year, there will be four meetings of the ad hoc working group on the Bali Action Plan at roughly quarterly intervals, with the fourth being in parallel with the Poznan meeting. There will also be at least one workshop on reducing emissions from deforestation in developing countries (REDD). Taken in conjunction with other related meetings, such as the UNFCCC ad hoc working group on developing country commitments, the G8 and Gleneagles meetings, the major emitters meetings and so on, this represents a very busy schedule for negotiators.

  7.  logically, the Bali Action Plan group should first consider the overall objective but should this prove difficult with, for example, the USA, it would be easy to begin meaningful discussion on any one of the other major topics on the Action Plan list.

  8.  Consideration also needs to be given to the types of mitigation policy mechanisms that the post-2012 regime will contain. For example, whilst it should continue to place binding targets on developed countries, continue the Kyoto carbon markets and continue to recognise CDM credits, it is an open question as to how to accommodate reducing emissions from deforestation in developing countries (REDD) and more broadly, ways in which developing countries might limit their emissions. For example, Papua New Guinea (PNG) proposes a sectoral commitment for REDD and this concept might be adopted for other sectors. China might opt to take on an emission limitation commitment for its electricity generation sector.

  9.  Emissions from international aviation and shipping should be included in the debate but although the politics of their inclusion are likely to be difficult, the mechanics should be fairly simple. In the past, a lot of fuss has been made about the difficulties of, for example, determining where to allocate responsibility of emissions and how to deal with uncertainty. In fact, there is little option but to allocate responsibility for emissions to the point of sale of the fuel and there is uncertainty associated with all emission estimates that can be dealt with using existing IPCC methodologies.

How can "common but differentiated responsibilities" be decided in such a way that ensures the engagement of all parties?

  10.  Although significant effort has been made by both NGOs and some governments to develop fair and equitable frameworks for emission reductions, these have for various reasons had little traction in the global climate negotiations to date. In part, this is because there are always some governments that simply refuse to go down this route. For the past seven years the US Administration has exemplified this position but it is shown to some degree by many countries. For example, at present India is less willing than South Africa, Brazil and China to take an active part in discussions on what developing countries might contribute to a post-2012 regime. In part, the situation also arises because it is very hard to devise a truly comprehensive framework that fits all. Some years ago, Brazil made a proposal on how to account for historical responsibility which has a lot of goodwill, resulted in some interesting discussions but which has still to come to a conclusion.

  11.  In very general terms, a degree of fairness and equity is acknowledged. All countries agree that developed countries should take the lead in tackling climate change (as enshrined in the Convention). They also agree that the poorest countries that emit almost nothing should not have to do anything on mitigation. There are, however, several large grey areas where who needs to do what is unclear and the waters are muddied by bad behaviour by a few. The emerging economies, especially South Africa, China and Brazil, recognise that if climate change is to be tackled then they need to take some action; the problem simply will not be solved otherwise. Yet is it politically hard for them to act in the absence of effort from the USA.

  12.  Having said this, there is now considerable agreement on the sorts of emission reduction that are needed globally and that may help shape the negotiations. Over the past year or so there have been a series of meetings at which an increasing number of nations have converging on agreeing on global emission pathways, if not individual national ones. In terms of the global pathways required, this emerging consensus largely built upon the third assessment report of the IPCC and, in terms of shorter term developed country targets, upon the proposals of the EU, which were in turn based upon science. On 13 December, two days prior to the conclusion of the Bali Action Plan, the draft Plan stated that " . . . the Fourth Assessment Report of the IPCC requires global emissions of greenhouse gases to peak in the next 10 to 15 years and be reduced to very low levels, well below half of 2000 levels by 2050 . . . " It also stated that " . . . recognising that much deeper cuts in emissions by developed country Parties will be required and that Parties to the Kyoto Protocol are considering the indicative range of emissions of Parties included in Annex I to the Convention with a commitment inscribed in Annex B of the Kyoto Protocol, as a group, of 25-40% below 1990 levels by 2020 . . ."

  13.  Whilst this text was stripped out of the final agreement, largely by the USA, reference is still made in the Plan to the relevant pages of the IPCC text, the 50% reduction goal was largely agreed in the Ad Hoc Working Group on developed country commitments under Kyoto, and it is consistent with what the main US Presidential candidates have been saying or is in their election manifestos. It is thus likely that any final agreement in Copenhagen in 2009 will contain similar text on the overall objectives.

How might an agreement be reached with emerging economies to ensure that their emissions trajectories move into line with the need to reduce global emissions?

  14.  It has been clear for some time that at least some of the major emerging economies appreciate that they need to take action, certainly in the cases of Brazil, South Africa and China, all of whom adopted positive stances in Bali. Indeed, on some issues such as REDD, all of the major emerging economies showed willingness for action. PNG led on REDD, Indonesia played a very helpful role together with Brazil, and both India and China constructive. Bearing in mind that tropical deforestation accounts for about 20% of global emissions (roughly the same as the USA) it was encouraging that all of the nations with such forests were keen to act to stop these emissions.

  15.  Whilst poorer nations might make use of the Clean Development Mechanism to limit their emissions, it is clear that the CDM is inadequate to make serious inroads on the emissions of large nations whose economies are growing rapidly. China, for example, has the lion's share of CDM projects but their effect on the Chinese economy is marginal. Access to far greater financial flows is needed. In our opinion, such access would best be gained by means of sectoral commitments. In such an agreement, a developing nation would voluntarily undertake to limit its emissions and obtain credit for any cut below this limit, in a very similar way to that proposed for REDD by Papua New Guinea. This could potentially unleash substantial amounts of money, if the carbon market is driven by tight caps on developed countries.

  16.  Under such an approach developed countries would essentially be paying developing countries to limit their emissions which, at least in principle, is fair in terms of historical responsibility. It is unlikely to be completely equitable, however, in that larger countries with burgeoning economies would be likely to benefit most—but then they are also the countries with the fastest growing emissions and thus need to receive the most encouragement.

Is the Asia-Pacific partnership a complement or a rival to the Kyoto Protocol? How is it likely to develop and what is it likely to achieve?

  17.  The Partnership is not a rival because its membership is limited and it has multiple objectives, encompassing energy security, air pollution more generally, poverty reduction and sustainable economic growth, as well as climate change.[3] Also, its remit is limited to certain economic sectors, mainly heavy industry. However, the partnership is both powerful and influential because its members represent about half of the world's economy, population and energy use, and they produce about 65% of the world's coal, 48% of the world's steel, 37% of world's aluminium, and 61% of the world's cement.

  18.  At times during the last few years, the USA has clearly tried to establish the Partnership as a rival to Kyoto but it has equally clearly failed, with even the Howard government in Australia backing off. With new governments in Australia and soon the USA, we suspect that the influence of the Partnership is likely to be more benign, or at least less potentially harmful.

How might mechanisms to tackle emissions from deforestation be developed?

  19.  A variety of proposals have been made as to how the REDD regime might develop, ranging from a full market-based approach by PNG to a fund-based approach from Brazil with several limited market approaches in between. It is at present unclear which option is likely to be agreed or, indeed, if another option may emerge. The question foremost in most negotiators minds is how to ensure that sufficient resources are delivered to negate the drivers of deforestation and which mechanism would serve best in this regard, rather than an in-principle preference for certain types of mechanism. A widespread view is that market mechanisms could deliver most money, but only if there are tight caps on developed country emissions—which cannot be assured. Voluntary funds, on the other hand, have a poor record of delivering large sums of money over long periods. (More than US$5 billion per year are likely to be needed to make a significant impact on deforestation).

  20.  In our view, a single policy approach may well be inappropriate and a step-by-step approach involving different mechanisms might be more effective. This is simply because most nations would find it very hard to implement a national sectoral commitment in the near future, requiring far more capacity building for several decades. Alternatively, a hybrid mechanism may work best, with a limited market feeding money into a fund.[4]

How can we ensure that such mechanisms contribute to wider sustainable development aims? Will such mechanisms deal with the need to ensure the protection of indigenous people, land use rights and governance?

  21.  We consider that it will be hard to address wider socio-environmental concerns adequately. This is because the negotiations take place in a United Nations treaty on climate change. The UN believes absolutely in national sovereignty and neither the treaty nor negotiators have a mandate to conclude agreements on social justice or any other domestic matter within states, other than those relating to climate change.

  22.  However, if there are existing international agreements, especially UN agreements such as the Convention on Biological Diversity, covering issues other than climate change then it is a relatively simple matter to have the climate regime recognise them and ask for them to be taken into account in its legal texts. If there is no such agreement then it is perhaps rather too much to expect the climate change regime to address the problem. In fact, the REDD agreement from Bali does specifically recognises that " . . . the needs of local and indigenous communities should be addressed when action is taken to reduce emissions from deforestation and degradation in developing countries . . ."—although this is not legally binding. We, of course, will be arguing that biodiversity protection should also be advanced through any REDD deal.

How might forest degradation be dealt with?

  23.  It was agreed in Bali to include degradation in the negotiations. Whilst it was right to include degradation, because it is often a precursor to deforestation and a significant source of emissions in its own right, it is harder to estimate the extent of changes in carbon stocks due to degradation than to deforestation. Clear-cut deforestation can largely be assessed by remote sensing, with some ground-truthing, but this is more difficult for degradation where ground-based measurement is probably generally required. Also, there are many different types of degradation with many different definitions.

  24.  However, the negotiating group on REDD has largely agreed that IPCC methodologies and good practice guidelines should be employed for emission estimates and the higher (more accurate) "tiers" of these are preferred. These employ national definitions and methodologies, thus avoiding the need for any new international ones. Moreover the IPCC guidelines, overall, promote the so-called conservative approach, in which credit is only given for what can be accurately estimated, ensuring the reliability of estimates and encouraging nations to improve their inventories. Nevertheless, estimating changing in carbon stocks due to degradation remains a significant challenge.

Are additional mechanisms required to enable the creation of carbon sinks?

  25.  It was agreed in Bali, at the insistence of India, that the REDD negotiations should now include not only reducing emissions from deforestation but also enhancement of carbon stocks too; in other words, take into account carbon sequestration. It is not yet clear precisely what this means but India clearly intends that it should allow credit for reforestation, which India is about to undertake, having already "stabilised" deforestation, and which both China and Costa Rica are already doing.

  26.  Whilst it is many ways rational to include all forest-related activities in one mechanism, this will complicate the negotiations, if only because there is already a mechanism for addressing afforestation and reforestation under the CDM—the prospects of which now look uncertain. Also, the inclusion of reforestation raises concerns about biodiversity; reducing emissions from deforestation is always likely to be beneficial to the conservation of "natural forests" but whilst reforestation would benefit regeneration of such forests, significant money is likely to be channelled into fast-growing monoculture plantations that could give more immediate carbon benefit but do little or nothing for wildlife.

January 2008






1   International transport emissions are not ruled out and there are a number of items in the agreement where they could be addressed. It should be noted, however, that there is significant opposition to their inclusion by countries with major transport hubs, including the USA. It was the Clinton not the Bush Presidency that excluded them from Kyoto. Back

2   The draft text said that global greenhouse gas emissions should peak and decline in the next 10-15 years and be cut to half of 2000 levels by 2050. It also said that developed country parties to the Kyoto Protocol should cut their emissions by between 25 and 40% by 2020. Back

3   APP partners are Australia, Canada, China, India, Japan, Republic of Korea, and the United States. Back

4   There are several proposals on this type of approach, including from Greenpeace and the Centre for Clean Air Policy. Back


 
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