Select Committee on Environmental Audit Written Evidence


Memorandum submitted by Sindicatum Carbon Capital

INTRODUCTION

    —  Sindicatum Carbon Capital (SCC) welcomes the Environmental Audit Committee's emphasis, throughout this Parliament, on climate change-related issues. It also welcomes the opportunity to contribute to this important Committee inquiry. It believes that the inquiry is timely, too, with 2008 marking the third anniversary of the Kyoto Protocol coming into effect (in February).

    —  SCC supports both the Kyoto Protocol and the new "global green currency" system which it created, through the introduction, for example, of carbon pricing and credits for reductions in the emission of greenhouse gases (GHG). Similarly, SCC welcomed the emphasis on market-based solutions to environmental challenges that was contained in last year's very positive report from the Commission on Environmental Markets and Economic Performance.

    —  The timeliness of the Environmental Audit Committee's inquiry is demonstrated by the fact that 2008 is likely to be the year in which the generation, carbon market capitalisation will pass the $1 trillion mark worldwide.[5] Sindicatum believes that the scale of this market, and London's leading role within it, is poorly understood.

SINDICATUM CARBON CAPITAL

    —  SCC is a UK-based developer of pollution abatement projects in the global emerging markets. It provides a combination of finance, technical expertise and project management to develop major, cost-effective greenhouse gas reduction projects. SCC's shareholders include Citigroup, AIG (the world's largest insurer), and Black River Asset Management (a wholly-owned subsidiary of Cargill).

    —  Areas of specialisation include abating Greenhouse Gas (GHG) emissions from the oil and gas, chemicals, waste management and natural resource sectors, as well as energy efficiency. SCC's commercial strategy is to provide its shareholders with strong capital growth combined with a manageable risk profile through direct investment as an "end-to-end" developer in projects that reduce greenhouse gases and, as such, result in the "manufacture" of environmental commodities and in the generation of cleaner power. The company uses its experienced management team to select the best investment opportunities and to deploy advanced and best-of-breed technologies to become the preferred partner and source of capital to qualifying asset owners worldwide.

    —  SCC has detailed knowledge of the economic incentives, created by the Kyoto Protocol, which can encourage both developed and developing countries to reduce their greenhouse gas emissions. SCC believes that people, companies and governments are not going to reduce pollution just because there are rules urging them to do so; they are going to reduce it because of the financial incentives and benefits of doing so.

  Our response will focus on the Committee's questions as far as SCC's experience is relevant.

1.   Is the Kyoto Protocol still a relevant and effective mechanism? How successful was the Bali conference? Does the roadmap contain all that is needed to lead to a post-Kyoto agreement that adequately addresses the climate change challenge? Will the roadmap focus on implementation issues or will it come to an agreement on a stabilisation level? How do we ensure that no key parties are left out of the process?

  SCC believes that the Kyoto Protocol remains a relevant and effective mechanism through which global greenhouse gas emissions can be reduced. SCC believes that a market-based mechanism is the only way in which deep and wide-ranging cuts in greenhouse gas emissions can be delivered within the timescale that the International Panel on Climate Change (IPCC) tell us is required. The Bali Conference was a success in that it continued progress towards a second commitment period but was disappointing in that it stopped short of setting any new targets.

  However, with the political situation in the US, any agreement was always going to be weak, and the Parties must now strive to build on the changes in attitude that a new US Administration may bring to the table. The best way of ensuring that no key parties are left out of the process is to demonstrate that:

    —  greenhouse gas emission reductions and caps on emissions do not impose significant costs or burdens on economies;

    —  there are positive benefits of reducing greenhouse gas emissions in the form of reduced energy costs; and

    —  reduced energy consumption is a strategic goal closely aligned to energy security

2.   What needs to be done between now and Poznan? Emissions from international aviation and shipping were not included in the Bali roadmap. Why did this happen and what can be done to address these emissions?

  Successful climate change mitigation will require action on a global scale and, in particular, it requires massive investment in new technology, research and development delivering significant results within a short time period. We believe that it is important to focus immediately on those sectors which have the potential make a significant contribution to global greenhouse gas emissions in the short term. Consideration must be given to immediate climate control mitigation policies, such as methane emissions and emissions of other industrial gases, whilst longer term targets are established using technologies such as CO2 sequestration, energy efficiency and renewable and nuclear energy.

  In order to address the climate change challenge, SCC has invested heavily in specialist teams operating in key areas where we believe that opportunities exist to significantly reduce greenhouse gas emissions in the short to medium term; these are land-fill gas, coal mine methane, energy and industrial emissions, and oil and gas.

  Globally, landfills are the third largest source of man-made emissions. Methane from landfills and coal mines is 21 times more powerful than carbon dioxide at affecting global warming. In the coal mining sector, methane also represents a major safety problem for miners and loss of value for mine owners. By 2020, the world's coal mines are expected to produce annual emissions of 153 million metric tons of CO2 equivalent in the form of un-treated or un-utilized methane.

  International shipping and aviation were excluded from the scope of the Kyoto Protocol because, by definition, they arise outside national boundaries and are not considered to be the responsibility of any one nation. The International Air Transport Association (IATA) and the International Maritime Organization (IMO) were both given responsibility for progressing the issue within their respective industries, but little progress has been made to date. Both sources could be included simply by agreement between the countries hosting the port of origin and the port of destination, as is now being proposed for aviation within the European Union Emissions Trading Scheme (EU ETS). There are also technologies that will deliver incremental reductions in greenhouse gas emissions in both industries and a system of international cap and trade could be used to limit the impact of growth in emissions.

EMISSION REDUCTION FRAMEWORKS

3.   How can "common but differentiated responsibilities" be decided in such a way that ensures the engagement of all parties? How can equity concerns regarding the allocation of mitigation targets and historical responsibility for climate change emissions be reconciled?

  A large part of the answer lies in the provision of technology and investment by Annex I parties to Non-Annex I parties, to help the latter to develop in less greenhouse gas intensive ways. Helping Non-Annex I Parties avoid lock-in to carbon intensive technologies now, will benefit them greatly in the future. For example, helping such countries develop efficient mass rapid transport systems will help them avoid the misery of traffic congestion.

  Allocation is a function of historic emission levels and the availability of technology to reduce greenhouse gas emissions. Whilst allocation is an emotive issue, the European Commission has gained considerable experience in the allocation of EU Allowances (EUA) through the National Allocation Planning process. Guidance should be taken from the European Commission's experience to date. Above all, the ultimate goal and the likely cost of failure to act should be borne in mind.

  Equity concerns are addressed through the provision of flexibility mechanisms, giving parties options as to how they achieve their targets. Domestic action and trade are, of course, the main flexibility mechanisms and the Clean Development Mechanism (CDM) has shown that there is a plentiful supply of additional emission reductions that can be used to take the brunt of equity concerns. Maintaining an appropriate price for carbon is key so that Parties and industries can make the required cuts without significant financial costs.

4.   How might an agreement be reached with emerging economies to ensure that their emissions trajectories move into line with the need to reduce global emissions? How might developing countries' need to expand their economies be reconciled with controls on emissions?

  Emerging economies must be helped in order to avoid being locked into high greenhouse gas emission positions. This can be achieved through the provision of technology and investment. In practice this should, for example, involve carbon capture and sequestration; a more beneficial and practical approach to recognising the storage of carbon in forests; greater support for the implementation of hydro power (instead of excluding it from the EU ETS through the application of the World Commission on Dams Guidelines); and wind and solar power applications.

  Of the emerging economies, China is by far the most significant. China accounts for 77% of world's growth in coal consumption, and coal production will double by 2020 if its economic growth is maintained. China will be dependent on coal for about 70% of its power generation for the foreseeable future. China must be convinced that concerted international action on climate change is not a ruse to restrain its economic potential. This can be achieved by demonstrating that partnerships such as that between SCC and Shanxi Coking Coal Group are mutually beneficial. (See question 5 for more detail).

  Methane emissions from coal mining can be substantially reduced by a combination of established and emerging technologies. Using technology pioneered by SCC, near-zero methane emissions coal mining is a practicable proposition and should be promoted as an important intermediate climate control mitigation policy ahead of CO2 capture and sequestration.

ADAPTATION AND TECHNOLOGY

5.   Is there adequate support for developing countries to adapt to climate change? Should there be binding targets for funding and how could these be decided? How will funding for climate change mitigation or adaptation interact with existing aid budgets? Will such funding contribute to wider sustainable development goals?

  Adaptation to climate change needs to take place in hundreds of thousands of individual installations across dozens of countries. The kinds of actions can be broadly divided into non-CO2 abatement and CO2 abatement activities. The former include potent gases such as sulphur hexafluoride (SF6), hydrofluorocarbons (HFC23), di-nitrous oxide (N2O) and Methane (CH4), whilst the latter is CO2—usually from the combustion of fossil fuels. Many of the non-CO2 abatement activities have already been addressed by the market mechanisms under the Clean Development Mechanism (CDM) because, particularly in the case of HFC23 and some N2O projects, they are massively profitable when carbon prices are in excess a $2 or $3 per tonne CO2e. Joint Implementation (JI) has yet to deliver on these.

  In retrospect, some of these activities could have been addressed via a global fund such as the Global Environment Facility (GEF) because, by and large they are non-revenue generating and are the result of un-intended industrial developments. CO2 emission reductions come from energy efficiency programmes and renewable energy, which have an underlying financial driver (although there are also significant CO2 emissions from some processes such as cement manufacture, which are harder to reduce because the CO2 comes from chemical reactions which are fundamental to the products). It has already been shown that with a CDM element, many such programmes can be encouraged Carbon Capture and Sequestration (CCS) is somewhat similar to the former category of Non-CO2 GHG abatement projects. There are no revenues involved; the quantities of greenhouse gas emission reductions are potentially very large and consequently they have the potential to impact upon the distribution of wealth. CCS could be dealt with via an international fund delivering benefit for the world's population without distorting trading regimes.

  The developing counties are right to demand that official development assistance is not used to pay for greenhouse gas emission reduction activities, because to do so would simply support the donors' standard of living.

  SCC believes that successful climate change mitigation can most efficiently be achieved by encouraging market-based solutions, underpinned by a secure regulatory framework. SCC harnesses the profit incentive in order to help developing countries respond to the challenge of reducing greenhouse gas emissions. SCC is a major player in promoting the development and implementation of new technologies in mitigation of greenhouse gas emissions. Unlike other project developers, SCC takes a principal position in its projects, using its capital and technology to create long-term emissions reductions, which generate emissions credits—as opposed to buying forward credits. These are sold on in the market and the profits are fed back to SCC investors.

  Taking our "near-zero" methane emissions coal mining project as an example, SCC encourages participation from developing and transitional countries by providing selected project owners with:

    —  Full technical support during project implementation to ensure project delivery and maximisation of emission reductions.

    —  Priority allocation of new and innovative mitigation technologies developed by SCC.

    —  A gas drainage audit report which provides recommendations and assistance in enhancing gas capture and quality.

    —  Technology transfer and training.

    —  Generation of electricity & heat, often in areas of unreliable supply.

    —  Creation of additional revenue streams by selling carbon credits and electricity.

    —  Attractive commercial terms at low risk.

  SCC will identify and introduce new technology where existing equipment and practices are limiting gas capture performance. SCC believes this is the kind of support that developing countries require to tackle their greenhouse gas emission effectively.

  Methane from coal represents 8% of worldwide greenhouse gas emissions and China is the world's largest coal producer, mining almost nine times more coal from underground longwalls than the USA—the second largest coal producer in the world. China emits over 43% of the global methane released by coal mining and this could rise to more than 50% by 2020, representing 450 million tonnes CO2e. At best, conventional approaches will mitigate 15% of this amount. More than 70% of methane released by coal mining is diluted to safe, low concentrations (generally < 1%) by ventilation air. SCC has developed a near-zero methane emissions coal mining strategy which can be widely replicated to achieve significantly greater reductions.

  SCC believes that its holistic approach of maximising gas capture, optimising utilisation of drained gas, flaring surplus methane and destroying Ventilation Air Methane (VAM) at the surface exhaust fans will ultimately facilitate near-zero methane emissions coal mining. These projects qualify for carbon credits under the Kyoto Mechanisms and Voluntary schemes, making them economically sustainable.

6.   Is there effective international coordination on technology R&D? How might technology transfer to developed countries be improved? How does technology transfer interact with international trade rules? How effectively do Government technology programmes, such as the Energy Technologies Institute, lead to technology development and transfer to developing countries? How effective are UK Government measures to assist developing countries to reduce emissions?

  In not agreeing to host Joint Implementation (JI) projects, the UK Government is failing to show leadership to other countries. In the Climate Change Bill, the Government justified the exclusion of non-CO2 greenhouse gases from the EU ETS and its refusal to host JI projects on the grounds that the sources of gas were too small and technologies were not available to reduce the emissions. However, SCC feels that the purpose of a market-based mechanism is to stimulate the development of new technologies. The fact that sources of greenhouse gases are insignificant in the UK does not mean that the UK Government should not promote technologies that may be of benefit in other countries and which the UK could export to those countries, either through the private sector under CDM and JI or through Government-sponsored programmes.

  In this respect, SCC is promoting the abatement of Ventilation Air Methane from coal mines, of which there are several notable sources in the UK. But without JI, there is no mechanism to implement such a technology in the UK.

7.   Is the Asia-Pacific partnership a complement or a rival to the Kyoto Protocol? How is it likely to develop and what is it likely to achieve?

  No SCC position.

MECHANISMS

8.   How might mechanisms to tackle emissions from deforestation be developed? How can we ensure that such mechanisms contribute to wider sustainable development aims? Will such mechanisms deal with the need to ensure the protection of indigenous people, land use rights and governance? How might forest degradation be dealt with? Are additional mechanisms required to enable the creation of carbon sinks?

  Under the Kyoto Protocol, Annex I Parties are required to account for the changes in stocks of carbon stored in various land-use activities. As a result, a decrease in carbons stored in forests is counted as an emission of carbon, to be made up with excess Assigned Amount Units (AAUs). There is no theoretical reason why the same approach could not be undertaken in Non-Annex I Parties where an increase in forest cover and carbon stored in the forests is rewarded through the existing cap and trade mechanisms; a decrease in carbon stock need not be penalized. Such a positive approach would encourage developing countries to change their land-use policies. The links to sustainable development and conservation of biodiversity are very significant and too numerous to elaborate here.

  The mechanism that is required is wall-to-wall accounting of forest carbon stocks with reward for increases in carbon stocks, via the international cap and trade markets, at a government to government level. There are issues to be addressed, such as catastrophic loss of carbon through drought and fire, for instance, and the size of the task to inventory carbon stocks, but the scale of the problem means that it merits considerable attention and political resolve.

9.   Are the Clean Development and Joint Implementation Mechanisms functioning effectively? How might they be improved? How might they better be used in relation to forestry or other land use emission reduction projects? Should CDM and JI projects play a greater role in sustainable development more widely? To what extent should credits such as those from the CDM and JI be permitted to be used in emissions trading schemes, or contribute to emissions reduction targets?

  CDM and JI are the two main flexibility mechanisms within the Kyoto Protocol. They play several fundamental roles. For example, they provide a route of participation for Non-Annex 1 countries; they also provide a flexible project-based mechanism driven by the private sector, which can quickly and efficiently allocate resources to find the most cost-effective means of reducing emissions.

  At the outset of the Kyoto negotiations, a reduction in greenhouse gas emissions amounting to one tonne of carbon dioxide equivalents (CO2e) was considered equivalent to another, irrespective of whether they were generated from a HFC 23 abatement facility in China or a small-scale renewable energy project in Africa. The justification for this was that both actions have the same environmental impact and the market was the means of allocating resources most efficiently to achieve global reductions at the lowest cost.

  More recently, and most recently in the EC's guidelines for Phase 3 of the EU ETS, there is an increasing discrimination between emission reductions of different kinds. First, the EU ETS excluded forestry-based credits, then the World Commission on Dams (WCD) guidelines were cited as a screening tool for all hydro power dams over 20 MW. In the most recent guidelines, there is a distinct preference for renewable energy and energy efficiency credits. The WCD guidelines are not an effective means of assessing hydro dams because there is no international dam certification programme; the guidelines are unwieldy and do not make adequate provision for dams which are already under construction without adhering to the guidelines.

  SCC believes that limiting the access to CDM and JI credits, in order to address the issue of supplementarity, the Parties have unwittingly undermined the value of the flexibility mechanisms. The Kyoto Protocol is about reducing global greenhouse gas emissions and promoting sustainable development, but, through the Linking Directive and rules on supplementarity, more emphasis has been placed on domestic interests above the over-reaching goal of reducing greenhouse gas emissions.

  It is true that industrial gas abatement projects contribute little other than tax revenues to the host country's sustainable development benefits; however, contribution to sustainable development is a sovereign issue. In conclusion, relatively un-limited access to CDM and JI credits would have the dual benefits of enabling Annex 1 Parties to make deeper cuts in greenhouse gas emissions without imposing significant costs on industry and the promotion of sustainable benefits in Non-Annex I countries.

  SCC currently has one Clean Development Mechanism (CDM) project under review by the mechanism's Executive Board. This Indonesian-based project, in conjunction with Indonesian gas company Odira, captures associated gases from oil production at the Tambun and Pondak Tengah oil fields in West Java. The captured gas is then piped into the gas distribution network; previously it would have been flared.

  The Clean Development Mechanism rewards voluntary reductions in GHG emissions from flaring. Flaring emissions are currently estimated to be 300 million tons of carbon dioxide equivalents (CO2e) per year. Our specialist Flaring Reduction team works with resource owners to identify appropriate development solutions for natural gas capture and utilisation projects—qualifying the projects, in the process, for carbon credits under the Clean Development Mechanism. SCC's Flaring Reduction team seeks to offer an integrated CDM project development solution based on:

    —  Access to industry best practice in technology, operations and programme management.

    —  Infrastructure development.

    —  Access to appropriate technologies.

    —  Access to funding.

    —  Access to economic value from the associated gas.

10.   What action is the Government taking to prepare for and accelerate the linking of the EU Emissions Trading Scheme with other trading schemes? Is a new institutional or regulatory framework required to enable their development and coordination? How might schemes be linked where they have different emission caps? Might the EUETS be undermined by linking with other schemes?

  The only threat to the EU ETS is linkage to schemes that allow non-additional projects to generate credits that are interchangeable with EU Allowances, Certified Emission Reductions (CERs) or Emission Reduction Units (ERUs). Different levels of emission caps are a short term issue; the key point is that participating countries should all be making sufficiently deep cuts in emission allowances and auctioning an increasing proportion of those allowances to ensure that industries do not benefit from distortions in international trade and windfall profits.

CONCLUSION

  The market for environmental allowances, an emerging asset class, is approaching $1 trillion in market capitalisation. This is equivalent to the stock market capitalisation of the Toronto Stock Exchange, the seventh largest in the world, or to half of the total size of the companies traded on the London Stock Exchange. SCC believes that a valuation approaching $1 trillion reflects the growing importance of markets for pollution permits and credits. A figure of this size is noteworthy and something worth celebrating.

  The $1 trillion total speaks volumes for the commitment from policy-makers, regulators, business leaders and a host of other players to make emissions trading the tool of choice to tackle environmental resource allocation. Momentum of this magnitude cannot fail to attract a high level of attention from the financial markets and we can already see many innovative mechanisms being applied to environmental issues.

  In 2007, the United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change (UNFCCC) announced that the CDM was on course to generate 1 billion certified emission reductions (CERs) by the end of 2012. This figure does not incorporate the risk of project under-performance or failure, but more projects are in the pipeline, so it is probably not unrealistic. Assuming an average price of $10 per CER (which represents one tonne of CO2e), this market is currently valued at around $10 billion to the end of 2012.

  These figures reflect that an increasing proportion of the world's economy is recognising and quantifying significant environmental assets and liabilities which, 10 years ago, were not even on the agenda. The industry which has emerged to capitalise on this market, underpinned by the generation and trade in carbon credits, in which SCC is a leading player, demonstrates both the relevance and the effectiveness of the mechanisms.

GLOSSARY

Annex I Parties

  The industrialized countries listed in the annex to the Convention on Climate Change that were committed to return their greenhouse-gas emissions to 1990 levels by the year 2000 as per Article 4.2 (a) and (b). They have also accepted emissions targets for the period 2008-12 as per Article 3 and Annex B of the Kyoto Protocol. They include the 24 original OECD members, the European Union, and 14 countries with economies in transition. (Croatia, Liechtenstein, Monaco, and Slovenia joined Annex 1 at COP-3, and the Czech Republic and Slovakia replaced Czechoslovakia.)

Assigned Amount Unit (AAU)

  A Kyoto Protocol unit equal to 1 metric tonne of CO2 equivalent. Each Annex I Party issues AAUs up to the level of its assigned amount, established pursuant to Article 3, paragraphs 7 and 8, of the Kyoto Protocol. Assigned amount units may be exchanged through emissions trading.

Certified Emission Reductions (CER)

  A Kyoto Protocol unit equal to 1 metric tonne of CO2 equivalent. CERs are issued for emission reductions from CDM project activities. Two special types of CERs—called temporary certified emission reduction (tCERs) and long-term certified emission reductions (lCERs)—are issued for emission removals from afforestation and reforestation CDM projects.

Clean Development Mechanism (CDM)

  A mechanism under the Kyoto Protocol through which developed countries may finance greenhouse-gas emission reduction or removal projects in developing countries, and receive credits for doing so which they may apply towards meeting mandatory limits on their own emissions.

Emission Reduction Unit (ERU)

  A Kyoto Protocol unit equal to 1 metric tonne of CO2 equivalent. ERUs are generated for emission reductions or emission removals from joint implementation projects.

EUA

  EU Allowance (C02-emissions).

Global Environment Facility (GEF)

  GEF is an independent financial organization, established in 1991, that provides grants to developing countries for projects that benefit the global environment and promote sustainable livelihoods in local communities. GEF grants support projects related to biodiversity, climate change, international waters, land degradation, the ozone layer, and persistent organic pollutants.

Greenhouse Gases (GHGs)

  The atmospheric gases responsible for causing global warming and climate change. The major GHGs are carbon dioxide (CO2), methane (CH4) and nitrous oxide (N20). Less prevalent but very powerful greenhouse gases are hydrofluorocarbons (HFCs), perfluorocarbons (PFCs) and sulphur hexafluoride (SF6).

Non-Annex I Parties

  Refers to countries that have ratified or acceded to the United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change that are not included in Annex I of the Convention—mostly developing countries.







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