Select Committee on Environment, Food and Rural Affairs Minutes of Evidence


Examination of Witnesses (Questions 20 - 39)

TUESDAY 23 OCTOBER 2007

RT HON HILARY BENN MP

  Q20  Mr Gray: We are going to come back to that precise question on Bluetongue in a moment but the nature of my question was not that, the nature of my question was this, if you are saying in the future the livestock industry are gong to have the fantastic privilege of sharing decisions with the Government, then presumably there must be decisions which the livestock industry are not currently sharing with Government. What I want to get from you is one example, any example of any decision which the livestock industry should have been sharing with Government but has not and, indeed, of course, a supplementary question to that would be, if they have not, why have they not because surely you ought to be consulting with the livestock industry?

  Hilary Benn: With respect, sharing with Government, in what circumstances? In relation to diseases which are zoonotic, where there is both an implication for animal health and human health, then obviously the Government has got to play a part, but if you take Bluetongue then I do not see in future why a decision about where you would draw those control zones, in this case actually should not be taken by a body—we have not yet worked out exactly what it is going to look like—representing the industry, there may be Government representation on it. I would envisage a different system in future where the holder of this office was not taking a decision like that because, fundamentally, Mr Gray, the impact is felt by the industry. There is a trade-off, as we know, in relation to Bluetongue as to where you draw the boundaries.

  Q21  Mr Gray: Forgive me, I have always acted on the presumption that the Secretary of State for Defra was taking these decision in the best interests of the livestock industry and of human health and, therefore, in the office you hold, you were doing the best thing for the nation. What you now seem to be telling me is under this new regime, which the livestock industry are going to pay a lot of money for, goodness gracious me, they will have the opportunity to differ from you. What I want to know from you is one example of any area of health and safety with regard to the livestock industry, any area, where you would say in the event that this new regime had been in place you would have done something different from what you are currently doing, with regard to Bluetongue, with regard to Foot and Mouth?

  Hilary Benn: With respect it is not a question—

  Q22  Mr Gray: What are they paying for? What will they get in return for the money?

  Hilary Benn: The ability to take the decisions about how animal diseases are dealt with within the constraints which are provided by Europe and internationally. With respect, what strikes me very forcefully, Mr Gray, is that sometimes farmers will say, "Well you have got these restrictions on us, as if it was for our benefit or for reasons other than trying to control animal disease". I think the people who are in the best position to take those decisions are those who have the greatest incentive in the decisions being the right ones, that is not to say the holder of this office does not have the same incentive, but I think it would be a much better system to have clarity about who is in the lead here and I am describing to the Committee a change under which decisions which are currently taken now could be taken by a new body which represents the industry.

  Q23  Mr Gray: What you are now saying is that the Government intends to abdicate responsibility—

  Hilary Benn: No.

  Q24  Mr Gray:—which many ordinary people could reasonably presume to be good decisions for the Government to take, and you would be handing that over to an industry, in this case the livestock farmers, to ask them to take decisions which the Government ought to be doing. In return for doing that, even though you ought probably to have been listening to farmers anyhow, the livestock farmers are going to have to be able to pay large sums of money for that privilege. It sounds like a pretty dumb deal to me.

  Hilary Benn: With respect I would not agree. I think there are those in the farming industry who look, and I know the current situation is very difficult because of the two diseases which farmers are having to deal with, who can see that this is a different way and in truth a better way of doing things. It is about trusting, it is a different system in which you would trust the farming industry to say, "Well, actually these diseases affect you, you are the ones who have to manage it, therefore why should you not be taking these decisions as opposed to the holder of this office?" I can see you are not persuaded.

  Q25  Mr Gray: Not entirely persuaded. You and I were on this Committee together 11 years ago, although your political career has been rather more successful than mine in the meantime.

  Hilary Benn: Not quite 11 years ago.

  Chairman: We are looking forward to your consultation on this, to see how it is going to work, particularly if the livestock industry got the wrong decision and you had to pick up the pieces. Mr Gray wants to ask you some questions now about Bluetongue. You will do those very quickly, will you not, Mr Gray.

  Q26  Mr Gray: Very swiftly indeed. Are you content with the way in which it has been done, you briefly touched on this question of the two zones, there are difficulties associated with that. Particularly in my own area, for example, just outside my constituency, the border goes through the middle of one farm, the farmer cannot move the animals across the border. Would it not be better to have a UK wide one or an England wide one or something like that?

  Hilary Benn: On that last point, this is a genuine dilemma and it goes back to the previous answer I gave. If you declared the whole of England now, the price you pay is that the disease may move further and faster than would otherwise be the case, bearing in mind temperatures are now dropping, but I think there is a little doubt if you look at the experience of Europe that it will be back next year. Weighing that against the benefit that would then flow to those who are locked in by the Bluetongue control and protection zones. Now, fundamentally, I think the industry has to try and answer that question because they are balancing the different interests that they have got. The stakeholder group with whom we have met so far, and consulted on this, has said, "Let's try and keep it where it is" bearing in mind that winter is coming but because of the cases, and the 20 and the 150 kilometre radius, in effect it has now taken a great chunk of England in the middle, leaving the North and the South West out of the zone but we will have to see what happens in terms of the further development of the cases. We have at the same time tried to ease some of those restrictions of the farmers I spoke to and those you represent by getting access to slaughterhouses in particular. Clearly if a boundary runs right through the middle of a farm it does not strike me as a terribly sensible way of doing it and I know that in drawing the boundaries we have consulted with a stakeholder group, in so far as we have discretion, keeping within the circles that we have to draw, to follow more natural or sensible boundaries than just literally taking a straight line, a curve, which means it is sometimes difficult for people to know which side of the line they are.

  Q27  Mr Gray: Lastly, the vaccine, what about a Bluetongue vaccine?

  Hilary Benn: There are three companies working away at it. Everybody is very anxious that we should get a vaccine. I hope it will be available next year, precisely when I do not know, it depends on how quickly one can be developed that can be shown to be safe and effective. Then, of course, there will be great demand for it because of the number of countries which have been affected by BTV8 Bluetongue but we need to work very hard to bring one to the market as quickly as possible.

  Q28  Chairman: Are these vaccine developments wholly privately funded?

  Hilary Benn: As far as I am aware, I will let the Committee know if I have got that wrong, yes. There are three companies, Merial, of course, being one of them and the names of the other two have escaped me for the moment but as far as I am aware they are.

  Q29  Chairman: The reason I ask is that there are different types of Bluetongue. I do not know, technically, whether it is easy or difficult to produce the vaccine. Obviously Defra is involved in the work, for example, in taking forward vaccine work on TB but, on the other hand, I wonder if this is more straight forward. Anyway, perhaps you could come back and enlighten us in due course?

  Hilary Benn: Okay.

  Q30  Dan Rogerson: Moving very much in the manner of your summer from one outbreak to another, Foot and Mouth. It caused a huge anxiety in terms of restrictions and obstacles to the industry and great cost to farmers and, indeed, to the Department. Looking at the source of the recent outbreaks, as the licensor, regulator and inspector of facilities working with the virus, was Defra responsible for ensuring that the drainage on the Pirbright site was fit for purpose? Do you accept that under the SAPO licences Defra issue it should have ensured that the drains were up to containing the virus?

  Hilary Benn: As I have said to the House, on two occasions, what happened should not have happened and we have to understand why it happened and have a better system in future; that is the first point. Secondly, under the SAPO licence arrangements, the licensor, in this case Defra, specifies what has to be achieved and the person who holds the licence has the responsibility for ensuring that they deliver it. In response to the very direct question, did that licensing and taking responsibility arrangement involve having a look see at the state of the drains, the answer is no it did not. With hindsight, that is one of the lessons we ought to learn. The other conclusion that I have drawn is, again with hindsight, it is not a good idea to have a major customer institution also being the licensor and the regulator. That is why, having had the HSE and Spratt reports, in establishing the two reviews, one the BBSRC will lead looking at funding and governance at IAH, the second one is Bill Callaghan's review which is going to ask the question, to what extent does the licensing and regulation and inspection arrangements for category 3 and 4 animal pathogen handling laboratories differ from those for human pathogens, 1 and 2, what is the right way forward, now I want to look and see what Bill Callaghan has to say about what the right way forward is because we need to learn from what has gone wrong in this case. I am very frank about that.

  Q31  Dan Rogerson: The correspondence published on the Department's website indicates that Defra staff were aware of the problems with the drains, there was a need for repairs. Was that information available to those in charge of inspecting?

  Hilary Benn: Do you mean those who went in and did the annual inspections? I do not know?

  Q32  Dan Rogerson: The transfer of information.

  Hilary Benn: Yes, I need to check on that. The correspondence with Defra was about the replacement of the drains. We have to be very careful here in how we describe it. It is not the case that Defra as the licensor and the regulator knew that the drains were leaking in the way that we discovered they were leaking, that they were damaged in the way that they were when the HSE went down and had a look as part of their investigations in August. That was not the case. Why was Defra written to? Defra was written to as the licensor and the regulator to be asked, if we change the system, because we know the drains are old, we know they need replacement but nobody thought, as far as I have seen, that they were in the condition that they turned out to be, had that been the case, well things would have been different, "Is it all right if we do it in this way". On funding, I do not know whether we will come on to funding, but you would not ask your licensor and your regulator to fund works that you thought were necessary, and I have drawn the parallel with the HSE, you would not go and ask the HSE for money and Defra was not asked for money, in that respect, yes.

  Q33  Chairman: Secretary of State, I want to follow up Mr Rogerson's line of enquiry. You said that Defra were the licensing body and it was Pirbright who had the duty to comply with the terms of the licence and deliver the requirements for the safe containment under a SAPO 4 licence but if I take the provision of a driving licence, I have to go along with a driving instructor and demonstrate before his very eyes my capability as being somebody suitable to grant a licence to conduct a motor vehicle on the highway.

  Hilary Benn: Yes.

  Q34  Chairman: What you have said effectively is, we defined the terms, they told us they could do it so we gave them the licence. If you read the HSE report you will find that they point out that the requirements for containment level 4 were not met thus constituting a breach of biosecurity. I just want to ask you about how detailed the process is that a licence applicant has to go through before as a Department you can be satisfied that somebody meets those conditions. It is quite clear, with the benefit of hindsight, that the systems which were in place, when the SAPO 4 licence was applied for, were not capable of providing safe containment under a variety of conditions about the way in which this site was operated. I note from page 53, for example, of the HSE report, it says, "A discussion with the site representatives confirmed that there were no routine maintenance instructions or testing undertaken within either the effluent or surface drainage systems. Any maintenance is undertaken on a reactive basis". What I want to know is against that background, why did your rigorous licensing policy not tease out this deficit?

  Hilary Benn: The honest answer is it was a weakness in the system, that is the truth. It was a weakness in the system. Now you go back to how a SAPO licence was originally granted, you are going back quite a few years, and the regulatory system has evolved over time. There is a series of regular inspections where the inspectors go in and check and draw things to the attention of those who have got responsibility but I think in any licensing arrangement you do have that balance of responsibilities. It is not unique.

  Q35  Chairman: Somebody has got to demonstrate capabilities to meet a licence requirement of safe containment. Quite clearly that, with the benefit of hindsight, reality and in fact seemingly the condition of this place when it got its licence—when was the last SAPO 4 given for Pirbright?

  Hilary Benn: The last inspection was, I think, in December of last year. The other thing we have to bear in mind is the nature of the layout of the drains because it is quite important.

  Q36  Chairman: No, no, I do not think it has got anything to do with the layout of the drains, I am talking about what happened when the licence was granted by the person or persons who had information from Pirbright. How did they demonstrate to those giving the licence that they could meet the requirement for safe containment because the rest of the HSE Report says that one bit of safe containment, i.e. the drainage system was found wanting? Surely, before you get a licence you have to demonstrate that the entity of the Pirbright site and systems was capable of meeting the licence requirements? You do not just accept that somebody says, "We can do this", surely you have to have some evidence. What was the evidence?

  Hilary Benn: I was just going to come on to explain, Chairman, that the layout of the drainage system and the two part system for inactivating virus is important here because both the Institute for Animal Health and Merial had their own activities, obviously Merial produces a much larger amount of virus than the IAH does. They both had their first stage procedures. In the case of Merial, we were aware that did not completely inactivate, that is true. It then went into this pipe system and there was a second stage. The important thing is the second stage process which did finally inactivate any remaining virus so that the effluent which went out into the system was safe. There was a two part protection, belt and braces, to ensure this was the case. Now, with hindsight, this bit of pipe work in effect was part of a high containment system, it was not to the standard that it should have been, that was a fault of the system.

  Q37  Chairman: Just concluding my line of questioning, on page 12 of the HSE Report it says, "Before any licence is issued, Defra inspectors will normally inspect the facility where the work is intended to be done. A licence will not be granted until and unless the inspectors are satisfied that the management facilities and documented operating procedures comply fully with the standards for the safe containment of the pathogen concerned". It strikes me that that process was found wanting?

  Hilary Benn: Clearly it did not work but I come back to the answer I gave to Mr Rogerson earlier. It is not the case that anybody, either at the Institute for Animal Health or indeed Defra's licensor and regulator, had any evidence to believe that the drains were in the state that it turned out that they were. It is quite important this because some people have said the drains needed to be replaced because they were old. Professor Spratt makes the point himself in his report that old does not necessarily mean unsafe, it depends on the system that you operate but undoubtedly a weakness that we have now learnt about at great cost in the system is if a bit of drains is going to be part of a high containment system—we are now changing that because Merial will not be allowed to put anything into that bit of re-lined drain until it has been completely inactivated, they are going to have to provide now a heat treatment facility, that is something that we have learnt as a result of this—clearly any bit of drain that is part of a high containment system ought to have a way of checking whether in fact it is doing its job and that was a weakness of the system.

  Q38  Mr Cox: Secretary of State, can we agree on a number of things? The first is that this length of drain was an essential part of the safety containment of the disease; correct?

  Hilary Benn: It was indeed, yes.

  Q39  Mr Cox: The second point is that Defra knew that the inactivation by citric acid that was applied by Merial did not fully deal with live virus being flushed down the drain.

  Hilary Benn: Correct.


 
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