Examination of Witnesses (Questions 40
- 59)
TUESDAY 23 OCTOBER 2007
RT HON
HILARY BENN
MP
Q40 Mr Cox: The third is that it
had known for a considerable time that the drains were regarded
as due for replacement and old.
Hilary Benn: That is true, yes.
Q41 Mr Cox: So we have a situation
where an essential part of the containment system which is having
live virus flushed down it on its way to the Institute of Animal
Health's own neutralisation facility was regarded as due for replacement
and old and nobody knew whether it would be likely to be dilapidated
and admitting virus into the outside environment or not; correct?
Hilary Benn: Nobody knew that
they were in the condition that they turned out to be.
Q42 Mr Cox: They could have been;
they might not have been. Nobody knew. Nobody had inspected them.
Hilary Benn: Nobody had looked
down the drains; that is true.
Q43 Mr Cox: But they knew that it
was an essential part of the biosecurity for a live virus and
nobody had taken the step of going directly to have a look and
see whether "old and due for replacement" meant leaking.
Hilary Benn: That was a weakness
in the system.
Q44 Mr Cox: It is not a weakness
in the system.
Hilary Benn: It was.
Q45 Mr Cox: It was a lamentable piece
of neglect by your ministry. Surely to goodness, Secretary of
State, it would have been much better to the farming communities
of this country if you had just admitted that Defra made a balls-up.
Is that not true?
Hilary Benn: That is not a phrase
that I would use.
Q46 Mr Cox: Let us say a mistake.
Hilary Benn: It was a failure
in the system and we are learning from that, which is why—
Q47 Mr Cox: Do I take it that the
answer to my question is yes?
Hilary Benn: I am trying to answer
your question.
Q48 Mr Cox: Are you trying to avoid
it or answer it?
Hilary Benn: No. I am trying to
answer your question. If you would just bear with me, Mr Cox,
I will do my best to do so. It was a failure in the system. We
now know that to be the case and we have to put it right and we
have to learn from it. The truth, Mr Cox, is that the framework
we have in place for dealing with all sorts of risks in society
evolves over time, in part because you learn from mistakes that
happen, and this was a mistake.
Q49 Mr Cox: The difference, Secretary
of State, is that Defra is constantly responsible for injunctions
and reminders to the farming community of the importance of biosecurity,
and what happened here is that Defra's own vigilance and attention
to the biosecurity of a plant that was developing live virus for
Foot and Mouth disease was grossly neglected. That is the position,
is it not?
Hilary Benn: I do not agree with
that, Mr Cox, and I would just say one other thing in terms of
investment on the site itself.
Q50 Mr Cox: Which part do you not
agree with? Do you agree that Defra is responsible for teaching
and preaching to farmers about the importance of biosecurity?
Hilary Benn: We all have a responsibility
for ensuring biosecurity.
Q51 Mr Cox: Would you agree with
me that biosecurity means vigilance against remote risks?
Hilary Benn: The HSE makes that
very clear in its report, yes.
Q52 Mr Cox: And so Defra had the
solemn duty, did it not, to be vigilant against even remote risks
coming out of this plant?
Hilary Benn: Yes, and the regulatory
and licensing inspection system did not pick up this fault, that
is true.
Q53 Mr Cox: And neither did people
at your ministry pick it up, did not think it was serious enough,
despite the gravity of what was being produced there, to go and
actually look and determine whether it was still safe.
Hilary Benn: And nor did people
at the Institute of Animal health think that. Therefore, the point
about investment, because one of the other arguments that has
been put and which you have not put, Mr Cox, is that somehow it
was a shortage of funds that was responsible.
Q54 Mr Cox: I have not said that.
Hilary Benn: I know you have not,
but if I may take the opportunity, Chairman, just to make the
point for the record, that is not the case because, with £31
million having been spent on this site as a result of the Government
in 2005 recognising that the facilities at Pirbright needed to
be renewed, if the Institute for Animal Health had thought that
this was that urgent and that much of a potential problem, because—and
I come back to my original answer to Mr Rogerson—they too
had the responsibility, and I am not trying to duck Defra's but
the body that is licensed has a responsibility too, then you might
have thought that in the conversations about how £31 million
is spent the drains might have figured and they did not, and,
as we know, there is a debate and a discussion between Merial
and IAH about who is going to pay for their replacement.
Q55 Mr Williams: I have always thought
that part of the problem here was calling this piece of the site
a drain, which gave the impression that it was used to discharge
safe material from the site when in fact it was an integral part
of the system and held potentially live virus, but that is another
matter. If a farmer was found guilty of one of these sorts of
offences he would be held personally responsible if it was thought
to be serious enough. Could you tell us or could you write to
us and let us know who signed off the last inspection of this
site and said it was safe for the purpose for which it was being
licensed?
Hilary Benn: I am very happy to
write to the Committee and inform you about the last inspection,
what was found and what action was taken as a result of that.
If you are talking about liability and prosecutions, responsibility
rests with Surrey County Council trading standards. They have
the responsibility of deciding whether any law has been broken
and it is a matter for them to weigh that up.
Chairman: I think Mr Williams was asking
a different question.
Q56 Mr Williams: I will ask it again.
Somebody acted on behalf of Defra in the last inspection and signed
off whatever it was. Could we know who that person was who took
responsibility on behalf of Defra for saying that these premises
were safe for the purpose for which they are licensed?
Hilary Benn: Can I reflect on
that and come back to the Committee if you are talking about the
name of the particular individual?
Q57 Chairman: Yes. Some part of your
empire took the decision to grant the licence. It would be quite
interesting to know how many licences have been granted and when
because it is not clear to me whether the granting of a SAPO 4
licence, bearing in mind that the regulations, as I understand
it, came in in 1988, is something which is repeated over time
or is a one-off. I think that would be helpful to know.
Hilary Benn: Okay. I am happy
to provide that.
Q58 Dan Rogerson: One part that puzzles
me is that what we have heard here is that there was a breakdown
in the overall system which has all sorts of other issues that
may need looking at. If you consider that Foot and Mouth disease
has caused one of the greatest crises in recent years up to this
point one would have thought that it would have had extra special
care taken over what was happening with this virus above and beyond
what one might have expected for any other work that was going
on anywhere else in the country. That is what puzzles me the most,
that, as Secretary of State coming in, if you were to look back
over the last few years as to what had been the problems for Defra,
Foot and Mouth certainly would rate very highly because of what
happened in 2001. That is why I cannot understand why it would
not have been near the top of the list to ensure that everything
was absolutely above and beyond what any standard system would
have called for.
Hilary Benn: Only the people who
have been operating the system can answer the question, but I
have no reason from anything that I have seen or heard to believe
that people were not doing the job that they thought they should
be doing. However, what we have discovered is that the system
as it operated was not good enough to prevent this happening.
Why did it happen? Because of a combination of a not completely
inactivated virus being admitted into that bit of pipework, and
absolutely it is part of a high containment system and should
have been treated as such, and that is one lesson to be learned;
secondly, the extent of the flooding; and, thirdly, ironically,
why were there vehicles up on the site? Because a lot of money
is being spent on renewing Pirbright. It was that combination
of events, so the report tells us, which is the most likely explanation
as to how it got out. I suppose I finish where I started. It should
not have happened, I am determined that it does not happen again
and I am very sorry for the impact that it has had because it
has been great and it has been felt by a lot of farmers up and
down the country. I make no bones about that whatsoever.
Q59 Mr Drew: You referred earlier,
Secretary of State, to the two farm disease outbreaks. You are
very aware that there is a third which is even more insidious
in a sense because it just is always there, and that is Bovine
TB. Some of us were a little surprised to get the Exocet we got
yesterday from Sir David King. First, who initiated that report
and why, and why did it come out this week, which seems highly
suspicious in the sense that there are a number of interlocking
arguments going on about what is happening with Bovine TB at the
moment? It just seems a bit strange that it has suddenly come
out now.
Hilary Benn: My predecessor asked
for the advice.
Chairman: When?
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