Select Committee on Environment, Food and Rural Affairs Written Evidence


Memorandum submitted by the Consumer Council for Water (FL 130)

FLOODING LESSONS LEARNED—RECOMMENDATIONS TO THE EFRA COMMITTEE

INTRODUCTION

  The Consumer Council for Water (CCWater) is the consumer organisation that represents water and sewerage consumers in England and Wales. We welcome the opportunity to contribute to the EFRA Committee's Flooding Inquiry. We have also submitted evidence to the Cabinet Office's Flooding Lessons Learned Review.

  The summer 2007 floods seriously impacted on peoples' lives. Homes and businesses were severely damaged by flood water, many people had to leave their homes and the impact on the local economy was significant. To ensure that future protection is as effective as possible and that incident response is rapid and efficient, it is clear that better planning is needed going forward.

  Our key concern about future flood incidents relates to the need to ensure adequate protection for water industry assets, to prevent the loss of supply and sewer flooding incidents, and also the need to improve water companies' response to incidents, particularly the communication they have with their customers during these times.

BACKGROUND

  During 2007, there have been many flood events across the country including Yorkshire, Wiltshire, Berkshire and Gloucestershire. In addition to the flooding of properties, the Gloucestershire floods in July 2007 also resulted in the loss of water supply to around 140,000 households.

  The loss of supply that resulted from the flooding was so unprecedented that in response to this, CCWater carried out qualitative research to explore the views of consumers that were affected. We did this to better understand their experiences and their perceptions of how the incident was managed, and also what they want to see happen in the future. We are currently carrying out quantitative research to further explore consumers' experiences.

  Many of the views expressed in this submission are based on the findings from the qualitative research. But we also draw on experiences from our involvement in the Hexham loss of water supply in 2005, and the floods that affected Hull and the Thames region earlier in 2007.

SUMMARY

  Following are the key recommendations from CCWater:

    —  Water consumers should not pick up the bill for general flooding. Flood protection should be reviewed and funded by the Environment Agency, and ultimately the tax payer.

    —  There needs to be a clearly defined communications process in the case of declared disasters, both nationally and locally. During the loss of water supply in Gloucestershire, customers considered communication to be a top priority. Key lessons from the Hexham loss of water supply also highlighted the need for better communication between the various agencies, and for those agencies to be aware of CCWater and how it can help, particularly in respect of communicating with customers.

    —  Key organisations and their responsibilities in the event of flooding need to be identified and defined now. They need to work together to take a strategic approach to flood risk management including the response to the loss of essential infrastructure. CCWater needs to be involved in that process where water and wastewater assets may be at risk.

    —  National standards on the minimum amount of water to be supplied in emergencies need to be re-considered after recent experience showed that Severn Trent delivered 10 litres per head per day more than the minimum requirement of 10 litres per head per day.

    —  New housing developments must create space for the water to flow in outside spaces. The creation of balancing ponds, lagoons and green spaces is essential for protecting homes against flooding, as well as creating bio-diversity opportunities.

    —  Water and sewerage companies should be statutory consultees for planning applications that could impact on water and wastewater infrastructure. This would allow companies to inform planners of their capacity to take more sewage and surface water into their systems. Indications are that the flooding in Hull was due to inundation of the drainage system during heavy rainfall.

    —  Consumers felt strongly that the loss of water supply in Gloucestershire should not have happened and more importantly that it should never happen again. However, the majority did not want compensation for the loss of water supply. They felt this would reduce the funds available to future proof the water supply.

    —  The Mythe water treatment works that flooded in Gloucestershire had been assessed by Severn Trent as being at low risk of flooding, its defences being up to the level of the 1947 floods. CCWater is concerned that other treatment works may also have been assessed as low risk. We think Ofwat should therefore review all companies' risk assessments into vulnerability to extreme weather.

    —  Customers also need to be reassured that funds previously allowed in companies' price limits by Ofwat have been spent appropriately on making water and wastewater facilities resilient to this and similar incidents.

    —  The consumers who took part in our research saw no evidence that Severn Trent had a contingency plan in place. The Interim Report into the Hull floods by the Independent Review Body concluded that there had been no contingency plan in place for the failure of Bransholme Pumping Station. Companies' contingency plans therefore need reviewing in the light of these experiences, and their existence communicated to consumers.

ADDRESSING THE OBJECTIVES OF THE FLOODING LESSONS LEARNED REVIEW

1.  Flood risk management and how to adapt to the risk of flooding

  The recent floods across the country have demonstrated the significant impact floods can have on infrastructure, homes and ultimately consumers.

  Whilst we accept that it is not possible to accurately predict weather conditions and plan for all eventualities, there are some fundamental approaches that can be implemented now that would significantly minimise the potential for flooding in the future. These are:

    —  A joined-up approach is needed on flood management, land drainage, surface water drains and sewers. One organisation, perhaps Defra, should have responsibility for making sure that the other bodies responsible are working together with well-defined plans.

    —  Full consideration should be given to the risk of flooding when new housing is being planned. New housing developments must create space for the water to flow in outside spaces. The creation of balancing ponds, lagoons and green spaces is essential for preventing homes from flooding, as well as creating bio-diversity opportunities.

    —  Water companies should be statutory consultees during the planning process, particularly for larger developments that will have a significant impact on the capacity of their infrastructure. This will allow them to tell planners about their capacity to take the sewage away without the risk of sewers flooding. Some consultation criteria would be needed so that water companies are only consulted on applications that could impact on their business, for example housing developments. We assume that there would be a large number of applications that water companies would not need to be consulted on, such as smaller loft conversions or external changes to the appearance of a property.

    —  Sustainable urban drainage systems should be pursued rather than impervious surfaces and car parks, with responsibility for maintenance clearly defined.

  Preventing development on flood plains to allow the water to flow and flood naturally is a simple solution that would minimise flood problems. However, we saw in Hull that not all floods are due to rivers. There, the local sewerage network was inundated after 110mm of rain fell when soil was already heavily saturated. Where flooding does happen, householders should have the option of a grant to help pay for flood defences, such as air brick covers and door protectors, although this is no substitute for long term investment and more robust remedial measures.

  Stopping flood water and sewage from entering peoples' homes is very important and just relying on insurers to clear up the mess is not enough, nor is it acceptable to customers. Guidance should be given to existing homes which are at risk of repeated flooding as to what they can do to minimise flood damage—for example, citing of electrics, practical flooring. When it comes to refurbishment after a flood they can then consider their options.

2.  Vulnerability of critical infrastructure

  The impact of flooding on critical infrastructure can have serious and far reaching effects. In July 2007, Thames Water was affected by flash flooding that made roads in their area impassable and resulted in pumping stations and a water treatment works being inundated. Whilst water supplies to customers were maintained, customers were still impacted. The company response times to queries and appointments were impacted as operations teams were unable to move around the area easily, and customers' properties suffered repeat sewer flooding because of the strain on the sewerage assets.

  In the case of the Gloucestershire floods, loss of water supply also took place. On 22 July 2007 Severn Trent's Mythe treatment works was submerged by rising flood water and subsequently shut down, cutting off mains water supply to around 140,000 households in Tewkesbury, Cheltenham, Stroud, Upton and Gloucester. In total this affected around 350,000 people who were informed that their supplies could be off for 14 days.

  Some of the customers involved in our qualitative research told us that the loss of water supply left them feeling like they were in "a return to the dark ages". Added to this were a number of properties which also temporarily lost their power.

  Mythe water treatment works had been historically assessed by Severn Trent as being at low risk of flooding. Following flooding there in 1947, they had done some work to protect against flooding at 1947 flood levels. However, this level of protection was not enough to cope with the July 2007 floods. Consumers felt strongly that the flooding and resulting loss of water supply should not have happened and, more importantly, that it should never happen again.

  We are concerned that other water companies' treatment works may also have been assessed as low risk. We think it is vital that in the light of climate change predictions, Ofwat urgently conduct a review of companies' risk assessments to ensure that their assessments of vulnerability to extreme weather remain valid. It is also necessary to ensure that funds previously allowed in companies' price limits by Ofwat have been spent appropriately on making water and wastewater facilities resilient to this and similar incidents.

  Respondents to our research want to see action not just regarding Mythe, but at a national level. These views were expressed not just as a reaction to recent flood levels but in the belief that with predicted increases in extreme weather events, flooding is likely to happen more often, and at significantly higher flood levels. However, it cannot be assumed that consumers should automatically fund such improvements to defences and infrastructure. Affordability remains a serious issue for many water customers who already struggle to pay their water bills.

3.  Response to the emergency

  A key message from the consumers who took part in our research was that they saw no evidence that Severn Trent had a contingency plan in place for the loss of water supply. Also, the Interim Report into the Hull floods concluded that there had been no contingency plan in place for the failure of Bransholme Pumping Station. It is therefore critical that companies' contingency plans are reviewed in the light of these experiences and integrated with other agencies' emergency plans.

    "I think all the rescue services and all these people they did extremely well but what I wonder is, did they prepare in advance if something like this happened? Was there anything that was already set up that they could say okay, this is an emergency. This is what we'll do. That's what they should have had."

    Upton.

  The Interim Report into the Hull floods states that no single agency accepts responsibility for elements outside their terms of reference. In Gloucestershire, customers were aware that there were a number of different organisations involved in responding to the emergency, but it was not always clear to customers who was responsible for which aspect of the response. Going forward, key organisations and their responsibilities need to be identified and defined in order to prepare and plan for the next event. They should work together to take a more strategic approach to tackling flood risk management including the response to the loss of essential infrastructure.

  CCWater in its role as the consumer representative should be part of this planning. After the loss of water supply in Hexham in 2005, WaterVoice, our predecessor, contacted emergency planners to make them aware of how we could help. CCWater needs to do this again to renew contact and ensure we are part of the process, and emergency planning teams also need to update their records and regularly review contact details.

  In Gloucestershire, our qualitative research obtained views on how customers felt that Severn Trent had responded to the loss of supply. The following issues were raised:

    —  Customers felt that the distribution of bottled water was managed effectively, with some customers still having spare supplies even after the water was turned back on.

    —  Severn Trent's management of the location and filling of the bowsers was not considered as effective, particularly as promises to keep them topped up were not fulfilled.

    —  Large tankers had difficulty accessing the streets where the bowsers had been left, and the water had to be transferred to smaller trucks, adding to delays.

    —  The placement of the bowsers was not considered to be well planned, with the distribution taking no account of the density of the population in that street/area.

    "Obviously, there was no plan . . . and the siting of the bowsers was haphazard. There were areas that were bereft of them, and the refilling of the bowsers was haphazard, until the Army [became involved]."

    Cheltenham

  Customers acknowledged Severn Trent's hard work in providing temporary water supplies and restoring their mains water supply. They felt that, for the most part and under difficult and extremely unusual conditions, Severn Trent had done a good job.

  However, Severn Trent may have fared better had it known more, or been advised, about the local circumstances and infrastructure. If it knew the best locations for bowsers and the size of the roads accessing those sites, it may have been able to meet its promises to fill bowsers quickly.

4.  Issues for wider emergency planning arising from loss of essential infrastructure

  The impact of losing infrastructure creates a number of problems. In most of the flooding incidents this year, flood water made it difficult for people to move around their area. In the case of Upton upon Severn, this meant that their flood barriers did not arrive in time due to delays on the motorways.

  For some customers, the flooding also resulted in power cuts which meant that they had no way of getting information through the television or radio. Respondents to our research were clear that what they wanted to see in such events was direct communication from the people responsible.

  The key planning issues we have identified following our involvement in the floods are:

    —  Clear, consistent and constant communication is essential. It needs to start early in the process and cover a range of media, not relying on communication methods that need electricity if power is out. Including CCWater in the earliest emergency contacts by water companies and emergency planners will help get the message out to consumers, and will enable CCWater to help consumers that contact it for advice.

    —  The security and emergency measures direction requires water companies to provide a minimum of 10 litres per person per day in emergency circumstances. Severn Trent provided 20 litres per person per day. This suggests that a review may be needed of what the minimum should be, with consideration given to a higher minimum standard.

    —  Logistics need consideration. The failure of the flood barriers to arrive at Upton should not have happened. However, their redeployment to protect the Walham electricity station prevented 100,000's customers from being without electricity. This example shows how there is a need for more locally based, mobile flood defences, and the need to identify, in advance, critical infrastructure.

    —  All major services including utilities need to review their flood defence and contingency plans. They should consider the population in an area so that the response provided is proportionate.

    —  Plans should take account of the type of urban/rural environment that the company works in. If streets are not wide enough for tankers, there should be an alternative plan.

    "Severn Trent Water put the big lorries out then they had to tip it into a smaller lorry so they were doing twice the work, they needed the little lorries to get through the streets. I think they did very well personally."

    Upton

    —  Plans need to take account of where to access additional volunteers to help staff who are working exceptionally long hours. Volunteers played a vital role in distributing bottled water in Gloucestershire.

    —  During the Gloucestershire loss of supply, the army became involved and helped to reassure consumers. However, an alternative approach might have been for the Government to have set aside "disaster" money to pay for other water companies' workers to be redeployed to the emergency area.

    —  Whilst vulnerable people were provided for during the loss of water supply, it is clear that with flooding and the loss of water supply, the term "vulnerable" takes on a new meaning. Water companies' vulnerable group lists do not include people who are unable to carry bottled water and take buckets to bowsers, or who needed special bottled water for babies. Whilst lists from the councils and GPs could provide this information, it is clear that a central list needs to be created that is consistent and includes all classes of customer that could be considered vulnerable under different emergency situations. We recognise this would be a huge task, but we consider that it would be worthwhile and offer reassurance to consumers. In the meantime, water companies need to maintain their extra care registers, particularly to include care homes, as recommended following the Hexham loss of supply.

5.  Issuing arising from the transition from response to recovery

  The key message we received from consumers who took part in our research was that they want to see direct communication from those responsible not only throughout the incident, but also afterwards, during the recovery phase.

    —  The importance of maintaining communication was emphasised in Gloucestershire where because there was no direct contact from Severn Trent, some consumers did not realise they should not yet be using water for cooking and washing up.

    —  Severn Trent should have built on, and improved, the dialogue they had with their customers throughout the Gloucestershire incident. Many customers wanted to hear directly from Severn Trent and to see a real presence from the company.

    —  The importance of listening to those affected, even after the event, was emphasised when some customers told us that the £3.5m Community Fund from Severn Trent was not welcomed. Those consumers said that they would rather that money was spent on making sure the loss of water supply never happened again.

6.  Lessons for the future

  The recent flooding across the country and the loss of supply in Gloucestershire has identified a number of lessons that can be applied to any emergency situation. The key priorities are to ensure that:

    —  Key assets are protected from flood waters to ensure continuity of supply in the future. This includes making sure that all emergency plans and risk assessments are re-assessed to reflect recent experiences and lessons learned. We endorse the Hull review's recommendation that a list of strategic sites and infrastructure is drawn up.

    —  Communication is clear, consistent and continuous. Consumers need to know what is happening and what they need to do. There needs to be a clearly defined communications process in the case of a declared disaster involving national and local media, with clear bulletins and information being given at specified time slots.

    —  Disaster recovery plans and contingency plans are reviewed in the light of the experience of these events and their existence communicated to customers.

    —  Companies are allowed to invest in their assets to ensure resilience for future eventualities. The Hull review suggested that the 1 in 30 year design standard for sewers needed changing to account for climate change. The most effective way forward is likely to be an approach that balances keeping the water in the catchment through sustainable drainage, removing streams from entering combined sewers and improving some assets.

    —  Climate change is not ignored. We need to develop a more sustainable approach to flood management.

    —  Key organisations and their responsibilities are clearly identified and defined. They should work together to take a more strategic approach to tackling flood risk management including the response to the loss of essential infrastructure. This would include involving CCWater where water and sewerage customers are affected, so that we can represent their views and feed information directly to them.

  We also echo the recommendations in the Scottish Government's flooding issues review which emphasises the need to:

    —  Set up a forum to help people and communities become more proactive through better awareness of flood risk and preparedness for flooding.

    —  Pursue the possibility of an individual property grant scheme.

    —  Link to catchment strategic planning and River Basin Management Planning.

    —  Ensure reducing the risk of flood damage is an objective of the Government. It should seek to promote rural land use solutions as part of its strategy for flood risk management.

    —  Set up a forum to continue to advise the Government on flooding matters.

7.  How to co-ordinate responses to flooding

  What is clear from the Gloucestershire flooding and loss of supply is that a number of organisations did work closely together to restore supplies to customers and ensure that they were provided with adequate temporary supplies. Whilst this may have worked well, it was not always clear to customers who was responsible for what.

    —  Key organisations and their responsibilities should be identifiable and they should work together to tackle flood risk management and the loss of essential infrastructure.

    —  Work needs to be taken forward now to improve communications between all the agencies responsible for dealing with flooding and loss of critical infrastructure, eg local councils, national government, the Environment Agency and water companies. Where water and sewerage customers are impacted, CCWater would also need to be involved.

    —  We echo the Scottish Review of Floods report which calls "for stakeholders to work together to ensure that a more strategic, catchment level approach is taken when considering flood alleviation options." and the response to the loss of essential infrastructure.

    —  As already emphasised, a clearly defined communications process is key.

    —  There needs to be a centrally held list of customers who could be considered to be vulnerable in different emergency situations, so that this is easily accessible and accurate.

8.  What access to support, equipment and facilities is needed in an emergency

  From the comments customers provided during our research, we believe that in the event of the loss of water supply, easy access would be needed to:

    —  Bottled water and special bottled water for babies.

    —  Adequately stocked bowsers in easy to access locations.

    —  Tankers able to negotiate narrow roads, or roads with parked cars.

    —  Manpower to relieve those working excessive hours.

    —  Lists of vulnerable consumers, which during the loss of supply includes customers who may not be able to carry bottled water or drive to distribution points.

    —  Information about the numbers and density of the population in an area.

    —  A supply of water butts to allow consumers to collect their own water.

    —  Water efficiency advice, eg hippos, so when they can flush the toilet, it uses less water.

9.  Communication

  As already stated throughout this submission, communication needs to be a key priority during any emergency incident.

  Severn Trent's communication throughout the loss of supply was considered by customers to be patchy and inconsistent and it was not always clear to them who was in charge of the situation or responsible for certain aspects of the distribution of water. This was the area most criticised by our respondents in terms of their response to the situation. Particular areas of criticism include:

    —  Information regarding the location of bowsers was considered poor.

    —  Respondents with babies were initially unaware that they needed special bottled water for babies and of the location where they could get this.

    —  Not everyone received the letter from Severn Trent regarding the restoration of mains water.

    —  Customers found it difficult to get through to Severn Trent and, when they did, responses from Severn Trent call centre staff lacked confidence and did not reassure.

    —  There was also criticism for Severn Trent's low profile in media communications.

    "There's always somebody who's listening to the local radio who's going to call somebody else. I heard from somebody who was actually in Yorkshire at the time . . . and somebody else would find out because they were queuing up in Sainsbury's wondering why everybody was buying water."

    Cheltenham

  In addition, channels of communication were also questioned. Local radio and Sky Television were mentioned as having been the best sources of information, along with the local "grapevine". Media reporting was felt to have focused more on flood victims perhaps at the expense of those without water supply.

  Work is therefore needed to ensure that areas of responsibility are clearly defined and communications improved between the agencies responsible for dealing with flooding and loss of infrastructure, eg local councils, national government, the Environment Agency and water companies. Where the loss of infrastructure affects water and sewerage assets, CCWater should be involved.

  During the Gloucestershire flooding, our website contained useful information for those consumers able to access it. We also did regular press releases and interviews and met with consumers to find out about their experiences. Our daily liaison with Severn Trent enabled us to keep customers that contacted us informed of the latest developments.

10.  What worked well

  Respondents acknowledged Severn Trent's hard work in providing temporary water supplies and restoring their mains water supply. They felt that, for the most part and under difficult and extremely unusual conditions, Severn Trent had done a good job. And in the Interim Report into the Hull floods, the fact that the pumping station worked as well as it did during the extreme rainfall was praised.

  Whilst communications to affected customers appeared to be mainly through the media, Severn Trent's use of its website and telephone information line was considered up-to-date and informative. It was also very effective in keeping the local CCWater office updated on a daily basis so that we could inform customers of what was happening. This was essential to be able to keep customers that contacted us fully informed.

  Prompt distribution of bottled water to customers was considered good. The volunteers who helped distribute the bottled water were praised at the same time as noting Severn Trent's absence or, at least, their low profile. The Red Cross and the army were also considered an asset to the situation.

    "My opinion was that, until the army arrived, Severn Trent were absolutely hopeless. The army appeared and they set up on the racecourse and suddenly it all started to happen."

    Cheltenham

    "They (Severn Trent) worked really hard, all through the night."

    Tewkesbury

  During the loss of supply, customers reported a real community spirit with neighbours looking out for each other, particularly the elderly or less able. It was clear from our research that customers had shown great resourcefulness in dealing with the loss of water supply.

Consumer Council for Water

October 2007





 
previous page contents next page

House of Commons home page Parliament home page House of Lords home page search page enquiries index

© Parliamentary copyright 2008
Prepared 7 May 2008