House of Commons - Environment, Food and Rural Affairs

Select Committee on Environment, Food and Rural Affairs Written Evidence

Memorandum submitted by Gloucestershire Constabulary (FL 110)

GLOUCESTERSHIRE WATER EMERGENCY 2007

CHIEF CONSTABLE'S MEMORANDUM

We have aimed to make the document as accurate as possible, however, due to a number of independent reviews and de-briefs being conducted by other agencies, information contained within the document may need further clarification as detailed reports become available.

1. EXECUTIVE SUMMARY

1.1 Operation Outlook was the multi-agency response to the emergency resulting from the unprecedented flooding in Gloucestershire in July 2007 which was the largest peacetime event this Country has seen in terms of complexity, duration and those affected. Gloucestershire Constabulary led the Strategic Co-ordinating Group and the Gold, Silver and Bronze Command structure, co-ordinating the response to the emergency. Much of the success of the operation can be attributed to the investment made by Gloucestershire Constabulary and the Gloucestershire Police Authority in the Gloucestershire Tri-Service Emergency Centre (GTEC), and Police Headquarters. These facilities ensured seamless communication between the emergency services as the events of 20th July 2007 unfolded, by providing the platform for the Gold and Silver Command arrangements and accommodating representatives from each of the agencies concerned. The design of the HQ, opened in December 2005, to accommodate a Strategic Co-ordination Centre (SCC) ensured effective lines of communication and rapid decision making to meet the challenges of the emergency situation.

1.2 Also key to the success of the operation was the work that had previously been undertaken by the Local Resilience Forum (LRF) and its constituent members. The extensive planning, training and exercise regimes delivered by the LRF ensured that senior representatives and their staff were familiar with the concept of emergency planning and in particular the SCC and associated arrangements. These measures together allowed the response to the emergency to be rapidly established and successfully managed. The plan to regionalise the fire control centre at Taunton, should be revised to allow for continuation of the Tri-Service facility at Gloucester. This background of partnership and investment has also been demonstrated by the County gaining "Beacon Status" for emergency planning.

1.3 The Gloucestershire Strategic Recovery Co-ordination Group is a multi-agency group comprises representatives from all the key agencies concerned in the post-emergency recovery work. The Chair of the LRF, a Constabulary Chief Officer, is a member of this Group to ensure that the distinction between recovery and resilience issues is clear and the work co-ordinated.

1.4 A number of issues arising from the flooding clearly need addressing and are brought to the attention of the Committee:

— All agencies need to re-visit their contingency plans and re-evaluate worst case scenarios and plan accordingly.

— The resilience of utilities across the Country needs to be reviewed and addressed as a matter of urgency.

— National and regional Utility companies need to engage at a local level with Local Resilience Forums so as to identify key local risks and confirm contingency arrangements.

— There must be an increased capacity to supply basic needs to communities in the event of an emergency.

— There needs to be a strategic reserve of light, heat and sanitation Countrywide.

— The Tri-Service Emergency Centre should be maintained and strengthened through continual commitment and investment.

— The County and Government need to consider fully the impact of continuing to build new homes on flood plains.

— There should be a specific requirement for national agencies to attend Strategic Co-ordinating meetings when so requested and to ensure consistency of representation.

— The importance of maintaining county-based structures needs to be recognised as these represent a suitably strategic organisation, but one, which has local roots and knowledge.

— There should be a review of national reserve emergency supplies of food, water, feeding and cooking amenities.

— Gloucestershire Constabulary is a strategic Force.

1.5 Most of these considerations are relevant at a national level, and therefore there should be a national review of contingency planning in terms of contingency reserves of basic utilities including food, water, shelter and sanitation. These reserve provisions would be available in the event of threat of disruption to basic living requirements from terrorism or environmental threat, as well as from conventional or CBRN attack in the event of war.

1.6 There were three fatalities that are all subject to a Coroner's inquest. The Chief Constable would like to reaffirm his sincere condolences to family and friends of those who lost their lives.

2. INTRODUCTION

2.1 Prolonged heavy rainfall resulted in widespread flash flooding across Gloucestershire which began on Friday 20th July with what the Met Office had warned would be "a major rainfall event".

2.2 Early forecasts released by the Met Office at 0554 hrs on Friday 20th July indicated that "rain will be persistent and locally very heavy at times throughout the day, with "fresh north east winds". A precipitation forecast issued at the same time stated that "current indications from models imply that the highest rainfall totals will probably be over the Welsh mountains and more south eastern areas of the region. The rain should weaken and become more showery in nature overnight and through Saturday".

2.3 On the basis of the Met Office forecast, the Constabulary had not issued any additional information regarding the weather conditions expected for Friday 20th July. The earliest indications of the evolving emergency came from Ambulance, who were beginning to have difficulty in responding to their 999 calls. Silver control was established at 1529 hrs on Friday 20th July as a consequence of the changing events.

2.4 The report also indicated that a heavy rainfall warning was in force at the time of issue. It would appear that there was no indication of the unprecedented amount or duration of rainfall that eventually fell on the County. It is interesting to note that whilst the best intentions of the forecast indicated the anticipated precipitation levels, there was no indication of the effects this rainfall would have on already fully-saturated ground.

2.5 Approximately 1,600 calls were made to the Constabulary in the first eight hours of the crisis, and it soon became apparent that this was not just a major rainfall event but also a flooding crisis. Many homes across the County were directly affected by flooding, and around 350,000 households were without drinking water for 17 days after the Mythe water treatment plant at Tewkesbury was inundated by the floods.

2.6 Gold Command was initiated on the evening of Friday 20th July at County Police Headquarters and Operation Outlook was the name given to the multi-agency response to the flooding and associated issues in Gloucestershire. The emergency phase finally ended with the return of drinking water supplies on 7th August.

2.7 Preliminary assessment by the Centre for Ecology and Hydrology (CEH)[37] indicates a combination of factors contributed to the flooding. Exceptionally high rainfall levels had resulted from the jet stream following a route further south than usual, and the high pressure cell from the Azores that would usually influence our weather bypassing Britain. These phenomena, combined with a sustained series of low-pressure systems over the preceding 12 weeks, had added to the unprecedented rainfall levels, indeed the May and June rainfall total was the highest on record for Britain by a substantial margin.

2.8 In a "normal" summer flood risk is low due to dry ground through which water can drain away. However, this year due to the record levels of rainfall and flooding in June, the soil was so saturated it could not cope with the rainfall of July. In addition urban drainage systems were overwhelmed by the intense rainfall resulting in localised "flash floods".

2.9 The role of anthropogenic carbon as the root cause of climate change has been cited as an explanation for these "freak" weather patterns. Other theories would contest climate change is simply part of a natural global cycle on which human activities have little impact. Such debates are beyond the scope of this report, however what is clear is that the weather leading to the July flooding could become more frequent no matter what the reason behind climate change.

2.10 The events of the two week water emergency were unprecedented and Gloucestershire emergency services, County and District Council as well as other agencies, responded with flexibility and energy to ensure emergency supplies and the restoration of water.

2.11 These were unprecedented events however they are no longer, and all agencies therefore need to use the benefits of experience to protect the County.

3. FLOODING IN GLOUCESTERSHIRE

3.1 Historically Gloucestershire is no stranger to flooding. Flooding is a regular part of life in many parts of Gloucestershire, but 1947 is the benchmark year in living memory for every subsequent flood. Comparisons with 1947 are difficult but it seems likely that the overall effects of the 2007 floods were substantially greater. Changes in landscape cannot be ruled out as contributory factors at this stage. This would be for other enquiries such as the Pitt Review to determine.

3.2 The Gloucestershire emergency differed from Humberside and Worcestershire, as there was no loss of water supply or power outage in these areas. The water supply for the majority of the County was lost for 9 days and drinking water for even longer. Electricity was lost in parts of the County and there was the threat of loss to the Whole County, parts of Bristol and Worcestershire. This was the largest peacetime emergency to have affected this Country, in terms of complexity, duration and affects.

3.1. The Severn Corridor[38]

3.1.1 The Severn, after rising in the Welsh Hills, flows generally north-eastwards into England before turning southwards to reach the sea through the Bristol Channel. The basin is generally sparsely populated (approximately 1.5 million): the majority of the population lives in the larger towns. Riverside towns on the Severn include Llanidloes, Newtown, Welshpool, Shrewsbury, Ironbridge, Bridgnorth, Bewdley, Worcester, Upton-upon-Severn, Tewkesbury and Gloucester.

3.2. The Upper Severn

3.2.1 This area covers the upper reaches of the River Severn from its source on Plynlimon in Powys to its confluence with the River Perry upstream of Shrewsbury in Shropshire.

3.2.2 There has been flood prevention work on the upper and middle reaches of the basin but this has not been extended to the lower sections.

3.2.3 There was extensive flooding in the Severn Uplands area in 1998, 1999 and Autumn 2000.

3.3. The Middle Severn

3.3.1 The Middle Severn, covers the length between the Perry and Teme confluences, a distance of 119 km. Here the river drains a catchment that lies mainly within the counties of Shropshire and Worcestershire and covers an area of 2,634 km2.

3.3.2 The River Severn runs broad and deep between fairly high banks over a clay bed. In the upper catchment there are two large impounding reservoirs, Llyn Clywedog and Llyn Vyrnwy. The river regularly floods in winter, in some reaches, up to 6-8 times a year.

3.4. Severn and Avon Vales

3.4.1 The area of Severn and Avon Vales is centred on the broad flood plain around the confluence of the Rivers Severn and the Warwickshire Avon.

3.5. River Severn

3.5.1 From the Teme mouth, just below Worcester, to the Gloucester Weirs, the 46 km length of the Severn drains an area of about 1000 km2. The only other large town is Tewkesbury although there are numerous smaller riverside towns and villages such as Kempsey, Severn Stoke and Upton-upon-Severn.

3.6. River Avon

3.6.1 The River Avon catchment covers much of the County of Warwickshire and parts of Leicestershire, Northamptonshire, Gloucestershire, Worcestershire and the City of Coventry. The head of the river is near Naseby in Northamptonshire and it meets the Severn at Tewkesbury. The Avon is the longest tributary of the River Severn (179 km).

3.7. Areas at Risk from Flooding

3.7.1 The River Severn has been subject to several high profile floods during 1998 and 2000. The main urban areas affected by flooding on the Severn are Shrewsbury, Ironbridge, Bewdley, Worcester, Upton-upon-Severn, Gloucester and Tewkesbury. However, in the Worcester to Gloucester area there are more properties at risk of flooding outside the towns than found within the main urban areas.

3.7.2 There are indications to suggest that in recent years flooding has occurred in areas not previously at risk, particularly on tributaries. Flooding may be getting worse, or the catchment may be experiencing an abnormally wet period, or it may be returning to normal after an abnormally dry period.

3.8. The Tidal Effects of the Severn[39]

3.8.1 Surges of water in areas covered by flood water are often unpredictable due to, amongst other factors, the undulation of the ground over which the water flows. There is also the issue of flooding in the water table caused by the saturation of the ground that may equally be prone to flooding despite being some distance away from rivers or water courses. Comment to this effect was made by a representative from the Environment Agency at a GOLD Command meeting reinforcing the unpredictable nature and circumstances in which various types of flooding can occur.

3.8.2 The Severn estuary is subject to the second highest tidal rise in the world. The basic geology and geomorphology of the Severn estuary is complicated but the combination of the underlying geology and geomorphology and the exceptional tides and estuary river flows regularly produces the effect known as the Severn Bore. At a time of inland flooding, the substantial effect of flood water, with the incoming water of the tide, aggravates the effect of flooding in the Gloucester flood plain area (Alney Island, Castlemeads and Gloucester Quay) reducing the outward rate of flow from the inland flooded area. The Walham electricity sub-station is situated near Alney Island and the Castlemeads electricity sub-station is located on Alney Island.

3.8.3 Recent effects of planning and building are not within the scope of this report, nor is it within the competency of the police to comment upon relatively recent planning decisions and building operations. However, it must be said that since the benchmark flooding of 1947, there has been the completion of the Gloucester northern bypass, built on a causeway, as well as substantial residential and business development in the flood plain areas. Many households, together with the utility sites at Castlemeads, Walham and other premises were affected by water rising from the saturated ground in the flood plain.

3.9. Overview of Flooding in Severn and Avon Basin

3.9.1 The low-lying areas near the rivers Severn and Avon suffered from excessive flooding in light of the events of 20 - 21st July and this led to the search and rescue phase of Operation Outlook.

3.9.2 During this phase, a fatality occurred which is subject to a Coroner's inquest. Two other fatalities occurred on the night of Wednesday/Thursday 25-26th July at Tewkesbury rugby ground when two individuals were attempting to pump out the clubhouse. These fatalities are also subject to a Coroner's inquest.

3.9.3 The situation then stabilised for several hours before flood water moving in volume from the upper and lower Severn met water seeking to flow from the Avon, at the confluence of the two rivers at Mythe Bridge.

3.9.4 The water appears to have backed up and overflowed at Mythe Bridge, flooding the nearby treatment works, the intakes of which were also subject to excessive pressure from an exceptional flow of water from the Severn.

3.9.5 This water then moved in volume to affect the Alney Island, Castlemeads and Gloucester Quays areas, peaking at approximately 2200 hrs Monday 23 July.

3.9.6 The recess of this water was delayed by the twice-daily effect of the incoming tide.

3.9.7 In addition, low-lying areas near the river were subject to rising water from the saturated ground.

3.9.8 It must be noted, however, that the Environment Agency, briefed Gold Command to the effect that the detailed consequences of the general movement water across the flood plains is extremely difficult to predict because of the effect of surges across undulating ground.

3.9.9 At no point until 22 July was Gold Command alerted to the excessive potential of flooding at Mythe or Walham.

4. MILITARY AID TO CIVIL POWERS (MACP) AND FORMAL REQUEST FOR MILITARY AID FOR THE CIVIL AUTHORITIES (MACA)

4.1 Prior to a formal request for MACA, Royal Air Force (RAF) search and rescue helicopters were deployed during the initial response to the emerging emergency on Friday 20th July. There was therefore a military presence in Gloucestershire from Friday evening. The request for MACP came from the Silver Co-ordinating Group as a result of the escalating nature of the situation. Also as part of the initial response, military liaison officers were an integral part of the Group. Lead elements from HM Coastguard and Severn Area Rescue Association (SARA) were also available for deployment from an early stage.

4.2 As an inland County the emergency services had not anticipated nor foreseen the use of search and rescue aircraft as part of incident response. Therefore ground to air communications, with military aircraft, was not an established facet of the Silver or Gold Command arrangements. A means to communicate with the RAF helicopters had to be set up as a separate system by the military and this was enhanced by the early contributions of the military liaison officers. This has been noted as a future modification to our own systems of communication. The rescue phase of Operation Outlook constituted the largest search and rescue operation mounted in peacetime by the RAF.

4.3 Following the formal request from the Chief Constable for MACA, on Sunday 22nd July, the contribution and role of the military in this emergency cannot be under- estimated. A critical function performed by the military aid throughout the emergency was the co-ordination and development of a logistical plan for distribution of water, as well as assisting in the delivery of bulk water, which included bowsers and bottled water to distribution points across the County. For the duration of the emergency, all military aid remained under the direct command and control of Gold Command.

4.4 Military aid was also vital in providing engineering expertise together with lift and shift capacity to build temporary defences at Mythe and Walham.

4.5 Military aid was released as soon as the situation had stabilised and there were suitable resources in place to maintain the basic provisions for the people of Gloucestershire.

4.6 Military aid formally ceased on 31 July, when full responsibility for the distribution of emergency water supply was formally handed over to the County Council and STW.

5. THE LOSS OF WATER AND THREATENED LOSS OF ELECTRICITY

5.1. Mythe Water Treatment Works

5.1.1 Mythe is fundamentally the single source of water supply for Cheltenham, Gloucester and Tewkesbury. The water treatment works was established 100 years ago and currently produces 120 mega litres of water for Gloucestershire every day. Gold Command was informed at 0900 hrs on Sunday 22nd July that at 0200 hrs the same day, the Mythe had been breached and the site evacuated. There appears to have been no early warning or indication other than a request made at 0002 hrs on Sunday 22 by Fire to arrange for the urgent attendance of an engineer at the treatment plant.

5.1.2 This was approximately seven hours after flood water had entered the treatment works. Gold Command had no prior warning of the likelihood of this being a risk of happening, from any of the respective agencies. STW estimated that it would take between 7 and 14 days to restore supply, an estimate that proved to be accurate.

5.1.3 Gold Command encouraged a more prompt restoration of water supply, but, due to major engineering works, this period could not be foreshortened, this was not possible. The engineering challenge was considerable and STW should be complimented on completing the restoration of the equipment in 8 days from disruption of supply. The disruption to the supply of water, however, left Gold Command in the unprecedented situation of having to supply 350,000 people with water for drinking, cooking and basic sanitation purposes.

5.1.4 The challenge was unprecedented in modern times, but relatively quickly Gold Command was able to ensure approximately 6 million litres of drinking water was distributed every day, 3 mega litres from bottled water and 3 million from bowser supplies. The initial bowser distribution process developed by STW proved ineffective because of there being initially too few bowsers to cover the area affected and inadequate numbers of small, rigid tankers to transfer water from bulk tankers to locally distributed bowsers. With the assistance from Gold Command and the Military the distribution problem was effectively resolved by Thursday 25 July and bowsers were then replenished three times daily.

5.1.5 It is important to note that there were no adverse effects reported in relation to people going thirsty or dehydration, inability to cook and boil water, or basic sanitation problems. Essential users, including hospitals, were identified early on and supplies maintained throughout. The County and District Councils and their network of volunteers ensured that supplies of water were provided to vulnerable individuals and households.

5.1.6 However, it is important to note that supplies to 350,000 people in Gloucestershire were only available for the duration of disconnection through bottled water and bowsers. This was despite attempts to provide alternative mains water solutions throughout the emergency. There was some initial panic buying of bottled water on Sunday 22 July, although residual mains water continued to flow to some parts of the County until Monday. Panic buying ceased by Monday 23 July as a result of commercial supplies running out but being replenished by the first emergency supplies of bottled water. Emergency supply centres were set up across the County manned by various combinations of STW officials, various District and County Council officials and volunteers overseen by police personnel. There were few incidents of anti-social behaviour and damage to bowsers.

5.2. Walham Electricity Sub-station

5.2.1 The threat to Walham sub-station, operated by National Grid, was of a critical and extreme nature. The sub-station supplies electricity from the National Grid to 600,000 people in Gloucestershire, effectively the whole of the County, as well as to areas in the South Midlands and South Wales. Alternative supplies could have been found for South Wales but not for Gloucestershire.

5.2.2 The potential threat to Walham was identified and driven by Gold Command. At 1007 hrs on Sunday 22 July at the Gold meeting, the Gold Commander tasked the Environment Agency to contact Central Networks to determine any future problems with supply of electricity from the Walham sub-station. At the same meeting, the Environment Agency was also tasked to provide maps of the likely flooding in and around the Quay, Hempsted, Alney Island, Castlemeads and Walham.

5.2.3 There was no early warning or indication from the National Grid or the Environment Agency as to the potential risks to Walham of flooding and the subsequent loss of electricity to the County and surrounding areas.

5.2.4 As previously noted, the sub-station is situated on a flood plain near to the River Severn and has been there for many years. The surrounding area is routinely flooded but not to the extent as to place the sub-station under threat. Therefore the threat that was reported to Gold Command on Sunday 22 July was not only unexpected but also unprecedented. A representative from the National Grid was subsequently present in Gold Command for the duration of the emergency.

5.2.5 The risks were immediately apparent to Gold, as loss of electricity would have meant that households could not have boiled water, cooked food, including baby food, and provide basic heating. Furthermore, essential services within the County would have been reliant on generators and sewage would not have been pumped. Street and domestic lighting would have been lost for the duration of the emergency.

5.2.6 It was anticipated that the loss of electricity could be for up to 3 weeks. Gold Command therefore made an immediate decision to ensure that barriers and pumps were in place to protect the sub-station and contingency arrangements made to ensure emergency supplies were provided. However, the primary intent was protecting the integrity of the sub-station. At no time were plans developed for the evacuation of the County. This would have been an inappropriate reaction.

5.2.7 Emergency barriers were provided from the Bristol/Bath area by the Environment Agency (EA) and these, reinforced by sandbags, were constructed throughout the remainder of Sunday 22 and Monday 23 July using civil and military personnel. Throughout, a major pumping operation continued using nationally supplied equipment under the direction of Gloucestershire Fire and Rescue Service. The critical point was high water on the evening of Monday 23 July for which the prediction from the EA indicated that the measures already in place would be sufficient to save the plant, and this proved to be the case. High water passed at 2200 hours without the plant being compromised. Estimates vary as to the precise margin of safety but at no point was it two inches from the top of the external emergency barriers. There is no doubt that the major pumping operation and the huge effort of building the Hesco barriers saved the Walham electricity sub-station from being lost, however, it must be noted that the critical risk to the sub-station came from an internal threat from rising flood water which came through the ground as a result of saturation and the rising water table, and not as a result of the external Hesco barriers being overwhelmed by flood water. It is a fact that internal rising flood water came within 2 inches of the base of the switching gear. This factor must be a vital consideration in future contingency planning to protect the utility sites from flooding.

5.3. Castlemeads Electricity Sub-station

5.3.1 The Castlemeads sub-station, operated by Central Networks, transfers electricity to the south Gloucester City area. Therefore, resources and effort were primarily focussed at Walham. Gold Command made the decision to switch off the sub-station to prevent substantial damage to the switching gear when it became threatened by the flood water. Power was subsequently lost to a small percentage of the population of Gloucester for a few hours on Monday 23 July, but this prompt action allowed power to be resumed the following day re-supplying the majority of homes and businesses affected, once the flood water had receded.

5.4. Cooperation with Utility Companies

5.4.1 Severn Trent Water, National Grid and Central Networks all provided staff to Gold Command throughout the emergency. It was, however, evident that the situation exceeded previous experience and contingency planning, and solutions had therefore to be dynamically developed in cooperation with the Police, Fire, Military, Health and other participating agencies. This included the provision of Hesco Bastion defences at the Mythe and Walham to limit the effects of future flooding. It should be noted that STW and electricity company representatives worked hard to provide solutions to the problems with which they were confronted. It should also be noted that the re-commissioning of the Mythe Treatment Works and the re-supply of the Gloucestershire mains networks were significant feats of engineering.

5.4.2 The Hesco Bastion barriers at Mythe and Walham are of a temporary nature, and are intended to inhibit the lateral flow of water across the sites. These will not inhibit rising water from saturated ground, or water pressure on the waterworks' intakes. It is for the Utilities themselves to address these issues. Central Networks has already provided enhanced external barriers for protection at Castlemeads.

6. CONTROL AND CO-ORDINATION

6.1. Local Resilience and Planning

6.1.1 Gloucestershire has invested heavily to ensure the infrastructure is in place for emergency management. This has undoubtedly secured the successful response to the flooding emergency. However this same level of investment is not replicated across the Country, and it is not clear that other parts of the Country could have managed a similar emergency as efficiently and effectively.

6.1.2 The Beacon Scheme recognises excellence and innovation in local government. The Gloucestershire local authorities successfully bid for and were awarded Beacon Status in March 2007 in recognition of the way they plan for and respond to major emergencies. Gloucestershire was one of only 7 authorities to achieve the award out of 29 applications.

6.1.3 Factors in the successful bid were partnership working and community involvement. County and District Officers regularly plan, train and exercise together and the judges were particularly impressed with the way they worked with partner agencies in the LRF to ensure that they can respond effectively to any emergency. The Gloucestershire local authorities also have a well established but unique volunteers accreditation scheme, which ensures that suitably trained volunteers are available to assist in caring for those affected by an emergency and they are also recognised as a centre of excellence for Business Continuity.

6.1.4 The Gloucestershire LRF was created in 2005 as a replacement for the County Major Incident Co-ordinating Group that had been working together since its' formation in 1989. This was as a direct result of the Civil Contingencies Act 2004, which laid statutory duties on certain agencies to plan, train, exercise and respond to Major Incidents in a co-ordinated fashion. The agencies, referred to as category 1 responders, include the Police, Fire Service, Ambulance Service, Health Services, Local Authorities, Maritime and Coastguard Agency and Environment Agency.

6.1.5 Further agencies make up what is known as category 2 responders and include the utilities and other companies concerned with the national infrastructure, such as the Highways Agency. It was evident as a consequence of the events created by the emergency that the utility companies were unfamiliar with the Gold, Silver and Bronze structure of incident management and response.

6.1.6 A Constabulary chief officer is currently the Chair of the LRF. The LRF has a long history of engagement and commitment to ensuring emergency preparedness within the County. Joint planning, training and exercising has enabled successful response to the recent flooding events and previous chemical incidents such as the fire at Andoversford. LRF Gold awareness training, which has been delivered over a number of years, enabled executives and support staff from Category 1 responders and the military to be familiar with the Strategic Co-ordinating Centre accommodation and processes.

6.1.7 It became clear as the emergency progressed that Severn Trent Water (STW) needed help. STW had intended to use the bowsers as the sole solution for water distribution. Their experience to date had been limited to short-term disconnections and localised distribution for short periods of time. The STW plan soon collapsed and it became clear they had neither the infrastructure nor resources to maintain sufficient supplies of drinking water to those affected by the emergency. On the Chief Constable's instigation, two senior officers from West Midlands Police were deployed to STW's headquarters, in Coventry, in support of the operation, and the emergency response from STW began to greatly improve. Although not a statutory responsibility, the police alongside the military assisted in the distribution of bottled water, and the staffing of a centralised water distribution point at Cheltenham Racecourse. This facility delivered approximately 3 million litres of bottled water to the County daily.

6.1.8 Engagement of and communication with communities was recognised as being an essential pre-requisite to a successful operation. This was achieved through the tasking of Police Safer Community Teams that remained in place throughout the emergency and through the use of Independent Advisors. These measures ensured the feelings and difficulties within communities were understood and addressed and enabled the monitoring of any community tensions and an appropriate strategic response from Gold.

6.2. Gloucestershire Constabulary County Headquarters

6.2.1 The Constabulary was successful in securing £17 million PFI funding for a purpose built headquarters that was able to transform in part into a Strategic Command Centre (Gold). The building was completed in December 2005. The events of July/August 2007 have highlighted the return on investment identified within Vision5 and continuing into Vision2010, the Constabulary's over-arching strategic plans.

6.3. Gold Command Suite and Local Emergency Centre

6.3.1 The Gold Command Suite is a permanently established space that provides the nucleus for the Strategic Co-ordination Centre (SCC) to immediately establish a control centre in the event of a major incident or event.

6.3.2 The Gold Command Suite has excellent and immediate communications systems, including IT, telephony, terrestrial and non-terrestrial television and radio facilities which are core to Gold Command.

6.4. Strategic Co-ordination Centre Overlay

6.4.1. Outside of the Gold Command Suite itself, the SCC facility is activated when there is a major incident, utilising accommodation that is used on a daily basis for a lower priority need. The size and nature of the overlay is dependent on the particular incident, but in all cases it is able to rely upon excellent and immediate communications.

6.4.2. The command structure adopted in responding to the emergency situation is the well-recognised and established Gold, Silver and Bronze system. These are respectively the Strategic, Tactical and Operational levels at which a situation is dealt with. This structure was adopted for the emergency.

6.4.3. In an emergency situation requiring a multi-agency response it is well established, and laid out in the Association of Chief Police Officers (ACPO) Emergency Procedures Manual, that it is the responsibility of the Police to establish and chair the Strategic Co-ordinating Group. This occurred.

6.4.4. One of the key factors in the successful response to the emergency is the investment that Gloucestershire has made in the Gloucestershire Tri-Service Emergency Centre (GTEC). This accommodates all the emergency services in the same building and allows for excellent communication and effective co-ordination of resources in response to the emergency. Without doubt the absence of GTEC would have led to a delayed and potentially chaotic initial response to the emergency. As it was, GTEC ensured that co-ordination between the three front line emergency services was on the "front foot" early in the emergency.

6.4.5. Gold was initiated at 18:00 hours on Friday 20 July. The formation of the Strategic Co-ordinating Group brought together key agencies who could draw on their combined resources to address the dynamically developing situation, and quickly make strategic decisions that were pragmatic and co-ordinated the actions of all agencies. In the absence of this set up cooperative working is hindered, communication is strained and duplication of efforts inevitable.

6.4.6. The SCC worked extremely effectively in response to the emergency and this can be attributed in the main to a number of factors.

6.4.7. Firstly the police officers and police staff of Gloucestershire Constabulary showed professionalism, willingness, enthusiasm, dedication and flexibility in support of the operation. Many of whom worked far beyond expectations, and these outstanding efforts should be recognised.

6.4.8. Secondly, Gloucestershire has a strong history of partnership working that extends long before the introduction of the LRF. Training, planning and exercising with our partners has developed strong relationships, and provided a familiarity with the concepts of emergency management and the facilities available. This ensured the establishment of the Strategic Co-ordinating Group was rapid and with roles and responsibilities clearly understood, enhancing the effectiveness of the response.

6.4.9. Thirdly, the Police Head Quarters (HQ) provides a purposely-designed Strategic Co-ordination Centre (SCC) to accommodate agencies. This set-up places all the agencies on an open plan floor adjacent to the Gold Command Room. This is flexible and can easily be expanded to accommodate other additions to Gold. Each person is provided with access to a telephone, computer, Gold e-mail addresses and the Gold Messaging Application (GMA) (software that records actions and policy decisions by the Strategic Co-ordinating Group). Without this purpose-designed accommodation the response to the emergency would be fragmented and lack the same high level of co-ordination, leading to a hindered emergency response.

6.4.10. Fourthly, the County has one of only three Tri-Service (Police, Fire and Ambulance) emergency control centres in the Country (GTEC). This was opened in 2002. This routinely ensures co-ordinated management of incidents involving the three services, and enhanced Silver Command facilities which enables early instigation of joint command management. This was evident in the early hours of the emergency on 20 July, and enabled the three County emergency services to get on the "front foot" and stay there.

6.5. Silver Command

6.5.1 On Friday 20 July at 15:29 hours a Silver Command was set up at the GTEC, again in accommodation designed for this purpose, as the impact of the torrential rain brought Gloucestershire's transport infrastructure to a standstill. Informal dialogue and co-ordination had taken place as the emergency evolved due to the close proximity of on duty staff from police, fire and ambulance.

6.5.2 The management of the emergency demonstrated that Gloucestershire Constabulary is a strategic force, having both the capacity and capability to deal with what has been described as the "largest peace time operation this Country has seen". The Constabulary also continued with daily business, for example in dealing with a murder that occurred on day four of the operation.

6.5.3 Non-essential staff were sent home to preserve utilities at HQ. By the end of the first week police staff who do not normally face the public were being used in a completely different role in water distribution. Officers and other essential staff were placed on 12-hour shifts for the duration of the emergency. The dynamic use of resources gave Gloucestershire Constabulary the flexibility that was required to deal with the emergency without calling for mutual aid.

6.5.4 The de-brief process and review of the Operation Outlook is still at this stage work in progress, however early indications are extremely positive. Whilst there are some minor issues that will be addressed, these should not detract from the overall huge success of the operation.

6.6. Dissemination of Information

6.5.1 A Gold Media Cell was established with a clear strategy in relation to the dissemination of information to the public, both via the media and through postal delivery of health information. From the start it was determined that Gold Command should be as frank with the media and public as possible, and to see the media as an ally, not an inconvenience.

6.5.2 A daily press conference was held at County Police Headquarters, attended by local and national media, led by the Chief Constable. The live news bulletins communicated relevant and timely information and also delivered the Chief Constable's key messages which were "patience and forbearance, use of common sense, listening to key messages and be a good neighbour". 24 hour media broadcasting was used to optimum effect and feedback indicated that people felt reassured and that the flow of information was greatly appreciated. Media information was provided to other interested stakeholders, for example local Members of Parliament (MPs).

6.5.3 All press releases and attendance at press conferences was co-ordinated through Gold to ensure consistency and clarity of messages and so as to avoid any contradiction between agencies. It was ensured that the expectations of the communities of Gloucestershire were managed whilst at the same time providing an honesty and realism about the situation. Public reassurance and maintenance of confidence were identified as key themes throughout.

6.5.4 Health information and advice in relation to flooded properties was disseminated on a number of occasions via the Royal Mail. Their support in this function was greatly appreciated. The Gold Commander negotiated with Union representatives from the Royal Mail to postpone strike action to ensure that delivery of important leaflets. Without the delivery of this important health information contained in the leaflets, the delay in the restoration of water supplies to the affected areas would have been much more protracted. Health information was provided in a number of formats to seek to ensure the needs of all members of communities, including those more difficult to reach or whose first language is not English, were met.

6.5.5 There were a few incidents where media reporting was inaccurate or unhelpful. This should not detract though from, on the whole a good relationship with the media who were a vital part of the emergency response in ensuring a flow of information. The media nationally and, especially, locally were notable in providing timely and, within the limits of a dynamic event, accurate information. There was some sensationalising at the beginning of the emergency but in the main, a sense of responsibility characterised media coverage in this emergency.

6.5.6 The emergency officially ended with mains water being formally declared fit for drinking. Gold Control stood down on Friday 6 August.

7. BENEFITS OF EXPERIENCE

At this point a number of issues seem prevalent to highlight for the committee's consideration.

7.1 All agencies need to re-visit their contingency plans and re-evaluate worst-case scenarios and plan accordingly.

All agencies need to re-think scenario and contingency planning and extend these to include previously unthought-of circumstances and plan accordingly. Whilst it would be impossible to cover every eventuality, agencies should at the very least ensure contingencies to deal with the forces of nature are fully considered and robust. In the light of climate change contingency planning must not be static but quickly grasp and move with these changes.

7.2 The resilience of Utilities across the Country needs to be reviewed and addressed as a matter of urgency.

The loss of function at Mythe left the majority of the County without mains water for an extended period. This cannot be allowed to happen again, and alternatives should be easily and quickly available. Although Walham maintained its function, the consequences to the County and beyond are clear, had this utility been lost. Alternative electricity sources from the network need to be available in the event that Walham cannot function. Exposure to single points of failure is planning to fail.

Medium term flood defences at Mythe, Walham and Castlemeads provided through Hesco Bastion defences should not become the long-term solution. Rigorous defences need to be put in place to prevent the potential loss of function at such crucial installations in the future event of flooding. Urgent consideration needs to be given to flooding as a result of the rise in the water table, in certain areas particularly around the counties utilities and the affects of ground saturation. The Hesco Bastion barriers will be no defence to water coming up through the ground as experienced at Walham, there should be no assumption that similar defences will stop Mythe from being lost in the future.

The question needs to be asked as to whether the existing County's flood defences are fit for purpose and what additional defences are required. The economic, social and emotional costs on the County as a result of the flooding have been vast. Any future investment in flood defences should take account of these costs.

7.3 National and regional utility companies need to engage at a local level with Local Resilience Forum.

Engagement with the LRF will assist in the identification of risks at local and strategic levels, with the application of shared knowledge ensuring the aversion of unnecessary scenarios being played out. The Gloucestershire LRF has previously made representations that the engagement of utilities should occur at this level and not be confined to national and regional forums as at present.

7.4 There must be an increased capacity to supply basic needs to communities in the event of an emergency

The County needs to increase its capacity to supply utilities, feed communities and supply other basic needs in the event of another sustained emergency situation. Using existing distribution networks could be one solution that should be explored.

7.5 There needs to be a strategic reserve of light, heat and sanitation Country-wide

7.6 The Tri-Service Emergency Centre should be maintained and strengthened through continual commitment and investment.

Lessons learnt from events of 9/11 and the London bombings of 7/7 2005 demonstrated the strength of a Tri-Service co-ordinated approach from the initial response to a significant event or incident. Events in Gloucestershire in July/August 2007 illustrated that the Tri-Service centre provided an efficient and effective co-ordinated response, an instant Command and Control infrastructure and an informal dialogue that promotes decision-making processes and action. The integration of the three emergency services at the Tri-Service centre allowed Gold Command to be on the front foot.

7.7 The Government need to consider fully the impact of continuing to build new homes on flood plains.

This has the potential to further increase the number of communities in Gloucestershire who could be adversely and dramatically affected by flooding to the point of losing their homes. Also the attraction of buying such housing given recent events should weigh in considerations.

7.8 There should be a specific requirement for national agencies to attend GOLD Command meetings when so requested and to ensure consistency of representation.

7.9 The importance of maintaining County-based structures needs to be recognised as these represent a suitably strategic organisation, but one which has local roots and knowledge.

7.10 There should be a review of national reserve emergency supplies of food, water, feeding and cooking amenities.

7.11 Gloucestershire Constabulary is a strategic Force

In dealing with the flooding crisis, the Constabulary was able to demonstrate its strategic capabilities as a County Force, without the need for mutual aid when dealing with an event of this magnitude. A regional response would not have been able to maximise local knowledge, experiences and co-ordinated such a dynamic and flexible response. The emergency equally highlighted the strengths of local entities including fire, ambulance and regional army brigades.

8. COBR

8.1 Liaison with COBR functioned well throughout the emergency, and the attention, visits and support from the Prime Minister, the Secretary of State for the Environment and the Minister of State for Local Government and Communities was very well received. It was not entirely clear whether COBR could always easily access emergency supplies and the build up of contingency reserves should be considered as a matter of urgency.

8.2 Most of these considerations are relevant at a national level, and therefore there should be a national review of contingency planning covering contingency reserves of basic utilities including food, water, shelter and sanitation. These reserve provisions would be available in the event of threat of disruption to basic living requirements from terrorism or environmental threat, as well as from conventional or CBRN attack in the event of war.

9. APPRECIATION

9.1 A big part of the success story in handling the emergency was the spirit and resilience displayed by the people of Gloucestershire. It was evident by the activities of individuals and groups of people, that there was a keen sense of ownership and responsibility both throughout the emergency and when dealing with the aftermath to resume normality and to help those less fortunate than themselves.

9.2 From first responders, agencies, voluntary groups and the wider people of Gloucestershire, there was a sense and feeling that generally everybody responded positively to the emergency. Although there were isolated occurrences of damage and disorder, people queued in an orderly fashion and there were numerous local support schemes assisting vulnerable locations and individuals. This was characteristic of the resilience displayed across Gloucestershire.

9.3 The Chief Constable would like to take the opportunity in expressing his sincere thanks and appreciation to everyone who helped, whether directly or indirectly, in the response and continuing recovery work in relation to the Gloucestershire water emergency of 2007.

9.4 The Chief Constable would like to extend particular thanks to those agencies represented in Gold Command, working alongside Gloucestershire Constabulary.

— Gloucestershire Fire and Rescue Service

— Great Western Ambulance Service

— Gloucestershire County Council

— Environment Agency

— Government Office South West

— Health Protection Agency

— Public Health (PTC)

— Gloucestershire Primary Care Trust

— RAF RLO

— ROYAL LOGISTICS CORP (9TH SUPPLY REGIMENT)

— 39th SIGNAL REGIMENT

— ROYAL ENGINEERS (10th FIELD SQN)