Memorandum submitted by Hull City Council
(FL 124)
HULL'S RECENT FLOOD EXPERIENCE
EXECUTIVE SUMMARY
1. On 25 June 2007, the city of Hull experienced
its most devastating flood in living memory. The scale of destruction
to property was much greater than that in other storm affected
parts of the country—with over 7,000 houses, over 90 local
schools, and dozens of businesses being flooded.
2. Hull's effective flood defences are designed
to protect from river or tidal flooding in the Humber Estuary.
However, the widespread flooding across the city was caused by
Hull's pumped drainage and sewerage system being overwhelmed by
the exceptional level of rainwater which fell on the city on 25
June.
3. Hull's unique topography makes it particularly
vulnerable to pluvial flooding, for which there is no established
UK warning system. However, many of the lessons learned from
Hull's experience will be applicable in other UK towns and cities.
4. In the wake of the flood, Hull City Council
set up an Independent Review Body, to establish the causes of
the flooding and to make recommendations on how the city's flood
defences and response arrangements could be improved in future.
The Council also established its own, internal review of its
flood preparedness, and co-ordinated joint aspects of flood responses
by the local councils in the Hull and Humber City Region.
5. A number of recommendations for action
on future flood improvements have resulted from these reviews.
Some of these are for the City Council and its local partner
agencies, some are for action by other key players such as the
Environment Agency and Yorkshire Water, and some will require
action at national level by the Government.
6. Although significant longer term investment
will be needed to improve Hull's flood defences, particularly
in response to the effects of climate change, some practical measures
can be taken quickly. A creative and collaborative approach,
on a multi-agency basis, should ensure that the future impact
of such flooding is much reduced and that the city's recovery
is swifter and less costly.
HULL'S
RECENT FLOOD
EXPERIENCE—ISSUES
REQUIRING ACTION
1. The unique location of Hull
Its low elevation and reliance upon pumped drainage
place Hull in a unique position compared to other UK cities.
Whilst all major UK conurbations can be liable to flooding caused
by heavy rainfall, Hull is especially vulnerable, as it has limited
natural methods of drainage. This increases its vulnerability
to flood damage should the pumps malfunction or fail. Hull is
also vulnerable to tidal flooding, but has significant and effective
flood protection defences. However, these are designed to protect
from flooding from the River Hull or from tidal flooding breaching
estuary defences.
2. Hull's drainage system
2.1 The overall management of Hull's drainage
system is confusing. It involves a multi agency inter-relationship
of separate, but complementary, responsibilities. The Environment
Agency is responsible for all open bodies of water—watercourses.
They are also responsible for river and tidal flood defence.
Where watercourses are culverted or flow underground they are
largely the responsibility of Yorkshire Water, who are also responsible
for the sewers. Feeding into the sewers at street level are a
system of gullies. They are the responsibility of the city council
(when on a public road or council land) or the landowner/homeowner
(when on private land).
2.2 In short, no single agency has accepted
responsibility for any elements outside their own terms of reference
nor have they historically allowed others to influence their own
obligations. There has been inadequate consultation, co-operation
and unity between the agencies, and this must end quickly.
3. Rainfall in June 2007
3.1 June 2007 was the wettest month recorded
in Yorkshire since 1882. The records for Hull show that over
250mm fell in June, with over 70 mm falling on 15 June and over
110 mm on 25 June.
3.2 The floods on 25 June were caused by
Hull's pumped drainage and sewerage system being overwhelmed by
the volume of rainwater. This led to backing up of water along
the sewer and drainage network leading to widespread flooding
across Hull. The drainage system in Hull is complex and several
of Hull's open watercourses flow directly into the main sewer
system. In Hull itself, there were no reports of blocked watercourses
and sewers. It appears that, as the sewers were full to capacity,
the watercourses had no-where to drain to.
3.3 Despite the devastation, there are many
positives to take from the floods. Given the magnitude of the
storm (greater that 1 in 150 years) it is very encouraging that
key pieces of important civil infrastructure did not fail. Hospitals
were open, electricity supplies were (largely) uninterrupted,
and drinking water supplies also functioned throughout. Telephone
and other utilities also worked throughout the storm. Sadly,
there was one fatality, but it is to the great credit of Humberside
Fire and Rescue, as well as Hull City Council operatives and other
agencies, that there were no other casualties.
4. The extent of flooding
4.1 The number of houses located in roads
affected by flooding were initially estimated at about 16,000.
Subsequently, it was established that over 7,000 properties experienced
water ingress into the home, a scale of property destruction for
greater than in other storm damaged areas of the country. Also,
there were large areas of standing water in many other parts of
the city, especially in open or park land with local schools being
disproportionately affected.
4.2 Almost every one of the 99 educational
establishments in the City were affected in different degrees
by flooding, with only seven schools not being closed temporarily.
4.3 Parks and school playing fields could,
in future, provide temporary storage areas into which flood water
could be pumped to avoid the drainage system overflowing. But,
this will require a new design model for school buildings (at
greater cost) to ensure that they are flood proof.
5. Flood warning
5.1 The flood warning system in Hull and
across the UK is only designed to deal with the threat of coastal,
estuarine or river flooding. There is no provision for warning
from events such as the 25th that were a result of pluvial flooding—that
caused by heavy rainfall. No agency seems to have responsibility
to provide warning from pluvial flooding. A warning system for
flash floods should be developed. This will require policy change
at a national level.
5.2 There is a lack of understanding within
other agencies of the differences between the EA's different levels
of warning (ie Flood Watch, Flood Warning and Severe Flood Warning).
There was Severe Flood Warning for Hull on this occasion, perhaps
reflecting the capacity of the watercourses on this occasion to
cope. However, this highlights the problem which appears to be
a national one, that no one agency has responsibility for issuing
warnings about rainfall flooding.
5.3 Furthermore, it is not clear what warnings
were actually given to members of the public. It appears that
the EA's flood warning system, which is an automated telephone
system, does not operate in Hull and is only designed to cover
the area in the immediate vicinity of a river. A pre-warning
by the EA would allow the earlier initiation of emergency procedures.
5.4 Surprisingly, an immediate requirement
raised by the flooding was the absence of critical baseline information
on the ownership of current watercourses, whether or not they
are pumped, and their maintenance regimes. The Environment Agency,
Yorkshire Water, East Riding of Yorkshire Council and Hull City
Council must provide and share data, and baseline information
on the ownership of current watercourses as a matter of urgency.
Responsibilities should be reviewed and, where possible, rationalised
as early as practical thereafter.
5.5 In addition a major public communication
campaign around practical storm awareness and preparedness issues
should be developed and the different agencies' roles and responsibilities
should be made clearer to the public. A joint agency public communication
strategy needs to be developed, and regular radio bulletins issued
during the course of any future events. Statements should come
direct from Silver/Gold command. There is a need also to educate,
and incentivise action by, the public on their obligations as
homeowners to take reasonable measures to flood-proof their homes.
6. Role of the Fire and Rescue Service
6.1 In the event of severe weather conditions,
the priorities of the Humberside Fire and Rescue Service are:
— Fire and rescue work—fire risks
— Flooding involving life—this
includes: children, disabled and the elderly
— Flooding that involves at risk properties—hospital,
telephone exchanges, power and substations etc.
— Flooding in other properties
— General flooding assistance
6.2 Co-ordinating and providing large scale
pumping operations is not a Humberside Fire and Rescue Service
statutory priority. The HFRS pumping capability is an emergency
resource beyond the pumping and water discharge operations for
foul and surface water operated by Yorkshire Water and the Environment
Agency. Fire and Rescue Service emergency pumping prevented some
flooding and removed water from flooded areas. There is not sufficient
clarity about the role of HFRS and the expectations of HFRS from
Government, public services and the public in such emergencies
may be unreasonable. In general, it is questionable whether HFRS
is sufficiently resourced to cope with such responsibilities.
6.3 On 25 June calls for assistance or advice
from HFRS quickly reached a peak of around 100 calls an hour and
were sustained for the next fifteen hours. Difficulties were
encountered by Kingston Communications and BT in connecting callers
to HFRS requiring queuing, call holding and reconnection attempts,
with more than a third of calls being unanswered.
6.4 Arrangements to divert calls to less
busy Fire and Rescue Services were made, with 904 further notifications
received by HFRS by fax and email. HFRS administrative staff
also handled 255 calls for assistance. HFRS received a total
of 3,054 calls in 18 hours. Many calls did not warrant the emergency
services, for example being concerned with the provision of sand
bags. An even higher volume of calls from the public also temporarily
overwhelmed the City Council's Call Centre, and threatened a crash
of the City's telecommunication network, the capacity and robustness
of which is limited in such emergencies.
6.5 A better appreciation of the priorities
and responsibilities of HFRS could reduce inappropriate calls.
Also, the public wrongly believe that HFRS will give priority
to protecting private property in such emergencies. It was not
clear whether the redirection of calls to other Fire and Rescue
Services has greater potential to provide reassurance to callers
and prioritise action or whether the Fire and Rescue Service is
resourced to satisfactorily assess the volume of information in
emergencies of this scale so as to prioritise the response.
6.6 There should be better co-ordination
of emergency responses to the public, with a single point of contact
for flood emergencies.
7. Declaring a state of emergency
7.1 There is some confusion between agencies
about whose responsibility it is to initiate a state of emergency
and call Silver or Gold Command. The decision of the Chief Constable
of Humberside Police to call a Silver Command only may have restricted
the strategic co-ordination of the emergency response locally,
and had the effect, unintentionally, of signalling to Government
that Hull did not appear to be experiencing a major disaster.
7.2 Generally, Silver Command coped well
with the immediate emergency, however there are important lessons
to be learned. Surprisingly there was a lack of local knowledge
of Hull City from Silver Command hierarchy as well as a need for
a list of key points of civil infrastructure. Silver Command
is reactive and (for example) will only be alerted once threats
to key items of infrastructure have occurred instead of anticipating
dangers. Communication to the public from Silver Command needs
to be better managed, formalised and more frequent. Local media
are vital for disseminating information and direct and formal
links should be made for future situations.
8. Involving the Army
There was some confusion on this and on the
question of any costs involved. Without authorisation at Chief
Executive level (ie Gold Command) the Army will change for their
services. The fact that Hull stayed at Silver Command could have
prevented the deployment of the Army if they were required. All
concerned need to have better awareness of how and when the Army
can be called in and take this factor into account when deciding
whether to move from Silver to Gold Command.
9. Emergency Plans
9.1 A list of strategic installations, in
particular key pumping locations, to be protected was not produced
until the worst of the flooding had occurred. This should be
part of Emergency Plans and of any future planning exercises.
This should also include the water company's pumping stations
and power supplies.
9.2 Very few of the participants in this
actual emergency had attended earlier emergency planning training.
This calls into question the value of doing such an exercise
every three years, as recommended by DEFRA. Consideration should
be given to increasing the frequency of these exercises. Inevitably,
there will be institutional turnover, and staff training programmes
should reflect the continuing need to cover flood response situations.
10. Drainage and sewerage in Hull
10.1 It is apparent that Hull's drainage
and sewerage system was a main factor in 25 June floods. Given
Hull's reliance on the capacity and resilience of the Yorkshire
Water pumping system, a key first step should be a major hydraulic
study to model flows in the city as a whole and to better understand
the impact on systems of climate change which may result in an
increased frequency of major rainfall events and rising sea and
river levels. This may then lead to recommendations to upgrade
the system, or re-model the existing configuration. The study
should include projections of climate change in accordance with
the latest Ofwat recommendation.
10.2 Key factors may have exacerbated the
flooding. As Hull's drainage system is entirely pumped, Hull
is reliant upon these pumps working and being designed to the
correct capacity. We have significant concerns as to whether
the pumping system is correctly designed to cover a 1 in 30 year
storm event. Humbercare, or parts of the Humbercare system, may
not have been designed to afford protection from a 1 in 30 year
storm prior to 2005. Furthermore, it is a concern that Yorkshire
Water appear to have a lack of monitoring data on sewer and pump
discharges that make it very hard to assess how well the sewer
and pump system was operating. Importantly, the availability
of additional pumping would also provide backup, or contingency,
should any of the existing pumps fail.
10.3 This would necessarily involve the
city making choices on what level of risk and protection is required,
taking into account the likely impact on customers' bills of any
major new investment in the sewerage and pumping network, and
that even the best infrastructure in the world would be most likely
to over-topped and over-whelmed by 1 in 150 year rainfall events.
10.4 It is difficult to decide what level
of protection is appropriate. However given the occurrence of
two greater than 1 in 30 events within ten days in June 2007,
we seriously question whether a 1 in 30 level of protection is
adequate. We believe that Hull is in a unique position and its
reliance on pumping drainage mean that a greater level of protection
and contingency (e.g backup pumping) should be incorporated.
10.5 At a national level, the level of protection
for drainage systems is set at 1 in 30 years by an industry standard.
There is no indication of whether this is regularly updated to
incorporate new large storm events that will increase the size
of a calculated 1 in 30 year storm, nor whether present day drainage
systems are regularly re-checked and re-evaluated to ensure they
meet new levels. Furthermore, there appears to be no accommodation
for climate change in these design criteria. Nationally, we suggest
that for urban drainage the level of 1 in 30 years should be reviewed
as a minimum, and that some additional capacity should be factored
in for possible climate change.
11. Costs—Financial Implications for
the Council
11.1 The flooding of 25 June has had a significant
impact on Council services and as a result considerable costs
have been incurred to date with further expenditure inevitable
as the full implications become clear.
11.2 An initial estimate of the impact of
the floods (in terms of additional costs incurred/income lost)
on service revenue has been amended over the course of recent
weeks as updated information has been received. In summary terms,
the current situation is as follows:
|
| | £ million
|
|
| (a) | Response and recovery costs
| |
| Street Scene |
|
| — Gully clearing, sandbags, tree cutting, emergency road repairs,
| 1.2 |
| waste collection and disposal
| |
| Housing |
|
| — Contractor support on cleaning, emergency bed and breakfast
| 1.2 |
| Community Care |
|
| — Residential and home care support for vulnerable adults
| 0.3 |
| Other services |
|
| — Overtime, other relief activity
| 0.8 |
| Total
| 3.5 |
| (b) | Lost revenue income, eg Leisure Centre trading
| 2.4 |
| (c) | Contents replacement |
|
| Schools and other services
| 3.1 |
|
11.3 A part of the response and recovery costs may be
reclaimable through the Bellwin emergency scheme, though there
is a threshold of Council expenditure of £690k before costs
can be reclaimed. The Bellwin rules specifically exclude claims
for lost revenue income so these will need to be borne by the
Council. However, there is uncertainty over what the Bellwin
scheme will cover and this, coupled with the need to reclaim such
Council expenditure retrospectively, could hamper decisions on
future relief efforts in the event of a major civil emergency.
The Government should consider an alternative funding approach,
such as establishing a National Disaster Relief Fund, which could
be drawn on immediately by local councils and other agencies in
a crisis.
11.4 The current assessment of the financial impact of
the emergency on the Council's asset stock may be summarised as
follows:
|
| Estimated Repair Costs
|
|
| £ million
|
| Schools | 70.0 Note 1
|
| Housing Stock | 11.4
|
| Highways | 1.2 Note 2
|
| Oher Corporate Assets | 5.0 Note 3
|
| Total | 87.6
|
|
11.5 Note 1:
The figure for schools reflects the simple like for like
reinstatement cost (which will be covered by insurance for some
sites) but does not include the cost of additional work to enable
replaced or existing schools to be made more flood resistant,
which is likely to be significant.
11.6 Note 2:
The current estimate for Highway repair of £1.2 million
is that originally forecast at the time of the floods. The nature
of the damage for this infrastructure required a more in depth
review of the longer term damage to roads and footpaths. A more
accurate cost of repairs is still awaited, and this is likely
to be significantly higher.
11.7 Note 3:
Of the other corporate assets figure, the main items include
Woodford Leisure Centre (£1 million), the Education Centre
(£1.0 million), Catherine Ellis Resource Centre (£0.6
million) and the Holden Centre (£0.9 million).
11.8 Information on the precise extent of the damage
to many buildings is still being compiled, and these figures will
again be subject to change as that process progresses.
11.9 There is, as yet, no clarity on the extent of any
Government assistance in meeting these major unplanned costs.
Without Government funding support, there is concern that the
Council will need to utilise capital resources that have been
earmarked for investment in the regeneration of the City's physical
infrastructure, thus undermining momentum in the growth of the
local economy.
11.10 The flood has inevitably had a significant effect
on some of the measures that are used to judge how successfully
the Council is serving its residents, particularly in our Community
Care, Housing, Revenues & Benefits and Children & Young
People's services. Some of these may be recoverable through the
rest of the year; however, the LAA targets for decent homes, for
example, will be very hard to recover because of the 2000 Council
houses that were damaged by flood water; similarly, the SAP energy
efficiency standard for housing may not achieve its 2007-08 target,
putting at risk the Government reward grant to the Council for
meeting stretch targets in 2009-10. The Government's audit and
inspection regime needs to take proper account of the impact of
this emergency on the Council.
Hull City Council
September 2007
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