Memorandum submitted by Sheffield City
Council (FL 96)
RESPONSE TO FLOODING—JUNE 2007
EXECUTIVE SUMMARY
1. The rainfall experienced in Sheffield
over 24-25th June came on top of an already saturated water table
and Met Office records show that between 22.00 hours on 24th June
and 22.00 Monday 25th June 88 mm of rain fell in the Sheffield
catchment. The total monthly average for June is 67 mm. This,
added to the already saturated ground conditions, created an unprecedented
level of water coming off the high ground and into city.
2. The major distinguishing feature of the
flooding that affected Sheffield was the sheer volume, force and
speed of water coming down the fluvial river system in a very
short period of time.
3. During the floods the Council worked
in partnership with a wide range of other authorities to co-ordinate
the immediate response and the ongoing recovery process.
4. Flooding in Sheffield has previously
been seen as low risk. Following the June 2007 floods a number
of initial issues have been raised and while the experience in
Sheffield highlights some issues that are specific to our own
particular location the learning points may also assist other
areas in planning and preparation for flooding.
5. KEY ISSUES:
5.1 Need for accurate, good quality, timely
warnings (para 4.2)
5.2 Allocation of responsibility for rainfall
flash flooding (para 4.2)
5.4 The need for flood defence and prevention
work (para 4.3)
5.5 Managing public Information and expectations
and educating the public (see para 4.8)
5.6 Resilience of the critical infrastructure
(para 4.5)
5.7 Improved involvement of Utilities in
future emergency planning (para 4.5).
5.8 Confusion caused by split in Utilities
ownership and responsibilities (see para 4.5)
5.9 Clarification on responsibility for
Dams in recreational use (para 4.5)
5.10 Better access to Dam/Reservoir Flood
Inundation plans and clarification on responsibility for dams
in recreational use (para 4.5)
5.11 Use of Assistance Centres should be
recommended as good practice (para 4.8)
5.12 Emphasis on benefits of training and
exercises
1. BACKGROUND
Sheffield is built on "7 hills", intersected
by valleys with five rivers converging at or before reaching the
City Centre. The rivers drain an extensive upland catchment with
moorland rising to 500 metres within the city boundary.
1.1 Water from all five rivers is then carried
by the River Don from the City Centre through the Lower Don Valley
to Meadowhall, near the Rotherham boundary, where it is joined
by a further tributary (Blackburn Brook, also subject to flood
risk). When the surrounding moors become saturated, water passes
quickly through to the city and the overall gradients mean that
it is not retained in the same way as in more low-lying areas
such as Rotherham, Doncaster and Hull.
1.2 During 14-16th June Sheffield experienced
rainfall totalling 136 mm. This caused some localised flooding
but was managed effectively within our normal plans and procedures.
1.3 The rainfall experienced over 24-25th
June came on top of an already saturated water table and Met Office
records show that between 22.00 hours on 24th June and 22.00 Monday
25th June 88 mm of rain fell in the Sheffield catchment. The monthly
average total for June is 67 mm.
2. IMPACT
2.1. The major distinguishing feature of
the flooding that affected Sheffield was the sheer volume, force
and speed of water coming down the fluvial river system in a very
short period of time and this resulted in two fatalities.
2.2 The effect of the flooding on the City
of Sheffield was devastating with the City divided in half by
floodwater, along a corridor some 23 km in length, effectively
isolating half of the city from access to the main accident and
emergency centre. Numerous roads were badly damaged, closed or
inaccessible.
2.3 RAF Sea King helicopters were used for
rooftop rescues with other people being rescued by boat and in
some cases by a tractor.
2.4 A large number of people were left stranded
and unable to get home; others were evacuated from flooded homes.
A number of reception centres were established these included
pre-determined and ad hoc centres to accommodate over 1400 people.
2.5 The City's railway station was closed
and passengers were left stranded, needing accommodation and assistance
the following day with onward travel arrangements.
2.6 Power cuts affected the north of the
city with 48,000 homes without power.
2.7 The M1 was closed between Junctions
32 and 35 due to fears that Ulley Dam would burst with the potential
for 2 million cubic metres of water cascading across the motorway
and damaging the Catcliffe substation with dire predictions of
the imminent loss of most of Sheffield's power supply for a considerable
period of time.
3. RESPONSE
3.1 Sheffield City Council (SCC) operated
from the Council's Emergency Control Centre at Silver Command
level and the Emergency Plan was activated. The Council has a
very clear plan for responding to emergencies, which is supported
by training and exercises at all levels.
3.2 The initial Council response was focused
on:
— Minimising the impact of the flooding
— Dealing with the immediate crisis
— Managing the recovery of the city
back to normality
3.3 Our response included:
— Full participation in all multi agency
structures
— Mobilisation of full emergency plan
— Deployment of strategic and tactical
resources city-wide to prevent harm to the public and to mitigate
damage to property and to care for those in need
— Liaison with Government, Regional
and National
— Setting up a network of reception
centres
— Liaised with other local authorities
on mutual aid basis
— Direct communications with press
and public
— Activation of Assistance Centres
in accordance with the plan
3.4 Resilience to continue to deal with
the emergency and the need to manage the transition from immediate
response to recovery was recognised at an early stage. The following
action was taken to ensure this:
— Key personnel rested during night
of 25th-26th so they could take over on 26th
— Handover briefing/debriefing meeting
at 6.00 am on 26th June chaired by CEX
— Recovery phase structures put in
place on Tuesday 26th to operate parallel with the incident management
structure.
— Recovery objectives set and continuously
reviewed
— Rota, welfare and support arrangements
in place to sustain recovery effort
— Key partners actively involved in
response and recovery with partner resources secured.
3.5 Resources were just sufficient, but
stretched and consideration should now be given to looking at
providing extra resources at alternative strategic locations.
3.6 Offers of assistance came from many
organisations, local authorities, voluntary organisations and
members of the public. While mutual aid arrangements are in place
locally these should also be formalised at a wider regional and
national level.
3.7 The flooding resulted in significant
financial cost to the City Council. The recovery process is lengthy
and carries significant longer-term risk for the Council, both
financial and reputational.
4. LESSONS FOR
THE FUTURE
4.1 Command and Control
SCC fully participated in all multi-agency structures
and attended Gold Command within 40 minutes of being activated
with an officer who has previous experience of operating at Gold
Command. The Gold Command incident structure remained in place
until 1st July 2007, making it, at the time, the longest-running
Gold Command in the UK.
4.1.1 The Council's Silver Control was activated
in the Emergency Control Room in the Town Hall.
4.1.2 South Yorkshire Police activated multi
agency Silver Control, co-located in the SCC Emergency Control
Room. A major incident was declared at 14.00 hours.
4.1.3 A full multi-agency silver control
ran 24 hours a day from Monday 25th until Saturday 30th June and
then operated on reduced hours over the weekend to deal with predicted
severe weather with potential for further flooding.
4.1.4 The importance of training and exercises
should not be underestimated and it was evident during the floods
that people who had attended training and exercises, particularly
Exercise Loxley in December 2006, were much better prepared for
and aware of the role in the response and recovery.
4.1.5 Issues Raised
— Location of Gold and Silver controls
need to be reassessed
— Representation from utility companies
needs to be timely and at an appropriate level
— Split in utility responsibilities
led to confusion and delay
— Importance of attending, training
and exercises for all levels of command and control should be
emphasised
4.2 Warnings—Met Office and Environment
Agency
4.2.1 Although Met Office and Environment
Agency (EA) do liaise, more account should be taken of previous
weather impact.
4.2.2 Good quality, accurate and timely
information is vital.
4.2.3 A Severe Flood Warning was not given
for Central Sheffield (Kelham Island) until 16.28 hours on the
25th June (water level was already up to windscreens on vehicles).
4.2.4 In Sheffield the differentiation between
Warning and Severe Warning becomes more difficult due to the relatively
steep gradient feeding surface water into rivers.
4.2.5 Warnings need to be easily understood
and perhaps converted into something people understand for example
flooding likely to extend to x area or y height up key buildings
and walls.
4.2.6 Automated Verbal Warnings on telephones
are available from EA but there has been limited take up (only
18% of homes and businesses have registered). Registration is
voluntary and could perhaps be compulsory with an opt out clause
available. Since flooding there has still been no significant
take up.
4.2.7 There is no warning system for rainfall
flash flooding.
4.2.8 The impact on people who have been
flooded is just as devastating whether pluvial or fluvial. Homes
or businesses don't really care which type of flood water it is;
whichever type the impact for them is just the same.
4.2.9 Issues Raised
— Need for accurate and timely information
— Consistency between the warnings
issued from Met Office and Environment Agency.
— Allocation of responsibility for
flash flooding.
— Need for identification of trigger
points for activation and initiation of plans and command structures
— Programme of information to the public
and businesses on weather warnings
— More co-operation between agencies
eg EA, Yorkshire Water etc
— Locally based telemetry to provide
better focussed information
— EA to understand their role in the
warning and informing process in relation to Cat 1 and Cat 2 responders.
4.3 Flood Prevention
4.3.1 Discussions with Environment Agency
are ongoing. EA are working on a Sheffield Catchment Flood Management
Plan. This was originally scheduled for completion in December
2008, but is now delayed and it will be Spring 2009 before all
options are considered. It is unlikely that any major EA scheme
for Sheffield would commence for at least 4 years.
4.3.2 Environment Agency Drop in Advice
Sessions have been arranged in four locations throughout the affected
areas of the City.
4.3.3 SCC are holding discussions to ensure
that links with other agencies are in place in advance of remedial
highway repair work to ensure any work is co-ordinated and not
piece-meal.
4.3.4 Work is currently being undertaken
to calculate the time of water travel in the River Don to assist
in planning flood management.
4.3.6 Issues Raised
— Time of water travel through river
catchments
— Identification and assessment of
Flood Management systems
— Need for better consultation with
affected areas
4.4 Community Impact
4.4.1 1273 homes were affected by flooding,
200 people were evacuated from Winn Gardens. SCC staff visited
all affected homes and financial support packages organised.
4.4.2 Over 1400 people stayed in a number
of reception centres set up throughout the city.
4.4.3 Power cuts affected 48,000 homes over
a number of days and involved rota power cuts.
4.4.4 SCC provided support to make property
habitable and gave a £100 good landlord payment.
4.4.5 A recovery package of up to £1000
included:
— Making safe electricity
— Water and sewage checks
— Emergency heating/humidifiers
— Removal of contaminated items
4.4.6 Longer term issues are being co-ordinated
through a care and support project being undertaken. This will
look at immediate issues, signposting to professional help and
community wellbeing and rebuilding.
4.4.7 Issues Raised
— Public perceived differences in financial
support for insured and non-insured and services available to
council tenants v private owner-occupiers
— Some areas felt isolated and neglected
as the main focus of attention went to particular areas
— VIP visits need to focus on all areas—not
just immediate high profile areas
— Floodwater—pluvial/fluvial—people
flooded aren't worried whether the water is from rivers or drains—the
impact is still as devastating
— Clarify identification and availability
of information on "vulnerable people"
— Importance of addressing the longer
term impact and community
4.5 Critical Infrastructure
4.5.1 During the flooding Sheffield was
faced with the prospect of the Ulley Dam in Rotherham bursting
its bank. Had it breached, the impact would have been much wider
than the flooding itself and would have impacted on other critical
infrastructure such as water, sewerage, communications etc.
4.5.2 Other utility flood defences were
also shown to be vulnerable e.g. Service pipes below bridges.
The loss of Neepsend substation during the floods led to the power
outages to around 48,000 homes in the city. Rota cuts introduced
into the city on Wednesday am led to confusion over exactly which
premises would be affected.
4.5.3 Difficulties with the split in utility
providers and confusion over ownership of different parts of network
and problems accessing contacts numbers for some Category 2 responders
caused unnecessary confusion and delay.
4.5.4 Utilities relied on other emergency
responders to supply resources (e.g. sandbags) to defend critical
sites when all were fully stretched responding to wide range of
flood related emergencies.
4.5.6 Issues Raised
— Utilities should be engaging with
partner organisations at local level.
— Critical infrastructure should have
appropriate defences.
— Critical links between the different
providers should be assessed
— Clarity on responsibility for dam
and reservoir overtopping plans—who has the statutory duty
to warn and inform?
— Clarification on responsibility for
dams in recreational use.
— The split in utility providers and
ownership of different parts of network leads to confusion over
responsibility and uncoordinated decision making.
4.6 Highways Infrastructure
4.6.1 The sheer speed and force of the floodwater
caused major damage to the city's highways and rural road network.
4.6.2 Initial work included the clean up
and disposal of debris from roads, bridges, culverts and highway
drainage systems, removal of abandoned vehicles from roads and
rivers, providing sandbags, temporary traffic management, removing
major blockages in rivers.
4.6.3 Work has now been undertaken to make
safe and restore the general highway system, repairs to carriage
ways, footpaths, street lighting, traffic signals, signs, retaining
walls, bridge parapets etc.
4.6.4 Other work is still outstanding. Two
of the main routes from the North into the city the A61 and A6102
remain badly affected.
4.6.6 Issues Raised
— The need for liaison with EA and
Utilities to ensure co-ordinated approach
— Impact on work programmes and the
knock on effect on areas of the city's performance over the next
12 months
— Problems identifying the location
of major services under bridges
— Ensuring Health and Safety Issues
are complied with for people working in exceptional conditions
eg Working in Water.
4.7 Business
4.7.1 There has been significant impact
on many businesses in the city as the flooding affected the city's
main industrial area. Over 1000 business were affect amongst which
are a number of large business and major employers directly and
indirectly.
4.7.2 There is likely to be a significant
long-term effect on business in the city.
4.7.3 The Sheffield Recovery Group immediately
established a business helpline in conjunction with the Assistance
Centre and appointed a business champion to lead on business related
issues.
4.7.4 Meadowhall closed for first time in
its history (except for Christmas and Easter).
4.7.5 Issues Raised
— Impact of redundancies—direct
and indirect
— Confidence and the need to counteract
negative publicity
4.8 Public Information
4.8.1 An Assistance Centre was set up at
the Customer Service centre and also based locally in affected
areas. This was publicised and face to face, phone and email information
and advice was provided.
4.8.2 The 101 system proved invaluable as
a first line information point.
4.8.3 There were 22,000 phone contracts
between 25th June to 19th July.
4.8.4 The Assistance Centre continues to
operate at reduced hours.
4.8.5 Questionnaires have been delivered
to 2,378 affected addresses and published on the website. Results
of the public consultation will be published on the website.
4.8.6 A regular information Flood Newsletter
is being distributed to affected properties.
4.8.7 Public information is particularly
important not least around raising awareness for the public to
make their own preparations and not rely totally on the local
authority to supply resources for everyone, for example sandbags.
The public need also to be made aware of other options of flood
protection for their properties.
4.8.8 Issues Raised
— Ensuring that the public are informed
on how to:
— understand their responsibilities
— understand the roles of different
agencies and what they can do
— Managing public expectations
— Assistance Centres and representation
in the community should be followed as good practice
— How do we get people to recognise
they could be affected by flooding?
Sheffield City Council
September 2007
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