House of Commons - Foreign Affairs

Select Committee on Foreign Affairs Fifth Report

4 THE DOMESTIC DIMENSION

83. We now consider the relationship between Iran's domestic politics and the nuclear issue. There are a number of linkages that need to be considered when assessing the international community's policy on the nuclear issue. We also consider in this chapter the role that the British Government can play in encouraging change in other fields, in particular on Iran's human rights record.

Domestic Politics

84. Following the overthrow of the Shah nearly 30 years ago, Iran has modelled itself as an 'Islamic Republic'. This is an appropriate appellation. Iran's constitution provides for both clerical authority (spared direct election), and the more republican notions of a President and Parliament, elected by and accountable to the population. The diagram below illustrates this complicated institutional architecture.

Iran's Government Institutions and Structure

Source: Peter Mandaville, Global Political Islam (London 2007)

85. The most powerful figure in Iran is the Supreme Leader (or faqih), a cleric appointed by the Assembly of Experts. The first Supreme Leader was Ayatollah Ruhollah Khomeini, who was succeeded upon his death in 1989 by the incumbent Ayatollah Ali Khamenei. Article 5 of the Iranian constitution states: "The guardianship over the affairs of the community shall be charged to the just faqih".[146] Under Khomeini's theory of politics, the Supreme Leader was afforded absolute authority in politics. Since his death, there has been a debate about what constitutional limits should be placed on the Supreme Leader, but all within the regime accept his role as the ultimate power broker in Iran.[147] As the diagram above demonstrates, the Supreme Leader has authority over the armed forces and the Supreme National Security Council.

86. Iran's President is elected directly, and can hold office for a maximum of two consecutive terms. He appoints Ministers, although his ability to shape policy is constrained by the Supreme Leader. All Presidential candidates are vetted by a body called the Guardian Council, which rejected hundreds of applications in the 2005 poll won by President Ahmadinejad. Iran's Parliament, or Majlis, can pass legislation, but this is subject to the religious scrutiny of the Guardian Council.[148]

87. On our visit to Iran, we heard that politicians are divided into three broad camps: reformists, pragmatic conservatives and hardliners. The reformists are embodied by former President Mohammed Khatami, who attempted to introduce more liberal policies in Iran during his tenure in office from 1997 to 2005. The figurehead of the pragmatic conservatives is Ali Akbar Hashemi Rafsanjani, another former President who lost the 2005 election. President Ahmadinejad is seen as a hardliner, and to some degree has the support of the Supreme Leader. Given the complexity of Iran's political system, it is no surprise that outsiders have found it difficult to analyse the current and future trends in the power balance between these three camps.

THE INTERNAL DEBATE ON NUCLEAR AFFAIRS

88. Officially, nuclear policy is handled by the Supreme National Security Council. Elahe Mohtsasham notes that all important decisions continue to be presented to the Supreme Leader for his approval.[149] When he gave evidence to our inquiry on Global Security: The Middle East, Professor Anoush Ehteshami told us that,

150

However, Dr Ali Ansari told us that the current leadership did not have "a good track record for being decisive", which can cause difficulties in Iran's international relations. He also argued that President Ahmadinejad had the potential to play an effective "spoiler" role in nuclear diplomacy, such as when it appeared that Dr Ali Larijani (Iran's former nuclear negotiator and former Secretary of the Supreme National Security Council) was making progress in his talks with Dr Solana.[151]

89. Dr Ansari argued to the Committee that,

[T]he nuclear programme and its development in Iran is a highly sensitive and very nationalistic issue. I think that, in some ways, it has been exploited very effectively by the Government of Mr. Ahmadinejad in order, perhaps, to disguise other failings in his Administration.

However, he qualified this analysis by noting there was not uniform support for this policy within Iran:

152

90. In his written submission, Karim Sadjadpour, an Associate at the Carnegie Endowment for International Peace, argues that Iranian public opinion on the nuclear issue is more nuanced than the regime admits. In particular, whilst the Iranian population would resent any imposition of what they believed to be "double standards" on nuclear policy, he notes that many in the regime agreed "nuclear pride had been manufactured" and that popular support for the programme may not run that deep. However, he acknowledges that there exists "little correlation" between public opinion and Iranian foreign policy. He also states that Iranians did not list this inability to influence their Government's foreign policy as a particularly important grievance, and that it would not, in isolation, cause unrest amongst the population.[153]

91. We asked Dr Howells how the imposition of sanctions would resonate in Iran, in particular whether President Ahmadinejad could use them to blame economic problems on the international community. He replied:

154

Mr Phillipson told us that, despite this, there was a "debate under way" in Tehran, with a former nuclear negotiator saying Iran's foreign policy is "damaging to the country". He argued that EU and UN sanctions played into this debate.[155]

92. The internal debate on nuclear policy was brought into the open somewhat in the weeks before we visited Tehran. Dr Ali Larijani resigned from his position as Iran's nuclear negotiator after what were reported to be "repeated clashes with Ahmadinejad over tactics."[156] Though himself a hardliner, Dr Larijani had gained something of a reputation for being willing to engage with the international community, and he appeared to be contradicted by the President after talking warmly about the visit of Russian President Vladmir Putin to Iran in October 2007. Saeed Jalili, a close ideological ally of the President, was chosen to replace Dr Larjiani. Ali Akbar Velayati, a close adviser to the Supreme Leader, said "it would have been better if this resignation had not taken place".[157] At least 183 of the 290 representatives in the Majlis signed their equivalent of an Early Day Motion affirming their support for Dr Larijani.[158] This episode highlights that even within the regime, there is noteworthy dissent for President Ahmadinejad (and perhaps by proxy the Supreme Leader) in his approach to this issue.

ENCOURAGING REFORM

93. Iran will hold elections for the Majlis in March 2008 and for the Presidency in 2009. These two events will help gauge the political mood amongst the population, albeit following the distortions to the democratic process carried out by the Guardian Council, which vets candidates. In late 2006, President Ahmadinejad suffered a blow in elections to the Assembly of Experts and local councils, with big gains for pragmatic and reformist elements on a 60% turnout. Former President Rafsanjani was seen as the biggest winner.[159] He is tipped as a potential frontrunner in the 2009 Presidential election, and whilst his main critique of Ahmadinejad appears to be in the economic sphere, his return to power would open up the opportunity for a more constructive dialogue with the international community.[160]

94. Dr Ansari argued that the actions of the international community often hindered reformist elements within the Iranian regime, noting that when a reformist President [Mohammed Khatami] offered cooperation with the United States, he "was rewarded with an accusation of being part of an 'axis of evil'". He implied that the failure to work with the reformists eased the way for a hard-line Government to emerge in Iran. He also strongly criticised the "poor" position of the EU in failing to protest sufficiently when the hardliners "seized the Parliament through wholly fraudulent means" in 2004 (when the Guardian Council blocked the candidacies of 85 incumbent reformist MPs).[161] Karim Sadjadpour notes that whilst President Ahmadinejad's popularity is expected to continue to fall in 2008 and 2009, the electoral behaviour of his allies in the Islamic Revolutionary Guards Corps and the paramilitary bassij group "will play an important but unpredictable role in deciding his fate".[162] It is important that the international community remains vigilant about this possibility.

95. There is a broad range of opposition to President Ahmadinejad. Some, like former President Khatami, prefer to work within the system. In Tehran, we met Shirin Ebadi, the Nobel Peace Prize winner who campaigns against the injustice of the system, but works through its courts. Amnesty International has highlighted the challenge faced by trade unions in fighting for workers' rights in Iran.[163] Others, such as the National Council of Resistance and Mujahedin-e-Khalq (MeK), campaign from abroad for the overthrow of the regime and have not been overtly politically active in Iran for a number of years. Akbar Ganji, a prominent and highly respected critic of the regime, has warned of the dangers of Western support for those that reject the status quo:

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His reference to the United States is linked to the $75 million State Department budget "to support democracy promotion activities in Iran." Human Rights Watch notes that a vast majority of Iranian dissidents have publicly disassociated themselves from the initiative.[165]

96. The Home Secretary proscribed the MeK as a terrorist organisation in 2001. Dr Howells explained to us the background of the MeK's relationship with the Iranian Government, noting its violent activities against Iranian embassies and politicians, which led to some civilian deaths. On our visit to Iran, representatives of the regime were particularly exercised by what they referred to as "the MeK terrorist cult" and sensitive about the UK's approach towards the MeK, although our discussions with a wide range of interlocutors did not suggest that the MeK enjoyed a strong level of support within the country. Soon after our return, the Proscribed Organisations Appeal Commission upheld an appeal against the proscription of the MeK, although the Home Secretary is to appeal against this finding.[166] We will continue to monitor this case to its final resolution.

97. Lord Archer told us that the population in Iran was "seething with discontent".[167] He argued that more could be done to coordinate the overthrow of the regime.[168] However, Mr Sadjadpour's analysis is sceptical of the prospects of significant change within Iran. He argues that,

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Rather than promote sudden upheaval, he argues that "professional and objective" news broadcasts could play an important role in widening the possibilities for reform. He notes the introduction of the BBC World Service's Persian television broadcast, due to begin operations in 2008, as a positive step. We have long urged the Government to introduce this service and welcome this development as part of a constructive approach to reform.

98. We conclude that Iran is a complex and diverse society at present governed by a theocratic regime. Iran's quasi-democratic political system is not fully closed and may lead to reform that will result in a more constructive approach on the nuclear issue. We recommend that the Government should be careful to avoid action that could be manipulated by the hardliners such as President Ahmadinejad to bolster their position against the more pragmatic and reformist elements ahead of his campaign for re-election in 2009. We recommend that the Government in its Response to this Report sets out fully why it has resisted the decisions of both the High Court in the UK and the European Court of Justice that the People's Mujahideen of Iran (PMOI), also known as the Mujahedin-e-Khalq (MeK), should no longer be listed as a terrorist organisation.

Human Rights

99. As a Committee, we have long taken an interest in the human rights situation in Iran through our Reports on the FCO's Annual Human Rights Report. During our visit, we had a robust exchange with Dr Mohammad Javad Larijani, the head of human rights in Iran's judiciary, and raised our concerns with a number of other interlocutors. We were seriously concerned by the way in which senior figures within the Iranian regime used their religious and ideological beliefs to justify severe abuses of human rights in their country.

100. The FCO's submission bluntly sets out the current situation in Iran. In particular:

Iran executed more people in 2005 and 2006 than any other country in the world except China (whose population is over 15 times the size).[170]
Iran was one of only two countries in the world known to have executed child offenders in 2006.[171]
Floggings, stonings and amputations remain on the statute books. A man was stoned to death for adultery in Qazvin province on 5 July 2007, the first such incident since a moratorium on stoning in 2002.[172]
Same sex relations are illegal in Iran and can carry the death penalty.[173]
In 2005, Reporters Sans Frontiers described Iran as "the biggest prison for journalists in the Middle East".[174]
Domestic violence, gender inequality and discrimination against women remain serious problems, despite the fact that women make up over half of Iran's university intake.[175]
Religious minorities such as the adherents of the Bahá'í faith continue to suffer widespread discrimination and persecution. We received evidence from the Bahá'í community in the UK that strongly suggests recent vigilante campaigns have led to deaths amongst its adherents.[176] Dr Howells called the treatment of the Bahá'í "absolutely dreadful".[177]

101. The FCO states that recent months "have seen an unmistakeable increase in the repression of human rights activists" and comments that there is a "real reluctance" on the part of Iran's Government to undertake necessary human rights reforms. The EU established a human rights dialogue with Iran in 2002, but this has made little progress. The UK Government "frequently initiates and participates" in EU demarches and public statements criticising human rights abuses in Iran.[178]

102. Human Rights Watch's evidence provides further examples of Iran's human rights violations. It charges the EU with prioritising the nuclear programme, with "human rights concerns a secondary matter". It argues:

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Dr Ansari told us it was "absolutely" the case that the international focus on the nuclear issue was detracting from human rights.[180] The FCO defends itself against this charge:

181

However, the FCO does acknowledge a linkage between human rights and the nuclear issue. It notes that the Supreme Leader has,

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Dr Howells argued that he had "not found" that the nuclear issue made it "more difficult" to lobby Iran on human rights.[183]

103. We conclude that Iran's human rights record is shocking. We recommend that the Government presses Iran to remove the death penalty, which includes hanging by strangulation, stoning, flogging and amputation from its statute books. We further recommend that the Government ensures human rights are not treated as a secondary concern to the nuclear issue, and that it underlines to Iran that its poor record in responding to human rights concerns makes it more difficult for the international community to trust its intentions in other fields.

146 Islamic Republic of Iran, The Islamic Constitution of the Islamic Republic of Iran, 1979, p 22 Back

147 "Iran's Outlook in 2004", University of Virginia Top News Daily, 5th March 2004 Back

148 "Iran: Who holds the power?", BBC News Online, news.bbc.co.uk Back

149 Ev 41 Back

150 Foreign Affairs Committee, Eighth Report of Session 2006-07, Global Security: The Middle East, HC 363, Ev 35 Back

151 Ibid Back

152 Q 58 Back

153 Ev 173 Back

154 Q 211 Back

155 Q 213 Back

156 "Hardliners gain as Iran's nuclear negotiator quits", The Observer, 21 October 2007 Back

157 Washington Institute for Near East Policy, Larijani's Resignation: Implications for Iranian Nuclear Policy and Internal Politics, 25 October 2007 Back