The Military Option
131. One controversial option that has been raised
as a way of resolving the crisis is the use of military action
against Iran. As Time to Talk notes, military action would likely
take the form of air strikes rather than a ground invasion.[229]
This is in part due to Iran's large land mass and population,
the commitment of troops elsewhere in the region, and the potential
sole objective of neutralising Iran's nuclear facilities.
132. The US Government has not taken the military
option off the table. Dr Barnaby notes that "advocates of
early military action argue that the consequences of a nuclear-armed
Iran are such that military strikes are justified, whether a smoking
gun is found or not." However, he points out that Iran has
a large number of targets and well-protected and hidden facilities.
He also warns that if Iran's facilities "were severely damaged
during an attack, it is possible that Iran could embark on a crash
programme to make one nuclear weapon" by focusing its efforts
on this single objective. He argues that "if Iran devoted
maximum effort and resources to building one nuclear bomb, it
could achieve this in a relatively short amount of time: some
months rather than years."[230]
133. We noted the extent of Iran's influence across
the region in Chapter Three. Time to Talk argues that any military
strike against Iran would have "grave repercussions"
for the Middle East, with particular concern given to the potential
for the Revolutionary Guards to launch more sustained attacks
against coalition forces in Iraq.[231]
Given Iran's "lynchpin" role in energy security (40%
of the world's shipment of oil pass through the Straits of Hormuz),
such an attack would also have a highly detrimental economic impact
across the globe.[232]
134. Dr Howells shared much of Dr Barnaby's assessment
of the difficulties faced in launching a military strike against
Iran. He noted that the US "would not look lightly upon a
military attack" and that he did not "see it as an immediate
possibility at all".[233]
He stated that the UK had "no intention of taking military
action against Iran," although he hedged this with a qualification
that action may be taken against Iran's support for insurgent
groups elsewhere in the region.[234]
135. In our 2006 Report on Foreign Policy Aspects
of the War Against Terrorism, we concluded that,
military action against Iran would be likely
to unleash a host of extremely serious consequences both in the
Middle East and elsewhere and would not be guaranteed to prevent
Iran from developing nuclear weapons in the long term. [T]he Government
should not undertake or support military action against Iran until
all other options have been exhausted or without broad agreement
among its international allies.[235]
We continue to hold this assessment of the consequences
of military action, but it appears to remain on the table. When
we asked Dr Howells if keeping the military option on the table
would help bring about some resolution of the difficulties over
this issue, he said he did not believe it would, noting that "President
Ahmadinejad has used the external threats to strengthen his own
position within the country, and […] a military threat would
be seen as a very real one."[236]
136. The then Prime Minister told the House in 2006
that giving an assurance that the UK would not support a military
strike against Iran would be seen as "a sign of weakness".[237]
Mr Fitzpatrick argues that the most important pressure applied
on Iran in 2003 (when it is judged to have halted its covert activities)
was the prospect of war with the US. He suggests that "the
threat of military action thus has a role in providing the muscle
that can make diplomacy work."[238]
Based on Dr Howells' evidence to the Committee, the Government's
current strategy appears to be to talk down the prospect of a
military strike against Iran without ruling it out completely.
137. Dr Ansari told us that it would be helpful to
develop a framework that provides the Iranians with a sense of
security.[239] Though
the military option is still left on the table, talking down the
prospects of the use of force may go some way towards achieving
that. However, it is clear that security guarantees from the UK
Government would not help reassure the Iranians if they are not
matched by the US. With regard to Israel, Dr Barnaby and Dr Ansari
agreed that they did not envisage it acting unilaterally without
the support of the US.[240]
138. If military action occurs, the UK may be asked
to lend diplomatic or military support against Iran. The US may
seek to use its base on Diego Garcia, an Overseas Territory of
the UK Government, for any attack. Dr Howells told us that the
US would "always inform" the UK if it sought to use
its bases on sovereign UK territory for an attack.[241]
Though acknowledging it was "above his pay grade" to
answer whether there would be a Parliamentary vote for any British
support for a military strike, he said that there would likely
be "very extensive debate" before any decision was made.[242]
139. Mr Fitzpatrick argued that the publication of
the National Intelligence Estimate has deflated what had been
"an unstinting escalation of tension" over Iran's nuclear
programme. In his assessment, "barring the discovery of inflammatory
new information that would discredit the new findings", "President
Bush would have no empirical basis and no political support for
ordering military action against Iran's nuclear program".[243]
140. We conclude that the publication of the US
National Intelligence Estimate has made a military strike against
Iran less likely. We remain of the view that such a military strike
would be unlikely to succeed and could provoke an extremely violent
backlash across the region. We recommend that the Government urges
Washington to consider offering a credible security guarantee
to Iran if the Iranian Government in turn will offer an equally
credible and verifiable guarantee that it will not enter into
a nuclear weapons programme and improves its cooperation with
the international community in other areas.
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