APPENDIX II
THE CHRONOLOGY OF MAIN EVENTS IN THE EU3/EU
AND IRAN'S NEGOTIATIONS
21 October 2003 = The Tehran Agreement. At the
end of their visit to Tehran the Foreign Ministers of Britain,
France and Germany made a joint statement with Iran agreeing to
take measures aimed at the settlement of all outstanding IAEA
issues with regard to the Iranian nuclear programme and at enhancing
confidence for peaceful cooperation in the nuclear field. Iran
decided to sign the IAEA Additional Protocol and commence ratification
procedures. Iran decided to continue to cooperate with the IAEA
in accordance with the Protocol in advance of its ratification.
Iran decided voluntarily to suspend all uranium enrichment and
reprocessing activities as defined by the IAEA.
October-July 2004 = Several informal meetings
were held to discuss in details the content of the Tehran agreement.
15 October 2004 = The meeting between the envoys
of the United States, Britain, France, Germany, Italy, Russia,
Japan, Canada and the European Union at the State Department in
Washington to discuss the possibility of a series of formal negotiations
between the European Union countries and Iran over the suspension
of Iran's enrichment programme. A four page plan had been drafted
by Britain, France and Germany which was circulated and discussed
but not formally adopted.
21-27 October 2004 = The EU and Iranian negotiators
met in Austria to discuss Iran's nuclear and the uranium enrichment
programme. Although they failed to reach an agreement over the
suspension of the uranium enrichment activities, they decided
to continue the negotiations in the following weeks.
5 November 2004 = The third round of negotiations
between Iran and the E3 (Britain, France and Germany) and the
European Union (EU). The 25 European Union leaders offered Iran
economic and political incentives in exchange for Iran's suspension
of its enriched uranium programme.
6 November 2004 = A preliminary nuclear agreement
reached between Iran and the European Union in Paris following
22 hours of negotiations between 5 and 6 November 2004. On 8 November
2004, the hard line Jomhuri-Eslami newspaper denounced the talks
on its front page and criticised the Iranian negotiators who conducted
them.
14 November 2004 = The Paris Agreement between
Iran and France, Germany and the United Kingdom, with the support
of the High Representative of the European Union (E3/EU) in which
Iran agreed to "on a voluntary basis, to continue and extend
its suspension to include all enrichment related and reprocessing
activities, and specifically: the manufacture and import of gas
centrifuges and their components; the assembly, installation,
testing or operation of gas centrifuges; work to undertake any
plutonium separation, or to construct or operate any plutonium
separation installation; and all tests or production at any uranium
conversion installation." They agreed to continue negotiations
to find an agreement for providing "objective guarantees"
that Iran's nuclear programme is exclusively for peaceful purposes.
The agreement would equally include firm guarantees on nuclear,
technological and economic cooperation and firm commitments on
security issues. The Paris Agreement also included a main section
on terrorism by stating, "Irrespective of progress on the
nuclear issue, the E3/EU and Iran confirm their determination
to combat terrorism, including the activities of Al Qa'ida and
other terrorist groups such as the MeK [Mujahedin Khalq']. They
also confirmed their continued support for the political process
in Iraq aimed at establishing a constitutionally elected Government."
December 2004 = The first round of meeting to
discuss the content of the Paris Agreement took place in Brussels.
17 January 2005 = Proposal by Iran presented
to the Political and Security Working group in Geneva. Iran demanded
security assurances from the E3/EU backed up by the United Nations
Security Council guarantee to prevent any use or threat of use
of nuclear weapons against Iran, and any direct or indirect attack
or sabotage or threat against Iranian nuclear facilities. Iran
also asked for the removal of restrictions against the transfer
of conventional armaments and their relevant sensitive dual use
goods and technologies to Iran. Iran proposed the establishment
of a senior expert level group with the participation of their
respective military officials from the E3/EU to carry out consultations
on defence issues in the framework of mutual defence cooperation.
Iran expressed its readiness to cooperate in the area of export
control in relation to its own sensitive material, equipment and
technology to prevent the development and proliferation of weapons
of mass destruction. However, Iran received no response to its
proposal.
21 January 2005 = A second round of meeting
to discuss the content of the Paris Agreement took place in Geneva.
8-11 February 2005 = A third round of meeting
to discuss the content of the Paris Agreement took place in Geneva.
8-11 March 2005 = A forth round of meeting to
discuss the content of the Paris Agreement took place in Geneva.
23 March 2005 = A steering committee to consider
the results of December-March working groups took place at the
French Foreign Ministry in Paris to review whether the negotiations,
which broke up in Geneva in the middle of March 2005 following
three months of negotiations, had made enough progress to justify
the continuation of diplomatic talks. Iran put a proposal to the
E3 negotiators (France, Germany and the United Kingdom) to consider
Iran's enrichment of uranium on a small scale. Iran presented
elements of "objective guarantees" which consisted of
a strong and mutually beneficial relations between Iran and the
E3/EU; confinement of the Iranian programme to open fuel cycle
with no reprocessing; ceiling of the uranium enrichment at low
enrichment level used only for civil nuclear purposes; limits
put on the extent of the uranium enrichment programme; immediate
conversion of all enriched uranium to fuel rods; incremental and
phased approach to implementation of all the elements of objective
guarantees; adoption and ratification of the Additional Protocol
(the IAEA's enhanced and intrusive monitoring system which came
into effect in May 1997); permanent ban on the development, stockpiling
and use of nuclear weapons; export control measures in Iran to
prevent the development and proliferation of sensitive technologies;
continuous on-site presence of IAEA inspectors, which could have
included E3/EU nationals at the Uranium Conversion Facility in
Esfahan and Uranium Enrichment plants in Natanz.
19-20 April 2005 = A working group to discuss
the technical issues related to the nuclear issue was held in
Geneva which made further recommendations to continue the discussions
at a strategy committee meeting in London on 29 April 2005.
29 April 2005 = Proposal presented by Iran to
the Meeting of the Steering Committee in London which stated that
in exchange for a declaration by EU to guarantee Iran's access
to EU markets and financial, public and private investment resources,
declaration of EU recognition of Iran as a major source of energy
supply for Europe and launching of feasibility studies for building
of new nuclear power plants in Iran by E3/EU members, Iran was
prepared to take the following steps in relation to its nuclear
programme. Iran would have approved the Additional Protocol in
the Cabinet; Iran would have declared to have an open fuel cycle
but no reprocessing; Iran would have presented a bill to the Iranian
parliament for a permanent ban on production, stockpiling and
use of nuclear weapons in Iran. As an additional confidence-building
measure, Iran was prepared to continue the suspension of all other
enrichment related activities, and make every effort to start
on joint steps for the establishment of a joint counter-terrorism
task force and a joint export control task force. The position
of the parties at this round of negotiations was as follows. Iran
stated its intention to resume uranium enrichment under an IAEA
inspection regime. The United Kingdom and Germany were trying
to secure Iran's agreement to abandon all uranium enrichment related
activities in return for benefits including a light water reactor
for nuclear energy. France was considering whether it should support
limited uranium enrichment in Iran, a compromise that was not
acceptable to the United States. The United Kingdom also hoped
to keep the negotiations to be continued until Iran's presidential
elections on 17 June 2005. They believed that the election of
a pragmatic president could have opened the way for an agreement.
18 July 2005 = Following President Ahmadinejad's
election as the president of Iran, Dr. Hassan Rohani, who was
still the lead negotiator in nuclear issues in July 2005, sent
a letter to the E3/EU ministers emphasising the need for cooperation
to combat mutual sources of threat to both Iran and E3/EU in significant
areas. Dr. Rohani asked for cooperation to establish stable governments
in Afghanistan, Iraq and Lebanon. He emphasised the common interests
of Iran and E3/EU to defeat the violent and blind misinterpretation
of Islam manifested in groups such as Al-Qaeda and other terrorist
groups like MEK. Iran also agreed to extend the period of full
suspension of its nuclear enrichment for a further two months.
Iran proposed to allow the IAEA to develop an optimised arrangement
on numbers, monitoring mechanism and other specifics for a limited
amount of uranium enrichment operation at Natanz.
5 August 2005 = The E3/EU presented a package
of offers to Iran. It required Iran to terminate all its nuclear
fuel cycle activities, including uranium conversion, enrichment
and reprocessing, as well as the heavy water reactor programme
at Arak. The offer would only allow Iran to continue with its
planned light-water nuclear power reactors. The fuel for such
reactors would have to be purchased from abroad and the spent
fuel had to be returned back to the supplier. The offer also required
from Iran to resolve all the outstanding issues with the IAEA,
ratify the Additional Protocol, and accept a legally binding commitment
not to withdraw from the NPT. In return, the E3/EU offered Iran
cooperation in the areas of trade and investment, joint work to
combat terrorism and drug trafficking, and some general promise
of cooperation to allow Iran access to nuclear technology and
markets. There was also a reaffirmation of the security guarantees
already in existence involving the European countries as well
as the United States.
10 August 2005 = Iran rejected the E3/EU proposal
of 5 August 2005 on the basis that their demand for the termination
of Iran's uranium enrichment and fuel cycle activities was in
contradiction with the understanding on the basis of which the
Iranians had originally agreed to enter into discussions with
the E3/EU. Iran believed that a limited Iranian enrichment programme
and establishment of "objective guarantees" of the civil
use of the programme were the basis of the earlier negotiations.
Iran in a statement denounced the package proposal as being too
vague in the offer of incentives provided to Iran, and believed
that the offer was a "clear violation of international law
and the Charter of the United Nations, the NPT, the Tehran Statement
and the Paris Agreement of November 15, 2004". Iran stated,
"the proposal amounts to an insult on the Iranian nation,
for which the E3 must apologise."
17 September 2005 = In the first months of the
Presidency of Ahmadinejad, Iran proposed partnership with private
and public sectors of other countries for uranium enrichment in
Iran as a means to provide the greatest degree of transparency.
30 March 2006 = Almost one year following the
election of President Ahmadinejad into office, Iran proposed establishing
regional consortia inside and outside the region with joint ownership
and division of labour based on the expertise of the participants.
31 May 2006 = The United States adopted a significant
change of policy by announcing that the United States would join
the direct negotiations with Iran and offer a European package
of incentives for Iran to suspend its uranium enrichment activities.
However, the United States asked for the full and verifiable suspension
of all Iran's uranium enrichment activities, including research
and development, as a precondition to the start of the negotiations.
6 June 2006 = The Permanent members of the Security
Council plus Germany (P5+1) presented a package of proposal to
Iran. Iran welcomed the proposals as containing positive elements
and announced that it would offer its detailed response on 22
August 2006. The P5+1 offer reaffirmed Iran's inalienable right
to nuclear energy for peaceful purposes, supported Iranian plans
for the development of new light-water power reactors, accepted
the Esfahan Uranium Conversion plant, proposed the establishment
of an international fuel centre in Russia with the Iranian participation,
offered to support a buffer stock for holding a reserve of up
to five year supply of nuclear fuel dedicated to Iran, it promised
to review the terms of the agreement following IAEA verification
of all unresolved issues, and offered a long-term energy partnership
between Iran and the E3/EU. However, there was no reference to
a negative and positive nuclear security guarantee in this proposal.
There was also a precondition for the start of the negotiations
involving Iran's full and verifiable suspension of all its uranium
enrichment activities, including research and development.
9 June 2006 = The United States and European
officials declared that Iran had three weeks to respond to 6 June
offer or face the prospects of sanctions by the Security Council
of the United Nations.
12 July 2006 = The start of the war between
Lebanon and Israel.
31 July 2006 = The Security Council resolution
1696 demanded that Iran should suspend all uranium enrichment
activities, including research and development by 31 August or
face unspecified appropriate measures.
14 August 2006 = The ceasefire between Israel
and Lebanon came into effect following the UN Security Council
Resolution 1710 adopted on Friday 11 August 2007.
22 August 2006 = Iran provided a 21 pages long
counter proposal to the packaged proposal offered by the P5+1
to Iran on 6 June 2006. Iran welcomed some aspects of the P5+1
offer. Iran proposed a joint venture with the European nuclear
energy consortium EURODIF to conduct uranium enrichment on Iranian
soil. Iran indicated that it would be prepared to discuss suspension
of uranium enrichment during the negotiations and not prior to
it.
12 September 2006 = For the first time, Iran
offered a two-month suspension during meetings with the European
negotiators.
21 September 2006 = President Ahmadinejad, during
an interview at the United Nations General Assembly meetings in
New York, told that the suspension of uranium enrichment could
be negotiable under "fair and just conditions".
September-October 2006 = Iran proposed an international
consortium, based on the IAEA's main proposals on multinational
fuel activities, including enrichment, published on 22 February
2005.
15 September 2006 = Iran's proposal for the
establishment of an international consortium was considered very
promising by the EU High Representative for the Common Foreign
and Security Policy, Javier Solana, leading to public statements
of progress following his meetings with Iran's nuclear negotiator.
4 October 2006 = Iran's proposal of 22 August
2006 was rejected by the Permanent members of the Security Council
plus Germany (P5+1) because Iran was not prepared to suspend its
uranium enrichment activities prior to the start of the negotiations.
9 October 2006 = The North Korean nuclear test.
11 October 2006 = Iran in a letter to the Secretary
General of the United Nations indicated that to address concerns
about Iran's commitment to the NPT, Iran would be prepared to
provide guarantees that it would never withdraw from the NPT,
once it reached a certain level of advancement. Iran offered to
resume the implementation of the intrusive inspection regime of
the Additional Protocol in the context of a negotiated settlement.
Using the model suggested by the IAEA experts, Iran proposed to
convert its enrichment facilities to regional and multinational
schemes, which would have provided the greatest degree of transparency
by allowing the concerned parties to participate in the ownership
and operation of these facilities.
26 April 2007 = During a two day meeting between
Javier Solana (the European Union foreign policy chief) and Ali
Larijani (the Secretary of the Supreme National Security Council
of Iran) in Turkey, Iran offered to suspend some, but not all,
of its centrifuges used for enrichment of uranium. The parties
attempted to define what a freeze of uranium enrichment facilities
mean. One idea was to allow Iran to build and operate the centrifuges
without injecting any uranium hexafluoride (UF6) into them. However,
the five permanent members of the Security Council and Germany
(P5+1) rejected any modifications to the full suspension term
in every respect.
31 May 2007 = A meeting between Javier Solana
(the European Union foreign policy chief) and Ali Larijani (the
Secretary of the Supreme National Security Council of Iran) took
place in Madrid, Spain to attempt to reach an agreement. It was
agreed to continue the discussion in June 2007.
NOTES AND
REFERENCES
1. Elahe Mohtasham is a Senior Research Associate
at the Foreign Policy Centre in London. She is an Iranian born
British academic and fluent in Persian. She has worked for the
Centre for Defence Studies at King's College, University of London,
the International Institute for Strategic Studies, and with the
Defence Academy of the United Kingdom to develop a project. As
a representative of the International Institute for Strategic
Studies in London, Elahe Mohtasham visited the Atomic Energy Organisation
of Iran and the Centre for Strategic Studies attached to the former
President Khatami's office in September 2004. She has been the
first western academic granted access to talk to the Iranian scientists
and visit Iranian nuclear facilities. She has written three articles
in the Oxford University Press publication of the Encyclopaedia
of Global Peace, Conflict and Transformation on the topics of
"Arms Control and Disarmament: Theory", "Arms Control
and Disarmament: Negotiations", and "Unilateral Nuclear
Weapons Disarmament: Policy". In the last three years, she
has presented academic papers at the Nuclear Non-Proliferation
Treaty (NPT) Preparatory Committees and at the 2005 NPT Review
Conference at the United Nations headquarters in New York and
Geneva. She attended the 2007 NPT Preparatory Committee for the
2010 NPT Review Conference in Vienna between 29 April-11 May,
and discussed Iran's nuclear programme with officials and diplomats
from Iran and other countries.
2. The Director General's report on the Implementation
of the NPT Safeguards Agreement in the Islamic Republic of Iran,
10 November 2003, GOV/2003/xx/paragraph 52.
3. The Director General's report on the Implementation
of the NPT Safeguards Agreement in the Islamic Republic of Iran,
27 February 2006, GOV/2006/15, paragraph 53.
4. The Director General's report on the Implementation
of the NPT Safeguards Agreement in the Islamic Republic of Iran,
23 May 2007, GOV/2007/22, paragraph 18, lines 1and 3-5.
5. The Director General's report on the Implementation
of the NPT Safeguards Agreement in the Islamic Republic of Iran,
27 February 2006, GOV/2006/15, paragraph 53.
6. The Director General's report on the Implementation
of the NPT Safeguards Agreement in the Islamic Republic of Iran,
2 September 2005, GOV/2005/67, paragraph 51.
7. The Director General's report on the Implementation
of the NPT Safeguards Agreement in the Islamic Republic of Iran,
27 February 2006, GOV/2006/15, /paragraph 53.
8. IAEA-GOV/2005/67, paragraph 51; IAEA-Gov/2006/15;
IAEA-GOV/200631/Add.1 (15 June 2006).
9. Ayatollah Khamene;i's Friday prayer sermon
on 5 November 2004, quoted in Kayhan, (a Persian language newspaper
published in Iran), 6 November 2004.
10. Javad Zarif, Iran's Ambassador to the United
Nations, "An Unnecessary Crisis: Setting the Record Straight
about Iran's Nuclear Program", New York Times, 18 November
2005.
11. Statement by Iran's representative to the
IAEA, Dr. Ali Asghar Soltanieh, to the First Session of the Preparatory
Committee for the 2010 NPT Review Conference, Vienna, 1 May 2007.
12. The Director General's report on the Implementation
of the NPT Safeguards Agreement in the Islamic Republic of Iran,
22 February 2007, GOV/2007/8/paragraph 14.
13. "IAEA Installs New Cameras at Natanz
Nuclear Complex," Islamic Republic of Iran News Agency, Tehran,
4 February 2007.
14. The Director General's report on the Implementation
of the NPT Safeguards Agreement in the Islamic Republic of Iran,
GOV/2007/22, dated 23 May 2007, paragraph 4.
15. The text in Persian of "the complete
report of Dr. Rohani to the President: the outline of the Supreme
National Security Council activities in relation to the country's
nuclear dossier", Iranian Students News Agency, 9 Bahman
1384 [31 July 2005]. http://www.isna.ir/Main/NewsView.aspx?ID=News-562149
(last accessed on 3 June 2007).
16. The Director General's report on the Implementation
of the NPT Safeguards Agreement in the Islamic Republic of Iran,
GOV/2004/83, dated 15 November 2004, paragraphs 79-84.
17. Alain Pigear, "The French Nuclear Triad",
Ground Defence (No. 74, 1981), p. A6; quoted in Robert S. Norris,
Andrew S. Burrows, and Richard W. Fieldhouse, Nuclear Weapons
Databook: British, French, and Chinese Nuclear Weapons, Volume
V, (Natural Resources Defense Council, Westview Press, 1994),
pp. 184-185.
18. The Director General's report on the Implementation
of the NPT Safeguards Agreement in the Islamic Republic of Iran,
GOV/2007/22, dated 23 May 2007, paragraph 5.
19. Mohammad Javad Zarif, "Tackling the
Iran-U.S. Crisis: The Need for a Paradigm Shift," Journal
of International Affairs, 60.2 (Spring-Summer 2007).
20. President Ahmadinejad's statement during
the ceremony marking the first anniversary of Iran's uranium enrichment
on 9 April 2007.
21. Sa'idi, Iran's Deputy Director of International
Affairs at the Atomic Energy Organisation of Iran, made the claim
during an interview with the Iranian Students News Agency [in
Persian] on 19 May 2007, http://www.isna.ir/Main/NewsView.aspx?ID=News-927033&Lang=P,
(last accessed on 21 May 2007).
22. UNGA Resolution 1665 (XVI), December 4, 1961.
23. DCOR, Suppl. for 1967 and 1968, Ann. IV,
sec.6 (ENDC/192, 24 August 1967 (US)) and sec. 8 (ENDC/193, 24
August 1967 (USSR)).
24. UNGA Resolution 2373 (XXII), 12 June 1968.
25. For a summary of objectives of safeguards
system see, International Nuclear Fuel Cycle Evaluation (INFCE)
SEC/11, February 1979, pp. 4-8. International Safeguards and the
Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons, (Austria: IAEA, IAE/P1/A11,E
85-00942, April 1985), p. 11.
26. Ibid.
27. "Leaked Letter in full: UK diplomat
outlines Iran Strategy", Times online, 22 March 2006, http://www.timesonline.co.uk/tol/news/uk/article744070.ece
(last accessed on 2 April 2007.
28. The Director General's report on the Implementation
of the NPT Safeguards Agreement in the Islamic Republic of Iran,
GOV/2007/22, dated 23 May 2007, paragraph 19, lines 3-5.
29. The Director General's report on the Implementation
of the NPT Safeguards Agreement in the Islamic Republic of Iran,
GOV/2007/22, dated 23 May 2007, paragraph 18, lines 1, 4-5.
30. Bertrand Goldschmith, The Atomic Complex:
A Worldwide Political History of Nuclear Energy (American Nuclear
Society, La Grange Park, Illinois, 1980), pp. 197-200.
31. Ibid.
32. The Iranian parliament passed a bill to oblige
the government to review its cooperation with the IAEA and accelerate
Iran's nuclear programme only four days after the imposition of
sanctions on Iran by the Security Council Resolution 1737 on 23
December 2007. The text of the Iranian bill was read out during
a parliament session and broadcast on the Iranian state radio.
The bill, which was approved by the Council of Guardians, also
permits the government to withdraw from the NPT or to stop IAEA
inspections in Iran. The bill was passed by an overwhelming majority
of 203 deputies who were present with 161 voted in favour, and
only 15 against and 15 abstained.
33. INFCIRC/209, Memorandum B is known as the
"Trigger List" is defined as the export of those items
listed in the IAEA's safeguards trigger. These items will only
be exported if the fissionable material produced, processed or
used in the equipment or material is subject to IAEA's safeguards.
34. IAEA document, INFCIRC/209, 3 September 1974,
Memorandum B, paragraph 2.
35. IAEA document, INFCIRC/209/Rev.1/Mod.1, May
1992.
36. Guidelines for the Export of Nuclear Material,
Equipment and Technology, IAEA document INFCIRC/254, February
1978; B.M. Carriahan, "Export Law and Policy of the Emerging
Nuclear Suppliers: A Basis for Continuous Optimism", Eye
on Supply, (No. 5, Fall 1991), p. 67; R. Timerbaev, "A Major
Milestone in Controlling Nuclear Exports", Eye on Supply,
(No. 6, Spring 1992), p. 58; T. Strulak, "The Nuclear Suppliers
Group", The Non-Proliferation Review, (Fall 1993), p. 2;
"International Safeguards and the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear
Weapons," (Austria: IAEA, April 1985), pp. 17-18. "London
Guidelines for Nuclear Transfers", IAEA document INFCIRC/254/Rev.
1/Part 1/Mod. 3.
37. Ibid., pp. 18-19.
38. Ambassador Soltanieh speaking on the record
at a seminar at the 2007 NPT Preparatory Committee for the 2010
NPT Review Conference, in Vienna between 17:00 p.m. to 19:00 p.m.
on Friday 4 May 2007. Ali Reza Jahan-Shahi, "Iran and France
to Jointly Build Uranium Plant", Tehran Journal, 5 January
1975, Clyde H. Farnsworth, "France Gives Iran Stake in Uranium",
New York Times, 4 January 1975.
39. National Security Decision-Memorandum 292,
dated 22 April 1975, Box 1, National Security Decision-Memoranda
and Study Memoranda, Gerald R. Ford Library, http://www.ford.utexas.edu/LIBRARY/document/nsdmnssm/nsdm292a.htm.
40. See Nuclear Threat Initiative, "Nuclear
Chronology 1957-1985".
41. Rudolf Harde (Kernforschungszentrum Karlsruhe
G.m.b.H. (Germany, F.R.), Iran Conference on the Transfer of Nuclear
Technology, (Tehran: Atomic Energy Organisation of Iran, 1977),
Volume I, Section 8: Safeguards and Standards), pp. 493-498.
42. "Nuclear Fuel Reprocessing and the Problem
of Safeguarding against the Spread of Nuclear Weapons", Report
to the Congress, (General Accounting Office, Washington, DC (USA),
Energy and Minerals Division, March 18, 1980).
43. Ambassador Nasseri, "Iran and the Nuclear
Non-Proliferation Treaty Review and Extension Conference 1995",
(Tehran: Islamic Republic of Iran, 1995); Interviews with the
Iranian diplomats involved in these negotiations at the NPT Review
Conferences.
44. For an historical account of the issues around
the security assurances see the paper by Elahe Mohtasham, "The
Clash of Ideologies or Peaceful Multilateral Negotiations Based
on National Interests: the Degree of Iran's Commitment to the
Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons (NPT)",
presented at the 2005 Review Conference of the Parties to the
Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons (NPT) at the
United Nations in New York on 11 May 2005, http://www.mohtasham.net/npt2005.html
45. David Albright, "Phased International
Cooperation with North Korea's Civil Nuclear Programs", 19
March 2007, http://www.isis-online.org/publications/dprk/civilNuclear
NK.pdf
46. Elahe Mohtasham, "Revealed: Iran's Nuclear
Factory" The Sunday Times, 1 May 2005. http://www.timesonline.co.uk/tol/news/world/article387202.ece
(last accessed on 6 June 2007)
47. International Atomic Energy Agency, "Multilateral
Approaches to the Nuclear Fuel Cycle: Expert Group Report Submitted
to the Director General of the International Atomic Energy Agency,"IAEA
INFCIRC/640, 22 February 2005, 103, approaches 3,4 and 5: "Promoting
voluntary conversion of existing facilities to MNAs, and pursuing
them as confidence-building measures, with the participation of
NPT non-nuclear weapon states an nuclear weapons states, and non-NPT
states," and "creating, through voluntary agreements
and contracts, multinational, and in particular regional, MNAs
for new facilities based on joint ownership, drawing rights or
co-management for front-end and back-end nuclear facilities, such
as uranium enrichment."
48. Ruhi Ramazani, "Might U.S., Iran cooperate
on al-Qaeda?", Special to the Daily Progress, Sunday 27 May
2007. http://www.dailyprogress.com/servlet/Satellite?pagename=Common%2FMGArticle%2FPrint
Version&c=MGArticle&cid=1173351363286&image=80x60cdp.gif&oasDN=dailyprogress.com&oas
PN=%21news%21columns (last accessed on 5 June 2007)
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