Written evidence submitted by Dr Frank
Barnaby, Nuclear Issues Consultant, Oxford Research Group
UNDERSTANDING IRAN'S NUCLEAR PROGRAMME AND
THE POSSIBLE CONSEQUENCES OF MILITARY ACTION
INTRODUCTION
1. Dr. Barnaby is Nuclear Issues Consultant
to Oxford Research Group (ORG). He is a nuclear physicist by training
and worked at the Atomic Weapons Research Establishment, Aldermaston
in the 1950s. He was also on the senior scientific staff of the
Medical Research Council; Executive Secretary of the Pugwash Conferences
on Science and World Affairs (which was awarded the Nobel Peace
Prize in 1995); Director of the Stockholm International Peace
Research Institute (SIPRI); a Professor at the Free University
in Amsterdam; and a Visiting Professor at the University of Minnesota.
In addition to his work for ORG, he is now a freelance defence
analyst and a prolific author on military technology.
2. Oxford Research Group is an independent
non-governmental organisation and registered charity which seeks
to bring about positive change on issues of national and international
security. Established in 1982, it is now considered to be one
of the UK's leading global security think tanks. ORG is a registered
charity and uses a combination of innovative publications, expert
roundtables, residential consultations, and engagement with opinion-formers
and government, to develop and promote sustainable global security
strategies. In 2003, Oxford Research Group was awarded the Niwano
Peace Prize, and in 2005 The Independent newspaper named ORG as
one of the top twenty think tanks in the UK.
3. Since mid-2005, ORG has been working
both publicly and behind-the-scenes to highlight the potentially
disastrous consequences of military action against Iran and its
nuclear programme, arguing that diplomacy must be made to work.
This written evidence explains that, far from setting back Iran's
nuclear programme, a military attack might create the political
conditions in which Iran could accelerate a nuclear weapons programme.
It supplements oral evidence on this issue given to the Foreign
Affairs Committee by Dr. Barnaby on 23 May 2007.
IRAN'S
NUCLEAR PROGRAMME
4. In spite of a flurry of recent meetings—between,
for example, Iran's chief nuclear negotiator Ali Larijani and
the German Foreign Minister Frank-Walter Steinmeier and between
Larijani and the European Union's foreign policy chief Javier
Solana—there has been no breakthrough on Iran's main dispute
with the West—its refusal to suspend nuclear enrichment
as a precondition for negotiations on trade benefits and other
issues.
5. The West continues to accuse Iran of
developing nuclear weapons in a programme disguised as a civil
nuclear-energy programme. Specifically, Iran is accused of intending
to use its gas centrifuge enrichment facility at Natanz to produce
highly enriched uranium for nuclear weapons. Tehran continues
to insist that its nuclear programme is aimed solely at the peaceful
generation of electricity and refuses to stop the enrichment of
uranium, an activity that it says it has an inalienable right
to conduct under the NPT.
6. IAEA inspectors believe that Iran has
now solved most of the technological problems associated with
its uranium enrichment programme and is enriching uranium on a
far larger scale than before. The rate of progress they have made
in recent months on enrichment has surprised IAEA officials. Iran
appears to be on course to enrich uranium to the level of about
90% in uranium-235 required to fabricate nuclear weapons, if they
take the political decision to do so.
7. In a recent IAEA inspection of Iran's
enrichment facility at Natanz the inspectors found that Iranian
engineers were already running about 1,300 gas centrifuges to
produce fuel, enriched to about 4.5% in uranium-235, suitable
for use as fuel in a nuclear reactor. In addition, 300 centrifuges
were being tested and 300 more were reportedly under construction.
The Iranians are now able to spin the centrifuges at the high
speeds necessary to make nuclear fuel, and to run them smoothly.
According to Iranian officials, the Natanz facility has 1,600
active centrifuges, and will soon have 3,000 operating.
8. Mohamed El Baradei, the Director General
of the IAEA, stated that: "The Iranians pretty much have
the knowledge about how to enrich. From now on, it is simply a
question of perfecting that knowledge. People will not like to
hear it, but that's a fact." What is not clear is whether
or not Iran can keep up the rate of its recent progress and be
able in the foreseeable future to produce a civil nuclear-power
reactor on an "industrial scale" as Iran's President
Mahmoud Ahmadinejad says Iran plans to do.
9. It must be assumed, however, that the
Iranians will continue to increase the number of centrifuges installed
at Natanz. They have announced the intention to operate about
50,000 centrifuges at the plant to produce fuel for a number of
nuclear-power reactors they intend to construct in the future
and possibly to export nuclear fuel.
10. Having reached an enrichment of about
4.5% in uranium-235, Iran could circulate enriched uranium hexafluouride
gas repeatedly through the centrifuge plant to increase the enrichment
to about 90% for use in nuclear weapons. If they take the political
decision to do this, the Iranians would presumably withdraw from
the NPT and not allow IAEA inspectors into the country (as did
the North Koreans).
11. According to a recent estimate by El
Baradei, Iran is likely to take between three and eight years
to acquire enough fissile material for a nuclear weapon, if it
encounters no further serious technical problems in their programme.
Three thousand centrifuges of the type Iran has (called P-1 centrifuges)
could, if they are operating smoothly and continuously, produce
about 40 kilograms of highly enriched uranium per year, enough
to fabricate two nuclear weapons. However, the components for
a nuclear weapon will have to be manufactured and tested and nuclear
warheads will have to be miniaturized for delivery by Iranian
surface-to-surface missiles—these steps will take a significant
time to achieve. There is, therefore, still time for diplomacy
to work.
QUESTIONING THE
CASE FOR
MILITARY ACTION
12. Despite the above conclusion, there
are some in the US and Israeli administrations, in particular,
who argue that military action must be taken before it is too
late. Advocates of early military action argue that the consequences
of a nuclear-armed Iran are such that military strikes are justified,
whether a smoking gun is found or not.
13. It is true that, alongside other regional
powers such as Saudi Arabia and Egypt, it is reasonable to assume
that Iran has conducted research and development into the fabrication
of nuclear weapons. However, there is no evidence to suggest that
Iran has embarked on production engineering—putting in place
the technical facilities needed to build a bomb—and, as
already stated, it is known that it is some way off being able
to produce the amount of fissile material needed to produce a
nuclear weapon.
14. The contention that military action
will set back Iran's nuclear programme significantly can and should
be questioned. Iran's nuclear programme is extensive and dispersed;
a military strike would have to contend with:
a. A large number of targets.
b. Well-protected and hidden facilities.
c. Inadequate intelligence.
d. The likely survival of key scientists
and technicians.
15. If the aim of military strikes is to
destroy key nuclear facilities, they would have to target:
a. The Kalaye Electric Company that produces
components for gas centrifuges.
b. The nuclear power reactor at Bushehr.
c. The heavy-water reactor and the heavy
water production plant at Arak.
d. The uranium enrichment facilities at Natanz.
e. The uranium mines and mills at Saghand.
f. The research reactors at Isfahan.
16. There is therefore an inherent contradiction
in arguments that a military strike could both encompass all key
facilities and be surgical and brief. A compromise would have
to be made on either the scale of military action or the certainty
of success. In either case, the numbers of innocent civilian casualties
would probably be high because a surprise attack would catch many
people unawares and unprotected.
17. There also is a real possibility that
Iran has constructed secret facilities in the anticipation of
a military strike. It is also conceivable that Iran has built
false targets, installations that appear to hold nuclear facilities
but in fact act as decoys. With inadequate intelligence, it is
unlikely that it would be possible to identify and subsequently
destroy the number of targets needed to set back Iran's nuclear
programme for a significant period. Furthermore, with the probable
survival of key scientific personnel, it would only be a matter
of time before Iran could rebuild its nuclear programme. The question
is, how much time?
CRASH RECONSTRUCTION
18. If Iran's nuclear facilities were severely
damaged during an attack, it is possible that Iran could embark
on a crash programme to make one nuclear weapon. In the aftermath
of an attack, it is likely that popular support for an Iranian
nuclear weapon capability would increase; bolstering the position
of hardliners and strengthening arguments that Iran must possess
a nuclear deterrent. Furthermore, Iran has threatened to withdraw
from the NPT and, should it do so post-attack, would build a clandestine
programme free of international inspection and control.
19. In the aftermath of an attack, following
a political decision to change the nature of the nuclear programme
to construct a bomb as quickly as possible, Iran could:
a. Used stored, fresh nuclear fuel to produce
highly enriched uranium (HEU) in a small centrifuge facility to
fabricate a weapon.
b. Chemically remove plutonium from irradiated
reactor fuel elements—from the Bushehr or Arak reactors,
if either were operational—and use it to fabricate a nuclear
weapon.
c. Assemble new centrifuges and produce HEU.
Some centrifuges might survive a military attack, but it is conceivable
that Iran has stored additional centrifuges in secure locations.
20. This process would be hastened if Iran
had a secret supply of uranium hexafluoride or if it had constructed
a small primitive reactor, fuelled with natural uranium, to produce
plutonium for nuclear weapons. It is also possible that, post-attack,
Iran could purchase additional needed materials from sympathetic
states or on the black-market.
21. In the aftermath of a military strike,
if Iran devoted maximum effort and resources to building one nuclear
bomb, it could achieve this in a relatively short amount of time:
some months rather than years.
CONCLUSION
22. The argument that military strikes would
buy time is flawed. It does not take into account the time already
available to pursue diplomacy; it inflates the likelihood of military
success and underplays the possibility of hardened Iranian determination
leading to a crash nuclear programme.
23. Post military attacks, it is possible
that Iran would be able to rapidly build a nuclear weapon as part
of a crash programme, and would then wield one in an environment
of incalculably greater hostility.
24. It is, therefore, a mistake to believe
that Iran can be deterred from attaining a nuclear weapons capability
by bombing its facilities. Diplomacy is the only realistic course
of action.
7 June 2007
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