Examination of Witnesses (Questions 94
- 99)
WEDNESDAY 23 MAY 2007
LORD TRIESMAN
OF TOTTENHAM
AND NEIL
CROMPTON
Chairman: Lord Triesman and Mr. Crompton,
thank you very much for joining us this afternoon. As you know,
we are going to hold 45 minutes or thereabouts of this sitting
in public, after which we will move into a private session for
matters that you wish to discuss with the Committee entirely privately.
Q94 Mr. Hamilton: Lord Triesman,
you know, as we all do, that on March 23 our British naval personnel
were captured and held by the Iranians in the Shatt al-Arab waterway.
The Iranians claim that the personnel were in their territorial
waters. We obviously disputed that. The Foreign and Commonwealth
Office has said in a submission to us that many key officials
were unavailable to speak to, because it was the Iranian new year
holiday. However, the Foreign Secretary spoke to Foreign Minister
Mottaki during that period. Why did very little happen during
the holiday period? Was it because Mr. Mottaki was not senior
enough to effect the release of the sailors?
Lord Triesman: I think that the
Ministry of Foreign Affairs does not have the same prominence
when crises break out in Iran as you would expect a foreign affairs
ministry to have and, on occasion, it probably does not have the
same authority. However, the ministry is the channel through which
you have to go to conduct any kind of dialogue. On two occasions—on
25 and 27 March—the Foreign Secretary was able to speak
to Foreign Minister Mottaki and set out the issues.
In dealing with the Iranians in London, I took
the view that I did not mind whether it was the new year or not.
There were meetings that had to be had, there were things that
needed to be said and there were things that needed to be clarified.
For those reasons, although people put it to me that it was a
traditional holiday in Iran, I insisted on having meetings, démarching
the ambassador and conducting the discussions that were necessary.
Q95 Mr. Hamilton: We know that you
spoke with Ambassador Movahedian, the Iranian ambassador in London,
on a number of occasions—one assumes almost daily. Did you,
at any time in that period, speak to Mr. Larijani in Tehran?
Lord Triesman: No, I did not.
I saw the ambassador on eight occasions and spoke with him in
two very long phone calls as well. My understanding was that he
was able to speak to Mr. Larijani, but that Mr. Larijani was unlikely
to speak to me. We made an application—which I think I am
right in saying was first made at the beginning of that period,
or close to it, on 30 March as I recall—to have a discussion
with Dr. Larijani. We got no response at all to that. It was only
when he appeared on Channel 4 and indicated that he was willing
to take part in a discussion that we got the first positive sign
from him that he would be willing to have such a discussion.
Q96 Mr. Hamilton: So why did it take
"Channel 4 News" to open up the channels of communication
with Dr. Larijani?
Lord Triesman: Actually, he opened
up the channel, because he refused to deal with us through any
channel, until he decided to make the announcement that he was
available.
Q97 Mr. Hamilton: So what you are
saying is that it was nothing to do with "Channel 4 News"
contacting him, but the fact that he made himself to "Channel
4 News"?
Lord Triesman: He contacted them.
Q98 Mr. Hamilton: And then after
that, on 3 April, Sir Nigel Sheinwald spoke to him directly, we
understand.
Lord Triesman: That is right.
Q99 Mr. Hamilton: What was said?
Have you any idea? Can you let us know?
Lord Triesman: I can let you know
in outline what was said, although it may be useful to talk a
little further later. The burden of the points that were made
to Dr. Larijani were the issues that had come up all through the
week and that had been refined down in their details. Those points
were, first, that we wanted—and want—good bilateral
relationships with Iran, and we want them to be substantive and
capable of doing a job into the future. Secondly, we wanted our
people released, and we wanted them released immediately and unconditionally.
Thirdly, in the process of release, we wanted consular access
just to assure ourselves and their families that they were physically
all right. Fourthly, we wanted our boats and equipment released.
Finally, throughout the week a number of things
had been gradually discussed—perhaps rather more in London
than elsewhere—in which there were possibilities for future
substantive discussion that would benefit both sides by making
a better relationship. That was the core of the discussion, and
the other critical thing to say about it is that because it was
a discussion involving the Prime Minister's senior foreign policy
adviser, it was understood to be at a level that should be taken
completely seriously not just by Dr. Larijani but by the supreme
leader in Tehran.
Chairman: Thank you. We now want to come
to some questions about the strategy that Her Majesty's Government
were trying to follow to terminate the hostage crisis.
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