Further letter to the Chairman of the
Committee from Dr Kim Howells MP, Minister of State, Foreign and
Commonwealth Office
IRAN: GLOBAL
SECURITY
I am writing to follow up some of the questions
which were raised during my evidence session on the Global Security:
Iran inquiry on 28 November.
Iranian weapons
The Committee asked about the Government's view
as to whether Iranian equipment is being used against British
troops in Iraq and Afghanistan.
There is considerable evidence to suggest that
a significant proportion of the equipment being used by insurgents
against UK forces in Iraq is of Iranian origin, or at least has
been transited through Iran. Further analysis is ongoing to determine
more categorically the origin of some specific equipment. We are
unable to accurately determine trend data to assess whether there
has been a substantial decrease in the transiting of equipment
of Iranian origin in the last three months. However, there has
been a substantial overall reduction in the number of attacks
on UK Forces in Iraq during this period.
In Afghanistan, we are concerned that elements
of the Iranian regime are involved in supplying arms and funds
to the Taleban, which could be used against NATO troops. This
view was confirmed by an operation on 6 September involving ISAF
troops which interdicted a number of EFP components. As part of
the operation, ISAF observed the convoy cross the border from
eastern Iran into Farah province, where it was intercepted. Any
Iranian links to illegal armed groups either through supply of
munitions, training or funding are completely unacceptable.
Paul Keetch also asked about mobilisation of
troops to the Iran-Iraq border. There has been no such mobilisation.
UK forces are based at the Contingency Operating Base on the outskirts
of Basra and mount operations from there in support of the Iraqi
Security Forces throughout their area of responsibility. These
operations primarily involve mentoring, monitoring and training
the Iraqi Army, the Iraqi Police Service and the Iraqi Department
of Border Enforcement, the latter of which has ultimate responsibility
for all Iraqi border issues (including policing the border with
Iran). Iraq has a substantial border of over 900 miles with Iran,
across which there is a considerable amount of both legal and
illegal trade. We are committed to supporting the Department for
Border Enforcement in fulfilling their role in combating illegal
activity.
Austrian rifles
Andrew Mackinlay asked about the sale of Austrian
Steyr rifles to the Iranians, and of their supposed diversion
to insurgents in Iraq. As we understand them, the facts are as
follows. Austria was originally approached by the Iranian authorities
about possible purchase of Steyr sniper rifles in October 2003.
The end-user certificate stated that they were to be used by the
Iranian border police as part of counter-narcotics operations
on the border with Afghanistan. The licence allowing the transfer
was issued by the Austrian authorities in November 2004, and part
of the total order, a shipment of 800 rifles, was made. When,
in February 2005, it became known that the Austrians had licenced
this transaction and the first shipment had taken place, both
the British and US Embassies in Vienna demarched the Austrian
authorities, highlighting in particular the risk of diversion.
In response to the demarches, the Austrians halted all further
shipments of the order. In the following September, the Austrian
authorities revoked the licence completely. All these events took
place before the imposition of the EU Arms embargo against Iran.
On the separate question of diversion, in February
2007 it was reported in the Daily Telegraph that US forces in
Baghdad, in the course of an operation against insurgents had
found a large consignment (up to 100) of the Steyr-Mannlicher
rifles which had been originally shipped to Iran. This story was
widely reported. However, on 29 March (six weeks after the initial
allegations had been made), a senior US Military spokesman confirmed
publicly that the story was in fact not correct, and that the
US Army had not seized any of the Austrian consignment which had
been shipped to Iran. We remain deeply concerned by the possibility
of diversions such as those alleged, but in this particular case
the story seems to have been untrue.
Counter-narcotics
Sir John Stanley asked about our counter-narcotics
policy in Afghanistan and the possibility of bilateral co-operation
between Britain and Iran. Specifically, he asked about whether
we could provide Iran with equipment to help interdict heroin
shipments.
As I mentioned during the evidence session,
since 2004 we have provided £1 million to help Iran to build
its counter-narcotics capacity, bilaterally and through support
to the UN Office on Drugs and Crime's Iran programme. This assistance
has been primarily training based, but has included the supply
of mobile detection units and IT equipment. Iran has, from time
to time, requested additional equipment including: heat cameras;
electronic surveillance radars; CCTV cameras; gyroplane and gyrocopter;
light armoured vehicle; number plate reading system; GIS, GPS,
GSM systems; DVR recording and photographing system; walkie-talkies;
eavesdropping transmitters and receivers; technical information
vehicle. While we continue to support Iran's counter-narcotics
work, our preliminary assessment has been that much of this equipment
has dual-use potential, and is likely to be subject to the EU
arms embargo. Instead, we are working hard to stimulate practical
discussions on joint counter-narcotics efforts and to revive regional
trilateral and quadripartite talks with Afghanistan and Pakistan
on the subject.
In recent months we have been denied access
at senior level to discuss counter-narcotics issues. But the Iranians
have recently told us that there should be no bar to resuming
co-operation on Afghan counter-narcotics, and that Iran is ready
to participate. Iran now needs to demonstrate its commitment to
engage in such talks, where all ideas on future co-operation and
associated equipment requirements can be considered fully.
Mujahedin-e-Khalq (MeK)
At the end of the session you asked about the
Mojahedin e Khalq (MeK, also known as the PMOI or MKO) As the
judgment in the appeal to the Proscribed Organisations Appeal
Commission (POAC) was due to be handed down later that week, you
requested that I send a response to your question in writing once
the judgment is in the public domain. I am now writing to answer
your initial question and set out a little on the implications
of the judgment.
You mentioned that the MeK was discussed during
many of your meetings in Iran, and asked why the issue is of such
significance. During the 1980s and 1990s the MeK carried out a
range of serious violent attacks on the Iranian authorities, in
Iran and elsewhere. In 1992, the MeK carried out attacks on Iranian
embassies in thirteen countries, and between 1998 and 2001 the
MeK carried out a number of attacks in Iran which resulted in
civilian as well as military casualties. Memories of these attacks,
and of the MeK's support for Iraq during the long and bitter Iran/Iraq
war, are still vivid in Iranian minds.
As you know, the then Home Secretary proscribed
the organisation in 2001. Supporters of the MeK have opposed the
organisation's proscription and have regularly called for it to
be deproscribed. As part of this process, last year a group of
MPs and Peers took a case on behalf of the MeK to the Proscribed
Organisations Appeals Commission. The POAC judgment, made public
on 30 November, allowed the appeal and instructed the Home Secretary
to lay an order before Parliament removing the MeK from the list
of proscribed organisations.
As Tony McNulty has made clear, we are disappointed
at the judgment. We believe that our approach to the MeK, which
took a cautious view of the request for deproscription, was correct.
We note that the judgment agreed that it was a reasonable decision
to proscribe the MeK in 2001, and concluded that many of the MeK's
public statements contain "spin" which justified a cautious
approach to the material. POAC also concluded that there was no
evidence for the allegation put forward by the appellants that
there had been a deal with Iran to proscribe the MeK, or for the
"exceptionally serious" allegation that the US and UK
had agreed to bomb the MeK in Iraq in 2003. We welcome these findings.
The Home Secretary intends to seek permission
to appeal. While the appeal process is ongoing no action will
be taken to remove the MeK from the list of proscribed organisations
(in accordance with the terms of the Terrorism Act 2000).
I will arrange to place a copy of this letter
in the Library of the House.
13 December 2007
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