Submission from the Falkland Islands Government
1. THE BACKGROUND
TO ASSI
1.1 The International Civil Aviation Organisation
(ICAO), as part of their Universal Safety Oversight Audit Programme
(USOAP), audited the United Kingdom (UK) as a signatory to the
ICAO Convention in 1999-2000.
As part of this audit, which was mainly of the
UK Civil Aviation Authority (CAA) ICAO questioned the oversight
process which the UK had in place for its Overseas Territories
(OTs). The answers were not sufficiently robust to satisfy ICAO
that the UK was adequately carrying out its responsibilities as
a signatory of the Convention.
1.2 The UK CAA and the UK Government commissioned
the Overseas Territories Institutional Development Study undertaken
by W S Atkins. This study included several recommendations, one
of which was the creation of a regulatory body that would have
specific responsibilities and capabilities for ensuring that the
UK's liability to ICAO with regard to OTs was being met. This
led to the Department for Transport (DfT) issuing Directions for
the creation of a wholly owned subsidiary of the UK CAA which
would have specific powers and responsibilities to carry out the
required functions—Air Safety Support International (ASSI).
2. ASSI TERMS
OF REFERENCE,
PARTICULARLY IN
RELATION TO
THE FALKLAND
ISLANDS
2.1 ASSI does not publish a TOR but states
that it:
"supports the Overseas Territories' existing
authorities, in the safety regulation of all aspects of civil
aviation, including the licensing of personnel and the certification
of aircraft, airports, airlines and air traffic control. In territories
where the civil aviation regulator does not have the resources
to undertake the task themselves, then ASSI can be designated
by the Governor to perform the civil aviation regulatory task
on behalf of the Government".
2.2 ASSI support differs with each Overseas
Territory. In each it has direct "designations". In
the Falklands, the split of role is:
| ASSI designations | —
| Operation and airworthiness of aircraft, aeronautical telecommunications and environmental protection.
|
Internal DCA | —
| Personnel licensing, aircraft accident and incident investigation, air traffic services.
|
| and conditionally | —
| Met services. |
| | Search and rescue.
|
| | Aerodromes.
|
| | Aeronautical information services.
|
| | Transport of dangerous goods by air.
|
| |
|
2.3 ASSI makes no charges for its services, which is
very welcome. More recently a National Audit Office report has
raised the principle of "user pays".
2.4 Expectations were that ASSI would be a body with
finite terms of reference, which would be phased out as OTs assumed
greater accountabilities for their operations. The NAO report
now identifies the ASSI role in the Falklands as "indefinite".
3. THE FIRST
TWO YEARS
3.1 In hindsight the role of ASSI was vastly underestimated.
This is not a direct fault of W S Atkins but rather a lack of
in depth understanding of each of the OTs, political and financial
situations and their aviation industries. After the first round
of assessments of the regulatory systems and infrastructure in
each OT by ASSI, it became apparent that the OTs were some way
short of the standards the UK wished to set and are required to
prove to the next ICAO USOAP audit.
3.2 Having set the standard of compliance to the various
legal requirements ASSI were then duty bound to take on all of
the areas that were found as not being "capable or effective".
This led to Governors being recommended to designate ASSI as regulator
for various areas (ICAO annexes) and a fair number of the remainder
being only conditionally designated to the local regulator (DCA).
The conditions attached to the latter type of designations have
required significant resources to be supplied by the OTs and in
many cases a large effort from ASSI in training and support. The
audit for the designation process brought to light many deficiencies
in the way OT's had been carrying out their business. Much work
has subsequently been carried out by OT aviation departments and
in some cases significant financial and other resources have been
identified.
3.3 The latest round of audits (FI in April 2008) will
give ASSI a clearer idea of just how long it will take for the
OTs to be self regulating in the areas that they wish to be and
are capable of sustaining.
3.4 There is also the substantial burden on ASSI of running
the entire regulatory function of one OT (British Virgin Islands)
and possibly others such as Montserrat and Anguilla. This factor
has seriously affected ASSI capability across the other OTs in
their availability and resources.
3.5 The last DCA's conference (Cayman 2007) featured
the DfT announcement that it intended to cease the Department's
funding of ASSI £3 million per annum and that OTs would have
to start to pay for their own regulatory oversight capability.
The UK has the ultimate responsibility to ICAO and therefore to
the regulation of aviation in the OTs. OTs have, however, already
had to find considerable additional resources just to meet the
new regulatory requirements, and will not welcome paying for ASSI
as well.
4. THE FALKLANDS'
EXPERIENCE OF
ASSI REGULATION
4.1 The Falkland Islands has had mixed benefit from the
input of ASSI over recent years. Falkland Islands Government has
tried to maintain a difficult balance between what is necessary
for the local and non local aviation industry and the resources
that are required to regulate that. It is recognised that some
of the larger more technical and financially burdening elements
are better off with ASSI. Closer scrutiny of our aviation industry
has revealed areas where oversight by the local DCA, pre ASSI,
has been inadequate, this has been analysed and there are a number
of reasons why this happened not all attributable to the DCA.
4.2 But the ASSI effort to the FI has been very low.
The FI has not had any where near the level of support and resources
that the Caribbean OTs continue to enjoy.
4.3 Where ASSI are the designated regulator, their visits
to the FI have been too infrequent. There is a real lack of understanding
of the FI situation and local aviation scene by some of the inspectors
especially in the area of Flight Operations. ASSI just do not
understand the critical and vital nature of FIG Air Service operations,
nor give credit for an enviable safety record over 27 years. ASSI's
performance has manifested itself in poor communication, lack
of respect, slow progress on audits, findings and work to comply
with new regulations. There is a similar issue with the FI non
local industry as not one ASSI person has been to Antarctica,
in any capacity, to get an appreciation of what that operator,
the BAS Air Unit, is trying to achieve.
4.4 More recently, FIG has experienced major inconsistency
in approach and findings between an ASSI inspection team sent
to the Islands, and the HQ at Crawley. In this case, a satisfactory
local finding was changed by the HQ into one of significant concern
and threatened closure of airstrips, essential for the continued
existence of people living on remote islands, tourism and scientific
research. Inconsistent and mixed messages continue, with sporadic
demands for intensive paperwork.
4.5 The lack of an ASSI system for medical examination
of aircrew (OTAR 67) has been raised over the past 10 months,
without response from ASSI. ASSI hope to have a common licence
for all aircrews in the OTs which implies a common medical examination
system. However, the task involves harmonising Caribbean OTs which
use the American (FAA) standards and Gibraltar and the Falklands
which use European (EASA) standards. There is a lot of work to
do (on health manuals, audit of Authorised Medical Examiners,
data recording and appeals processes), which has not been done,
and for little apparent benefit.
4.6 FIG is concerned that ASSI are overstretched and
underperforming, and that their future is not at all assured.
All of this causes misunderstandings, friction, and significant
ineffectiveness in the OT aviation industry. To have to pay for
this level of service would not be welcome.
15 January 2008
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