House of Commons - Foreign Affairs

Select Committee on Foreign Affairs Tenth Report

2 Japan and South Korea: Regional relations

30. Relations among East Asian states, including Japan and South Korea, continue to be marked by the legacy of earlier historical periods. Western powers, including the UK and the US, began to "open up" the region from the mid-19^th century, through instruments such as the treaties signed between the UK and Japan in the 1850s and the UK and Korea in 1883. Among regional states, Japan emerged in the early 1900s as the dominant power, defeating China and then Russia, and formally annexing Korea in 1910. Under a militarist regime, Japan invaded China in the 1930s and extended its control across much of Asia during the Second World War. After Japan's surrender to the Allies in 1945, the US became the dominant political and security force in East Asia. With the Cold War looming between the former Allies, the US and the Soviet Union encouraged the creation of two separate client states in liberated Korea, one in each of their occupation zones, in the South and North of the country respectively. Meanwhile, the Communist Party emerged victorious from China's post-1945 civil war. In 1950, North Korea attacked South Korea, with the backing of the USSR, triggering the Korean War. Military successes in defence of the South by a US-led coalition mandated by the UN, which included the UK, prompted Communist China to join in on the North Korean side. The inconclusive conflict was brought to an end in 1953 only with an Armistice; technically, North and South Korea remain at war (see Chapter Three). As part of the Cold War alignments which were institutionalised after the Korean War, the US incorporated Japan and South Korea into its regional alliance system, while North Korea was aligned with the Soviet Union and China in the communist camp. Western states did not initially recognise North Korea, while communist and pro-Soviet states did not initially recognise South Korea. As the Cold War system broke down, North and South Korea were admitted to the United Nations as two separate states in 1991. Many countries subsequently recognised the previously unrecognised of the two Korean states, although South Korea, the US and Japan have not normalised diplomatic relations with Pyongyang.

Japan's regional relations

UNITED STATES

31. The relationship with the US remains Japan's most extensive security relationship. Since 1960 the US has guaranteed Japan's security under the US-Japan Security Treaty.

32. In several respects, the relationship with the US is deepening. The FCO notes that the "Japanese support for the war on terrorism, along with the absence of major trade frictions, has contributed to a warming of relations",[44] and that the two countries "have begun co-operation on a ballistic missile defence programme in response to [North Korea] and terrorist threats".[45] Largely driven by the US, NATO is also seeking to forge a new relationship with Japan, among other out-of-area allies. Former Prime Minister Fukuda appeared to reaffirm the importance of the US relationship by making Washington his first foreign destination after taking office.

33. However, a recent incident in which a US soldier stationed in Okinawa was accused of raping a Japanese woman has disturbed the bilateral relationship and reawakened anti-American sentiment in Japan. A similar incident in the mid-1990s helped to trigger a reconfiguration of US forces in the region which is still being implemented. During our visit to Japan, we were told that the presence of US troops is strongly resented by local people in Okinawa, where they are based in large numbers: Okinawa accounts for 1% of the total land-mass of Japan, but is host to 65% of the US forces stationed in the country. We were told that the US military presence is much less of an issue elsewhere, and that there was no strong anti-US feeling across the board. Dr Swenson-Wright confirmed that "general attitudes towards the United States […] for the most part remain very favourable".[46]

34. In September 2008 the nuclear-powered aircraft carrier USS George Washington arrived at her new home port of Yokosuka at the entrance to Tokyo Bay. She is the first nuclear-powered surface warship to be permanently stationed in Japan.[47] Her arrival was welcomed by the Japanese Minister for Foreign Affairs as "symbolizing the firm commitment of the United States to the [Japan-US] Alliance",[48] but was greeted by some local people with protests.[49]

35. There are some concerns in Japan that, as regards North Korea, the US might be concentrating on that country's plutonium programme at the possible expense of managing other threats which North Korea represents to Japan, and resolving the North Korea-Japan abductees issue.[50]

36. In its written evidence, the FCO states that the success of Japan (and South Korea) in ensuring stability in East Asia "will depend on their close relations with the US",[51] and notes that former Prime Minister Fukuda commented that Japan's alliance with the US "should be used to leverage an enhanced Japanese role in Asia to boost relations with China and the Republic of Korea".[52]

37. Japan has a policy, not enshrined in the constitution but of long standing, not to export defence equipment or technology. This has caused problems in terms of Japan-US co-operation, especially in the field of ballistic missile defence. There is a question as to how far Japanese and US systems can be integrated. Ballistic missile defence for Japan involves not only short-range Patriot missiles but also Aegis mid-range interceptors.

38. We conclude that recent Japanese commitments to the international fight against terrorism and to reconstruction efforts in Iraq have strengthened Japan's relations with the United States, as has the two countries' co-operation in developing a ballistic missile defence programme in response to the nuclear threat from North Korea.

39. We deal in paragraphs 58 to 68 below with the specific question of Japanese concern that US rapprochement with North Korea over the nuclear issue should not be at the expense of a satisfactory resolution of the abductees issue.

CHINA

40. Japan normalised relations with the People's Republic of China in 1972. In the course of our 2006 East Asia inquiry, we heard evidence that Japan was in some respects concerned about the "rise of China", particularly as regards the scale and non-transparency of the increase in Beijing's defence spending, and the potential economic competition which the Chinese economy may represent. However, we also heard that Japan, along with other regional economies, was benefiting economically from the opening-up of China, as a new market and a new element in the regional supply chain.[53] One of our witnesses in that inquiry described the relationship between the two countries as "hot economics, cold politics".[54]

41. Politically, Japan's behaviour during its pre-1945 occupation of China, and Tokyo's subsequent handling of the issue, continue to cause friction. Particular flashpoints are the disagreement between Chinese and Japanese historians over the scale of Japanese atrocities in the so-called "Rape of Nanking" in 1937-38, and the issue of Chinese women abducted into sexual slavery, known as "comfort women" (although in its peace treaty with Japan, China renounced all claims for compensation arising from wartime actions).[55]

42. Former Prime Minister Koizumi's visits to the Yasukuni shrine in Tokyo, which honours Japanese war dead, including war criminals, caused particular offence in Beijing. However, neither of Koizumi's two immediate successors, Mr Abe and Mr Fukuda, visited the shrine. It is not yet clear whether new Prime Minister Aso will do so. During his period as Foreign Minister he made statements supportive of Koizumi's visits, but it is noteworthy that although three cabinet ministers and 53 members of the Diet, along with former Prime Ministers Koizumi and Abe, visited the shrine on 15 August 2008 (the anniversary of Japan's surrender), Aso did not do so.[56]

43. More generally, Sino-Japanese relations appear to be improving. The Chinese President Hu Jintao spent five days in Japan in April 2008, the first visit by a Chinese head of state for a decade. During the visit, President Hu and former Prime Minister Fukuda made a joint statement which was the first bilateral political document signed by the two countries' top political leaders. The declaration signed in 1972, when the two countries normalised their relations, was signed by the then Chinese Prime Minister, Chou En-lai, not the President. The two countries' 1978 treaty was signed by the two Foreign Ministers. In 1998, the then Chinese President Jiang Zemin refused to sign a bilateral joint declaration. The willingness of President Hu to sign the new joint statement signals the political importance that China now attaches to the relationship.

44. In June 2008 the two countries announced that they had reached agreement on what had been a significant area of contention between them, regarding the ownership of rights to exploit what may be extensive gas fields in the East China Sea. This is linked to a territorial dispute over a group of islets in that Sea which the Chinese call the Diaoyu islands and the Japanese call the Senkaku islands.[57] China's official position has been that the whole of the East China Sea belongs to its economic zone. Japan's position has been that the area should be divided along a central line which does not take Taiwan and the southern area into account. China has already started unilateral development of some of the fields. At the Hu-Fukuda summit in April, both sides agreed that great progress had been made in their negotiations over the gasfields issue. On 19 June it was announced that the two sides had effectively shelved their dispute over the sea border, whilst at the same time neither side had actually renounced its claim. The two countries will co-operate in carrying out joint surveys of the sea bottom, and Japanese companies will invest in Chinese petroleum firms operating in a defined "joint development area".[58]

45. In its written evidence, the FCO commented that "a confident, outward-looking Japan which enjoys good relations with China is essential for regional security".[59]

46. We reiterate the conclusion in our 2006 East Asia Report that "productive links between China and Japan are essential for peace and stability in East Asia". In that Report we expressed regret at the deterioration of the relationship to, as one witness put it, "the verge of dysfunctional". We conclude that the successful visit of Chinese President Hu to Japan in April 2008, and the agreement concluded in June 2008 between the two countries over exploitation of gasfields in the East China Sea, are positive signs of an upswing in the relationship between China and Japan. We recommend that the Government should continue to do whatever it can to see that that this is maintained.

SOUTH KOREA

47. Like Japan, South Korea has been a US ally in the post-1945 era. However, the common geopolitical alignment between Japan and South Korea has not overcome the strains deriving from the two states' pre-1945 history, when Korea was under Japanese rule. In this respect, Japan's relationship with South Korea has points in common with its relationship with China: Dr Swenson-Wright told us that "difficult historical issues […] bedevil"[60] both sets of ties, and that Japanese public opinion could be "volatile" with regard to both states.[61] Japan normalised relations with South Korea in a Basic Treaty of 1965, but any enduring improvement in relations has repeatedly been disrupted by flare-ups over historical issues, including the Second World War "comfort women"[62] and history text books. Relations deteriorated especially under former Japanese Prime Minister Koizumi (2001-06), principally over his visits to the Yasukuni shrine. Although relations improved somewhat subsequently, Dr Swenson-Wright told us that Japan had still tended to see South Korea's previous President, President Roh, "as being over-willing to play the history card over territorial differences and to use the vexed question of history text books as a means of securing domestic support on the home front".[63]

48. It is alleged that 200,000 young women captured during the Second World War were forced to serve in Japanese army brothels. These victims—euphemistically known as "comfort women"—were predominantly Korean, but also included Chinese, Philippine and Indonesian women. The Japanese Government has not offered an apology to former "comfort women", and has not offered direct compensation, on the grounds that compensations claims were settled by post-war treaty arrangements. However, in 1995 it established an "Asian Women's Fund", funded by donations from the general public. This paid 2 million yen (about £10,000) each in compensation, plus medical and welfare support, to 285 former "comfort women" in South Korea, the Philippines and Taiwan. These arrangements have been criticised by Amnesty International as "fail[ing] to meet international standards on reparation and […] perceived by survivors as a way of buying their silence".[64] Hitherto, all claims for reparation brought on behalf of survivors before the Japanese courts have failed. The Asian Women's Fund was recently wound up. Japan's treatment of the former "comfort women" continues to face criticism internationally, for example in resolutions passed by the European Parliament[65] and by a number of national legislatures, including the US House of Representatives, which said in July 2007 that Tokyo should "formally acknowledge, apologise and accept historical responsibility in a clear and unequivocal manner".[66] Japan's Foreign Minister at that time, now the Prime Minister, Taro Aso, issued a reply to the US House, stating that its resolution was not based on facts and was "extremely regrettable".[67] At government-to-government level, Japan and South Korea regard the "comfort women" issue as being settled. However, some South Korean former "comfort women" continue to protest about their treatment.

49. Despite recurrent difficulties over historical issues, economic and human contacts between Japan and South Korea have continued to expand. Bilateral trade was worth around $78.5 billion in 2006; Japan was South Korea's third-largest trade partner after China and the EU.[68] Japan and South Korea agreed a visa waiver programme in 2006, and Tokyo has been issuing growing numbers of working holiday visas to South Koreans; air traffic between the two states is busy. The two states successfully jointly hosted the football World Cup in 2002. Dr Swenson-Wright also drew our attention to "the importance of cultural exchange" in the Japanese-South Korean relationship, in the form of significant consumption of the popular culture of the other country.[69] Even in the difficult field of history, a Korea-Japan Joint History Research project was launched in 2002, to try to start to develop a common historical understanding.

50. South Korea's new President, President Lee, came to office aiming to improve relations with Japan as one of his top foreign policy goals. The FCO told us of "signs that [President Lee's stance was] receiving a warm response in Tokyo",[70] and Dr Swenson-Wright told us that Japan's reaction to President Lee's election had been "generally […] very positive".[71] Dr Swenson-Wright noted that President Lee had been born in Japan, and that he was seen in Tokyo as a "pragmatist".[72] Former Japanese Prime Minister Fukuda attended President Lee's inauguration in February 2008, and President Lee made Tokyo his second destination in office, after the US, in April 2008. During our visit to the region, shortly after President Lee had been in Tokyo, we too gained the impression that both sides saw prospects for a welcome improvement in relations. At his April summit with then Prime Minister Fukuda, President Lee said that "the past should not stand in the way of the two countries".[73] The two leaders pledged to step up diplomatic dialogue and further strengthen business and people-to-people links. President Lee also invited Emperor Akihito to Seoul.

51. Japan and South Korea are the two states which face the most immediate potential security threat from North Korea, primarily from Pyongyang's missile arsenal. Japan and South Korea are both participants in the Six-Party Talks, in which regional states are pursuing North Korea's denuclearisation.[74] Professor Smith said that Tokyo and Seoul—along with Beijing—share an interest in ending the North Korean crisis, in order to ensure stability and thus continued economic growth in the region, and that Japan broadly supported South Korea's efforts to engage with North Korea.[75] Nevertheless, Japan itself has tended to adopt a tougher approach towards Pyongyang than has South Korea.[76] Under President Lee, South Korea is now adopting a more robust stance towards the North.[77] Dr Swenson-Wright told us that under these circumstances Japan's "relations with South Korea offer a new opportunity […] with regard to co-operation between Seoul and Tokyo in developing a more co-ordinated approach towards North Korea".[78]

52. In the period following the April 2008 summit between former Prime Minister Fukuda and President Lee, Japanese-South Korean relations were again disrupted in familiar fashion, on this occasion over the two states' rival claims to a group of islets situated between the two states, known as Takeshima in Japan and Dokdo in South Korea (and also sometimes as the "Liancourt Rocks"). The islets are located between South Korea's Ullung-do island and Japan's Oki islands (see map). The islets are barely inhabited but South Korea maintains a police garrison there and South Korean tourist boats visit regularly.[79] The sea area around the islets is rich in fishing, and possibly also energy resources. The dispute turns on whether Japan's claim to the islets—made in 1905—was part of its subsequent annexation of Korea and thus surrendered as part of the post-1945 peace settlement, or a separate issue. The sovereignty question was not resolved in the post-Second World War settlement, and it has been one of the periodic irritants in bilateral relations over the last decade. In July 2008, Japan's Education Ministry issued a set of school curriculum guidelines which referred to the islets as Japanese territory, while also noting the existence of South Korea's different view. South Korea temporarily recalled its Ambassador to Tokyo in protest.[80] There were also protests outside the Japanese Embassy in South Korea, where Dr Swenson-Wright told us that the dispute was "much more of a live issue […] than in Japan".[81] In the wake of the row, the Lee Administration announced plans to back up Seoul's claim to the islets in more concrete fashion, for example by making them habitable and starting energy exploration.[82] There were some signs during the summer that the dispute might hobble the nascent reinvigoration of Japanese-South Korean diplomatic relations,[83] although it did not prevent the two states from meeting together with the US in the revived Trilateral Oversight and Coordination Group (TOCG) in October.[84] New Prime Minister Aso met President Lee for the first time at the Asia-Europe (ASEM) meeting in China in late October, at which relations appear to have been repaired somewhat, and by early November it was being reported that a three-way Japan-China-South Korea summit would go ahead in December.[85]

53. Dr Swenson-Wright told us that Japan and South Korea could not agree on a mechanism to resolve the dispute over the Takeshima/Dokdo islets: while Japan has been willing to take the issue to international arbitration, this meets with "complete reluctance on the part of the South Korean Government, who see the territory as legitimately Korean".[86] Dr Swenson-Wright was therefore "afraid that [the issue] will continue to bedevil the relationship".[87] However, he noted that "we may see the leaders being willing to find some formula for avoiding […] unexpected flare-ups".[88]

54. We conclude that recent indications on both sides of a wish further to improve Japanese-South Korean relations are to be welcomed. Given the important contribution which enhanced Japanese-South Korean co-operation could make on a number of issues, especially policy towards North Korea, we further conclude that the continuing capacity of the Takeshima/Dokdo islets dispute to disrupt Japanese-South Korean relations is regrettable. We recommend that the Government should urge Tokyo and Seoul not to escalate the dispute and encourage both parties to seek a mechanism for its lasting resolution. We further conclude that the issue of the Second World War "comfort women"—Korean and other Asian women obliged to provide sexual services for the Japanese army—remains a painful and emotive issue for the South Korean public and Government, and that its importance should be recognised internationally, including by Japan.

NORTH KOREA

55. Japan does not have diplomatic relations with North Korea. In this respect, Japan has followed the US position. The central policy issue for Japan, as for the US, is whether to normalise bilateral relations with Pyongyang.

56. Japan regards North Korea as a direct security threat. This was confirmed to us in our meetings in Tokyo. Rather than Pyongyang's nuclear activities, Dr Swenson-Wright told us that "from the vantage point of Tokyo, the principal security concern is about ballistic missiles".[89] In its submission to our inquiry, the Royal United Services Institute (RUSI) listed North Korea's test firings of missiles over and beyond Japanese airspace in 1998 among the factors which had pushed Tokyo into a more activist security policy in recent years,[90] and Dr Swenson-Wright told us that the 1998 tests "pulled Japan out of its post-war cocoon" and "made the Japanese public in particular aware of their vulnerabilities".[91]

57. Japan is a participant in the Six-Party Talks which since 2003 have been the international community's framework for dealing with North Korea.[92] One of the working groups established in the Six-Party Talks framework is dedicated to the normalisation of Japanese-North Korean ties, but the FCO told us that the group had "failed to make substantive progress".[93] This was also the impression that we received during our meetings in Tokyo in May.

58. Japan makes any normalisation of relations with North Korea conditional on resolution of a specific bilateral issue which dominates the relationship: North Korea's abduction of a number of Japanese citizens in the 1970s and 1980s. The reason for the abductions appears to have been that North Korea needed people of different nationalities to train its own spies in foreign languages and culture. The abductees were later used for other purposes like making counterfeit money. During a groundbreaking visit to Pyongyang by former Japanese Prime Minister Koizumi in 2002, North Korean leader Kim Jong-il admitted 13 abductions. Mr Koizumi secured the release of five of the abductees, and—during a subsequent visit—of their families too. Pyongyang said that the eight remaining admitted abductees had died. Tokyo claims that North Korea abducted 19 Japanese citizens in total, but families of Japanese missing persons believe that the number of Japanese abducted by North Korea may be higher.[94]

59. During our visit to Japan two members of the Committee met the families of some of the abduction victims.[95] The families have campaigned for more information about their fates. The Members were given two individual accounts of abductions by the parents of those concerned:

In 1982 Keiko Arimoto, aged 23, went to London to study at an international school. She stayed there for a year, and in 1983 she was abducted through Copenhagen and Moscow to Pyongyang; she sent a letter to her parents in 1988. North Korea claims that she died in a gas poisoning accident but her parents regard this as an untrustworthy claim.
In 1977 Megumi Yokota, aged 13, was walking back to her house in Niigata Prefecture when she was abducted by North Korean spies. In 1997 her parents received information that she was in Pyongyang. At the time, North Korea denied any involvement in her abduction. In 2002, at the Japan-North Korea summit, it admitted that she had been abducted but claimed that she had subsequently committed suicide. In 2004, at the second Japan-North Korea summit, it undertook to reinvestigate the case. Subsequently her parents were sent what were purported to be her ashes. However, we were told that DNA tests showed that the remains were not of Megumi and that the supposed death certificate contains elementary errors. Megumi married another abductee and had a daughter who is now aged 20 and at university in North Korea. There is no guarantee that Megumi is alive, but there is no proof that she died, so her parents believe that she is still alive.

60. The fate of the admitted and suspected abductees remains a high-profile and highly emotive issue among the Japanese public. Japan does not give humanitarian aid to North Korea largely because of this issue, which is widely regarded within Japan as being no less important than the nuclear issue in the country's dealings with North Korea. It is raised with visitors from the UK because the UK has an Embassy in Pyongyang and is therefore seen as able to exercise leverage; the DPRK Abductee Family Association told us that the Embassy had been very helpful to them on this issue.

61. In the context of the progress which was being achieved in late spring and early summer 2008 on the North Korean denuclearisation issue,[96] we picked up some anxiety in Tokyo that the US might move towards a normalisation of relations with North Korea without "waiting" for sufficient progress on the abduction issue that Japan would feel able to do likewise. Dr Swenson-Wright told us that Japan

worries […] that as part of the necessary arrangements to provide incentives to North Korea, the US is about to de-list the country as a state sponsor of international terror, in effect undercutting Japan's negotiating position with North Korea and potentially creating very significant problems domestically.[97]

Dr Hughes similarly suggested that the issue might cause strains between Japan and the UK, if progress on North Korea's denuclearisation meant that the UK faced calls to provide new support to Pyongyang, at a time when Japan had not yet normalised relations with North Korea.[98] However, the FCO told us that at the two leaders' summit in November 2007 President Bush had "reassured [former Prime Minister] Fukuda that the US would not jeopardise the US-Japan relationship as it sought to normalise relations with the DPRK, and that the Japanese abductees would not be forgotten."[99]

62. Giving evidence to us in April 2008, Dr Swenson-Wright expressed the view that if Japan could find a formula for dealing with the abduction issue, there was a real possibility that relations with North Korea could be normalised. He noted that the then Prime Minister Fukuda was "adopting a much more pragmatic approach" than his predecessor Abe.[100] Dr Swenson-Wright also felt that "even public opinion in Japan is much more flexible, or at least ambivalent, on the importance of emphasising the abductee question".[101]

63. Giving evidence in early July 2008, the FCO Minister of State Lord Malloch-Brown told us that:

We have been trying to support the Japanese efforts on this in every way that we can. There have been some quite positive bilateral talks—hosted by the Chinese, but between Japan and DPRK—in which the DPRK authorities agreed to reopen the investigations. As you will have gathered from your briefing in Tokyo, the numbers are quite small. There are only 19 officially recognised abductees. However, you will also know from your visit to Tokyo that it is a dramatic issue in Japan, over which Governments fall and Prime Ministers get chosen. It has a huge emotional attachment. So, yes, we do support the Japanese. The good news is that, because it is such a priority for the Japanese, the DPRK understands and within the general coat tails of the Six-Party Talks' progress, the Japanese are getting some traction on this now.[102]

64. The two members of the Committee who had met the families of abductees in Tokyo wrote to the Prime Minister to draw his attention to that meeting and to the plight of these families. On 11 August the Prime Minister replied, setting out the Government's position:

I am aware that the issue of abductees remains extremely emotive in Japan and is very distressing for the abductees and their families to whom I extend my heartfelt sympathy and respect. We continue to support Japanese efforts to resolve the issue. […] We support the [Six Party Talks] process as the principal mechanism for denuclearising the Korean Peninsula; however we also attach importance to Japanese concerns over abductees. We support recent US statements by President Bush and Secretary of State Rice that the abductees issue will not be forgotten.

[…] The abduction of Japanese citizens by North Korea represents a particularly terrible abuse of human rights. I assure you that we will continue to press the North Korean regime on this and other aspects of its human rights record.[103]

65. On 12-13 August 2008, further Japan-North Korea Working Group talks were held, at Shenyang in northeast China. Japan's Foreign Ministry subsequently announced that it had reached an agreement with North Korea that a commission would be set up to reinvestigate the abductions of Japanese nationals, with a view to discovering any further survivors and returning them to Japan.[104] The intention was for the new investigation to proceed quickly, with the aim of concluding it by autumn 2008. In return, Japan agreed to lift restrictions on individual travel and charter flights between the countries.[105] However, after Prime Minister Fukuda's resignation on 1 September 2008, North Korea informed Japan that it would suspend implementation of the agreement until it had ascertained the views of the new Government. The Japanese Foreign Ministry described this decision as "extremely unfortunate and […] regrettable".[106]

66. The decision by the United States in October 2008 to remove North Korea from its blacklist of state sponsors of terrorism[107] provoked severe criticism in Japan for having pre-empted efforts to resolve the abductions issue. In response to these concerns, the US Ambassador in Japan, Thomas Schieffer, stated that President Bush believed that "the abduction issue needs to be addressed and the United States will continue to support Japan and these families in their efforts to get this situation resolved".[108]

67. Dr Swenson-Wright highlighted Japan's potential role vis-à-vis North Korea as and when the two countries normalised bilateral relations, particularly in terms of economic development. He said that during former Prime Minister Koizumi's 2002 visit to Pyongyang, the talk had been of an aid package of perhaps $5-10 billion, compared with estimates of the total size of the North Korean economy of up to around $40 billion, with most figures much lower than this.[109]

68. We conclude that there is a realistic prospect of Japan normalising relations with North Korea, if progress can be made to resolve both the North Korean nuclear issue and the issue of North Korea's abductions of Japanese nationals, but that these issues should be resolved separately. We further conclude that although the number of Japanese nationals who were abducted by North Korea is small, even allowing for the highest possible estimate, nonetheless it should be recognised by the international community that this is an understandably emotive issue for the Japanese public and Government. Like the Prime Minister, we extend our sympathy and respect to the surviving abductees and to the abductees' families. We conclude that the British Embassy in Pyongyang has played a useful role in bringing pressure to bear on North Korea in relation to the abductees. We recommend that the Government should continue to give such assistance as it can to Japan over this matter, and in particular that it should encourage North Korea to proceed speedily to set up the proposed reinvestigation commission, with a view to reaching a final resolution of the issue and removing this significant obstacle to the normalisation of North Korea's relations with Japan. While recognising the importance of these country-specific sensitivities, we further conclude that, in relations with North Korea, the greatest interest of the international community as a whole, including the UK, lies in denuclearisation.

South Korea's regional relations

UNITED STATES

69. The relationship with the US is South Korea's most important security relationship. The US was the first and largest provider of troops to the UN Command which defended South Korea in the Korean War, and the US continues to lead the UN Command, under UN Security Council resolution 84 of 1950.[110] The US continues to guarantee South Korea's security under the two states' Mutual Defence Treaty of 1953, concluded at the end of the Korean War. The US deployed tactical nuclear weapons in South Korea between 1957 and 1991, and it retains 28,500 troops there. For its part, South Korea sent troops to fight with the US in the Vietnam War, and it contributes to the current US-led missions in both Afghanistan and Iraq.[111]

70. The centrality of the security relationship notwithstanding, South Korea's relations with the US have sometimes been bumpy. At times, there has been resentment in Seoul at perceived US dominance and lack of consultation, leading to assertions of greater South Korean status and independence. This has occurred, for example, when the US has been seen to be making North Korea policy over South Korea's head, whether Washington's line was tougher or more accommodating than that preferred by Seoul. Anti-American Korean nationalist sentiment may have been one of the factors behind the mass protests over renewed US beef imports in 2008.[112] At other times, there has been uneasiness in Seoul lest the United States' security commitment to South Korea was weakening. South Korea's relations with the US were often seen to be particularly difficult under the two previous liberal Presidents in Seoul, Presidents Kim and Roh, especially after US President Bush took office in 2001. While the Bush Administration initially adopted a tough stance towards North Korea, South Korea's leaders were pursuing their "sunshine policy" of engagement with the North.[113]

71. The new South Korean President, President Lee, has made an improvement in relations with the US one of his top foreign policy aims, in parallel with his similar goal as regards Japan.[114] The FCO told us that the "key political difference" under President Lee in relation to North Korea will be his "determination to co-ordinate his DPRK policy more closely with that of the United States".[115] US Secretary of State Condoleezza Rice attended President Lee's inauguration, and President Lee made the US his first foreign destination in office, in April 2008, becoming the first South Korean head of state to be received at Camp David. At the summit, Presidents Bush and Lee reaffirmed the importance which they attach to the bilateral alliance. The two sides agreed on steps that allowed South Korea to be admitted to the US visa waiver programme from November 2008, and to gain a status equivalent to NATO members for the purposes of US military sales; the two leaders also agreed to facilitate South Korean student visits to the US.[116]

72. The US military presence in South Korea, like that in Japan, is undergoing major reorganisation and reconfiguration, which can be a source of bilateral difficulties. The long-term trend is for South Korea increasingly to attain a greater and more independent military capacity, with the US moving to a supporting role. This accords both with South Korea's wish for a more equal bilateral relationship and with the United States' need to shift military resources elsewhere. Since an agreement in 2004, the US has reduced the number of its troops in South Korea from 37,500 to 28,500, although Presidents Bush and Lee agreed in April that there was not, after all, scope to implement the further cut—to 25,000—which had originally been foreseen. Under the same 2004 agreement, the US has so far closed 39 of its bases in South Korea. By 2012, US forces will be concentrated in only two major "hubs", both in the south of the country, in contrast to US forces' previous dispersion throughout South Korea, including Seoul. The reconfiguration will reduce the US military presence in heavily populated areas, where relations with the local population have sometimes come under strain, and leave the frontline forces nearer the North Korean border overwhelmingly South Korean. Reaching agreement on sharing the costs of the reorganisation has sometimes been a source of difficulty between Seoul and Washington.

73. As regards military command structures, South Korea took peacetime operational command of its own armed forces from the US in 1994. Wartime operational command currently remains with the Commander of the US-South Korea Combined Forces Command (CFC), who is always from the US. However, in 2012 the CFC is to be disbanded, and wartime operational command of South Korea's armed forces will pass to Seoul, with the US forces and their Commander moving to a supporting role. In summer 2008, South Korea took command for the first time of one of the regular US-South Korean joint military exercises. We discuss in Chapter Three below the implications for the UN Command in Korea of the changes to the US-South Korean command relationship.[117]

74. The most high-profile issue in South Korean-US relations is currently the two states' Free Trade Agreement (KORUS FTA).[118] Despite the other difficulties in the bilateral relationship at the time, the agreement was negotiated under former South Korean President Roh and signed in 2007. In terms of the value of trade affected, the agreement is the United States' largest FTA since the North American Free Trade Agreement (NAFTA), which came into effect in 1994; it is South Korea's largest-ever free trade agreement. The FCO told us that if the KORUS FTA were to come into effect, it would be expected to boost trade between the two countries by up to 20%, and to add up to 1.99% to GDP in South Korea and 0.2% in the US.[119]

75. As of November 2008, the South Korea-US FTA had not been ratified by the legislature in either country. As outlined in the previous Chapter, in Seoul political opposition to the agreement became linked to the row over renewed US beef imports, and the outgoing National Assembly did not ratify the agreement. In his opening address in July to the new National Assembly, where his party now enjoys a majority, President Lee urged the legislature to ratify the agreement as soon as possible.[120] His Government re-introduced the required legislation in the legislature in October.[121] For his part, when he visited Seoul in August President Bush promised to "press hard" for US Congressional ratification of the FTA.[122] However, the agreement faces significant opposition in Congress, which did not ratify the deal before rising in advance of the 4 November US Presidential election. Prospects for possible ratification during a "lame-duck" session between the election and the formation of the new US Administration are uncertain.[123]

76. We conclude that the recent moves on both sides further to strengthen the South Korea-US alliance are to be welcomed. We conclude that the likelihood of greater convergence between South Korean and US approaches to North Korea should be especially useful.

CHINA

77. South Korea's relations with China have undergone a major transformation in recent years. China fought with North Korea against the South in the Korean War, and during the Cold War it did not recognise South Korea. Having established diplomatic relations with South Korea in 1992, China is now its largest trade partner, by some considerable distance. Bilateral trade was worth $118 billion in 2006.[124] China is an important destination for South Korean investment, and significant numbers of students from one country study in the other.

78. The British Association for Korean Studies (BAKS) reminded us that, historically, when faced with Japanese aggression "the Koreans have always been allied with the Chinese". BAKS suggested that the current situation might be regarded as one in which "this old equilibrium is re-emerging" to some extent.[125] Professor Smith similarly said that South Korea and China "share a[n] […] intangible but nevertheless important commonality in that both countries harbour still important popular antagonism towards Japan for a perceived recalcitrant attitude to the consequences of the colonial past."[126]

79. We heard during our visit to the region that the Chinese leadership might feel uncomfortable with the renewed priority which South Korea's new President, President Lee, is awarding to improved relations with the US and Japan. Nevertheless, President Lee and Chinese President Hu have already held two bilateral summits, in Beijing in May and in Seoul in August. At the former meeting, the leaders agreed to upgrade the South Korean-China relationship to a "strategic and cooperative partnership".[127]

80. China and South Korea have not settled their mutual maritime border. Talks on the issue since 1996 have failed to reach a resolution. The dispute concerns in particular what Korea calls the Ieodo isles and China the Suyan Rock, where the two countries' claimed economic zones overlap. In their August 2008 summit statement, Presidents Lee and Hu called for an acceleration of talks on the issue.[128]

81. China's human rights record may be becoming a more potentially contentious area in the relationship with South Korea. When the torch relay for the Beijing Olympic Games passed through Seoul in April 2008, South Korean anti-China protestors clashed with Chinese students studying locally. South Korea protested to China about the behaviour of its nationals and threatened to tighten visa arrangements for Chinese,[129] although the incident did not disrupt the two countries' summit in May. The South Korean demonstrators were protesting not only about Beijing's behaviour in Tibet but also about its policy of repatriating North Korean emigrants in China, if apprehended. There appears to be increasing South Korean sentiment on this issue. At his summit with President Hu in Seoul in August, at which there were again demonstrations on the issue, President Lee raised the issue of China's treatment of North Korean emigrants directly with the Chinese leader.[130]

82. China and South Korea are the two countries with the most direct interest in avoiding any crisis within North Korea which would produce unmanageable numbers of emigrants or other immediate security risks. Professor Smith told us that:

it would not be an exaggeration to state that Communist China and capitalist South Korea have probably more in common today than China and North Korea because of their joint commitment to sustaining stability in the region to promote economic growth and their concern that [the] North Korean Government is a major cause of instability.[131]

In the longer run, however, the two countries' interests in North Korea may diverge. Aidan Foster-Carter told us that "China and South Korea are rivals for influence in Pyongyang".[132] The British Association for Korean Studies reminded us that historically "the Chinese have viewed Korea as a buffer state" and "have committed massive resources to defend Korea—in alliance with a Korean state—to drive military power away from their Korean frontier […] when it has had the resources, China has never allowed a hostile or potentially hostile power to dominate Korea".[133] Beijing would therefore presumably resist any change in North Korea that would allow the US to extend northwards its existing security presence in South Korea.

83. We conclude that the growing relationship between South Korea and China is to be welcomed as a potential factor for stability in East Asia, in particular as regards the management of the risks posed by North Korea, and on the assumption that there is no question of the two countries aligning against Japan. We recommend that the Government should make clear to the parties that it would welcome an early agreement on the South Korean-Chinese maritime border.

Trade agreements

84. In recent years Japan and South Korea have acceded to a burgeoning number of bilateral and regional free trade agreements (FTAs) and other preferential economic arrangements. Japan has reached economic partnership agreements—which include trade liberalisation measures—with Mexico, Chile, the Philippines, Indonesia, Brunei, Malaysia, Thailand and Singapore, as well as the Association of South-East Asian Nations (ASEAN) as a whole. Tokyo is currently negotiating agreements with Australia, India, Switzerland and Vietnam, as well as the Gulf Co-operation Council countries.[134] For its part, South Korea has FTAs with ASEAN, Chile, Singapore and the European Free Trade Association (EFTA), as well as the KORUS FTA with the US (which we discussed above). Seoul is in FTA talks with the EU[135] and with a further 40 countries, including well-advanced negotiations with India; and it is exploring the possibility of launching negotiations with a range of further states.[136] For example, at their summit in May 2008, President Lee and Chinese President Hu agreed to continue to study the possibility of a South Korea-China FTA; and in August 2008, President Lee and Australian Prime Minister Kevin Rudd agreed to launch FTA talks.[137] A number of ideas have also been floated about possible pan-Asian free trade arrangements.

85. In our 2006 Report on East Asia, we welcomed stronger links between states, but expressed some concern in case preferential trade arrangements in the region developed into "a group which might discriminate against EU trade".[138] At that time, the FCO told us that "There is no evidence that the emergence of particular groupings or Free Trade Agreements in the region are having any negative impacts upon EU or UK business interests."[139] Two years on, Lord Malloch-Brown reaffirmed this position. He told us that the Government

remain[ed] of the view that a global successful conclusion of the Doha trade round to prevent the need for all these regional agreements is the way to go, but we are not inherently against regional agreements as long as their general impact is to increase international trade.[140]

At the end of July 2008, the latest attempt to bring the Doha round to a conclusion with a global trade agreement ended in failure.

86. In the context of efforts to encourage a greater opening-up of the South Korean economy, Dr Hoare suggested that free trade agreements involving the country were "a good thing", because they "bind the South Koreans into more open trading practices".[141]

87. Japan and South Korea opened negotiations on a bilateral FTA in 2003, but the talks stalled the following year. At their summit in April 2008, former Prime Minister Fukuda and President Lee committed themselves to re-launching the negotiations. However, Dr Swenson-Wright told us that "there will inevitably be tensions in the economic relationship between the two countries" and that if the FTA talks were reopened "there will be difficulties, particularly in the agricultural sector."[142] Moreover, in summer 2008, the two states' dispute over the Takeshima/Dokdo islets, outlined above, led Seoul to postpone further talks.[143]

88. For the UK, currently the most important prospective FTA involving Japan or South Korea is that between the EU and South Korea. The proposed deal, on which talks opened in 2007, is one of a series of FTAs which the EU plans to negotiate with emerging states and regional groupings outside Europe, partly in response to the possible risk of losing out as others negotiate bilateral or regional deals.[144] The EU is now South Korea's largest foreign investor and second-largest trade partner (after China), with trade worth $78.6 billion in 2006. South Korean exports to the EU were worth $48.5 billion and EU exports to South Korea $30.1 billion.[145] The European Commission has estimated that an FTA might boost EU exports to South Korea by 48%.[146] Other studies have suggested that a deal might boost EU GDP by perhaps 0.1% and South Korean GDP by 2.0-3.0%, depending on its content.[147]

89. In the context of the negotiations on the South Korea-EU FTA, Dr Hoare warned us that "it is essential that an eye is always kept on [South Korea's] free trade agreement with the United States".[148] An analysis for Chatham House has suggested that, if the South Korea-US FTA were implemented, it would make the proposed South Korea-EU deal both more urgent and more beneficial for the parties involved, because a US deal without an EU one would give US firms an advantage in sectors in South Korea in which the EU is more competitive. However, the analysis also suggested that any EU wish to secure terms at least as good as those secured by the US might "delay or even preclude success" in the negotiations.[149] If, on the other hand, the South Korea-US agreement were to fail to be ratified, impetus towards further trade liberalisation might be undermined in both countries, and Seoul might in particular be unwilling to make concessions to partners which were not available to its prime ally the US.

90. After several rounds of talks in 2008, South Korea and the EU have both suggested that the negotiations on their proposed FTA could be concluded by the end of the year. However, analysts have pointed to a number of serious potential difficulties in the negotiations, relating to rules of origin and market access in sensitive sectors such as services (for South Korea) and cars (for the EU), a number of which still appeared to require resolution as of November.[150] We discuss some further policy issues for the UK and the EU regarding the South Korea FTA in Chapters Three and Six below.

91. Particularly in the context of the failure of the global Doha trade round, and given our support for a strengthening of relations among regional states, we conclude that bilateral and regional trade agreements involving Japan and South Korea are to be encouraged, provided that they do not prejudice economic access to local markets for the EU nor undermine any remaining prospects for the conclusion of a global trade agreement. We recommend that the Government should remain vigilant in assessing the implications of such agreements for the UK and the EU, and ensure that the EU maintains a similar stance.

Regional security forums

92. East Asia does not have an overarching security architecture or a set of strong, well-established political/security institutions along the lines of those developed in post-War Western Europe and the Transatlantic area. There are, however, a number of regional bodies and forums, including:

Asia-Pacific Economic Co-operation (APEC). This was formed in 1989 and encompasses 21 states, including Japan, South Korea, the US, China, Russia, Australia and states in South-East Asia and Latin America. APEC focuses on economic issues and has become less prominent in recent years.

ASEAN Regional Forum (ARF). This has been meeting since 1994 and has 24 members. It brings the 10 member states of the established Association of South-East Asian Nations (ASEAN) (Brunei, Cambodia, Indonesia, Laos, Malaysia, Burma, Philippines, Singapore, Thailand and Vietnam) together with other countries including Japan, both Koreas, the US, China, Russia, India, Pakistan, Australia, Canada and New Zealand, plus the EU.

ASEAN+3. This grouping brings Japan, China and South Korea together with the 10 ASEAN countries. The ASEAN+3 framework has existed since 1997, and encompasses meetings between all 13 countries, ASEAN plus just one of the additional three states, and the "plus three" countries only.

ASEAN+3+3, also known as the East Asia Summit (EAS). The EAS is the newest regional grouping, having been meeting since 2005. The EAS brings together 16 countries, adding India, Australia and New Zealand to the ASEAN+3 format.

93. Since 2003, the framework for international engagement with North Korea has comprised Six-Party Talks which offer a further alternative line-up for regional security discussions. The Six-Party Talks involve North Korea and its neighbours—that is, South Korea, China, Russia and Japan—and the US.[151] One of the working groups in the Six-Party Talks framework is addressing "North-East Asia peace and security".

94. We heard during our visit to the region about plans for a possible Japan-China-South Korea summit, which was reported to be likely to go ahead in December;[152] and Dr Swenson-Wright also referred to "talk of possible trilateral co-operation between China, the United States and Japan".[153] Dr Swenson-Wright also mentioned the possible "reactivation" of the Trilateral Co-ordination and Oversight Group (TCOG), a US-Japan-South Korea mechanism for discussion primarily of North Korea.[154] TCOG fell into abeyance after the launch of the Six-Party Talks in 2003, but, as noted above, a renewed meeting in the TCOG framework went ahead in October 2008.[155]

95. As will be clear, a perennial issue in regional co-operation initiatives in East Asia has been the line-up of countries to be involved. One possibility is an exclusively North-East Asian framework, but other options would involve the South-East Asian states. Another question concerns the extent of involvement by major states proximate to, but not exclusively part of, East Asia—namely the US, Russia, India, Australia and New Zealand. Countries' preferences regarding the line-up of states often reflect the regional power considerations that are at issue: thus China reportedly prefers smaller groupings, whereas Japan was among the states which pushed for India's inclusion in the East Asia Summit, as a means of balancing China.[156]

96. In our 2006 Report on East Asia, we noted the region's "lack of effective regional security mechanisms". We recommended that the Government should "encourage debate about the institutionalisation of security issues in East Asia" by drawing on "the UK's involvement with and knowledge of NATO and of regional organisations in Europe, such as the Council of Europe, the Organisation for Security and Co-operation in Europe and the European Union". We suggested that these organisations provided "useful models for any indigenous security structures which might broaden the security system from one based on alliances into one of mutual interdependence."[157] In its response, the Government said that the EU was in particular using the ASEAN Regional Forum (ARF) to "encourage debate on institutionalisation of security issues in East Asia" and that the UK Government was "working with Asian and EU partners to make the ARF more effective as a preventative diplomacy tool."[158]

97. Witnesses to our current inquiry were largely of the view that regional security bodies in East Asia remained weak. Dr Hoare said that "the reality has not changed a great deal since 2006",[159] and he characterised regional security bodies as "not very powerful or dynamic".[160] Lord Malloch-Brown assessed East Asian security forums as remaining "pretty insipid".[161]

98. Dr Hoare went into more detail for us on the difficulties facing any efforts to develop regional security institutions in East Asia, especially along the lines of those seen in Europe:

There are a number of problems with trying to impose a European or western-style security apparatus on East Asia. There is the difficulty that there are two leading East Asian nations: China and Japan. There are difficulties because of the historical legacy of the Second World War, which affects attitudes towards Japan, and because East and South-East Asia are not [a] coherent political and cultural region in the way that Europe is […] There is also the historical fact that until very recently the major outside power interested in East Asia—the United States—was not really very interested in any sort of regional security system. It preferred what was called the hub-and-spoke system, whereby the United States was the hub and had bilateral treaties with countries such as the Philippines, Japan and South Korea. Therefore, one of the problems is that you lack one of the basic building blocks to create the sort of regional security structure that we have in Europe."[162]

Dr Hoare also said that the "various off-spins" from ASEAN were weak for "partly cultural" reasons: "anything that might provoke confrontation was to be avoided".[163] Summarising, Sir Stephen Gomersall concluded that "Asia and Europe are fundamentally different in geography, culture, stages of development and relative wealth, and therefore the European experience cannot be transported there".[164]

99. Alongside the fact that the US has preferred to maintain only bilateral security arrangements with its regional allies, Sir Stephen Gomersall highlighted the similar position of Japan. He argued that:

Japan has also slightly missed out by not being more proactive in trying to promote some structures based loosely on ideas of free trade and respect for certain political norms in the area, which would have put relationships among Japan, China, Korea and the ASEAN countries on a more stable and constructive kind of framework and taken some volatility out of the situation […] the bottom line is that there are virtually no takers for those kinds of ideas in Japan. Japan has pursued its own diplomacy through aid, the negotiation of free trade arrangements with individual ASEAN countries and […] through the ASEAN+3 format.[165]

100. There have been signs recently that interest in strengthening East Asian regional security institutions is increasing in some quarters.[166] Dr Hoare told us that "the emergence of some issues, particularly the North Korean nuclear issue and how to cope with it, have made countries in the region look much more at the idea of some form of overarching security apparatus", although he warned that he did "not see [the problems] being solved in the short term."[167] Perhaps most significantly, in an article in Foreign Affairs in July 2008, US Secretary of State Condoleezza Rice said that the parties to the Six-Party Talks "intend to institutionalise [their] habits of co-operation through the establishment of a Northeast Asian Peace and Security Mechanism—a first step toward a security forum in the region".[168] In their joint statement after their August 2008 summit, Presidents Bush and Lee agreed to work "with a view to […] the creation of a new peace structure on the Korean Peninsula and in Northeast Asia".[169] For his part, Lord Malloch-Brown told us that the question of an East Asian security framework would "become more and more of an issue."[170]

101. We conclude that North-East Asia is characterised by a set of interlocking and highly delicate inter-state relationships. While there have been improvements recently in some bilateral relationships, the region continues to be marked by a number of historical and territorial disputes which are potential sources of instability and obstacles to enhanced co-operation. We further conclude that the states of the region have a clear common interest in maintaining stability, in the interests of perpetuating economic growth and enhancing their international standing. We also conclude that, although there is no question of replicating European institutions in East Asia, there are some aspects of the European experience which might usefully be drawn on in the region, in terms especially of the mitigation of historical and territorial disputes, and that the strengthening of standing forums for regularised security dialogue among regional states would be welcome. We recommend that the Government should continue to work with its East Asian, European and US partners to encourage the further development of regional security forums in East Asia. In particular, the Government should convey to the US Administration its support for what appears to be a shift in US policy towards promoting multilateral regional frameworks in East Asia. We recommend that in its response to this Report, the Government should provide an assessment of the development of the various East Asian regional security forums so far, and in particular of the likely impact of the apparent shift in US policy and of prospects for the further institutionalisation of the Six-Party Talks framework.

102. We recommend that in its work in East Asia, the Government should take every opportunity to support initiatives aimed at developing a shared historical understanding between the region's Second World War combatants. We further recommend that the Government should build elements of co-operation between regional states into programmes and projects in the region that it might otherwise pursue bilaterally, for example regarding climate change or research co-operation. We recommend that in its response to this Report, the Government should provide information on such work as it is already doing to encourage co-operation between regional states in specific policy areas.

44 FCO website, country profile: Japan (reviewed July 2008), at www.fco.gov.uk Back

45 Ev 58 Back

46 Q 10 Back

47 "Arrival of USS George Washington to Yokosuka", Japanese Ministry of Foreign Affairs press release, 12 September 2008 Back

48 "Message from Mr Hirofumi Nakasone, Minister for Foreign Affairs, Celebrating the Arrival of USS George Washington", Japanese Ministry of Foreign Affairs press release, 25 September 2008 Back

49 "Japanese protest basing of US nuclear carrier", International Herald Tribune, 25 September 2008 Back

50 For which, see paras 58-68 below. Back

51 Ev 56 Back

52 Ev 58 Back

53 Foreign Affairs Committee, Seventh Report of Session 2005-06, East Asia, HC 860-I, paras 229-46 Back

54 Ibid., para 229; the witness was Professor David Shambaugh of Washington University. Back

55 For "comfort women", see para 48 below. Back