Select Committee on Foreign Affairs Tenth Report

3  North Korea

103.  The Democratic People's Republic of Korea (North Korea) is one of the world's few remaining communist regimes, and the most oppressive and internationally isolated. It was established in 1948 under Soviet sponsorship and largely on the Soviet model, under the leadership of Kim Il-sung. Kim's son, Kim Jong-il, became leader of North Korea on his father's death in 1994. Compared to other communist states, North Korea is distinguished by the combination of: hereditary succession and the personality cult which surrounds Kim Il-sung (the "Great Leader" and "Eternal President") and Kim Jong-il (the "Dear Leader"); the official nationalist ideology of "self-reliance" ("juche"); and the size, favoured economic position and political prominence of the military, under the regime's "military first" ("songun") policy.

104.  North Korea was initially more economically developed than South Korea. Most industrialisation under Japanese rule had taken place in the north, where the peninsula's mineral deposits are mostly located. South Korea is generally reckoned to have overtaken North Korea in terms of economic development by the early 1970s. North Korea went into a steep economic decline after the collapse of the non-market Soviet-bloc trading system in the early 1990s, which brought a major fall in aid and access to cheap energy and other inputs. During our visit to the region in May 2008, it was suggested to us that the North Korean economy should now be thought of as several separate economies, namely: the elite or "court" economy surrounding Kim Jong-il; the military economy; the official civilian economy; and the unofficial economy. We were told that the elite economy operates in hard currency, with revenues generated from international sales of weapons, drugs, and counterfeit currency and cigarettes. Professor Smith summed up for us the situation facing most of the rest of the population:

Chronic food shortages underlie continuing malnutrition in all parts of the country. Unemployment and underemployment is prevalent. The economic and social infrastructure remains degraded with basic services of running water, sewage systems, electricity and heating availability unpredictable and inadequate even for those living in the capital city.[171]

105.  As noted at the start of Chapter Two, during the Cold War Western states did not recognise North Korea. Many effectively did so in 1991, when North and South Korea were both admitted to the UN. Many Western states have subsequently established diplomatic relations with Pyongyang, including the UK.[172] The US and Japan do not have diplomatic relations with North Korea. In addition, the US maintains some bilateral sanctions against North Korea, including, until 2008, restrictions under the Trading with the Enemy Act. Until October 2008, the US also continued to list North Korea as a state sponsor of terrorism, a designation applied since North Korean agents blew up a South Korean commercial airliner in 1987.

106.  For the West, and the country's regional neighbours, North Korea presents a number of security and other policy risks and challenges. Aidan Foster-Carter told us that the situation in North Korea satisfied the UN definition of a 'complex emergency': "there are so many issues".[173] Professor Smith referred to "the continuing Korean security crises",[174] and in our 2006 East Asia report we discussed North Korea as a "failing state".[175] The FCO assessment is that "the DPRK nuclear and missile issues and the fragility of its economic and political systems are a major threat to international peace and security in the region."[176] We discuss a number of the relevant policy issues in the following sections.

Nuclear programme

107.  Internationally, North Korea is regarded as a security risk primarily because of its nuclear activities. These include both a domestic nuclear weapons programme and nuclear proliferation to other countries.[177]

108.  When we completed our Report on East Asia in July 2006, it was not known whether North Korea had developed a nuclear weapon: in February 2005 Pyongyang had announced that it had done so, but there was no hard evidence.[178] In October 2006, this uncertainty was ended: North Korea tested a small nuclear device. Dr Hoare told us that "whatever was tested in October 2006 was hardly a resounding success":[179] the bomb is believed to have detonated only imperfectly. Lord Malloch-Brown told us that North Korea "could not sustain any kind of nuclear military effort against Japan beyond a first strike, but we have to remain wary of, or alert to, the possibility of a once-off nuclear weapon or flight of nuclear weapons—or the launch of a very small number with the character of a dirty bomb—that could [...] do significant civilian harm".[180] North Korea's nuclear bomb is based on plutonium which Pyongyang is known to have produced at the Yongbyon facility before 1994 and between 2002 and 2008. North Korea is reckoned to have enough weapons-grade plutonium to make up to perhaps a dozen nuclear weapons.[181]

109.  North Korea had acceded to the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT) as a non-nuclear weapons state in 1985, largely through Soviet pressure. Pyongyang only allowed full inspections by the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) in 1992, when its possession of weapons-grade plutonium was confirmed. Disputes over further inspections led North Korea to threaten to withdraw from the NPT in 1993. This prompted bilateral negotiations between the US and North Korea which yielded the Agreed Framework (also known as the Geneva Framework Agreement) of 1994. Under the Agreed Framework, the US in essence deferred temporarily the issue of the plutonium which Pyongyang had produced prior to 1994 in defiance of the NPT, in the interests of securing an IAEA-inspected freeze on new production. The US also agreed to supply Pyongyang with fuel oil, organise an international consortium to provide a light water reactor for civil energy production, and move towards a normalisation of bilateral relations. Under the Agreed Framework, North Korea froze its plutonium programme, under IAEA inspection, between 1994 and 2002.

110.  The Agreed Framework broke down in 2002, after the US accused North Korea of running a second—secret—nuclear weapons programme, based on uranium enrichment and employing gas centrifuge technology obtained through the A.Q. Khan network based in Pakistan. The US claims that North Korea admitted running a uranium programme, although Pyongyang has subsequently denied its existence. The FCO told us that it believes that North Korea "has […] tried to develop a uranium enrichment programme for weapons purposes."[182] In response to the US charges in 2002, North Korea restarted its suspended plutonium-based activities at Yongbyon, expelled IAEA inspectors, and formally withdrew from the NPT in January 2003. North Korea is the only state ever to have acceded to the NPT and subsequently withdrawn. (The UK does not regard Pyongyang as having met the procedural requirements for NPT withdrawal, and therefore continues to regard North Korea as bound by its NPT commitments.)[183]

111.  Following North Korea's October 2006 nuclear weapon test, the UN Security Council unanimously passed Resolution 1718, which demanded that North Korea conduct no further such tests. The Resolution also banned trade with North Korea in goods and technologies that could be used in ballistic missile programmes[184] or programmes for the manufacture of weapons of mass destruction (WMD). UNCSR 1718 also imposed an asset freeze on individuals and entities supporting North Korea's WMD and ballistic missile programmes, and a travel ban on the relevant individuals. The resolution also demanded that North Korea return to the NPT and IAEA safeguards.[185]

112.  Alongside the UN sanctions regime, since the country's nuclear weapon test the international community has continued to negotiate with North Korea on denuclearisation, through Six-Party Talks which were established in 2003 following Pyongyang's NPT withdrawal. The Six-Party Talks involve North Korea and its neighbours—that is, South Korea, China, Russia and Japan—and the US. China was largely responsible for securing North Korea's acceptance of this negotiating format, and chairs the Six-Party Talks. The Six-Party Talks made little progress until 2005, when the parties agreed a joint statement of principles, including that their aim was "the verifiable denuclearisation of the Korean peninsula in a peaceful manner". The parties also agreed that they would proceed on the basis of "commitment for commitment, action for action". In the joint statement, North Korea promised to return to the NPT and IAEA safeguards, and the other parties promised to discuss the provision of a light water reactor for civil energy purposes. North Korea and the US, and North Korea and Japan, also agreed to take steps towards the normalisation of bilateral relations.[186]

113.  Following North Korea's nuclear test in October 2006, the parties to the Six-Party Talks reached agreement in February 2007 on "Initial Actions for the Implementation of the [2005] Joint Statement". This constituted a breakthrough, by establishing sequencing and deadlines for specific steps to a greater extent than had previous agreements—although, in his submission to our inquiry, Dr Tat Yan Kong of the School of Oriental and African Studies highlighted the many difficulties inherent to the "denuclearisation" process that nevertheless remained.[187] In the first implementation phase under the February 2007 agreement, North Korea was to shut Yongbyon and allow the return of IAEA inspectors, in return for the shipment of 50,000 tons of fuel oil, and talks with the US and Japan on the normalisation of bilateral relations. The US was to start the processes of de-listing North Korea as a state sponsor of terrorism and removing the country from the terms of the Trading with the Enemy Act (TWEA). North Korea did not shut Yongbyon on time, but it had done so to the satisfaction of the IAEA by July 2007.[188] In October 2007, the parties agreed on a second phase of implementation measures. In this phase, by the end of 2007 North Korea was to disable Yongbyon and make a full declaration of all its nuclear programmes, while the other parties were to supply further fuel oil or equivalent, up to a total of 1 million tons supplied in phases 1 and 2 combined. The US said that it would fulfil its commitments regarding terrorist de-listing and the TWEA "in parallel with the DPRK's actions".[189]

114.  When he gave evidence to us in March 2008, Aidan Foster-Carter said that North Korea's plutonium programme was by then "canned".[190] Lord Malloch-Brown confirmed to us in early July 2008 that the disabling of Yongbyon was ongoing, although the process was "going slower than had been hoped […] partly due to deliberate stalling by the DPRK, but […] also some health and safety issues."[191] On 27 June 2008, North Korea blew up the cooling tower at Yongbyon in front of the international press. US negotiator Christopher Hill told the Senate Armed Services Committee on 31 July 2008 that North Korea had by then completed eight of eleven agreed disabling tasks at Yongbyon, and was "no longer able to produce weapons-grade plutonium at Yongbyon".[192] Both IAEA and US personnel have been on the ground at Yongbyon monitoring the disabling process. Mr Hill also told the Senate Armed Services Committee that, as of end-July, North Korea had received 420,000 of the 1 million tons of fuel oil or equivalent which it is due in the first two implementation phases, and that the remainder would be provided by the end of October 2008.

115.  North Korea did not meet its end-2007 deadline for a full declaration of its nuclear programmes. Matters were held up when the US insisted, against North Korean resistance, that the declaration cover the United States' longstanding allegations of a covert uranium-based programme, and more recent US charges that North Korea had assisted in Syria's construction of a covert nuclear facility at al-Kibar which was destroyed by Israel in an air strike in September 2007.[193] In March 2008, Aidan Foster-Carter told us that "unless [US negotiator] Chris Hill […] can come up with some way of getting the Syria issue and the enriched uranium issue off balance sheet, as you might say, or shove them away into a separate track of talks, the Bush Administration will run out of time."[194] By April, it was being reported that the US might be preparing to accept a North Korean nuclear declaration which did not provide full information on these issues.[195]

116.  In May 2008, North Korea handed to the US over 18,000 pages of documentation on its activities at Yongbyon. On 26 June 2008, North Korea made its formal nuclear declaration. The FCO's Stephen Lillie told us that the Government's "understanding [was] that the declaration itself probably does not include [an accounting of proliferation activities] but there have been other discussions with the US to address it."[196] According to US National Security Adviser Stephen Hadley, in its declaration North Korea denied that it was engaged in uranium enrichment or nuclear proliferation, but the Administration was prepared to set aside temporarily its continuing suspicions on these counts "in order to keep the process going".[197] The amount of plutonium which North Korea admitted possessing, 37 kilograms, is also lower than US estimates.[198] President Bush announced on the same day that the US was removing North Korea from the provisions of the Trading with the Enemy Act, and starting the process of de-listing the country as a state sponsor of terrorism. Under this process, the US would de-list North Korea after a minimum of 45 days if the parties to the Six-Party Talks had agreed on "acceptable verification principles and an acceptable verification protocol" and "an acceptable monitoring mechanism" as regards North Korea's nuclear declaration.[199] Combined with the symbolic public destruction of the Yongbyon cooling tower the following day, the developments at the end of June appeared to mark a major breakthrough in the international effort to secure North Korean denuclearisation. The Foreign Secretary wrote on his blog that North Korea's nuclear declaration was "significant" and that there was "hope" that the "process of engagement [with North Korea] may be working".[200]

117.  During our trip to Tokyo and Seoul in May, we picked up some anxiety that the Bush Administration might be preparing to accept less-than-complete fulfilment by North Korea of all international demands, in the interests of making a breakthrough in bilateral relations during its remaining months in office that it could claim as a foreign policy success.[201] We asked Lord Malloch-Brown about this in early July, with respect especially to verification of North Korea's 26 June nuclear declaration. Lord Malloch-Brown told us that he thought that "the Six-Party Talks process has been very well grounded […] President Bush will not do anything imprudent. He will move cautiously on this matter right until the end."[202] However, Dr Hoare warned us that "the unwillingness to settle for less than total demands could well mean no settlement at all".[203]

118.  When the first possible date arrived for North Korea's de-listing as a state sponsor of terrorism, 11 August 2008, the US did not proceed with the step, because no agreement had been reached on a verification mechanism for North Korea's nuclear declaration. US negotiator Chris Hill said that having the "declaration without a [verification] protocol is really like just having one chopstick. You need two chopsticks if you're going to pick up anything".[204] In response to the US stance, North Korea halted disabling work at Yongbyon and threatened to start to restore the facility. On 19 September 2008, North Korea confirmed that it had started preparations to reactivate Yongbyon. Pyongyang also announced that it no longer wished to be de-listed by the US as a state sponsor of terrorism.[205] On 24 September, the IAEA said that it had removed its seals and surveillance cameras from Yongbyon at the request of North Korea, and that IAEA inspectors would have no further access to the site.[206]

119.  After negotiations conducted by Mr Hill in Pyongyang at the beginning of the month, the US announced on 11 October that it was de-listing North Korea as a state sponsor of terrorism. The US said that it had reached an agreement with North Korea that included "every element of verification that [it had] sought", including that experts will have access to all declared facilities and, "based on mutual consent", to undeclared sites, and that all measures contained in the verification protocol will apply not only to the plutonium-based programme but also to "any uranium enrichment and proliferation activities".[207] North Korea welcomed the US move, and, in response, halted its activities to reactivate Yongbyon, resumed disabling activities there and allowed IAEA inspectors back to the site.[208] Although the agreement appeared to have restored the Six-Party process, observers warned that it might run into the same kinds of dispute over implementation details as have previous denuclearisation deals with North Korea.[209]

120.  International interpretation of North Korea's moves in the denuclearisation process in September-October 2008 was complicated by separate speculation over the possible illness of Kim Jong-il and its impact on decision-making in Pyongyang.[210] In addition, Dr Kong had already noted in his submission to our inquiry that the US presidential election timetable might be a further difficulty for the denuclearisation process, with North Korea perhaps "waiting for the outcome of the 2008 presidential contest" and "unlikely to commit to commit fully to denuclearisation unless it can be sure that the guarantees made by one Administration will be maintained by its successor"[211]—although Dr Kong also noted that the involvement of the other four parties to the process gave a "more binding effect" to agreements reached in the Six-Party Talks framework than had been enjoyed by purely bilateral US-North Korea deals.[212]

121.  Beyond the difficulties surrounding North Korea's nuclear declaration, there is a third phase to the implementation of the Six Parties' 2005 joint statement. In this third phase, which the parties have not yet reached, North Korea is supposed to give up all its nuclear weapons, materials and programmes. The FCO told us that "until these are given up the DPRK will remain a nuclear and proliferation threat".[213]

ONWARD NUCLEAR PROLIFERATION

122.  The FCO's Stephen Lillie told us that the UK's concerns regarding North Korea's nuclear activities were "not just its indigenous programmes, but its proliferation".[214] As regards possible North Korean nuclear proliferation, the most recent allegation has been the US charge in 2008 that North Korea assisted Syria in the construction of a covert nuclear facility at al-Kibar which was destroyed in an Israeli air strike in September 2007.[215] In April 2008, the US published intelligence material which it said demonstrated the North Korean link, including photographs showing the apparent similarly of the Syrian facility to Yongbyon, and North Korean officials at the Syrian site.[216] Mr Lillie told us that the "fact that [North Korea] appears to have provided technology to Syria is in itself an indication of the continuing threat that it poses".[217] Mr Lillie also reminded us that the two 2006 UN Security Council resolutions on North Korea, one passed after the country's nuclear weapon test in October and an earlier one passed after missile tests,[218] were "very much directed at the proliferation threat".[219]

123.  On 20 September 2008, it was reported that preliminary results from the investigation of the al-Kibar site by the IAEA "show[ed] nothing to back up US assertions that the target was a secret nuclear reactor".[220] However, it was reported in late October that the IAEA's final evaluation of the relevant samples from the site had led it to conclude that "there is enough evidence there to warrant a follow-up", although this had not been publicly confirmed.[221] There are doubts both over the likely extent of Syrian cooperation in any further IAEA investigations and over the feasibility of reaching firmer conclusions, given that the Syrian facility was not completed when it was destroyed and IAEA inspectors were in any case able to visit the site only nine months later. It should be stressed that some credible independent observers find the US evidence of the North Korean link convincing.[222]

ASSESSMENT OF THE SIX-PARTY TALKS

124.  The Foreign Secretary has likened the international effort to secure North Korean denuclearisation to a "slow and tortuous process [that] looks like a delicate piece of bomb disposal".[223] In addition to the apparent breakthroughs and reversals with North Korea which were outlined above, our discussion in Chapter Two indicated some of the difficulties involved in harmonising the North Korean policies of all the non-North Korean participants in the Six-Party Talks, including the US, China, Japan and South Korea.

125.  In the history of the international effort against North Korea's nuclear weapons programme over the last 15 years, US policy has been the most controversial element. The US has moved from being, according to Professor Smith, "two days away" from a pre-emptive strike on Yongbyon in 1994 to making an agreement with North Korea later that year; and from declaring North Korea to be part of the "axis of evil" along with Iraq and Iran, in President Bush's 2002 State of the Union address, to beginning in 2007-08 to implement agreements in the direction of an eventual normalisation of bilateral relations.

126.  One issue has been the coherence of US policy. Aidan Foster-Carter reminded us that, at the time of our East Asia inquiry in 2006, the question being asked was, "did the Americans have a policy towards North Korea?"[224] Giving evidence to our present inquiry in March 2008, Mr Foster-Carter reported that the "Bush Administration, rather belatedly, has acquired a policy".[225] Professor Smith told us that the US has "adopted a de facto policy of de-linkage […] such that progress in any one issue has not been made contingent on another. It has also made difficult decisions to prioritise some issues for negotiation over others with denuclearisation being given top priority since 2006."[226]

127.  A second issue for US policy has been whether to pursue North Korean denuclearisation through negotiation and agreements, or sanctions, isolation and hostility alone. In our 2006 East Asia Report, we concluded that "the US policy of increasing pressure on the North Korean regime may be entrenching the divisions between the parties", and we recommended that the Government "use its relationship with the US to suggest a more flexible and pragmatic approach".[227] In its response to that Report, the Government appeared to reject our criticism of US policy, saying that "it is the highly provocative actions of the DPRK, in particular its decision to carry out a nuclear test, which represent the real obstacle to progress."[228] In his evidence to our present inquiry, Lord Malloch-Brown acknowledged that there had been a shift in US policy, saying that the Bush Administration was "initially […] against [the] kind of approach [now being pursued] and they have come round to it somewhat reluctantly."[229] While Dr Tat Yan Kong of the School of Oriental and African Studies told us that "ideological hostility towards North Korea" on the part of the Bush Administration had been "the most decisive factor"[230] in the breakdown of the 1994 Agreed Framework in 2002, Aidan Foster-Carter told us that he was "amazed and pleased at how far the Bush Administration have moved from where they were in their disastrous first few years on the Korean issue".[231]

128.  The policy of negotiation with North Korea remains highly controversial in US political and policy-making circles and, it is reported, within the Bush Administration.[232] Critics of the approach argue that North Korea never fulfils its commitments and has no intention of giving up its nuclear weapons capability, but is merely using the negotiations process to extract economic and symbolic concessions that will benefit the regime. Aidan Foster-Carter told us that "if the Bush Administration run out of time, […] the views of those [...] who argue that the North Koreans were never going to make a deal and that Kim Jong-il will never give up nuclear weapons and is just stringing us along, will become more persuasive."[233]

129.  Discussion of the most effective way of securing North Korean denuclearisation is linked to debate over Pyongyang's motives in pursuing a nuclear weapons programme. The International Institute for Strategic Studies wrote in 2004 that:

For years, North Korea watchers have debated whether Pyongyang views nuclear weapons as indispensable to the regime's survival and therefore non-negotiable, or whether it sees its nuclear assets as a bargaining chip to be traded away for political and economic benefits necessary to sustaining the regime.[234]

130.  Aidan Foster-Carter tended somewhat to the former view. He told us that:

the North Korean regime has consistently traded on […] genuine fears and, for older North Koreans, on memories of attack from the outside, to create a permanent impression of a country at war on the verge of being attacked […] I cannot imagine a North Korea that is not trying to arm itself with everything under the sun, partly for bargaining, but mainly because it cannot conceive of security in any other way […] That is the kind of state it is.[235]

131.  Professor Smith, on the other hand, told us that North Korea was exercising "quite a classical use of […] nuclear possession as a negotiating card. It is a fairly normal […] use of nuclear deterrence".[236] She told us that "the DPRK's nuclear weapons development programme was designed to offer a deterrent capacity against the perceived threat of United States attack,"[237] especially after the Soviet Union and then Russia in the early 1990s "made it clear to the DPRK leadership that there could be no automatic military support for the DPRK in the event of hostilities breaking out on the Korean peninsula."[238] Dr Hoare similarly told us that "North Korea feels and is threatened by nuclear weapons, and believes that the only way to counter that threat is to make it costly for any attacker."[239] Professor Smith further said that Pyongyang conceived of the normalisation of relations with the US primarily as a security gain. "If there was some form of normalisation, in their view it would mean that they were not going to be invaded or bombed",[240] she said; "they want a security guarantee".[241]

132.  Professor Smith said that the conception of security which North Korea was pursuing extended beyond territorial security to the survival of the regime itself. According to Professor Smith, regime maintenance is one of North Korea's two core aims.[242] She said that North Korea saw a risk not only of military action against it, but also of "regime change through different ways of trying to undermine the regime".[243] She told us that:

until they are sure that the regime will be safe—that is the Government with Kim Jong-il in charge and the structure around them—they are not likely to do anything about the wholesale abandonment of what they consider to be their trump card, which they call their nuclear deterrent.[244]

133.  Dr Tat Yan Kong argued that, among those who contend that North Korea seeks merely to extract concessions from the US without denuclearisation, "what tends to be overlooked is the high value that North Korea places on developing friendly relations with the US." He suggested that "beyond immediate economic benefits, North Korea seeks a relationship with the US in order to counter-balance China's growing influence on the Korean peninsula."[245]

134.  In addition to US and North Korean stances, Professor Smith drew our attention to a "contributory factor" in what she called, in March 2008, "the relative success recently of the Six-Party Talks".[246] This was two changes in the position of China, the Talks' chairing state, compared with the early 1990s. First, Professor Smith said that China's new economic weight meant that it "is a valued partner of both South Korea and Japan, to a certain extent".[247] As a result, "North Korea is much more isolated" than it was in the early 1990s.[248] Second, Professor Smith said that, while China continues to be North Korea's main economic prop, Pyongyang had done various things over recent years that "China was very unhappy about", including, most notably, the October 2006 nuclear test. Professor Smith described the nuclear test as "a red line" for China,[249] and Aidan Foster-Carter called the test "a fateful day" as regards Pyongyang's relations with Beijing.[250] Mr Foster-Carter said that "China is already applying more pressure than it used to [on North Korea], and it is in a position to apply more;"[251] he said that "China is key now" as regards further progress on North Korean denuclearisation.[252] In the UK National Security Strategy, published in March 2008, the Government stated that "many of the security challenges [the UK faces] will not be solved without Chinese engagement", including denuclearisation of the Korean peninsula.[253]

135.  In our 2007 Report on Global Security: Russia, we noted that, compared with the US and China, Russia was not the most influential participant in the Six-Party Talks. We also reported that Russia had tended to be more reluctant about supporting sanctions against Pyongyang than the UK, but that at the strategic level Russia shared the wish not to see North Korea become a nuclear-armed state.[254] In his evidence to that inquiry, the then Minister for Europe, Jim Murphy MP, agreed with a description of Russia as "credible" and "a good partner" on North Korea.[255] In conclusion, we "welcome[d] Russia's participation so far in international anti-proliferation efforts regarding North Korea".[256] In a statement released on 27 August 2008, after the war in Georgia had seen relations between Russia and the West deteriorate significantly, the Russian Foreign Ministry expressed "disappointment and concern" about Pyongyang's threat to halt the disabling process at Yongbyon.[257]

136.  As regards the UK, Lord Malloch-Brown acknowledged that it is "not […] a front-line player" in North Korean denuclearisation, being outside the Six-Party Talks. Lord Malloch-Brown told us that "supporting the Six-Party Talks is the most important thing that [the UK] can do".[258] The FCO told us that:

the UK and the EU strongly support the [Six-Party Talks], and both [the UK] and the EU have made clear [their] readiness to assist. The UK and EU also take every opportunity to press the DPRK to honour NPT obligations and to negotiate constructively and in good faith in the Six-Party Talks. [The UK] will continue to work with the EU and the international community to try to reduce the threat of DPRK WMD proliferation.[259]

We discuss British policy towards North Korea in more detail in a separate section below.[260]

137.  We conclude that the North Korean denuclearisation process in the framework of the Six-Party Talks is difficult and imperfect, and that there can be no certainty that it will lead to the elimination of all North Korea's nuclear weapons activities. However, we also conclude that the process has achieved a significant degree of denuclearisation, namely a halt to plutonium production at Yongbyon, verified by International Atomic Energy Agency personnel, and significant dismantling of the facility. We conclude that the fact that the agreements reached in the Six-Party Talks process are similar in outline to the 1994 Agreed Framework—namely denuclearisation steps by North Korea in exchange for energy supplies and security gains through improved relations with the US—suggest that this is the most effective basic deal for securing progress in denuclearisation. We further conclude that, by better harmonising the policies towards North Korea of the states most immediately concerned, and by increasing the number of states signed up to agreements and therefore the costs of defection, the Six-Party Talks format is more effective than bilateral US-North Korean negotiations, and may also have wider knock-on benefits for regional security. We conclude that the leading role of China in the Six-Party Talks is to be welcomed, and that the Government is correct to identify China as key to North Korean denuclearisation. We therefore conclude that the Government is correct to support the Six-Party Talks process, including the priority which the process gives to denuclearisation over other policy aims regarding North Korea.

138.  Given the difficulties in the denuclearisation process which arose in September 2008, we recommend that the Government should make clear to Six-Party Talks participants that it is willing to assist in any way that might help prevent any further possible breakdown in the process. We further recommend that the Government should make clear to the incoming US Administration that it would welcome an early commitment to continuing the Six-Party Talks and the policy approach which they embody. We recommend that, in its response to this Report, the Government should provide an assessment of prospects for the international North Korean denuclearisation effort under the new US Administration, in light of the latest developments in the process and in the West's relations with Russia.

NUCLEAR NON-PROLIFERATION IMPLICATIONS

139.  In demonstrating its possession of a nuclear bomb in 2006, North Korea became the newest addition to the group of states which are not acknowledged nuclear weapons states under the NPT but are known to possess such weapons. The other members of this group are Israel, India and Pakistan. Unlike those states, however, which never acceded to the NPT, North Korea developed much of its nuclear weapons programme while an NPT member, before its disputed withdrawal in 2003. In this respect, the closest potential parallel to the North Korean case is that of Iran, which is a signatory to the NPT but which is suspected of seeking to develop a nuclear weapon.[261] There has been considerable discussion in policy circles of possible parallels between, and lessons to be drawn from, the North Korean and Iranian cases.[262]

140.  In discussing the possibility of North Korea using its nuclear capability, Lord Malloch-Brown said that "the issue is the irrationality of the leadership that is equipped with such damaging […] weapons."[263] The UK National Security Strategy states that

Both North Korea and Iran are of particular concern because of their attitude to international institutions and treaties, and because of the impact of their activities on stability in regions crucial to global security. But [the UK] oppose[s] all proliferation, as undermining our objectives of de-escalation and multilateral disarmament, and increasing the risk of instability in the international system and ultimately the risk of nuclear confrontation.[264]

The FCO told us that "an unchecked DPRK nuclear programme would undermine global non-proliferation norms weakening our ability to counter proliferation elsewhere".[265]

141.  Like Iran, North Korea insists on its right to civil nuclear power. In the history of international dealings with North Korea over its nuclear programme, the provision of a light water reactor for civil energy production has been a consistent demand from Pyongyang and a frequent source of dispute and difficulty regarding its interlocutors' fulfilment of their commitments. There is now considerable international discussion of potential mechanisms by which states might gain access to civil nuclear power without increasing the risk of nuclear weapons proliferation, and a number of proposals have been floated.

142.  We are considering these wider nuclear proliferation issues as part of our recently-launched inquiry into Global Security: Non-Proliferation.[266]

143.  We conclude that the Government is correct to regard the North Korean case as having wider implications for nuclear proliferation and for international non-proliferation efforts. We conclude that it is important from this perspective that North Korea should be returned credibly to the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT) regime as a non-nuclear weapons state. We further conclude that the North Korean case highlights important weaknesses in the current NPT regime, and we recommend that policymakers should draw systematically on the North Korean case, alongside others, in considering the future of that regime. We further recommend that North Korea's ongoing demand for civil nuclear power should be considered in the context of both the international effort to end the country's nuclear weapons programme, and current international discussions about mechanisms for the future safe provision of such power to further states.

CHEMICAL AND BIOLOGICAL PROGRAMME

144.  The FCO told us that North Korea is "believed to have chemical and biological weapons capabilities."[267] However, the available information is uncertain and imprecise. During our 2006 East Asia inquiry, some witnesses expressed doubts as to whether North Korea retained a capacity to manufacture chemical or biological weapons, given the run-down state of its industrial base.[268] Whether or not it continues to manufacture them, one authoritative recent study reports "a strong consensus that the DPRK has a large stockpile of chemical weapons".[269] The study cited South Korean intelligence estimates that North Korea possessed between 2,500 and 5,000 tons of chemical agents.[270] The FCO noted that North Korea has ratified the Biological and Toxin Weapons Convention but is not a party to the Chemical Weapons Convention.[271]

GLOBAL PARTNERSHIP AGAINST WEAPONS AND MATERIALS OF MASS DESTRUCTION

145.  The Global Partnership Against Weapons and Materials of Mass Destruction is a G8 programme established in 2002, initially for ten years, which aims "to prevent terrorists, or those that harbour them, from acquiring or developing nuclear, chemical, radiological and biological weapons; missiles; and related materials, equipment and technology."[272] Twenty-four states are now involved (plus the EU), including—among non-G8 countries—South Korea. In 2007, the UK's contribution to the Global Partnership was incorporated into a cross-departmental Global Threat Reduction Programme, with a single budget of £36.5 million a year.[273]

146.  The Global Partnership is not currently involved in North Korea. It has focused its work on Russia and other former Soviet states, where Global Partnership projects have addressed the destruction of chemical weapons, the dismantling of nuclear submarines, the security of fissile materials and the development of alternative employment for former weapons scientists. We commended the work of the Global Partnership in the former Soviet Union, and especially the contribution of the UK, in our Report on Global Security: Russia in 2007.[274]

147.  In its response to our Global Security: Russia Report, the FCO told us that the UK was

working actively with a number of Global Partnership members to promote a more 'global' vision amongst Global Partnership partners. Over the next few years, and as work in Russia is completed, an increasing proportion of the UK's Global Threat Reduction Programme budget is expected to be committed in countries where WMD-related material presents the greatest threat, and where the capacity to deal with it is least developed.[275]

A mid-point review of the Global Partnership conducted under Germany's G8 chairmanship in 2007 concluded that the scheme "is open to further geographical expansion", and in its latest annual report on the Global Partnership, the Government says that the UK "supports the expansion of [the programme's] geographical scope".[276]

148.  Dr Swenson-Wright suggested that the Global Partnership might have a role in addressing the risks arising from North Korea's WMD activities. It has been reported that US specialists who visited the Yongbyon plant in February 2008 under the Six-Party Talks process "found Pyongyang receptive to the idea of a programme similar to that which helped former Soviet republics destroy their nuclear weapons and find alternative work for scientists".[277]

149.  Dr Swenson-Wright highlighted the role that Japan in particular might play with regard to possible Global Partnership involvement in North Korea. Dr Swenson-Wright said that Japan, which had been active in encouraging denuclearisation, often behind the scenes and in a low-profile context, could play an equally valuable role in providing technical assistance in reducing the risks associated with both nuclear and non-nuclear WMDs. Such assistance might be offered in conjunction with the UK.[278]

150.  We conclude that the G8 Global Partnership Against Weapons and Materials of Mass Destruction (WMD) could provide a strong base of political, technical and organisational experience for projects reducing the risks associated with WMD activities in North Korea, when appropriate political conditions are in place. We further conclude that the willingness of the G8, including the UK, to consider expanding the work of the Global Partnership beyond the former Soviet Union is welcome. We recommend that, as part of the discussions that are underway on the future of the Global Partnership after 2012, the Government should consider with its G8 partners—and especially the Six-Party Talks participants Japan, Russia and the US—the possibility of Global Partnership involvement in North Korea. We further recommend that the Government should encourage Global Partnership participants who are also participants in the Six-Party Talks to begin to explore the same possibility with their North Korean interlocutors.

Delivery systems

151.  The FCO told us that North Korea "possesses and has tested missiles which [the FCO believes] are capable of delivering payloads to all of Japan and beyond. [North Korea] has also demonstrated expertise in technologies that could, if developed successfully, give its missiles the capability to reach the UK."[279] More specifically, North Korea is believed to possess hundreds of short-range missiles capable of hitting South Korea, and to have deployed at least 90 Nodong missiles capable of reaching Japan.[280] One recent study, by Dr Daniel Pinkston of the International Crisis Group, for the Strategic Studies Institute, US Army War College, estimates that North Korea has deployed over 800 ballistic missiles, including perhaps 200 Nodongs.[281] In a military parade in April 2007, North Korea displayed a new medium-range missile, the Musudan. This has a reported range of over 2,500 kilometres, making it capable of reaching the US military bases on Guam.[282]

152.  It is not known whether North Korea has the capability to deliver a nuclear warhead by ballistic missile. Pyongyang's missiles are certainly believed to be capable of delivering chemical as well as conventional payloads.

153.  As outlined in Chapter Two above, in 1998 North Korea tested a long-range Taepodong-1 missile over Japan, in a move which had a major impact on Japanese security perceptions.[283] Taepodong-1 missiles have a range upwards of 2,200 kilometres and would therefore be capable of reaching Guam, as well as Japan. Following the test, and with North Korea's plutonium production frozen under the 1994 Agreed Framework, US policy appeared to focus for a time on North Korea's missile programme. In 1999, Pyongyang agreed to a moratorium on missile testing. However, on 4 July 2006, North Korea broke its moratorium by test-firing seven missiles, including a Taepodong-2. Such missiles have a range upwards of 3,500 kilometres and would therefore be capable of reaching the US from North Korea. However, the Taepodong-2 failed, and Dr Hoare told us that "the tests […] carried out in 1998 and 2006 appear to show a regression rather than an advance."[284] In our 2006 Report on East Asia, completed just after North Korea's July missile launches, we concluded that they were "calculatedly provocative and unacceptable", and we recommended that the Government should call on North Korea to return to its moratorium on missile testing.[285] North Korea has not conducted a long-range missile test since July 2006, although it has continued to carry out tests of short-range missiles.

154.  In response to the July 2006 tests, the UN Security Council unanimously passed Resolution 1695, which demanded that North Korea suspend its ballistic missile programme, including by returning to its moratorium on testing. The resolution also required member states to prevent transfers of missiles and missile-related items to North Korea's missile and WMD programmes, and to refrain from procuring such items from the country.[286]

155.  Experts differ widely regarding the degree of foreign assistance which North Korea may have received or may still be receiving for its missile programme, and therefore over the extent to which Pyongyang could continue to develop its missile capability regardless of international efforts to the contrary. Countries from which North Korea may at various times have received help include China, the Soviet Union/Russia, Iran, Pakistan and Syria. In its response to our 2006 East Asia report, the Government noted in particular that it was "working […] to develop [its] relationship with China on counter-proliferation issues, through which [it] would aim to help prevent the import by North Korea of sensitive materials required by their missile programme."[287] In his February 2008 study, Dr Pinkston said that "international export controls and denial strategies have made it increasingly difficult [for North Korea] to procure dual-use items and technologies."[288] He argued that these restrictions, when combined with domestic economic constraints, may prove "so formidable that Pyongyang might find diplomatic initiatives to end the programme an attractive alternative".[289]

156.  Sales of missiles and missile technologies to third countries are believed to be a major source of hard currency earnings for the North Korean regime.[290] Countries to which North Korea may have exported missiles or missile technologies include Iran, Libya, Pakistan, Sudan and Syria. In our 2006 East Asia Report, we concluded that "North Korea's exports of missile technology pose a threat to peace and security".[291] Dr Pinkston's February 2008 report states that "North Korea has […] established itself as the Third World's greatest supplier of missiles, missile components, and related technologies".[292] However, the report also notes that international efforts against North Korean missile proliferation "have caused a decline in North Korean missile exports".[293] In its response to our 2006 East Asia Report, the Government told us that "many of [North Korea's] former [missile] customers have agreed not to purchase further equipment or services from North Korea, including Egypt, Libya and Yemen."[294]

157.  The Government also noted that UNSCR 1965 did not allow the interdiction of shipments suspected of carrying missiles and missile-related equipment without the consent of the vessel's flag state, but that recent changes to the Convention for the Suppression of Unlawful Acts Against the Safety of Maritime Navigation would strengthen the regime in some cases.[295]

158.  The long-range missile tests which North Korea conducted in 1998 and 2006 took place at Musudan-ni, on the country's north-east coast. In September 2008, it was reported that North Korea had constructed a second long-range missile launch site, in the west. The claim was made by independent specialists, on the basis of satellite imagery.[296] South Korea's Defence Minister reportedly told a parliamentary hearing that the site was 80% complete. An anonymous US intelligence official was quoted as saying that the US had known about the second site for several years.[297]

159.  On 16 September 2008, an anonymous US official was reported as saying that North Korea had tested the engine on a Taepodong-2 missile at the new launch site earlier in 2008.[298] Such a test would be in violation of UN Security Council resolutions 1695 and 1718.

160.  On 1 November, the Wall Street Journal reported that in August 2008 India had acceded to a US request to deny permission to enter Indian airspace to a North Korean plane which US intelligence believed was carrying a forbidden cargo, most likely missile components, to Iran.[299]

161.  We conclude that North Korea appears to retain an active ballistic missile programme. We further conclude that there is evidence that international efforts to deny North Korea both assistance and customers for its missile programme appear to be having some effect. We recommend that the Government should continue to work with its international partners to deny North Korea missile-related materials, equipment, technology and overseas sales. We further recommend that, in its response to this Report, the Government should provide an updated assessment of the impact of current international measures against North Korea's missile programme, including the transport of North Korean missiles and missile components overseas.

Human rights

162.  The nature of the North Korean regime means that reliable, up-to-date, first-hand information on the human rights situation in the country is not readily accessible. North Korea has no independent media, human rights organisations or legal profession. In 2004, the former UN Commission on Human Rights appointed a Special Rapporteur on the human rights situation in North Korea, but Pyongyang does not recognise him and has never allowed him into the country. North Korea has denied requests for visits from a further three UN Special Rapporteurs for thematic human rights issues.[300] North Korea similarly denies access to researchers from international human rights NGOs, such as Amnesty International (from whom we took evidence). As regards foreign diplomats posted to Pyongyang, the FCO notes that they

are subject to severe internal travel restrictions and some 20 per cent of the counties in the DPRK remain inaccessible 'for reasons of national security'. The government denies foreign diplomats access to judicial institutions, saying that it amounts to interference in the country's internal affairs.[301]

The same restrictions apply to humanitarian aid workers.[302]

163.  Under these circumstances, information about the human rights situation in North Korea—including that presented by the UN Special Rapporteur for the subject—is largely compiled from the testimony of emigrants, interviewed in countries such as China or South Korea.[303] A number of South Korean NGOs and media outlets are active in attempting to document the North Korean human rights situation. For example, a team of South Korean journalists has produced a documentary film "On the Border", about North Koreans leaving for China and other destinations in Asia, footage from which was used in BBC documentaries shown in 2008;[304] and the British Embassy in Seoul is sponsoring a South Korean NGO to produce a report on children's rights in the North, on the basis of emigrant testimony.[305]

164.  The FCO told us that North Korea "is widely considered to have one of the worst human rights records in the world".[306] North Korea has featured as a "country of concern" in the FCO's Human Rights Annual Report every year since the UK opened an Embassy in Pyongyang in 2001. Lord Malloch-Brown told us that North Korea "continues to abuse human rights on a massive, systematic scale".[307] The human rights situation in North Korea is assessed as "poor" by the US State Department,[308] "abysmal"[309] by Human Rights Watch and "grave" by the UN Special Rapporteur, who repeated in his latest report in August 2008 that there are "longstanding and systematic […] human rights transgressions […] which are highly visible, substantial and exponential".[310] In our Report on the latest FCO Human Rights Annual Report, we concluded that the human rights situation in North Korea was "extremely grave",[311] and the FCO agreed with this assessment.[312]

165.  On the basis of the information that is available, human rights concerns in North Korea that are raised consistently by international official and non-governmental bodies include the following:[313]

• Professor Smith told us that "in terms of political freedoms, human rights are still non-existent."[314] There is no political competition, and no freedom of assembly or association, including no independent trade unions. The judiciary is not independent.
• North Korea has no independent media, and no freedom of expression or information. In Reporters Without Borders' press freedom index, published annually since 2002, North Korea came last every year until 2007; in 2007 and 2008 it was second-last, ahead of Eritrea.[315] No foreign books or magazines are available for open purchase, and the authorities control access to the internet on an individual need-to-know basis. Official permission is required to own a mobile phone or computer.[316] In its submission to our inquiry, BBC Global News confirmed that radio and television sets are sold permanently pre-tuned to state stations, and are subject to regular inspection.[317] BBC Global News also noted that "ordinary North Koreans caught listening to foreign broadcasts risk harsh punishments, such as forced labour".[318]
• Movement within North Korea is, at least in theory, strictly controlled. Leaving North Korea without official permission is illegal and those who are caught or returned are often imprisoned and sometimes tortured or executed.[319]
• The state is believed to distribute permits, jobs and goods at least partly on political grounds, according to a system by which it classifies the population into more and less politically reliable and deserving groups. For example, this applies to official permission to live in Pyongyang.
• There is no freedom of religion. The US designates North Korea a "Country of Particular Concern" under its International Religious Freedom Act. There is some organised religious activity, but it is largely under the control of the state; reports vary as to the existence of underground churches.[320]
• In the sphere of criminal justice, North Korea employs detention without trial, and the detention of family members. Prison conditions are believed to be poor and detainees to suffer abuses, including sometimes torture.
• North Korea operates a system of prison and labour camps. The number of people being held in the camps is commonly put at around 200,000.
• North Korea employs the death penalty. The anti-death penalty NGO Hands Off Cain puts the numbers of executions at minimums of 13 in 2007, three in 2006 and 75 in 2005, and records 37 so far in 2008.[321] Execution is by hanging or shooting, including, it is reported, occasionally in public. Five categories of crime carry the death penalty, namely conspiracy against the state, high treason, terrorism, anti-national treachery and international murder. These categories are reportedly often interpreted broadly.
• As we discussed in Chapter Two above, North Korea has abducted a number of Japanese nationals.[322] In a report from February 2008, the UN Special Rapporteur said that North Korea may have abducted or otherwise be detaining nationals of perhaps another dozen countries.[323] The largest group is from South Korea. It comprises both prisoners-of-war and perhaps originally 80,000 non-combatants from the Korean War period,[324] plus what South Korea claims are 485 subsequent abductees.[325]

166.  North Korea is party to four of the major international human rights instruments: the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, the International Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights, the Convention on the Rights of the Child, and the Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Discrimination against Women. North Korea has not signed up to two further UN instruments to which the FCO has urged that it accede, namely the International Convention on the Elimination of all Forms of Racial Discrimination, and the Convention against Torture.

167.  North Korea's human rights record, its failure to meet its obligations under the human rights conventions to which it is party, and its failure to co-operate with the UN Special Rapporteur, have been condemned in a series of resolutions since 2003 by the former UN Commission on Human Rights, the new UN Human Rights Council, and the UN General Assembly.

168.  The British Government makes human rights a focus of its North Korea policy. According to the FCO, the Government has "made it clear to the DPRK Government that [the UK] cannot extend the benefits of a full and normal bilateral relationship until [the UK has] evidence that it is addressing [the UK's] concerns on issues such as human rights."[326] Lord Malloch-Brown told us that the Government uses "every opportunity that [it] can to raise the issue bilaterally".[327] The EU and the Embassies of other EU Member States in Pyongyang also raise human rights issues with North Korean interlocutors. The EU was one of the sponsors of the resolutions on North Korean human rights passed by the former UN Commission on Human Rights and by the UN General Assembly, and the UK and most other EU Member States also sponsored the resolution passed by the new UN Human Rights Council in March 2008.[328] This resolution extended the mandate of the UN Special Rapporteur, at a time when there was a movement to terminate a number of country-specific mandates established by the former Commission on Human Rights. The FCO told us that the Government "worked closely with partners to ensure that [the Rapporteur's mandate] was not weakened or abolished."[329]

169.  Norma Kang Muico of Amnesty International told us that the UN regime of resolutions and the Special Rapporteur should be persisted with, despite its apparent failure to achieve any significant improvement in North Korea's human rights practice. Ms Muico said that the UN mechanisms at least provided for a system of monitoring and reporting, and represented the "best hope".[330]

170.  Ms Muico commended the work of the FCO, and especially the British Embassy in Pyongyang, on North Korean human rights. She said that the Government had "pressed on human rights issues" but had also "maintained a good relationship" with the North Korean authorities. Ms Muico suggested that the UK's role as a "Government that is not the United States works in [its] favour."[331] Given the restrictions on the activities of international human rights NGOs in North Korea, Ms Muico also said that the Government could "provide a venue" for such organisations to speak.[332]

171.  The FCO's Stephen Lillie told us that the FCO had "seen some reports from non-governmental organisations suggesting that when there is international pressure and international attention, there are limited changes" in North Korea's human rights practice. However, he said that "the big picture—the overall trend—is still rather pessimistic."[333] Lord Malloch-Brown was frank enough to admit that the ability of the UK and its international partners to influence North Korea's human rights practice was "very limited".[334]

172.  The FCO told us that North Korea has "repeatedly invoked sovereignty, non-interference and cultural differences to avoid its human rights responsibilities."[335] Lord Malloch-Brown suggested that North Korea's human rights practice was "the cost of a country that has essentially opted out of the international system."[336] It has been suggested that human rights abuses are intrinsic to the nature of the North Korean regime. Professor Smith told us that Pyongyang itself viewed matters in this way: she said that North Korea "understands 'human rights' talk as a synonym for 'regime change' talk" and that "a serious effort to support the North Korean population on human rights issues requires thinking about how to engage the DPRK Government in a human rights dialogue that is not conceived of by them as a way of promoting regime change."[337] Professor Smith recommended that "such discussion should be accompanied by offers of technical support".[338]

173.  The Six-Party Talks process has prioritised denuclearisation over other policy goals which the parties involved may have as regards North Korea, including an improvement in human rights. However, Ms Muico told us that policy on denuclearisation and on human rights could and should be separated. The goal of denuclearisation did not require foreign Governments to refrain from pressing Pyongyang on human rights.[339]

174.  The FCO noted that South Korea has "to date […] been hesitant to openly criticise the human rights situation in the DPRK",[340] under its "sunshine policy" of engagement with the North.[341] However, South Korea's new President, President Lee, has said that he does intend to raise human rights issues and pursue an improvement in North Korea's human rights practice, as part of his wider recalibration of policy towards the North.[342] Until the Lee Administration took office, South Korea had not voted for resolutions condemning North Korea's human rights practice at the former UN Commission on Human Rights, and had backed only one of the relevant General Assembly resolutions. Under its new Administration, South Korea voted in favour of the resolution on North Korean human rights at the Human Rights Council in March 2008. There are signs that the issue of North Korean human rights may be gaining in prominence among the political class and public in South Korea, as evidenced, for example, by the demonstrations during Chinese President Hu's visit to Seoul in August 2008 against Beijing's treatment of North Korean emigrants. Ms Muico told us that South Korea's new position on North Korean human rights offered a "window of opportunity".[343]

175.  We conclude that the North Korean regime is one of the worst human rights abusers in the world, that its human rights practice is an affront to the international community, and that the main reason that the issue is not the subject of a larger international outcry is because it remains too little known. We conclude that the work of the FCO in attempting to address North Korean human rights, both bilaterally and with international partners, is to be commended. Although we conclude that human rights abuses are deeply linked to the nature of the North Korean regime, we recommend that the Government's efforts to address North Korea's human rights abuses should avoid language which Pyongyang might construe as threatening, and should be couched in terms of reference to specific obligations under international instruments to which North Korea has signed up. We further recommend that enabling the acquisition of more human rights information from inside North Korea should be a major goal of the Government's work, and that efforts should focus in particular on securing access for the UN Special Rapporteur. We further recommend that the Government should seek to co-ordinate its work on North Korean human rights with that of the South Korean Government, as Seoul's new willingness to raise human rights issues with Pyongyang may come to represent an important strengthening of the international effort in this field.

176.  In our Reports on the FCO's Human Rights Annual Reports since the new UN Human Rights Council was established in 2006, we have discussed criticisms that the new body has not so far developed a body of credible and even-handed positions against human rights abuses in all parts of the world.[344] A new mechanism introduced in the framework of the Human Rights Council is the Universal Periodic Review (UPR). This is a peer review process, for all member states, in which three randomly selected member states review the human rights performance of the state in question every four years.[345] Japan and South Korea were among the first states to undergo the process, in 2008; we discuss their human rights records in Chapter Five below.[346] North Korea is to undergo its UPR in December 2009. In its response to our Report on its Human Rights Annual Report 2007, the FCO told us that the UPR mechanism would "be a particularly important priority for the Government" as regards its future work at the Human Rights Council.[347]

177.  The Committee welcomes the opportunity that was afforded to a member of the Committee to attend in a House of Commons representative capacity the 5^th General Meeting of the International Parliamentarians' Coalition for North Korean Refugees and Human Rights held in Seoul in October 2008.

178.  Given the failure of UN mechanisms so far to achieve any significant improvement in North Korea's human rights practice, we conclude that the Universal Periodic Review (UPR) which North Korea is to undergo at the UN Human Rights Council in December 2009 offers a major opportunity to advance the international effort to secure improvements in North Korean human rights, as well as to establish the credibility of the UPR process. We recommend that the Government should engage actively with Pyongyang and with international official and non-governmental partners to ensure that the potential of North Korea's UPR process is realised to the maximum extent possible.

Food security

179.  North Korea is food insecure. It experienced a famine in the mid-to-late 1990s in which around one million people, roughly 5% of the population, are commonly reckoned to have died (although estimates vary widely). In the largest survey of North Koreans' nutritional situation, conducted in 2004, well after the worst of the famine, 37% of children were still found to be chronically malnourished.[348]

180.  There are several sources of North Korea's food insecurity. Opinions vary regarding the relative weight to give to natural factors as opposed to what the UN Special Rapporteur has called "mismanagement on the part of the authorities".[349] Professor Smith told us that North Korea "is not a natural […] agricultural country", and that in its more successful period its agriculture sector "relied heavily on agro-industrial inputs: electricity for irrigation; fertiliser, chemicals and pesticides".[350] Following the collapse of the Soviet Union, these inputs became much less readily available, just as energy and other inputs also became scarcer for industry. In turn, North Korea's failure to produce significant manufactured goods capable of export constrains its ability to generate income with which to import food. The Soviet collapse also led to a significant reduction in food aid. In addition, North Korea is susceptible to seasonal flooding, which may be exacerbated by man-made deforestation.

181.  In the face of the famine of the mid-1990s, the regime requested international assistance, most notably from the World Food Programme (WFP). Between 1995 and 2005, the WFP supported around one-third of the population with direct food aid.[351] In 2005, North Korea announced that it no longer needed emergency assistance, and requested an end to such aid. In 2006, the WFP agreed with Pyongyang on a much scaled-down, two-year food aid operation, focused on longer-term needs. However, in 2006 and 2007, renewed flooding triggered a new WFP relief operation. The WFP has consistently found it difficult to secure sufficient contributions to its appeals for food aid for North Korea. Many states are reluctant to contribute to assistance for the country, partly owing to political considerations such as North Korea's nuclear programme, and partly owing to doubts as to whether food aid reaches its intended recipients rather than the country's elite. In March 2007, nearly half-way through the WFP's two-year programme, donations were running at less than 20% of the required total, meaning that the WFP was unable to implement its full planned programme.[352]

182.  In addition to WFP assistance, North Korea has received food aid bilaterally from China and South Korea. These two states picked up much of the slack left by the significant withdrawal of Soviet/Russian assistance, although South Korea temporarily suspended its supplies after North Korea's 2006 nuclear test. Professor Smith told us that "the humanitarian situation is kept afloat by aid from South Korea and China",[353] and that South Korea, in particular, "has been the main supplier of food and fertiliser to help North Koreans grow food over the past six or seven years."[354]

183.  Norma Kang Muico of Amnesty International highlighted the advantages of WFP over bilateral food aid. Although the WFP has accepted some restrictions on its activities at Pyongyang's insistence, Ms Muico told us that the agency was more likely to request and to secure better access and monitoring than has South Korea.[355]

184.  The year 2008 has seen North Korea's food situation again deteriorate significantly. In April, the WFP warned that "it is increasingly likely that external assistance will be urgently required to avert a serious tragedy".[356] The UN Food and Agriculture Organisation has forecast that North Korea's food deficit in 2008 will nearly double compared to 2007, and will be the largest since 2001.[357] After the North Korean authorities allowed the WFP in June to carry out the most extensive survey of the situation since 2004, the organisation's assessment was that "millions of vulnerable North Koreans are at risk of slipping towards precarious hunger levels", and that the situation had not been as bad since the late 1990s. Nearly three-quarters of households had reduced their food intake, and consumption of wild foods was up by nearly 20% compared with the 2003-05 period.[358]

185.  North Korea's 2008 food shortage partly reflects the effects of the 2007 flooding, followed by a dry winter. The 2007 cereals harvest was down by around 25% year-on-year.[359] The effects on prices of North Korea's production shortfall are being exacerbated by high global prices for food. These are affecting North Korea's own ability to import food, the WFP's effort to provide official food aid, and individuals' purchases of food at unofficial private markets.[360] By June 2008, the price of rice in Pyongyang had nearly tripled and that of maize had quadrupled compared with a year earlier.[361]

186.  Political factors are also contributing to North Korea's food shortage. After coming to office in February 2008, South Korea's President Lee announced that aid to the North would be made conditional on Pyongyang's progress on denuclearisation and human rights.[362] In response, North Korea declined to request further South Korean food aid. As of summer 2008, North Korea had received no food aid from the South during the year, and the North also did not receive fertiliser from the South in time for the spring 2008 planting season. The FCO forecasts that the main October/November harvest is likely to be down by 25-30%.[363] Meanwhile, food aid from China is reported to have nearly halved between 2005 and 2007,[364] partly because Beijing seeks to retain food stocks for its own population and thereby clamp down on domestic food price inflation.

187.  In May 2008, the US announced that it was resuming food aid to North Korea, after a three-year hiatus since the end of the major WFP programme. The US is now contributing up to 500,000 tons of food, largely through the WFP, with the remainder being channelled through US charities. The US made its announcement after securing what it called "a substantial improvement in monitoring and access in order to allow for confirmation of receipt by the intended recipients".[365] This came shortly after Pyongyang had provided large-scale documentation on its nuclear activities at Yongbyon,[366] but the US said that the two events were unconnected. In June, the WFP announced an agreement with Pyongyang allowing a major expansion in the geographical scope of its aid programme and in the number of WFP workers in North Korea. The first shipment of US food aid arrived immediately after the announcement of the agreement.

188.  The conjunction of a worsening food situation with a key stage in the denuclearisation process has prompted renewed discussion in 2008 about the use of food aid as a source of leverage over Pyongyang on other issues. Our witnesses were sceptical about this possibility. Lord Malloch-Brown told us that the North Korean regime "does not thank us for the generous food aid we provide and does not allow us to use it as a lever because of its lack of humanity towards its own people."[367] Norma Kang Muico of Amnesty agreed, saying that "what would normally work as leverage in most countries cannot be guaranteed to work with the North Koreans."[368]

189.  Professor Smith told us that, in the longer term, both North Korea's plans and those of the UN are based on the proposition that "if North Korea wants to feed its people, it needs to do something about developing and manufacturing export capacity so that it can buy food."[369]

190.  We conclude that North Korea's longstanding food shortage is an avoidable human tragedy and a matter of the gravest concern. Provided that conditions are felt to be in place that ensure the receipt of aid by the most needy, we recommend that the international community should do everything possible to respond to the food shortage. We conclude that the recent resumption of US food aid and expansion of World Food Programme access and monitoring in North Korea are to be welcomed. We recommend that the Government should point to the ongoing food crisis when discussing with North Korean interlocutors the possible advantages of further economic modernisation and international opening.

Emigrants and China

191.  Since the famine of the mid-1990s, increasing numbers of North Koreans have been leaving the country. This is despite the fact that it is a criminal offence to leave North Korea without official permission, which is typically granted only to officials and a few favoured sportspeople and cultural figures;[370] and that family members of those who leave illegally are routinely consigned to prison. The first destination of most North Koreans leaving the country is China. This is partly because it is easier to cross the long land border than to attempt a sea crossing or get across the heavily militarised border with South Korea, and partly because the Chinese population in the region next to the border includes a large group of ethnic Korean descent. The pull of the region as a destination is presumably now being augmented by the growing community there of more recent North Korean emigrants themselves. The border between North Korea and China can be crossed either in secret or by bribing border guards. Some would-be emigrants have been known to die in the attempt.[371]

192.  Some North Koreans going to China aim to settle there, and others to leave for a further destination, while others intend to return to North Korea, either after one trip or after repeated crossings. Human Rights Watch has noted that North Koreans in China include

those fleeing political and religious persecution, women who are in de facto marriages with Chinese men, those who have fallen victim to human trafficking, family members who are temporarily visiting China to meet their relatives (most without official permission) but intending to return home, people who escaped because of the food shortage or other economic reasons, and merchants who regularly cross the border for business either secretly or by bribing border guards.[372]

The diversity of North Koreans in China means that no single term is appropriate for the whole population; the FCO notes that those involved are referred to variously as "defectors", "refugees", "escapees" or "border-crossers".[373] In this Report, we use "emigrants" as the most neutral and inclusive term. The diversity of the group also adds to the difficulties involved in assessing its size: the FCO has said that estimates of the numbers of North Koreans in China range from 10,000 to 100,000.[374] A 2007 report by the US Congressional Research Service noted that the official Chinese estimate was 10,000, the US State Department assumes 30,000-50,000, and some estimates range up to 300,000.[375] North Korean emigrants to China include a particularly large share of women, who are especially vulnerable to human trafficking and other forms of exploitation.

193.  North Korean emigrants in China almost all have illegal status there (as well as having committed a criminal offence under North Korean law, by leaving without permission). Under the 1951 UN Refugee Convention, to which China is a party, refugee status can be granted either by the authorities of the receiving state or by the UN refugee agency, the UNHCR.[376] However, only a handful of North Koreans in China have received refugee status: the FCO told us that around 180 were registered as refugees with the UNHCR.[377] The vast majority of North Koreans in China are not given the opportunity to apply for refugee status. China does not allow the UNHCR access to the border region which receives North Koreans,[378] and it does not itself have a developed and accessible asylum application system.[379] There are some reports of variation in the treatment of North Koreans in China by different local officials—perhaps, among Chinese-Korean officials, on the basis of co-ethnic fellow feeling.[380] However, China's habitual practice is to assume that the North Koreans whom it discovers are economic migrants and to deport them back to North Korea, without their having gone through a determination-of-status process. In its 2008 Annual Report, Amnesty International estimated that China is forcibly repatriating "hundreds" of North Koreans each month.[381]

194.  China's asylum and deportation practice effectively obliges its North Korean immigrants to live in secret. This gives rise to human rights concerns, made especially serious because of China's official identity registration system. As North Korean emigrants do not make themselves known to the authorities for fear of deportation, they cannot work legally or access many services. Some take on false identities. The problem is particularly acute for the large number of children born to Chinese fathers and North Korean mothers: the identity registration process which is required in order for them to access schooling risks revealing the nationality and illegal status of their mothers, thus exposing the mothers to the risk of deportation. The situation is even more difficult for children in China who are born of two North Korean parents.[382]

195.  Such assistance as is available to North Korean emigrants in China comes from networks of local Chinese people of Korean descent, and from small South Korean, Japanese, US and European NGOs. They tend to operate in a low-key manner, in order to avoid attracting the attention of the Chinese authorities.[383]

196.  Further human rights concerns arise from North Korea's treatment of its nationals repatriated from China. As with all human rights issues relating to North Korea, it is difficult to obtain reliable information on this question. There are reports that North Koreans deported back from China have been subject to prison, labour or prison camp, torture, execution and, for women who have become pregnant by Chinese men, forced abortion.[384] Human Rights Watch has reported that North Korea toughened its treatment of would-be or returned emigrants after 2004, but in 2007 both Human Rights Watch and the UN Special Rapporteur also noted reports that the treatment of captured emigrants had improved somewhat.[385] Norma Kang Muico of Amnesty International told us that "the treatment of border-crossers is getting harsher, because numbers are growing and it is a huge embarrassment for the North Korean Government", but also that some repatriates "tended to receive sentences that were less than what they would have been in previous years".[386] Stephen Lillie of the FCO noted "reports that suggest that the North Koreans have stopped the practice of forced abortions on returnees from China".[387] There have been several suggestions that the North Korean authorities are increasingly differentiating on political grounds among repatriates from China, with those who are reported to have sought contact in China with foreign and/or Christian organisations receiving harsher punishment than those who appeared motivated by purely economic factors.[388] Aidan Foster-Carter told us that "the degree of punishment can vary greatly", and said overall that "there seems to be a growing arbitrariness" in North Korea's practice regarding its returned nationals.[389]

197.  As already noted, China is a signatory to the 1951 UN Refugee Convention and its 1967 Protocol. The Convention obliges states parties not to expel persons formally recognised as refugees. It also grants certain rights before a determination of refugee status has been made, solely on the basis of a person's physical presence in the state concerned. The most important right which is implied is the right to enter and to remain in the state, pending a determination of status. This is the result of the principle of non-refoulement—that is, that no-one should be returned to a state where their "life or freedom would be threatened on account of [their] race, religion, nationality, membership of a particular social group or political opinion".[390] This applies to people not yet formally recognised as refugees or not given the opportunity to apply for refugee status.[391] Other such rights include freedom from arbitrary detention and rights to physical security, the necessities of life and family unity.

198.  We asked Lord Malloch-Brown whether China's treatment of North Korean emigrants constituted a breach of its international human rights obligations. We also sought additional written evidence from the FCO on this issue. We were told that:

• China would be in breach of its obligations under the Refugee Convention if it were to repatriate persons recognised as refugees.[392]
• It is legitimate for China to distinguish between refugees and economic migrants. Lord Malloch-Brown reminded us that "just the fact that you are punished for illegally leaving your own country is not in itself grounds for being able to claim refugee status".[393] The Refugee Convention stipulates that refugees are those who are outside their country of nationality or habitual residence "owing to well-founded fear of being persecuted for reasons of race, nationality [or] membership of a particular group or political opinion".[394] However, as regards North Koreans in China, Lord Malloch-Brown also told us that the Government did "not accept [China's] position that all the people concerned are economic migrants."[395]

199.  The Government's position does not appear to address at least four possible violations of international refugee law which China may be committing:

• While it is legitimate to distinguish between refugees and economic migrants, China does not fulfil its obligation—implicitly required under the Refugee Convention—to provide North Korean emigrants with access to a process whereby such a determination of status may fairly be made.
• As noted above, the principle of non-refoulement—that is, the principle that no-one should be returned to a state where their "life or freedom would be threatened on account of [their] race, religion, nationality, membership of a particular social group or political opinion"[396]—applies to people physically present in a state which is party to the Refugee Convention, whether or not they have been formally recognised as refugees or given the opportunity to apply for refugee status.[397] In a document for the October 2008 meeting of the UNHCR Executive Committee, the High Commissioner said that the principle of non-refoulement "prohibits any form of forcible removal, whether direct or indirect, to a threat to life or freedom […] or to torture, cruel, inhuman or degrading treatment or punishment".[398] In a report to a meeting of its Standing Committee in March 2004, UNHCR said that it "remain[ed] deeply concerned that [North Koreans in China] do not have access to a refugee status determination process and are not protected from refoulement".[399]
• Many North Koreans in China may have left North Korea for economic reasons, rather than owing to fear of political persecution, and may therefore not have been refugees. However, international law recognises the concept of "refugee sur place"—that is, a person who was not a refugee when he left his country but who becomes a refugee at a later date.[400] Such refugees may include someone who acquires a well-founded fear of persecution for a Convention reason in his original country simply through the act of leaving it. What seems to be the growing arbitrariness of North Korea's treatment of returned emigrants might make it difficult to determine the applicability of the concept as regards North Koreans in China.
• States parties to the Refugee Convention are obliged to "to co-operate with the Office of the United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees […] and […] in particular [to] facilitate its duty of supervising the application of the provisions of [the] Convention."[401] China's refusal to allow the UNHCR access to the border region which receives North Korean emigrants would appear to be a clear breach of this obligation.

200.  Apart from the UN Refugee Convention, a number of other international and regional conventions also contain (or have authoritatively been interpreted as containing) prohibitions on refoulement, notably as a component part of the prohibition on torture or cruel, inhuman or degrading treatment or punishment. Principal amongst these is Article 3 of the 1984 Torture Convention, to which China is a party. This article prohibits a state party from returning "a person to another state where there are substantial grounds for believing that he would be in danger of being subjected to torture", and says that for the purposes of making a determination on this question the authorities "shall take into account […] the existence in the state concerned of a consistent pattern of gross, flagrant or mass violations of human rights".[402]

201.  China's position with regard to North Korean emigrants is complicated because China and North Korea have a bilateral repatriation agreement dating from 1986. China claims that, under this agreement, it is obliged to return all North Korean emigrants.[403] However, bilateral agreements do not override international obligations.

202.  Lord Malloch-Brown told us that the issue of North Korean emigrants was one that the Government had raised in both the bilateral UK-China and the EU-China human rights dialogues.[404] The FCO has said that the Government "regularly urge[s] China to allow the UN High Commissioner for Refugees access to the border region and to observe its obligations under the 1951 Convention",[405] and Lord Malloch-Brown told us that the Government had told China about its rejection of Beijing's claim that all North Koreans there are economic migrants.[406] In previous Reports, we have consistently expressed scepticism about the effectiveness of the UK-China human rights dialogue.[407]

203.  As regards action at the UN, the FCO noted that "there is no enforcement mechanism for the [Refugee] Convention, but member states and the UNHCR can call on a member state to comply with the terms of the conventions if they believe a breach has taken place." The FCO said that "the UK has not yet done so in this case, judging that it was more effective to raise this bilaterally and through the EU." The FCO told us that it was "considering raising the issue at the next [UNHCR] Executive Committee meeting in October".[408] In November, the FCO confirmed that it had not done so, "because we felt that it would be more effective to concentrate our efforts on the resolution on DPRK human rights which the EU is currently sponsoring at the UN General Assembly (UNGA). However, we will discuss this matter at working level with the UNHCR." Writing in early November, the FCO further told us that "the text of the UNGA resolution is still being finalised, but it includes a reference to the harsh penalties imposed upon returnees to the DPRK and calls on all States to respect the principle of non-refoulement (i.e. not returning refugees to their country of origin)."[409]

204.  In its North Korean Human Rights Reauthorization Act of 2008, passed in January 2008 to update the 2004 North Korean Human Rights Act, the US Congress called on China to "immediately halt its forcible repatriation of North Koreans"; fulfil its obligations under the Refugee Convention and 1967 Protocol; and allow the UNHCR "unimpeded access to North Koreans inside China to determine whether they are refugees and whether they require assistance."[410]

205.  As noted in our discussion above, South Korea has so far tended not to raise North Korean human rights issues.[411] However, at the two leaders' summit in Seoul in August 2008, South Korea's new President, President Lee, urged China's President Hu not to repatriate North Koreans against their will.[412]

206.  China faces a number of sensitive political considerations in deciding on its handling of the issue of North Korean emigrants. Given its alliance with Pyongyang, it might be politically awkward for Beijing to recognise North Korean emigrants as refugees—especially because of the international criticism which China itself faces on a number of the human rights questions also at issue in North Korea. As chair of the Six-Party Talks, China has a special responsibility to consider the wider political and security implications of developments in North Korea. Any significant easing of the conditions facing North Koreans in China might encourage a larger emigration flow, possibly leading to what would be for China an undesirable destabilisation of North Korea, as well as of the Chinese border region. Given that there is a settled population of Korean descent in the border region, Beijing may also see further North Korean immigration as potentially giving rise to a new ethnic minority issue. On the other hand, it has been suggested that Beijing may believe that allowing the influx—without recognising those arriving as refugees—acts as a helpful "safety valve" for the North Korean regime in some respects.[413]

207.  The weaknesses of China's practice as regards immigrants are not confined to North Koreans. China has no national legislation implementing the provisions of the 1951 Refugee Convention or its 1967 Protocol.[414] In its 2007 Country Operations Plan for China, UNHCR said that it planned a "major shift in focus and strategy", away from providing direct assistance to refugees, to encouraging the Chinese authorities to develop "national refugee regulations that comply with international protection standards" and to provide a legal status that will facilitate refugees' local integration.[415]

208.  We referred in our earlier discussion of human rights in North Korea to the new Universal Periodic Review (UPR) mechanism at the UN Human Rights Council.[416] China is to undergo its first UPR in February 2009.

209.  We conclude that China is in breach of its obligations under the 1951 Refugee Convention as regards its treatment of North Korean emigrants—specifically, its failure to allow them access to a determination-of-status process, and its practice of repatriation without ensuring that deportees will not be subject to persecution, torture or cruel, inhuman or degrading treatment or punishment in North Korea. We further conclude that China's practice as regards North Korean emigrants places them in a distressing and dangerous situation. Especially given its view that North Koreans in China include people who are not economic migrants, we recommend that the Government should press harder on the issue of Beijing's treatment of North Korean emigrants, in its bilateral dealings with China, at EU level, and at the UNHCR. We recommend that in this effort the Government should prioritise the aims of: halting forced deportations from China to North Korea; securing access to the Chinese/North Korean border region for the UNHCR; and seeing the development in China of a legal regime allowing the regularisation of the status of North Koreans there, and above all of children with a North Korean parent. We recommend that in its response to this Report, and again in its 2008 Human Rights Annual Report, the FCO should report on the progress being made towards these aims. We further recommend that the Government should ensure that the issue of Beijing's treatment of North Korean emigrants is raised effectively as part of China's Universal Periodic Review process at the UN Human Rights Council in 2009.

210.  Given what appears to be rising interest in South Korea in pressing the issue of China's treatment of North Korean emigrants, and given South Korea's intimate connection with North Korea and its relationship with China, we recommend that the Government should consult on policy regarding North Koreans in China with the Government in Seoul.

211.  Among the countries to which North Korean emigrants move on from China, South Korea takes the largest numbers. The number of North Koreans arriving in the South each year is estimated to be rising by several hundred a year, with the FCO putting the annual influx now at around 2,000.[417] The total population of North Koreans in the South is reckoned at around 10,000. South Korea's constitution commits it to granting citizenship automatically to arriving North Koreans. Despite the common language and the provision for them of dedicated integration programmes, there are reports of North Koreans finding it socially and psychologically difficult to integrate into South Korean society.[418]

212.  Smaller numbers of North Korean emigrants are found in a range of other countries in South-East Asia, including Laos, Burma and Vietnam. Thailand appears to be taking the largest numbers. Bangkok's capacity to deal satisfactorily with North Korean emigrants appears to be coming under strain: Amnesty International has reported that North Koreans have been subject to mass arrests there,[419] and Human Rights Watch has referred to their being held in "overcrowded immigration detention centres".[420] Unlike China, Thailand is not a party to the UN Refugee Convention or its 1967 Protocol, leaving North Korean emigrants there especially vulnerable.

213.  Some North Koreans in China leave northwards for Mongolia, often as another step towards another eventual destination. Although Mongolia is not party to the Refugee Convention, it does not repatriate North Koreans, and the UN Special Rapporteur has noted that its policy towards them "has been based upon humanitarian considerations".[421] Mongolia also has a separate official guest worker programme with Pyongyang, bringing North Koreans to Mongolia to work. In August 2008, Human Rights Watch called on the Mongolian authorities to ensure that the rights of North Korean guest workers were safeguarded.[422]

214.  We conclude that the growing outflow of North Koreans from North Korea is creating an emigrant population in several parts of Asia whose human rights are systematically vulnerable. We recommend that the FCO should ensure that its Posts in relevant locations are aware of the issue and ready to assist both the individuals concerned and host Governments as needed.

Regime reform and stability

215.  The nature and stability of the North Korean regime have security implications for the region and beyond. This is partly because of the country's weapons materials and capabilities, and partly because any breakdown in North Korea could generate new security risks, including an early unmanageable outflow of people, primarily to China.

DEVELOPMENTS AT THE GRASS ROOTS

216.  In discussing prospects for North Korea with us, Aidan Foster-Carter identified three issues. One was developments at the "grass roots", among the North Korean population.[423] Official structures in North Korea formally remain rigid and restrictive. However, there is now widespread agreement among researchers and visitors that the total social control and discipline previously exercised by the regime has weakened significantly over the last decade. This has been the result largely of processes triggered by the 1990s famine. [424] For example:

• As a result of the famine, the state food distribution system collapsed, and people were obliged to fall back on their own resources. In the economy more generally, Dr Kong told us that "North Korea's economic collapse of the 1990s led to the spontaneous rise of non-state economic activities (especially private farming, light manufacturing and primitive markets) as the state could no longer provide employment and goods for the desperate population". He referred to North Korea's "fledgling private economy".[425] Professor Smith concurred that "people have much more access to individual decision-making—they are making their own decisions about their day-to-day economic transactions because the state does not provide them".[426]
• The development of traffic across the North Korean-Chinese border has resulted, in Aidan Foster-Carter's words, in "a partial breakdown of the information quarantine".[427] This has resulted both from exposure to China itself and from the goods which can be obtained in China and brought back across the border—above all, recordings of South Korean films and television programmes. The FCO reported "anecdotal evidence […] suggest[ing] that increased numbers of illegal radio sets are being smuggled into the DPRK from China, and that more people are listening to foreign radio broadcasts."[428]
• However restricted their number and activities, the influx of foreign aid workers since the mid-1990s has brought some North Koreans a further form of contact with the outside world.
• Officials no longer always enforce laws and regulations. As a result of economic hardship, they may be occupied themselves with trying to survive, and reportedly are now widely susceptible to bribes. The relaxation applies in particular as regards restrictions on movement. Professor Smith told us that "there is more ability to move around in the country, if you can walk, that is, because you will not usually have access to petrol or cars."[429]

217.  As regards the possible political implications of the breakdown in state capacity, Professor Smith told us that there was now a "crisis of legitimacy"[430] in North Korea, and that she thought that the Government was "very fragile".[431] In her written submission, she referred to "signs of instability in North Korea whose outcomes are not at all clear".[432] Aidan Foster-Carter said that:

the tensions are growing. The pressures on the regime and its long-suffering people are acute, and they grow worse. The fact that the regime has been able to keep things under control so far does not mean that it can do it for ever.[433]

He noted that "one is beginning to hear reports of people going to Government offices and protesting, and not immediately being carted away".[434]

218.  Professor Smith was cautious about expecting any manifestations of mass discontent. She told us that

revolutions are not really made by hungry people. Revolutions are made by people who have a little bit of a stake in the system and who do not have to worry about literally getting enough food to feed themselves and their families at the end of the week. Now, in North Korea, with a population of about 23 million people, probably about half the country is still worried enough about food, particularly when the harvest has run out, in terms of its distribution. The urban areas do not have access to their own stores, so this is the top priority. Those people, including the people that might in another system be thinking about political change, such as white collar workers, teachers, doctors and local government officers working throughout the country, are spending their time thinking about food and survival—literally, survival. […] While there are continuing food shortages, there is a lack of legitimacy for the Government, but there are also bigger priorities than overturning the Government—that is, making sure people are alive.[435]

Professor Smith said that these considerations probably also applied to the military, at the "foot soldier" level.[436]

219.  Rather than revolutionary change, Dr Kong suggested that the international community should "look to the social transformation of North Korea over a long time frame driven by improved living standards, spread of the profit motive and generational change (i.e. North Korea as a slow motion replay of China or Vietnam)."[437]

DEBATES WITHIN THE ELITE ABOUT REFORM

220.  The second issue identified by Mr Foster-Carter was that of debates within the elite about reform.[438] Professor Smith told us that "the structure within the North Korean state is not a monolithic entity, contrary to outside conventional knowledge. There are real divisions […] there are different interests at stake."[439]

221.  On the one hand, Professor Smith said that there were "people from the Foreign Ministry and the Ministry for Foreign Trade who travel abroad, and they are fully aware that they need to do some sort of deal with the international community". She said that "lots of learning takes place at the Foreign Ministry and the Ministry of Trade, even at the top, and that can be effective when the very big issues are at stake." On the other hand, she said that "the structure is such that everything that goes in […] must then go through another layer, which is the security or the military apparatus [who] […] are not in direct touch with foreigners". Professor Smith said that these figures can access hard currency with the partially broken-down state economy as it is, without further reform. Professor Smith said that this "powerful layer […] is capable of keeping a block on, or at least entering into negotiations that have the effect of, paralysing progress."[440]

222.  Our witnesses were in agreement that, for the North Korean regime, the question of economic reform was intimately connected to the question of denuclearisation. In Aidan Foster-Carter's words, "one imagines people who are on one side on that issue or the other."[441] Dr Kong explained that North Korean decisions on these two issues were mutually reinforcing. On the one hand, he said that "a secure external environment (centred on improving relations with the US and the opportunities for aid and investment that flow from normalisation) is a necessary but insufficient condition for the introduction of substantive market reform in North Korea."[442] In Dr Kong's view, also necessary would be "the acceptance of the principle of reform amongst North Korean leaders." In turn, he said, "readiness for substantive reform will reinforce denuclearisation".[443]

223.  North Korea introduced some limited economic reforms in 2002, mainly some liberalisation of prices. The measures are usually seen now as an attempt by the regime to accommodate changes that had already occurred spontaneously, rather than as the launch of a new economic course.[444] Aidan Foster-Carter said that the measures had "not been radical enough to be effective".[445] Moreover, Dr Kong reported that the regime has subsequently been seeking to reassert some state control.[446] Lord Malloch-Brown likened North Korea's reform steps so far to

some of the communist reform initiatives of [former Cuban leader Fidel] Castro at a certain point, allowing a small enclave for overseas industrial investment and a little bit of liberalisation of prices in some areas. However, the fundamental state system is still in place.

Lord Malloch-Brown did not see prospects for fundamental economic reform in North Korea without a change of government.[447]

224.  Given China's influence over Pyongyang, and the conspicuous economic growth which China has posted in recent years as a result of market reforms and integration into the international economy, there has been considerable discussion of the extent to which China might act as an economic reform model for North Korea. We already raised this issue in our Report on East Asia in 2006.[448] For our present inquiry, the FCO's Stephen Lillie told us:

What the North Koreans have clearly not done is made the Chinese calculation that embracing economic reform will ensure the sustainability of their own system. They have taken rather the opposite view and fear very much that moving down a real process of economic reform would be the beginning of the end.[449]

225.  Dr Kong concurred that, "historically Kim Il-sung and Kim Jong-il have been lukewarm about Chinese-style market reforms", because "concerns about loss of economic control and social challenges to the regime always outweighed concerns about productivity." Dr Kong also said that "the small size of North Korea and its weak position vis-à-vis South Korea means that the North Korean leadership feels more vulnerable than its counterparts in China or Vietnam", making its likely "approach to economic reform […] more cautious."[450] This is the argument also made by the noted North Korea-watcher Professor Andrei Lankov, who believes that the regime sees Chinese-style reforms as likely to lead to its own demise and takeover by Seoul.[451]

226.  His views about the regime's past attitude notwithstanding, Dr Kong told us that North Korean leaders now "seem to have reappraised the Chinese experience." He pointed to "Kim Jong-il's praise for the Chinese model (especially the special economic zones), the dispatch of economics students to China, and […] the enticement of Chinese entrepreneurs by the North Korean authorities." Dr Kong identified "grounds for expecting North Korea to increasingly copy aspects of Chinese reform." He noted that some of China's initial reforms were introduced simply to sanction spontaneous non-state economic processes, of the kind now underway in North Korea; and that China now has a major influence over the North Korean economy, "through its leading role as aid provider, trade partner and foreign investor". China's share of North Korea's foreign trade rose from 28% to 43% between 2001 and 2005. Most importantly, Dr Kong said that "the impressive results of China's modernisation demonstrate to North Korean leaders a route for long term regime survival by promoting economic growth without surrendering the monopoly of power."[452]

227.  Dr Kong suggested that there were two other possible scenarios for North Korea's economic course apart from major Chinese-style reform. These were: first, to invite limited and controlled foreign participation in some areas of the economy, while largely maintaining centralised state control; and, second, a "muddling through" model, involving simply ensuring continued flows of aid and foreign currency as at present. Dr Kong said that a decision to "muddle through" would be most likely to lead Pyongyang to "keep the nuclear threat alive as a bargaining counter". However, he suggested that "even the most conservative North Korean leaders are likely to be aware of the limits of muddling through".[453] Professor Smith told us that economic development was one of the regime's two core policy aims.[454]

228.  We conclude that the absence of market reform in the official North Korean economy contributes to the international risks which the regime represents, by failing to generate incentives for improved relations with the West, and by fuelling the regime's need to generate income from sales of weapons and illegal goods in the absence of alternative exports. We further conclude that, although the forces working against economic reform in North Korea are powerful, the Government should not assume that there is no possibility at all of more meaningful reform under the present regime. We recommend that the Government should remain alert so as to identify and cultivate any elements in the regime which may be open to further economic reform.

THE SUCCESSION TO KIM JONG-IL

229.  The third issue identified by Mr Foster-Carter, and a major one at present, was that of the succession to Kim Jong-il. The North Korean leader is 66, and has been believed for some time to have health problems. Although there have been extended periods in the past when Kim Jong-il has not been seen in public, a renewed flurry of succession speculation was prompted when he failed to appear on the 60^th anniversary of the founding of North Korea, on 9 September 2008, having last been seen in mid-August. Kim Jong-il had appeared at the ceremonies marking the 55^th and 50^th anniversaries. South Korean intelligence sources were reported to have concluded that the North Korean leader had suffered a stroke. North Korean officials denied that he was unwell.[455]

230.  On 4 October, official North Korean media reported that Kim Jong-il had again made a public appearance, attending a football match. On 11 October, North Korea published photographs of Mr Kim, but US and South Korean officials raised doubts that they had been taken recently. Kim Jong-il reportedly did not appear on 10 October at the ceremonies marking the anniversary of the foundation of the ruling Korean Workers' Party.[456] The North Korean authorities published further photographs of Mr Kim in early November.

231.  Aidan Foster-Carter told us that Kim Jong-il was handling the succession issue very differently to his father. When Kim Il-sung was the age that Kim Jong-il is now, Mr Foster-Carter said, the latter's "dauphinhood, if there is such a word, was already being arranged".[457] Kim Jong-il was publicly groomed for the leadership through a succession of official positions over a long period. As leader, however, Kim Jong-il now reportedly bans discussion of the succession issue even in private.[458] None of his children appears to have been picked as the future leader. The speculation amongst commentators in September 2008 about a post-Kim Jong-il North Korea included scenarios for another dynastic succession, the elevation of a senior civilian official not belonging to the Kim family, some form of collective or mixed leadership, a military takeover, and a breakdown of central authority, with local officials taking control of their own areas.[459] Aidan Foster-Carter summed up the lack of certainty about the succession by saying, "If [Kim Jong-il] were to have the heart attack tomorrow […] all bets for North Korea are off".[460]

232.  In an article published even before the latest speculation surrounding Kim Jong-il's health, the former Director for Asian Affairs at the US National Security Council, Victor Cha, said: "Is there a plan in place if something happens in North Korea tomorrow? The answer is no."[461] Professor Smith told us that "there has been some discussion in the United States and South Korea of contingency planning",[462] but in September The Economist reported that "Chinese, American and South Korean officials admit in private [that] so far they have drawn up only the sketchiest contingency plans among themselves."[463] Our impression from our visit to the region was also of uncertainty surrounding possible scenarios.

233.  Professor Smith recommended that "the UK Government should work with its European partners in the EU to establish a contingency framework of support to regional partners in the event of a major public order and/or humanitarian crisis in the Korean peninsula."[464] In its "Guidelines on the EU's Foreign and Security Policy in East Asia", approved in 2005 and published in 2007, the EU Council identified stability on the Korean peninsula as a key EU interest in the region.[465]

234.  Given North Korea's possession of WMD materials, we conclude that the degree of uncertainty surrounding possible future political developments in the country is worrying. We conclude that, given the lessening in the regime's social control since North Korea's last leadership succession, and the apparently enhanced likelihood that Kim Jong-il is suffering from health problems, the international community should have a set of co-ordinated plans in place for sudden change in the situation in North Korea. We further conclude that, although the parties to the Six-Party Talks would be the lead states in any international response, the UK and the EU would be likely to be called upon to assist and would have an interest in doing so. We appreciate that there are reasons why it may be sensible not to discuss plans in public, but we recommend that in its response to this Report, the Government should provide assurance that such planning is being undertaken.

North-South Korea relations

235.  South and North Korea technically remain at war. No peace agreement has ever been reached bringing the Korean War formally to an end. Fundamental security arrangements on the Korean peninsula continue to be governed by the Armistice signed in July 1953 between UN Command (Korea) on the one hand, and the North Korean and Chinese military commanders on the other. South Korea is a party rather than a signatory to the Armistice.

236.  South Korea's defence posture is directed overwhelmingly against the risk of renewed conflict with the North. There have been numerous small-scale clashes and Armistice violations between the two sides since 1953, largely as a result of incursions by North Korea. We saw for ourselves during our visit that the Demilitarised Zone (DMZ) between North and South remains tense and heavily militarised. The most recent serious incident was a naval skirmish in 2002 in which four South Korean sailors died. We heard during our visit that the most likely location for renewed clashes remained the West Sea, where the maritime border is disputed and there are key fishing grounds. The FCO's assessment is that another "war between the two Koreas […] [is] unlikely, [but] would have disastrous consequences for the Korean peninsula."[466]

237.  The two Koreas have in principle been officially committed to consensual reunification at least since a declaration to that effect in 1972. The nature of the policy which should be pursued towards the North so as to facilitate that ultimate goal has been a central controversy in South Korean politics in recent years.

BEYOND THE "SUNSHINE POLICY"

238.  After taking office in 1998, former liberal President Kim Dae-jung launched South Korea's first policy of concrete engagement with the North, known as the "sunshine policy". Kim Dae-jung's successor, former President Roh, essentially persisted with the approach. Under the "sunshine policy", South Korea sought to cultivate the North, and extended economic assistance. The policy saw the holding of the first North-South summits, in Pyongyang in 2000 and 2007, between Chairman Kim Jong-il and former South Korean Presidents Kim and Roh, respectively. The policy has also involved visits between some of the families left divided by the North-South border; the provision of food aid, fertiliser and other economic assistance by the South to the North;[467] the encouragement of bilateral trade; the opening of two major South Korean-funded economic projects in the North, the Mount Kumgang tourism project and the Kaesong Industrial Complex (KIC);[468] and the opening of two transit corridors across the Demilitarised Zone—in the West to the KIC and Kaesong city, and in the East to Mount Kumgang—allowing some controlled access for South Koreans into the North. At their summit in October 2007, shortly before President Roh left office, he and Chairman Kim agreed on a number of further co-operation projects. Former South Korean President Kim was awarded the Nobel Prize in 2000 partly for "his work […] for peace and reconciliation with North Korea".[469]

239.  One of our witnesses, Dr Hoare, has characterised the "sunshine policy" as

essentially an acceptance that the DPRK was not about to suddenly disappear […] instead of 'unification policy' the government would begin to talk about 'policy towards the North'. There would be no attempt to undermine the North.[470]

240.  While the "sunshine policy" accepted North Korea's existence, it was seen by some of its supporters as a means of encouraging change in the nature of the North Korean regime that might eventually facilitate any reunification. The FCO told us that:

South Korea hopes that by exposing the DPRK to outside influences, and improving basic infrastructure, the regime will see the benefits of engagement and becoming a responsible member of the global community.[471]

241.  South Korea's new conservative President, Lee Myung-bak, came to office in February 2008 promising a different approach to the North. He held out the prospect of greater economic engagement, with the aim of raising per capita income in North Korea to $3,000 a year. However, unlike his liberal predecessors, President Lee proposed to make engagement with the North conditional on the North's steps towards denuclearisation.[472] President Lee also proposed to take account of North Korea's human rights performance. As noted earlier, under President Lee South Korea voted in favour of the March 2008 resolution at the UN Human Rights Council prolonging the mandate of the Special Rapporteur for human rights in North Korea. The Lee Administration said that humanitarian aid to the North would continue, but only if Pyongyang requested it. Implementation of other co-operation initiatives would depend on the North's behaviour, and on an assessment of their value to and support in the South. President Lee's new approach cast doubt over the implementation of the projects agreed between his predecessor and Chairman Kim at their October 2007 summit.

242.  Dr Swenson-Wright told us that, whereas former President Roh had seen "engagement, in and of itself, as in turn producing success in terms of proliferation and nuclear discussions", President Lee's approach represented "a reversal of the sequencing".[473] Supporters of President Lee's new policy, in both the political class and the electorate, typically felt that his predecessors' unconditional approach had not stopped the North Korean regime from developing a nuclear bomb, from remaining largely unchanged domestically, or from remaining fundamentally antagonistic to the South.[474] Instead, some argued that the "sunshine policy" had merely propped up the regime, through food aid and hard currency, while reducing pressures for change. Lord Malloch-Brown indicated that the South's tougher stance under President Lee was likely to be helpful, because it "increase[d] the need to hold the North to an even higher standard of verification of its actions"[475] in the nuclear field.

243.  Our witnesses stressed that President Lee was not proposing to abandon engagement with the North altogether. Dr Swenson-Wright told us that "on the commitment to reaching a positive outcome, [former President Roh and new President Lee] are not that far apart".[476] Lord Malloch-Brown told us that the Government saw "the basic policy as remaining unchanged, but with a good dose of scepticism […] the impact of the new President, if anything, will be to make things move more slowly and cautiously."[477]

244.  President Lee's new stance provoked a fierce reaction from Pyongyang. At the end of March 2008, North Korea expelled South Korean officials from the Kaesong Industrial Complex, and suspended official contacts with the South. It did not ask Seoul to provide it with food and fertiliser aid. A football World Cup qualifying match in late March between the two Koreas had to be moved from Pyongyang to Beijing, after the North refused to play the South's national anthem.

245.  In his address to the opening session of the new National Assembly in mid-July, President Lee said that "dialogue between the two Koreas must resume", including dialogue on the implementation of projects agreed between Chairman Kim and former President Roh at their October 2007 summit. President Lee also offered renewed humanitarian aid and said that "inter-Korean relations should transcend changeovers in administrations".[478] However, what appeared to be President Lee's shift to a more conciliatory stance was overshadowed by the shooting immediately before the speech of a South Korean tourist by a North Korean guard at the Mount Kumgang resort. North Korea did not co-operate with South Korea's calls for an investigation into the incident, and in August it expelled South Korean workers from the resort. South Korea suspended tours to Mount Kumgang. At the opening ceremony for the August 2008 Beijing Olympics, the teams from the two Koreas marched separately for the first time since the 1996 Games.[479]

246.  Professor Smith enumerated what she saw as the benefits from South Korea's engagement policy over the last decade. She told us that:

• "there is absolutely no doubt that many more North Koreans would be dead if it was not for South Korean assistance";
• family reunions were "a huge achievement on a very personal and individual level";
• increased contact had produced "increased understanding at some levels" in the two societies; and
• the maintenance of various channels of communication between North and South had produced greater "security predictability"; "the complete unpredictability of North Korea is long gone", she judged.[480]

Dr Hoare similarly told us that the "sunshine policy" had been a "success". He said that South Korea's insistence on keeping open contacts with the North after Pyongyang's missile and nuclear tests in 2006 had facilitated the re-launch of the Six-Party Talks. He also told us that he believed that "there is now […] a pro-South Korean constituency in the North, which will not willingly see the benefits it receives thrown away."[481]

247.  Our witnesses also pointed to weaknesses of South Korean engagement policy so far. Professor Smith said that there had "not been enough paybacks on a political level".[482] She also suggested that there had not been enough soundly-based economic development, as opposed to politically-driven projects and humanitarian aid.[483] Aidan Foster-Carter similarly suggested that South Korean engagement had not so far produced business conditions in the North sufficient to encourage South Korean firms operating on a normal commercial basis to wish to do business there.[484]

248.  On 1 October 2008, North and South Korea had their first official contacts since the Lee Administration took office. Military officials held a reportedly unproductive meeting, at the North's instigation.[485]

249.  Dr Hoare, who as chargé d'affaires opened the British Embassy in Pyongyang in 2001, at the height of international optimism over the "sunshine policy" in the wake of the first North-South summit, said that the rationale for the UK's decision to open diplomatic relations with Pyongyang was "to help the South Korean Government in their relations with North Korea."[486] Professor Smith told us that supporting North-South engagement was "something that the UK Government should still see as the centre of their priorities in the security realm in their relations with South Korea, supporting, though not blindly".[487]

250.  We conclude that a breakdown in relations between North and South Korea would bring to an end opportunities for valuable human contacts, and increase insecurity on the Korean peninsula. We further conclude that it is legitimate for South Korea to attach conditions to its co-operation with the North. We recommend that the Government should continue to support North-South engagement.

251.  Dr Hoare told us that, thanks to the greater accessibility of the North and information about it which had been secured under the "sunshine policy", the country was now "viewed far more realistically" in the South.[488] Elsewhere, he has written that this greater knowledge has had a "sobering effect on those who might have sought early reunification of the peninsula".[489] The difficulties which Germany has encountered under its reunification model have also contributed to a lessening of enthusiasm for reunification in Seoul. The Bank of Korea has estimated that, whereas the ratio of GDP per capita in West Germany compared to East Germany was around two-to-one, the figures for South compared to North Korea are around 17-to-one.[490] Given South Korea's ambitions for its own economy, it appears that the costs of reunification are not ones which Seoul would be keen quickly to bear. During our meetings there, we encountered no concrete plans for reunification, and no sense that this was considered to be a realistic prospect in the near future.

252.  Aidan Foster-Carter drew our attention to a geoeconomic and geopolitical dimension to the debate about South Korea's engagement policy. Mr Foster-Carter regards South Korea and China as "rivals for influence in Pyongyang".[491] He said that "there is great concern in South Korea […] that the Chinese have been buying up all the minerals in North Korea". He suggested that, while South Korea might wish to try to use a policy of holding back on economic co-operation with the North in order to secure greater progress on denuclearisation, "there is powerful geopolitical and geoeconomic pressure to get in there and stop the Chinese, regardless of the nuclear issue".[492] We heard during our visit to the Kaesong Industrial Complex, for example, that the South Korean company behind the project, Hyundai Asan, was not making a profit from it but hoped to be in an advantageous position in North Korea as and when that country opened up to international business.

KAESONG INDUSTRIAL COMPLEX AND THE SOUTH KOREA-EU FREE TRADE AGREEMENT

253.  The Kaesong Industrial Complex (KIC) is the flagship project of South Korea's "sunshine policy" of engagement with North Korea. When we visited the complex, in May 2008, we were the first UK parliamentarians to do so.[493]

254.  The KIC is in North Korea, just north of the Demilitarised Zone, and uses North Korean labour. The KIC was initiated and is being developed by the South Korean firm Hyundai Asan, which paid the North Korean regime $500 million for a 50-year lease on the land. Hyundai Asan sells the land use rights on to firms establishing operations at the complex. (Hyundai Asan is also behind the parallel Mount Kumgang tourism resort, where it also paid Pyongyang $500 million for the land use rights.) The KIC is open to firms of any nationality, but non-South Korean firms wishing to operate in the complex must have a subsidiary in the South and establish a joint venture with a South Korean firm.

255.  The KIC is supported administratively and politically by the South Korean Government, which gives favourable tax treatment to the South Korean firms operating there. Transfers of goods between South Korea and the KIC are free of customs duty. South Korea provides the KIC's electricity supply and has financed the infrastructural developments allowing access to the site across the Demilitarised Zone.

256.  Production at the KIC started in 2004. At the time of our visit in May 2008, we were told that around 250 firms had committed to establishing operations at the complex, all of them from South Korea apart from one each from China, Germany and Japan (with discussions on possible involvement also underway with one firm each from France and the US). Around 70 firms had actually started operations, employing around 26,000 North Koreans and 1,000 South Koreans. The firms at the KIC are engaged overwhelmingly in light industry, producing mostly for the South Korean market. Production at the KIC in 2007 was worth $185 million, up from $15 million in 2005. Under Hyundai Asan's plans, by 2020 the KIC would be employing perhaps 300,000-350,000 North Koreans and producing goods worth $20 billion, hosting more sophisticated production than at present and expanding to become a new "mini-city" including accommodation for some of its workers.[494] However, expansion of the complex is not taking place at the pace foreseen by Hyundai Asan, and the KIC is now one of the projects where future development is in doubt following the changes in North Korea policy made by South Korean President Lee.

257.  Our understanding from our visit was that supporters of the KIC view it as offering advantages to all parties. For the North Korean regime, the KIC is a source of hard currency. For South Korean governments pursuing the "sunshine policy", the project offered economic development of the North and its exposure to South Korean business practices—as well as a means of improving South Korean competitiveness through access to lower-cost production. For South Korean firms, the KIC offers labour at a fraction of its cost in South Korea[495] but less than an hour from Seoul. Our impression from the factories we visited was that South Korean firms operating at the KIC were using labour-intensive production processes which they might not find economic to employ at home.

258.  As regards the hopes of its supporters that the KIC might encourage economic reform and opening in North Korea, Professor Smith suggested that project might push both ways. On the one hand, she pointed out that "South Koreans come in, talk to North Koreans and show them new economic practices as well as just engaging in normal conversation".[496] However, she also made the point that "in many ways, the Kaesong enterprise can reinstitute the old social and political controls that were prevalent in North Korea" before they began to break down.[497] Professor Smith said that "in Kaesong, the paradox is that with South Korean investment, which is properly and efficiently organised, the old systems can be reinstituted."[498] Overall, Professor Smith said that "politically […] it is a good thing that all this engagement takes place, but economically it acts as a subsidy for some very old-fashioned ways of operating in North Korea."[499] Lord Malloch-Brown told us that the KIC "is not indicative of a willingness to open up the economy as a whole. It is an opportunity of limited value. It is not the doorway to political and economic change in North Korea."[500]

259.  The KIC is controversial internationally mainly because of conditions for its workers. Firms operating at the KIC do not employ or pay their North Korean workers directly. Rather, firms approach the management committee on the South Korean side, known as KIDMAC, with requests for workers. KIDMAC transmits such requests to its North Korean counterpart, which supplies the workers. We understood during our visit that only workers regarded as politically reliable would be given employment at the KIC, given that the jobs bring both contact with South Koreans and high wages, by North Korean standards.[501] Firms operating at the KIC are able to reject workers supplied by the North Korean authorities who prove unsuitable. We heard that there had been a very few cases of the North Korean authorities removing workers from jobs at the KIC for political reasons.

260.  Firms at the KIC transfer around $70 per month per worker to the North Korean authorities. (Salaries for equivalent workers in South Korea would be perhaps $1,500-$2,000.) Of the $70, we were told during our visit that 30% is retained by the North Korean authorities to cover social security costs. Of the rest, 50% is transferred to the workers in cash, in North Korean won converted at the official exchange rate (140-160 won to the dollar at the time of our visit in May, as opposed to the unofficial rate of around 4,700 to the dollar). The other half of the amount due to the workers can be drawn down in return for goods at special shops provided for this purpose in the KIC. Workers are paid indirectly despite the fact that the KIC labour law provides for direct payment. We were told during our visit that direct payment and employment may be implemented in future.

261.  The FCO told us that the transfers of hard currency to the North Korean regime which are taking place as a result of the KIC project "may not contravene" UN Security Council Resolution 1718 of 2006, which banned member states from making funds available to entities supporting North Korea's WMD programmes. However, the FCO noted that the "lack of transparency" surrounding the transfers was "problematic".[502]

262.  The FCO told us that "concerns have been raised by a number of human rights organisations about the absence of basic workers' rights"[503] at the KIC. For example, Human Rights Watch judges that "the law governing working conditions in the KIC falls far short of international standards on freedom of association, the right to collective bargaining, sex discrimination and harassment, and harmful child labour".[504] There are no trade unions or collective agreements at the KIC, and no meaningful workers' representation.[505] The legal position is complicated because South Korea is a member of the International Labour Organisation, but North Korea is not.

263.  Norma Kang Muico of Amnesty International told us that "the work conditions in the [KIC] are, relatively speaking, fairly good", that "many North Koreans would like to work at Kaesong", and that overall the "net gain may be in the favour of the North Korean workers".[506] On the basis of the figures we were given during our visit, the wage received in won and in kind by workers at the KIC is equivalent to 6,860-7,840 won a month, whereas we understand that average earnings in North Korea are around 3,000-5,000 won a month. Ms Muico also said that "we cannot be complacent" and that "a lot more needs to be done in Kaesong to make the labour situation better".[507] Lord Malloch-Brown called the conditions at the KIC "unacceptable, even if a little better than the rest"; they reflected, he said, "a bit of a Faustian pact".[508]

264.  Conditions at the KIC are a policy issue for the UK and the rest of the EU because of the current negotiation of the South Korea-EU Free Trade Agreement (FTA).[509] In the course of the negotiations, it will have to be determined whether goods produced at the KIC are to be included under the terms of the agreement, alongside goods produced in South Korea, and thus given improved access to the EU. Lord Malloch-Brown confirmed that South Korea was "pushing for goods that are produced at Kaesong to be covered" by the agreement.[510]

265.  In the negotiations in 2006-07 over South Korea's FTA with the US, Seoul similarly wanted the agreement to include the KIC, but Washington was opposed. Dr Hoare reminded us that—at the time, at least—the US was effectively banning trade with North Korea.[511] In the end, the KORUS FTA did not include the KIC, but it did include an annex allowing the two parties to agree in future to extend its terms to cover designated "outward processing zones" in North Korea, subject to certain conditions. It is assumed that the KIC would count as such a zone. Human Rights Watch has argued that the annex would allow "outward processing zones" in North Korea to be included in the FTA while meeting labour standards weaker than those required of South Korea.[512] Whereas the FTA holds South Korea to ILO standards, it provides that "outward processing zones" in North Korea are to be considered for inclusion in the agreement only "with due reference to the situation prevailing elsewhere in the local economy and the relevant international norms".[513] Human Rights Watch has recommended that the South Korea-US FTA be amended so as to require "outward processing zones" in North Korea to meet the same labour standards as South Korea in order to be included in the agreement.[514]

266.  Lord Malloch-Brown told us that if the KIC were to be included in the South Korea-EU FTA he "imagine[d] that [the Government] would want human rights issues to be incorporated into the agreement".[515] Lord Malloch-Brown said that there was a "very evident" risk attached to not doing so, namely of "a flood of cheap goods into our markets for which there are no workers' or human rights protections".[516] Lord Malloch-Brown said that we could be "absolutely confident" that the KIC was "not going to be allowed in [to the South Korea-EU FTA] without a set of conditions to govern it",[517] but he invited us to express our view as to the desirable content of those conditions.

267.  Norma Kang Muico of Amnesty International told us that there was currently "a window of opportunity for South Korean companies and the South Korean Government to do more in terms of freedom of association, collective bargaining and best practices [at the KIC] using the labour standards of the International Labour Organisation of which South Korea is a member".[518]

268.  We conclude that the current arrangements for the Kaesong Industrial Complex (KIC)—which allow South Korean firms to escape the International Labour Organisation standards to which they are subject at home, while providing non-transparent transfers of hard currency to the North Korean regime—are far from ideal. However, we also conclude that the contact between North and South Koreans, and exposure of North Koreans to South Korean business practices, which take place at the KIC are to be welcomed; and that the KIC offers much better pay and working conditions than are available elsewhere in North Korea. We recommend that the Government should seek to use the leverage which is afforded by South Korea's wish to see the KIC included in the South Korea-EU Free Trade Agreement (FTA) to encourage improvements in the position of workers at the KIC, within a context of what is realistically achievable, and without jeopardising either the FTA or the continued operation and expansion of the Complex.

UK policy toward North Korea

269.  The UK effectively recognised North Korea when it agreed to admit it, along with South Korea, to the UN in 1991. (The UK had recognised South Korea in 1948, and had full diplomatic relations with it since 1957.) The UK opened diplomatic relations with North Korea in 2000, and an Embassy in Pyongyang the following year. The UK is one of only seven EU Member States to maintain an Embassy there.[519]

270.  As we noted in the Introduction to this Report, Lord Malloch-Brown told us that the Government sees the UK as being in the "second row" of states as regards dealing with North Korea, the first row being constituted by the participants in the Six-Party Talks.[520] Our witnesses concurred that the UK did not, and could not be expected to, take a lead role on the Korean peninsula.[521]

271.  Professor Smith, who accepted that the UK had a secondary role with regard to North Korea, argued nevertheless that the UK had a comparative advantage regarding the international effort to denuclearise that country, which it could usefully exploit more actively if it chose to do so. The UK's advantage, she said, lay in "being both close to the US as a valued ally and at the same time having diplomatic relations with the DPRK". The UK's diplomatic relations with Pyongyang involve not only maintaining an Embassy there, but also hosting what Professor Smith called "high-level ambassadors" heading the North Korean Embassy in London.[522]

272.  Professor Smith said that the UK should use its position to support confidence-building between the US and North Korea. She said that "there [was] still a lack of trust between the two major protagonists" which made negotiations difficult.[523] Dr Kong made the same point.[524] Professor Smith suggested that the UK could in particular facilitate "track-two" meetings, at which policy-makers and academics could discuss security matters, perhaps organised in terms of the themes being tackled in the working groups of the Six-Party Talks. Professor Smith recognised that this would require a commitment of FCO resources.[525] However, she said that the UK was "in a very privileged position, in terms of its relationships with the key players, to provide forums for that sort of trust-building exercise", and that "supporting confidence-building between the two major protagonists is […] the single most important thing that the UK Government could do in the short term to facilitate denuclearisation in the Korean peninsula."[526]

273.  We conclude that, while the UK is not in the frontline of the international effort to secure North Korea's denuclearisation, it occupies a special position as a close US ally which has diplomatic relations with Pyongyang. Especially given the difficulties into which the denuclearisation process ran in August-September 2008, we recommend that the Government should ask both North Korea and the US whether, coming to the process as a fresh element, it could facilitate any meetings which would help to strengthen the process.

274.  Professor Smith said that a further important element of the UK's position with respect to North Korea was its membership of the EU. She said that the EU had been "very active" in North Korea, in humanitarian and development aid, and in political discussions where possible, on issues such as human rights. However, Professor Smith said that the European Commission was currently taking the lead, and that there was "room for a political leadership role to be played". She suggested that the UK would have a comparative advantage in potentially taking this role, because of its relationships with the US and North Korea.[527] Among the other large EU Member States, for example, France does not have diplomatic relations with North Korea.[528] The UK is also the only EU Member State to be a permanent member of UNCMAC, the delegation of UN Command (Korea) to the Military Armistice Commission in Korea.[529]

275.  The EU Council has set out its priorities for the Korean peninsula, among other parts of the region, in a set of East Asia Policy Guidelines agreed in 2005 and published in 2007. The FCO told us that the Guidelines were "a step forward in [its] efforts to achieve a coherent and strategic EU approach to East Asia."[530]

276.  Lord Malloch-Brown told us that the Government's top priority with regard to North Korea was to bring that country

more fully into the global community […] so that the range of more normal pressures starts to have effect and the regime engages, gets a little richer, gets a glimpse of a better future for itself and its people in the world, and becomes amenable to pressure and dialogue as it engages.[531]

The stated aim of Government policy is to "work for positive change in the DPRK by exposing the country to external thinking and alternative models of economic and social organisation."[532]

277.  Dr Hoare, along with several other of our witnesses, supported the principle of engagement with North Korea:

By dealing directly with the North Koreans, we learn more than we would if we were not there. By showing them, in however small a way, that the outside world has lessons for them to learn, by exposing their officials and students to that outside world and by giving an alternative to the closed society in which they live, we are helping to modify North Korean behaviour and policies. It is not going to be an easy or quick process, but it is underway […] We may not make great advances, but we will certainly not help if we back away.[533]

278.  Since the opening of the British Embassy in Pyongyang in 2001, there has been a partial drawing back on the part of the Government from the policy of engagement. After North Korea announced that it was withdrawing from the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty in 2003, the UK "halted any bilateral activity, which might be seen to directly support the DPRK regime, e.g. economic/technical assistance and trade promotion." The FCO told us that the Government had made clear to North Korea that "relaxation of these restrictions will not be considered without progress on the nuclear issue and also on human rights concerns."[534] The Government now describes its policy as being one of "carefully targeted engagement".[535]

279.  Dr Hoare summarised British policy by saying that the UK had established diplomatic relations with Pyongyang in order to support the South in its "sunshine policy" of engagement with the North, as noted above;[536] but that since the nuclear crisis of 2002, "the North Korean nuclear issue has overshadowed that initial initiative, and that has led [the UK] away from a position of developing our engagement with North Korea."[537]

280.  Professor Smith told us that one casualty of the policy shift had been Government funding for universities to engage in academic training and exchange with North Korea.[538] She recommend that the Government should reconsider this position, as

all concerned parties in the efforts to encourage North Korea to normalise its relations with the rest of the world have considered education and training to be a fundamental prerequisite to equip the next generation of North Korean leaders with the foundation for interaction with the rest of the world.[539]

281.  We discussed with Lord Malloch-Brown and Stephen Lillie why there were no North Koreans studying in the UK on the FCO's Chevening scheme.[540] Mr Lillie said that "the difficulty so far has been for the North Korean side to identify the right sort of person with the right level of English". Mr Lillie said that the FCO had indicated a willingness to be flexible on the English language requirement if Pyongyang could nominate otherwise suitable people. However, Lord Malloch-Brown said that he did "not think that there [was] the political will on [North Korea's] side for [the] kind of opening up" involved in sending students to the UK, whether on the Chevening scheme or other university programmes. He said that the problem was that North Korea was "a paranoid regime that really does not want people to go abroad." [541]

282.  Professor Smith told us that "the North Korean Government has […] agreed to permit students to attend UK universities if funding can be found for them".[542] She said that it was

North Korea's top policy priority to get its people out and educated in degree courses, not just short-term courses, outside the country […] That runs counter to the myth that the North Koreans will never let anyone out. They will now, if we can find the funding to do it.[543]

283.  Aidan Foster-Carter said that "encourag[ing] [North Korea] to send people over" to the UK should be the Government's top priority regarding the country. He said that the Government should try "to get as many North Koreans over […] as possible […] the coming people, the students and so forth […] the more younger North Koreans we can get [to the UK] and expose to the West, the better."[544]

284.  The British Council has been working in North Korea since 2003. It has three teachers running programmes of English and teacher training in three Pyongyang universities, of whom two were in post when we took evidence from Lord Malloch-Brown in July.[545] The programmes include visits to the UK for the students involved. The British Council told us that this scheme had the potential to expand both geographically and in terms of the topics taught. The scheme was last extended in May 2008.[546] The British Council also arranges English-language training in the UK for middle-ranking North Korean officials.[547]

285.  The BBC World Service does not have a Korean-language service and does not broadcast into North Korea. Given conditions there, the BBC World Service assesses that, technically, short-wave radio would be the "only feasible option" for delivering Korean-language broadcasts into North Korea. The BBC World Service judges that

such a service might reach a few hundred senior officials (who are likely to understand English and have access both to satellite TV and the internet anyway) and a small number of North Korean civilians who are prepared to risk extremely severe punishment.[548]

In the FCO's words, the World Service has therefore concluded that "it would be difficult to make a robust business case for this service in the current financial climate and given the difficulty in measuring impact." The FCO noted that the US stations Voice of America and Radio Free Asia, which do broadcast in Korean into North Korea, do not have to justify audience numbers in the same way as does the BBC World Service. The FCO stated that it was "likely, therefore, that the US [would] continue to lead the way forward in this area."[549]

286.  As regards trade with North Korea, the FCO noted that some of the UK's EU partners "argue that trade relations are an important part of bringing the DPRK out of its isolation", in contrast to the UK's decision not to conduct trade promotion activity regarding North Korea. The FCO said that its position was to bring the trade policy "under review if there is significant progress on the nuclear issue."[550]

287.  We conclude that the Government is correct to make the aim of exposing North Korea's people to alternative ways of life its top policy goal with regard to engagement with that country. However, we also conclude that the restrictions on relations which the Government has introduced, to try to leverage progress on denuclearisation and human rights, may be undercutting this goal. We recommend that the Government should think more creatively about ways in which it might increase contacts with North Koreans without simply benefiting the regime's elite. We recommend that the FCO should discuss with interested higher education institutions possibilities for hosting North Korean students.

288.  We conclude that the work that the British Council is doing in North Korea is to be commended. We recommend that the British Council should expand its work there if possible.

289.  As already noted, not all EU Member States which have diplomatic relations with North Korea actually maintain an Embassy in Pyongyang (the others typically cover the country from China). The British Embassy in Pyongyang is not an easy Post to maintain or, for its UK-based staff, in which to serve. We cited earlier in this Report the view of Amnesty International that the UK's presence in Pyongyang is valuable from a human rights perspective.[551] During our visit to Japan, our interlocutors expressed appreciation of the British Embassy's work in relaying information to the Japanese Government and in raising in Pyongyang the issue of the Japanese abductees.[552]

290.  We conclude that the existence of a British Embassy in Pyongyang brings diplomatic benefits to the UK, in terms of both bilateral dealings with North Korea and the UK's position in regional and international North Korea policy, and we recommend that its staffing and resources should reflect its value.

The UK in UN Command (Korea)

291.  UN Command (Korea) was established in 1950 under UN Security Council Resolution 84, to defend South Korea from the North Korean attack and restore peace and security to the Korean peninsula. UNSCR 84 established that the UN force would be under US command. During the Korean War, 16 "sending states" contributed combat forces to the UN Command, including the UK.

292.  The UN Command is one of the signatories to the 1953 Armistice, along with the North Korean and Chinese militaries. These parties have joint responsibility for maintenance of the Armistice, in particular as it applies to the Demilitarised Zone (DMZ) between North and South Korea. The Armistice provided that the parties were to exercise their joint responsibilities through a Military Armistice Commission (MAC), which was to comprise five senior officers each from the Korean War's two sides. The UN Command side of the MAC, known as UNCMAC, comprises two officers from South Korea, one from the US, one from the UK (as the Senior Commonwealth member), and one from the Command's other sending states in rotation. In 1991, the UN Command—effectively the US—nominated a South Korean officer to be the senior UNCMAC representative. North Korea rejected this, on the grounds that South Korea was not a signatory to the Armistice. North Korea and China formally withdrew from the MAC in 1994, although lower-level meetings between military officers continue to take place.

293.  The UK is represented on UNCMAC by the British Defence Attaché in Seoul. UNCMAC members also each have a national liaison officer to UNCMAC. This is not a full-time post. Until March 2008, the UK national liaison officer was the Naval Attaché at the Seoul Embassy. The navel attaché post there has now been withdrawn, as part of the global retrenchment of the UK's network of defence attachés consequential on the FCO's decision to withdraw funding for these posts.[553] The UK liaison officer to UNCMAC is now a civilian diplomat, namely the Political Counsellor at the Seoul Embassy. We understand that there are some military inspections conducted by UNCMAC in which civilians—and thus the UK liaison officer—cannot participate, but that several other UN Command member states also have civilians as their liaison officers. Lord Malloch-Brown told us that the Government did "not accept the proposition that [the Naval Attaché's replacement by a civilian official] […] is a downgrading". Indeed, the Minister argued that "by having both the Defence Attaché and the Political Counsellor, we have a broader array of talents on the committee, because we have both the military and the political foreign policy side."[554]

294.  In the longer term, the fate of the Military Armistice Commission is tied to that of the Armistice agreement which established it. North Korea has already made proposals that the MAC be replaced by bilateral North-South or trilateral North-South-US bodies; such proposals are commonly held to be closely linked to Pyongyang's wish for a peace treaty with the US to replace the Armistice and bring the Korean War formally to an end, as part of the normalisation of bilateral relations for which it hopes.[555] North Korea's effective withdrawal from the MAC, and from another of the Armistice bodies, the Neutral Nations Supervisory Commission (NNSC), is often seen as part of an effort to weaken the Armistice institutions.[556] In their summit declaration of October 2007, Chairman Kim and former South Korean President Roh agreed to work for a "peace regime" to replace the Armistice, but the FCO told us that President Roh's successor, President Lee, has "as yet […] shown no particular rush towards the negotiation of a peace treaty with his northern counterpart".[557]

295.  According to the FCO, the UK's membership of UNCMAC means that it "continue[s] to have a role in upholding peace and security on the Korean peninsula".[558] Lord Malloch-Brown told us that the UK "remain[ed] committed" to UNCMAC, but that he was "not quite sure what longer-term plans" there were for the UK's role on it. Lord Malloch-Brown left open the question of "whether there would be a UK role" if a peace agreement were ever to replace the Armistice. He said that "primary responsibility" lay with the states participating in the Six-Party Talks.[559]

296.  We conclude that the UK's participation in the UN Command Military Armistice Commission represents an important British commitment to peace and security on the Korean peninsula, and we recommend that it should be maintained.

MILITARY ISSUES

297.  Under the Korean peninsula's current security architecture, in the event of renewed military conflict between North and South the UN Command would arguably retain ultimate responsibility for the defence of South Korea and the restoration of peace and security, because UNSCR 84 remains in force. In a "Joint Declaration Concerning the Korean Armistice" in 1953, the UN Command's 16 sending states—including the UK—stated that "if there is a renewal of the armed attack […] we should again be united and prompt to resist".[560] However, this declaration is not legally binding, and of the 16 original sending states, only the US has made a formal commitment to participate in a renewed military defence of South Korea, and only the US maintains forces there. The FCO's Stephen Lillie told us that "the basis for the security of South Korea is not the UN Command, but the US-ROK mutual defence treaty", and that "it has always been [the UK's] assumption and understanding that in the case of a war, it would be the US and ROK combined forces that would be activated, at least in the first instance."[561]

298.  Speaking in January 2007, the then UN Commander, General Bell, said that the UN Command "must maintain the capability to support the ROK-US Alliance with UN Forces, equipment and supplies".[562] Lord Malloch-Brown similarly told us that the UN Command "is vital because it allows the transit of reinforcements and equipment through Japan if they are needed."[563]

299.  In the framework of their bilateral military relationship, the US and South Korea agreed in 1978 that, in the event of a renewal of hostilities, wartime operational command would not be held by the UN Command, but by the new US-South Korean Combined Forces Command (CFC). This might have raised the prospect of an operational "gap" opening up between the responsibility on paper of the UN Command on the one hand, and the effective responsibility on the ground of the joint US/South Korean forces on the other. This was prevented because a single US General was always "triple-hatted" as Commander of the UN Command, Commander of the CFC, and Commander of US Forces Korea. However, as part of the South Korean forces' long-term attainment of greater operational independence from their US allies, Seoul and Washington have agreed that the CFC is to be disbanded in 2012.[564] At that time, South Korea will take sole wartime operational command of its forces.

300.  In his January 2007 remarks, General Bell said that the transfer of wartime operational command from the US to South Korea threatened to create a "military authority-to-responsibility mismatch for the United Nations Command", because the UN Commander—whom UNSCR 84 requires to be from the US—would no longer have direct operational authority over the South Korean armed forces in the event of war.[565] This is potentially significant given that the US is withdrawing many of its forces further south into South Korea, leaving the frontline forces near the North Korean border overwhelmingly South Korean.[566] General Bell said that the situation in prospect in 2012 would potentially "make it impossible to credibly maintain the Armistice".[567]

301.  Lord Malloch-Brown told us that the transfer of operational wartime command to South Korea in 2012 will "not get in the way of the UNC, […] which will retain responsibility for maintaining the Armistice. That will remain under US control."[568] Mr Lillie implied that the US and South Korea would come to an arrangement about their future military co-operation and command structures, and he said that the Government "would accept the judgement of the United States forces that that is an acceptable arrangement, which fully meets their security requirements."[569]

302.  In a follow-up letter to Lord Malloch-Brown's oral evidence, the FCO told us that:

the UNC has kept participating states informed of arrangements for reconfiguration of the Combined Forces Command (CFC) in the run-up to 2012 through monthly meetings with the relevant Ambassadors in Seoul. The new Commander of the CFC has also publicly committed to continue this process as plans develop.[570]

In September 2008, the UNC's Deputy Chief of Staff, Major General John Weida, visited all the Command's sending states to brief officials. The Chairman of the Committee met the General during his stay in London. On the basis of the information which is now available, it is clear that, in the event of renewed conflict with the North post-2012, US and UNC forces would take a supporting role under overall South Korean command. However, the contributions of sending states would remain, subject to national caveat, under the same direct command relationship with the United States as at present. The UNC is taking steps to try to secure greater participation from its sending states in exercises in preparation for the post-2012 arrangements, with the aim of increasing contact between the sending states and the South Korean military in particular.

303.  UNCMAC maintains a Joint Duty Office in the Joint Security Area (JSA) at Panmunjom. The Joint Security Area is the area in the Demilitarised Zone—straddling the demarcation line between the two sides—where the Armistice bodies meet and other military and humanitarian contacts between the two sides in the Korean War may take place. We visited the JSA during our trip to South Korea in May. The UK has on occasion sent junior officers to do tours of duty in the UNCMAC Joint Duty Office on an ad hoc basis. Mr Lillie told us that the "provision of junior officers […] is very much an additional supporting role to help […] the South Korean forces"[571] (who make up the bulk of UNCMAC's special security force for the JSA). In correspondence following our visit to the JSA, the FCO confirmed the information that we had received there, namely that "commitments elsewhere have meant that [the UK has] not had officers available for the attachment since January 2008".[572] The FCO told us that the "Government remains willing to continue this arrangement when capacity allows".[573]

304.  The UN Command has a Rear Headquarters in Japan. Under the 1954 status of forces agreement (SOFA) between the UN Command and Tokyo, the UN Command is allowed to use seven bases in Japan. The SOFA also specifies that the UN Command is to provide an international officer at its Rear Headquarters. The UK previously provided the international officer, but in 2007 it decided to withdraw its permanent post. During our visit to the region, we heard that the UN Command's sending states had agreed in principle to provide the officer in rotation, but we encountered some uncertainty about the provision of the officer after the tour of the duty of the initial Thai officer finished at the end of 2008. In subsequent correspondence, the FCO told us that Turkey and then France had agreed to provide the officer after Thailand, and that the UK had committed to providing the officer in 2015.[574]

305.  We conclude that although there had been some risk of a disjunction opening up between the evolution of the bilateral South Korean-US military relationship and the formal responsibilities of the wider UN Command for peace and security on the Korean peninsula, under UN Security Council Resolution 84 and the Armistice Agreement, the UN Commander and his team are making efforts to avoid this risk, and that this is to be welcomed. We recommend that the Government should participate actively in UN Command preparations for the transfer of operational wartime command to South Korea in 2012.

306.  We conclude that the Government's continued willingness to send officers to serve in the UNCMAC Joint Duty Office and at the UNC Rear Headquarters in Japan is a welcome expression of the UK's commitment to the UN Command. We conclude that the agreement reached among the Command's participating states to ensure the continued provision of an international officer at Rear Headquarters is to be particularly commended.

---

171   Ev 84-85 Back

172   See para 269 below. Back

173   Q 27. The UN definition of a "complex emergency" is "a humanitarian crisis in a country, region or society where there is total or considerable breakdown of authority resulting from internal or external conflict and which requires an international response that goes beyond the mandate or capacity of any single agency and/or the ongoing United Nations country programme"; www.reliefweb.int. Back

174   Ev 86 Back

175   Foreign Affairs Committee, Seventh Report of Session 2005-06, East Asia, HC 860-I, paras 203-6 Back

176   Ev 56 Back

177   For the history of North Korea's nuclear programme and international efforts against it, this section draws largely on International Institute for Strategic Studies, North Korea's Weapons Programmes: A Net Assessment (Basingstoke, 2004) Back

178   Foreign Affairs Committee, Seventh Report of Session 2005-06, East Asia, HC 860-I, paras 182-98 Back

179   Ev 80 Back

180   Q 112 Back

181   "US increases estimate of N. Korean plutonium", Washington Post, 14 May 2008; " N. Korea 'admits making 37 kg of plutonium'", Chosun Ilbo, 3 June 2008; "Leap of nuclear faith", Wall Street Journal, 27 June 2008; "N. Korea razes cooling tower in show of nuclear accord", Washington Post, 28 June 2008; "'2 kg of plutonium used in N-test': N. Korea's report to China shows that 30 kilograms were extracted", Daily Yomiuri, 3 July 2008; "N. Korea 'produced plutonium for six bombs'", Chosun Ilbo, 20 September 2008 Back

182   Ev 70 Back

183   Ev 69 [FCO] Back

184   See paras 151-61 below.  Back

185   Ev 69 [FCO]; UNSCR 1718, 14 October 2006 Back

186   "Joint Statement issued at the Fourth Round of the Six-Party Talks", Beijing, 19 September 2005, in Robert Carlin and John W. Lewis, "Negotiating with North Korea: 1992-2007", Center for International Security and Co-operation, Stanford University, January 2008, Appendix B Back

187   Ev 100-101 Back

188   Ev 100 [Dr Kong]; "N Korea reactor closed down, UN confirms", Financial Times, 17 July 2007 Back

189   "Second-Phase Actions for the Implementation of the Joint Statement", 3 October 2007, in Robert Carlin and John W. Lewis, "Negotiating with North Korea: 1992-2007", Center for International Security and Co-operation, Stanford University, January 2008, Appendix B  Back

190   Q 21 Back

191   Q 107 Back

192   "North Korean Six-Party Talks and Implementation Activities", Statement before the Senate Committee on Armed Services, 31 July 2008, via www.state.gov Back

193   See paras 122-3 below. Back

194   Q 22 Back

195   "Past deals by N Korea may face less study", New York Times, 18 April 2008 Back

196   Q 113 Back

197   "US to remove North Korea from terror list", New York Times, 26 June 2008 Back

198   "North Korea contradicts US plutonium estimates", International Herald Tribune, 2 June 2008; "North Korea nuke declaration signals start of new phase", Korea Herald, 27 June 2008; "Leap of nuclear faith", Wall Street Journal Europe, 30 June 2008 Back

199   "North Korea: Presidential Action on State Sponsor of Terrorism (SST) and the Trading with the Enemy Act (TWEA)", US State Department press release, 26 June 2008 Back

200   "North Korea: Sanctions working?", Foreign Secretary's blog, 27 June 2008 Back

201   For Japan, see paras 35, 61 above. Back

202   Q 107 Back

203   Ev 80 Back

204   "Update on Six-Party Process", 6 September 2008, transcript via www.state.gov Back

205   "North Korea hardens stance on nuclear issue", International Herald Tribune, 19 September 2008 Back

206   "N Korea nuclear seals removed", BBC News online, 24 September 2008 Back

207   Assistant Secretary of State Sean McCormack, "Briefing on North Korea", 11 October 2008, transcript via www.state.gov Back

208   "N Korea hails terror list removal", BBC News online, 12 October 2008; "NK restores nuclear site access", BBC News online, 13 October 2008 Back

209   "Latest US-N. Korea deal is 'very modest step' forward", interview with Gary Samore, Vice-President of the Council on Foreign Relations, 14 October 2008, via www.cfr.org Back

210   See paras 229-34 below.  Back

211   Ev 101 Back

212   Ev 103 Back

213   Ev 70 Back

214   Q 113 Back

215   See para 115 above. Back

216   "US details reactor in Syria; Americans push Damascus, N. Korea to admit collusion", Washington Post, 25 April 2008 Back

217   Q 113 Back

218   See para 154 below. Back

219   Q 113 Back

220   "Diplomats: Syria passes 1^st test of nuclear probe", Associated Press, 20 September 2008 Back

221   "Diplomats: IAEA says Syrian nuke info needs probe", Associated Press, 29 October 2008 Back

222   Council for Foreign Relations conference call with Gary Samore on North Korea, 27 June 2008, transcript via www.cfr.org; International Institute for Strategic Studies, Nuclear Programmes in the Middle East (London, 2008), pp 73-6 Back

223   "North Korea: Sanctions working?", Foreign Secretary's blog, 27 June 2008 Back

224   Q 21. See Foreign Affairs Committee, Seventh Report of Session 2005-06, East Asia, HC 860-I, para 207. Back

225   Q 21 Back

226   Ev 83 Back

227   Foreign Affairs Committee, Seventh Report of Session 2005-06, East Asia, HC 860-I, para 228 Back

228   FCO, Foreign Affairs Committee, Seventh Report of Session 2005-06: East Asia: Response of the Secretary of State for Foreign and Commonwealth Affairs, Cm 6944, October 2006, para 69 Back

229   Q 107 Back

230   Ev 99 Back

231   Q 22 Back

232   "Ruling on North Korea angers US hardliners", International Herald Tribune, 28 June 2008; "The troubled North Korea deal", New York Times, 29 September 2008. We noted reported differences within the Bush Administration in our 2006 Report; Foreign Affairs Committee, Seventh Report of Session 2005-06, East Asia, HC 860-I, para 207. Back

233   Q 22 Back

234   International Institute for Strategic Studies, North Korea's Weapons Programmes: A Net Assessment (Basingstoke, 2004), p 24 Back

235   Q 23 Back

236   Q 23 Back

237   Ev 82 Back

238   Ev 82 Back

239   Ev 80 Back

240   Q 22 Back

241   Q 22; see also Ev 81. Back

242   Ev 82 Back

243   Q 22 Back

244   Q 22 Back

245   Ev 103 Back

246   Q 23 Back

247   Q 23; see also Q11. Back

248   Q 23 Back

249   Q 23 Back

250   Q 24 Back

251   Q 24 Back

252   Q 24 Back

253   Cabinet Office, The National Security Strategy of the United Kingdom, Cm 7291, March 2008, p 47 Back

254   Foreign Affairs Committee, Second Report of Session 2007-08, Global Security: Russia, HC 51, paras 315-28 Back

255   Ibid., para 319 Back

256   Foreign Affairs Committee, Second Report of Session 2007-08, Global Security: Russia, HC 51, para 328 Back

257   "Russia 'regrets' North Korea's halt in nuclear disablement", Associated Press, 27 August 2008 Back

258   Q 110 Back

259   Ev 70 Back

260   Paras 269-90 Back

261   We published a Report on Global Security: Iran earlier in 2008; Fifth Report of Session 2007-08, HC 142 Back

262   Lawrence Korb and Sean Duggan, "Pay heed to Pyongyang: The US could have struck a deal with North Korea years ago - it would be foolish to wait with Iran", The Guardian, 9 July 2008; "US shift on Iran talks seems lifted from its N Korea playbook", Chicago Tribune, 17 July 2008 Back

263   Q 112 Back

264   Cabinet Office, The National Security Strategy of the United Kingdom, Cm 7291, March 2008, p 12 Back

265   Ev 69 Back

266   See "Announcement of new inquiry: 'Global Security: Non-Proliferation'", Foreign Affairs Committee press notice 38 (Session 2007-08), 14 July 2008. Back

267   Ev 70 Back

268   Foreign Affairs Committee, Seventh Report of Session 2005-06, East Asia, HC 860-I, para 199 Back

269   Daniel Pinkston, "The North Korean Ballistic Missile Program", Strategic Studies Institute, US Army War College, February 2008, p 49 Back

270   Ibid., p 52 Back

271   Ev 70 Back

272   "Statement by G8 Leaders: The G8 Global Partnership Against the Spread of Weapons and Materials of Mass Destruction", Kananaskis, 27 June 2002, via www.g8.utoronto.ca Back

273   FCO/BERR/MOD, Global Threat Reduction Programme, Fifth Annual Report 2007, February 2008 Back

274   Foreign Affairs Committee, Second Report of Session 2007-08, Global Security: Russia, HC 51, para 336 Back

275   FCO, Foreign Affairs Committee, Second Report of Session 2007-08: Global Security: Russia: Response of the Secretary of State for Foreign and Commonwealth Affairs, Cm 7305, February 2008, para 95. See also FCO/BERR/MOD, Global Threat Reduction Programme, Fifth Annual Report 2007, February 2008, p 51 Back

276   FCO/BERR/MOD, Global Threat Reduction Programme, Fifth Annual Report 2007, February 2008, p 1 Back

277   Menas Korea Focus, February 2008 Back

278   Q 6 Back

279   Ev 70 Back

280   "The Asian military balance", in International Institute for Strategic Studies, Asia's Strategic Challenges: In Search of a Common Agenda, conference publication from the IISS-JIIA Tokyo Conference, 2-4 June 2008, p 71 Back

281   Daniel Pinkston, "The North Korean Ballistic Missile Program", Strategic Studies Institute, US Army War College, February 2008  Back

282   "The Asian military balance", in International Institute for Strategic Studies, Asia's Strategic Challenges: In Search of a Common Agenda, conference publication from the IISS-JIIA Tokyo Conference, 2-4 June 2008, p 71 Back

283   Para 56; see also para 316 below. Back

284   Ev 80 Back

285   Foreign Affairs Committee, Seventh Report of Session 2005-06, East Asia, HC 860-I, para 193 Back

286   UNSCR 1695, 15 July 2006 Back

287   FCO, Foreign Affairs Committee, Seventh Report of Session 2005-06: East Asia: Response of the Secretary of State for Foreign and Commonwealth Affairs, Cm 6944, October 2006, para 67 Back

288   Daniel Pinkston, "The North Korean Ballistic Missile Program", Strategic Studies Institute, US Army War College, February 2008, p vii Back

289   Ibid., p 57 Back

290   See para 104 above. Back

291   Foreign Affairs Committee, Seventh Report of Session 2005-06, East Asia, HC 860-I, para 202 Back

292   Daniel Pinkston, "The North Korean Ballistic Missile Program", Strategic Studies Institute, US Army War College, February 2008, p 57 Back

293   Ibid., p 57 Back

294   FCO, Foreign Affairs Committee, Seventh Report of Session 2005-06: East Asia: Response of the Secretary of State for Foreign and Commonwealth Affairs, Cm 6944, October 2006, para 67 Back

295   Ibid., paras 65-66 Back

296   "Ready for launch? North Korea's new missile facility", Jane's Defence Weekly, 16 September 2008 Back

297   "N Korea 'builds new missile site'", BBC News online, 11 September 2008 Back

298   "US says North Korea conducted missile engine test", Associated Press, 16 September 2008  Back

299   "North Korean plane was grounded at US request", Wall Street Journal, 1 November 2008  Back

300   "Situation of human rights in the Democratic People's Republic of Korea: Report of the Secretary General", UN General Assembly, A/62/318, 4 September 2007 Back

301   FCO, Human Rights Annual Report 2007, Cm 7340, March 2008, p 148 Back

302   Ev 72 [FCO] Back

303   See paras 191-214 below. Back

304   BBC News' online report of its coverage, including footage shot by the South Koreans, was headlined "Deadly risks in escaping N Korea", via www.bbc.co.uk/news, 29 May 2008 Back

305   Ev 67 [FCO] Back

306   Ev 71  Back

307   Q 114 Back

308   US State Department, 2007 Country Reports on Human Rights Practices: Democratic People's Republic of Korea, 11 March 2008, via www.state.gov Back

309   North Korea country chapter, 2008 World Report, via www.hrw.org Back

310   "Report of the Special Rapporteur on the situation of human rights in the DRPK", A/63/322, UN General Assembly, 22 August 2008 Back

311   Foreign Affairs Committee, Ninth Report of Session 2007-08, Human Rights Annual Report 2007, HC 533, para 148 Back

312   FCO, Ninth Report from the Foreign Affairs Committee Session 2007-08: Annual Report on Human Rights 2007: Response of the Secretary of State for Foreign and Commonwealth Affairs, Cm 7463, September 2008, para 87 Back

313   Apart from the specific sources cited, this list draws on the FCO's submission to our inquiry, the FCO Human Rights Annual Report 2007, reports of the UN Special Rapporteur and the UN Secretary-General, and publications of Amnesty International and Human Rights Watch.  Back

314   Q 29 Back

315   www.rsf.org Back

316   "Report of the Special Rapporteur on the situation of human rights in the DRPK", A/HRC/7/20, UN Human Rights Council, Seventh Session, 15 February 2008, para 25 Back

317   Ev 94 Back

318   Ev 92 Back

319   Ev 108 [FCO]; see paras 196-210 below. Back

320   North Korea chapter in the US State Department's International Religious Freedom Report 2008, 19 September 2008, via www.state.gov Back

321   Year-by-year database at www.handsoffcain.info, as of September 2008 Back

322   See paras 58-68. Back

323   "Report of the Special Rapporteur on the situation of human rights in the DRPK", A/HRC/7/20, UN Human Rights Council, Seventh Session, 15 February 2008, para 27  Back

324   Q 43 Back

325   Human Rights Watch, North Korea country chapter, 2008 World Report, via www.hrw.org Back

326   Ev 72 Back

327   Q 114 Back

328   "Situation of human rights in the Democratic People's Republic of Korea", A/HRC/Res/7/15, Human Rights Council, Seventh Session, 27 March 2008 Back

329   Ev 71 Back

330   Q 51 Back

331   Q 57 Back

332   Q 57 Back

333   Q 116 Back

334   Q 114 Back

335   Ev 72 Back

336   Q 114 Back

337   Ev 85 Back

338   Ev 86 Back

339   Qq 52-3 Back

340   Ev 67 Back

341   For which, see paras 238-40 below. Back

342   See paras 241-5 below. Back

343   Q 54 Back

344   Foreign Affairs Committee, Third Report of Session 2006-07, Human Rights Annual Report 2006, HC 269, paras 12-19; Foreign Affairs Committee, Ninth Report of Session 2007-08, Human Rights Annual Report 2007, HC 533, paras 13-19 Back

345   Foreign Affairs Committee, Ninth Report of Session 2007-08, Human Rights Annual Report 2007, HC 533, para 16 Back

346   Paras 376-408 Back

347   FCO, Foreign Affairs Committee, Ninth Report of Session 2007-08: Annual Report on Human Rights 2007: Response of the Secretary of State for Foreign and Commonwealth Affairs, Cm 7463, September 2008, para 11 Back

348   "Child malnutrition rates in North Korea fall, but UN agencies say more help is needed to build on gains", World Food Programme press release, 5 March 2005, via www.wfp.org Back

349   "Report of the Special Rapporteur on the situation of human rights in the DRPK", A/HRC/7/20, UN Human Rights Council, Seventh Session, 15 February 2008, para 15 Back

350   Q 28 Back

351   www.wfp.org Back

352   "WFP concerned about food shortfall in DPRK; seeks to increase aid", WFP press release, 28 March 2007, via www.wfp.org Back

353   Q 29 Back

354   Q 33 Back

355   Qq 48, 50  Back

356   "WFP warns of potential humanitarian food crisis in DPRK following critically low harvest", WFP press release, 16 April 2008, via www.wfp.org Back

357   Ibid. Back

358   "DPRK survey confirms deepening hunger for millions", WFP press release, 30 July 2008, and "Executive Summary: Rapid Food Security Assessment, Democratic People's Republic of Korea", World Food Programme, June/July 2008, via www.wfp.org Back

359   "WFP warns of potential humanitarian food crisis in DPRK following critically low harvest", WFP press release, 16 April 2008, via www.wfp.org Back

360   See para 216 below.  Back

361   "DPRK survey confirms deepening hunger for millions", WFP press release, 30 July 2008, via www.wfp.org Back

362   See paras 241-5 below. Back

363   "Executive Summary: Rapid Food Security Assessment, Democratic People's Republic of Korea", World Food Programme, June/July 2008, via www.wfp.org Back

364   "UN steps up aid to North Korea to avert famine", Financial Times, 3 September 2008 Back

365   "US resumes North Korea food aid", BBC News online, 16 May 2008 Back

366   See para 116 above. Back

367   Q 122 Back

368   Q 48 Back

369   Q 28 Back

370   Congressional Research Service Report for Congress, "North Korean Refugees in China and Human Rights Issues: International Response and US Policy Options", RL 34189, 26 September 2007, p 9 Back

371   "Deadly risks in escaping North Korea", BBC News online, 29 May 2008 Back

372   "North Korea: Harsher Policies against Border-Crossers", Human Rights Watch Background Briefing, March 2007 Back

373   Ev 71 Back

374   FCO, Human Rights Annual Report 2007, Cm 7340, March 2008, p 149 Back

375   Congressional Research Service Report for Congress, "North Korean Refugees in China and Human Rights Issues: International Response and US Policy Options", RL 34189, 26 September 2007 Back

376   Ev 106 [FCO] Back

377   Ev 106 Back

378   Congressional Research Service Report for Congress, "North Korean Refugees in China and Human Rights Issues: International Response and US Policy Options", RL 34189, 26 September 2007, p 10; Joel R. Charny, "Acts of Betrayal: The Challenge of Protecting North Koreans in China", Refugees International, April 2005, p 7 Back

379   Congressional Research Service Report for Congress, "North Korean Refugees in China and Human Rights Issues: International Response and US Policy Options", RL 34189, 26 September 2007, p 10; see para 207 below. Back

380   Joel R. Charny, "Acts of Betrayal: The Challenge of Protecting North Koreans in China", Refugees International, April 2005, p 7 Back

381   www.amnesty.org Back

382   On the situation of North Korean children in China, see "Deadly risks in escaping North Korea", BBC News online, 29 May 2008, and a number of recent articles by Kay Seok, a researcher for Human Rights Watch, which published a report on the topic in April 2008: "Denied Status, Denied Education: Children of North Korean Women in China", Human Rights Watch report, April 2008; "How China breaks up refugees' homes", International Herald Tribune, 9 April 2008; "Unusual cruelty", The Guardian, 23 May 2008 Back

383   Congressional Research Service Report for Congress, "North Korean Refugees in China and Human Rights Issues: International Response and US Policy Options", RL 34189, 26 September 2007, p 13 Back

384   Ev 108 [FCO]; "Forced labour in North Korean prison camps", Anti-Slavery International, August 2007; Congressional Research Service Report for Congress, "North Korean Refugees in China and Human Rights Issues: International Response and US Policy Options", RL 34189, 26 September 2007; "Report of the Special Rapporteur on the situation of human rights in the DPRK", A/62/264, UN General Assembly, 15 August 2007, "Report of the Special Rapporteur on the situation of human rights in the DPRK", A/HRC/7/20, UN Human Rights Council, Seventh Session, 15 February 2008; North Korea country chapter, Amnesty International Report 2008, via www.amnesty.org Back

385   "North Korea: Harsher Policies against Border-Crossers", Human Rights Watch Background Briefing, March 2007; "Report of the Special Rapporteur on the situation of human rights in the DPRK", A/HRC/7/20, UN Human Rights Council, Seventh Session, 15 February 2008 Back

386   Q 38  Back

387   Q 116 Back

388   Joel R. Charny, "Acts of Betrayal: The Challenge of Protecting North Koreans in China", Refugees International, April 2005, pp 12-13; Congressional Research Service Report for Congress, "North Korean Refugees in China and Human Rights Issues: International Response and US Policy Options", RL 34189, 26 September 2007, p 10 Back

389   Q 29 Back

390   Convention Relating to the Status of Refugees, 1951, Article 33, para 1 Back

391   James C. Hathaway, The Rights of Refugees under International Law (Cambridge, 2005), chapters 3.1 and 4.1 Back

392   Ev 106 Back

393   Q 125 Back

394   Convention Relating to the Status of Refugees, 1951, Article 1 Back

395   Q 125 Back

396   Convention Relating to the Status of Refugees, 1951, Article 33, para 1 Back

397   Executive Committee of the High Commissioner's Programme, "Non-refoulement", Conclusion No 6 (XVIII), 1977 Back

398   "Note on International Protection: Report by the High Commissioner", A/AC.96/1053, 30 June 2008, Executive Committee of the High Commissioner's Programme, 59th Session, Geneva, 6-10 October 2008  Back

399   Quoted in Joel R. Charny, "Acts of Betrayal: The Challenge of Protecting North Koreans in China", Refugees International, April 2005, p 15  Back

400   UNHCR, "Handbook on Procedures and Criteria for Determining Refugee Status under the 1951 Convention and the 1967 Protocol relating to the Status of Refugees", HCR/IP/4/Eng/REV.1, Geneva, 1979, re-edited 1992, paras 94-96 Back

401   Convention Relating to the Status of Refugees, 1951, Article 35, para 1 Back

402   Convention Against Torture and Other Cruel, Inhuman or Degrading Treatment or Punishment, A/RES/39/46, 10 December 1984 Back

403   Congressional Research Service Report for Congress, "North Korean Refugees in China and Human Rights Issues: International Response and US Policy Options", RL 34189, 26 September 2007, p 11; Joel R. Charny, "Acts of Betrayal: The Challenge of Protecting North Koreans in China", Refugees International, April 2005 Back

404   Q 124 Back

405   FCO, Human Rights Annual Report 2007, Cm 7340, March 2008, p 149 Back

406   Q 125 Back

407   See Foreign Affairs Committee, Seventh Report of Session 2005-06, East Asia, HC 860-I, paras 350-2 and Annex 1. Back

408   Ev 106 Back

409   Ev 109 Back

410   North Korean Human Rights Reauthorization Act of 2008, H.R.5834, ENR, 3 January 2008, Section 3 para 5 Back

411   See para 174. Back

412   "Lee urges Hu not to repatriate N Koreans", Korea Herald, 26 August 2008 Back

413   Joel R. Charny, "Acts of Betrayal: The Challenge of Protecting North Koreans in China", Refugees International, April 2005, p 12 Back

414   UNHCR, "Country Operations Plan 2007-People's Republic of China", 1 September 2006, p 6, via www.unhcr.org Back

415   UNHCR, "Country Operations Plan 2007-People's Republic of China", 1 September 2006, pp 2-3, via www.unhcr.org Back

416   See para 176 above. Back

417   FCO, Human Rights Annual Report 2007, Cm 7340, March 2008, p 149 Back

418   Joel R. Charny, "Acts of Betrayal: The Challenge of Protecting North Koreans in China", Refugees International, April 2005, p 17 Back

419   Amnesty International Report 2007, via www.amnesty.org Back

420   North Korea country chapter, 2008 World Report, via www.hrw.org Back

421   "Report of the Special Rapporteur on the situation of human rights in the DRPK", A/HRC/7/20, UN Human Rights Council, Seventh Session, 15 February 2008, para 54 Back

422   "Mongolia: Protect rights of North Korean migrant workers", Human Rights Watch press release, 19 August 2008, via www.hrw.org Back

423   Q 27  Back

424   Kay Seok, "How famine changed N Korea", The Washington Post, 26 February 2008, and "North Korea's Transformation: Famine, Aid and Markets", April 2008, via the Human Rights Watch website, www.hrw.org; Andrei Lankov, "Staying Alive. Why North Korea Will Not Change", Foreign Affairs, March/April 2008; "N Korea struggles to control changing economy", BBC News online, 26 August 2008; "Survival of the fittest. North Korean society is turbulent and in flux", The Economist, 27 September 2008. A review of recent accounts of North Korea is Christian Caryl, "The Other North Korea", New York Review of Books, 14 August 2008. Back

425   Ev 102 Back

426   Q 29 Back

427   Q 27 Back

428   Ev 72 Back

429   Q 29 Back

430   Q 23 Back

431   Q 23 Back

432   Ev 84 Back

433   Q 27 Back

434   Q 27 Back

435   Q 27 Back

436   Q 27 Back

437   Ev 103 Back

438   Q 27 Back

439   Q 22 Back

440   Q 22 Back

441   Q 27 Back

442   Ev 101 Back

443   Ev 101 Back

444   Andrei Lankov, "Staying Alive. Why North Korea Will Not Change", Foreign Affairs, March/April 2008 Back

445   Q 27 Back

446   Ev 102 Back

447   Q 116 Back

448   Foreign Affairs Committee, Seventh Report of Session 2005-06, East Asia, HC 860-I, paras 213-20 Back

449   Q 116  Back

450   Ev 102 Back

451   "A hardline approach to North Korea will not work", Financial Times, 24 March 2008; "Staying Alive. Why North Korea Will Not Change", Foreign Affairs, March/April 2008 Back

452   Ev 102 Back

453   Ev 102 Back

454   Ev 82 Back

455   "North Korea leader 'recovering'", BBC News online, 10 September 2008 Back

456   "Kim Jong-il 'at football match'", BBC News online, 4 October 2008; "Doubts raised over Kim's latest photos", Korea Herald, 13 October 2008 Back

457   Q 27 Back

458   Q 27 Back

459   For example, "Kim rumours provide a wake-up call", BBC News online, 10 September 2008; "More than ever, uncertainty rules in North Korea: Questions of succession after Kim's reported stroke", International Herald Tribune, 11 September 2008; "Seoul baulks at prospect of North Korea's abrupt collapse", Financial Times, 13 September 2008; "Academics ponder N Korea after Kim Jong-il", Chosun Ilbo, 26 September 2008; "Seven questions: Reading the tea leaves in Pyongyang", Foreign Policy online, September 2008 Back

460   Q 27 Back

461   "We have no plan", Chosun Ilbo, 9 June 2008 Back

462   Ev 85 Back

463   "Jaw-jaw. The international consequences of North Korea, and all the talk about it", The Economist, 27 September 2008 Back

464   Ev 85 Back

465   Council of the European Union, "Guidelines on the EU's foreign and security policy in East Asia", 20 December 2007 Back

466   Ev 52 Back

467   See para 182 above. Back

468   See paras 253-68 below. Back

469   www.nobelprize.org Back

470   Jim Hoare, "Does the sun still shine? The Republic of Korea's policy of engagement with the Democratic People's Republic of Korea", Asian Affairs, March 2008, p 76 Back

471   Ev 66 Back

472   Ev 66 [FCO] Back

473   Q 14 Back

474   James Foley, "Terms of endearment - South Korean President eclipses sunshine", Jane's Intelligence Review, 15 May 2008 Back

475   Q 117 Back

476   Q 14 Back

477   Q 117 Back

478   "Address by President Lee Myung-bak on the opening of the 18^th National Assembly", 11 July 2008, via www.english.president.go.kr Back

479   "Relations unravelling between the Koreas; Tourist's shooting sets back efforts on conciliation", Boston Globe, 11 August 2008 Back

480   Q 33 Back

481   Ev 80 Back

482   Q 33 Back

483   Q 33 Back

484   Q 33 Back

485   "N Korea fires off insult as soon as military talks end", Financial Times, 3 October 2008 Back

486   Q 104 Back

487   Q 32 Back

488   Ev 80 Back

489   Jim Hoare, "Does the sun still shine? The Republic of Korea's policy of engagement with the Democratic People's Republic of Korea", Asian Affairs, March 2008, p 81 Back

490   Andrei Lankov, "Staying Alive. Why North Korea Will Not Change", Foreign Affairs, March/April 2008 Back

491   Q 33 Back

492   Q 33 Back

493   Unless otherwise stated, we gathered the information in this section during our visit, where we were hosted by the official South Korean Kaesong Industrial Management Committee (KIDMAC).  Back

494   See also Ev 66 [FCO] and "Big dreams for North Korean industrial park", International Herald Tribune, 20 August 2008 Back

495   See para 260 below.  Back

496   Q 34 Back

497   See paras 216-9 above.  Back

498   Q 34 Back

499   Q 34 Back

500   Q 151 Back

501   See paras 260-2 below.  Back

502   Ev 52 Back

503   Ev 52 Back

504   North Korea country chapter, 2008 World Report, via www.hrw.org Back

505   Human Rights Watch, "The US-Korea Free Trade Agreement. Annex 22-B: A Missed Opportunity on Workers' Rights in North Korea", August 2007 Back

506   Q 39 Back

507   Q 39 Back

508   Q 121 Back

509   See paras 88-90 above. Back

510   Q 121 Back

511   Q 92 Back

512   Human Rights Watch, "The US-Korea Free Trade Agreement. Annex 22-B: A Missed Opportunity on Workers' Rights in North Korea", August 2007 Back

513   Annex 22-B, para 3 of the South Korea-US FTA, cited in Human Rights Watch, "The US-Korea Free Trade Agreement. Annex 22-B: A Missed Opportunity on Workers' Rights in North Korea", August 2007 Back

514   Human Rights Watch, "The US-Korea Free Trade Agreement. Annex 22-B: A Missed Opportunity on Workers' Rights in North Korea", August 2007 Back

515   Q 121 Back

516   Q 151 Back

517   Q 151 Back

518   Q 39 Back

519   The others are Bulgaria, the Czech Republic, Germany, Poland, Romania and Sweden. Back

520   Q 110 Back

521   Qq 25, 31 [Professor Smith], Q 104 [Dr Hoare] Back

522   Q 25 Back

523   Q 21 Back

524   Ev 86 Back

525   Qq 25, 31 Back

526   Ev 83 Back

527   Q 31 Back

528   Estonia is the only other EU state not to have diplomatic relations with Pyongyang.  Back

529   See paras 291-6 below.  Back

530   Ev 59 Back

531   Q 123 Back

532   Ev 71 Back

533   Q 104 Back

534   Ev 69-70 Back

535   Ev 71 Back

536   Paras 238-40 Back

537   Q 104 Back

538   Ev 84 Back

539   Ev 84 Back

540   HC Deb, 2 June 2008, col 698W  Back

541   Q 122 Back

542   Ev 84 Back

543   Q 31 Back

544   Q 26; see also Q 31 [Mr Foster-Carter], Q 57 [Ms Muico] Back

545   Qq 118, 122 Back

546   "British Council to extend English education program in N Korea", Yonap news agency, 29 May 2008, via BBC Monitoring Back

547   Ev 91 Back

548   Ev 95 Back

549   Ev 72 Back

550   Ev 71 Back

551   Q 57 Back

552   See paras 58-68 above.  Back

553   See HC Deb, 17 September 2007, col 125WS; HC Deb, 16 June 2008, col 726-9W. We discussed the changes to the defence attaché network in our First Report of Session 2007-08, Foreign and Commonwealth Office Annual Report 2006-07, HC 50, paras 167-172. Back

554   Q 128 Back

555   See paras 105-38 above. Back

556   The NNSC was established to monitor the Armistice in areas outside the Demilitarised Zone. Its original members were the then Czechoslovakia, Poland, Sweden and Switzerland.  Back

557   Ev 66 Back

558   Ev 56 Back

559   Q 127 Back

560   "A Cold War relic that refuses to die", Straits Times, 13 May 2008 Back

561   Q 129 Back

562   General B. B. Bell, "Role of United Nations Command", Seoul Foreign Correspondents' Club, 18 January 2007, transcript via www.usfk.mil Back

563   Q 127 Back

564   See para 73 above.  Back

565   General B. B. Bell, "Role of United Nations Command", Seoul Foreign Correspondents' Club, 18 January 2007, transcript via www.usfk.mil; also "Bell stresses UN Command role in crisis", Korea Times, 19 January 2007; "UN Command needs new peacetime role: USFK Chief", Chosun Ilbo, 20 January 2007 Back

566   See paras 72-3 above. Back

567   General B. B. Bell, "Role of United Nations Command", Seoul Foreign Correspondents' Club, 18 January 2007, transcript via www.usfk.mil Back

568   Q 127 Back

569   Q 129 Back

570   Ev 106. General Walter Sharp took over from General Bell in June 2008 as Commander of US Forces Korea, Combined Forces Command and UN Command (Korea).  Back

571   Q 128 Back

572   Ev 106 Back

573   Ev 106 Back

574   Ev 107 [FCO] Back

---

Prepared 30 November 2008