House of Commons - Foreign Affairs

Select Committee on Foreign Affairs Tenth Report

4 Japan and South Korea: International roles

307. Japan and South Korea are both expanding their international roles. The FCO told us that the two countries are "major 'like-minded' partners for the UK", with "a number of common objectives in international issues".[575] Among these, the FCO highlighted international security, climate change and poverty reduction.[576]

308. In financial terms, Japan plays a major international role. Japan is the largest aid donor in Asia and the fifth-largest in the world. It is the second-largest contributor to the UN budget after the US. However, Japan's international financial muscle is not matched militarily. Article 9 of Japan's Constitution renounces war and disallows the possession of armed forces. Japan maintains forces which are self-defence forces (SDF) only, and its current interpretation of the constitution restricts its ability to participate in UN peacekeeping missions and to engage in military co-operation with any countries other than the US. In recent years, against strong domestic opposition, specific legislative approval has been given for SDF ground and air forces to be deployed to Iraq, and for SDF naval forces to provide fuel to coalition vessels operating in the Indian Ocean in support of the US operation in Afghanistan. More ambitious proposals to reduce the constitutional constraints on Japan's ability to participate in UN peacekeeping and international military missions have so far come to nothing. The Japanese government is also pursuing a proposal, supported by the UK, that Japan should acquire a permanent seat on the UN Security Council.[577]

309. South Korea began to emerge internationally as it moved away from authoritarian rule in the late 1980s, a shift encapsulated in Seoul's hosting of the Olympic Games in 1988. In the security sphere, South Korea has remained focused on developments on the Korean peninsula and its immediate region, but the overall improvement in North-South security relations over the last decade—plus South Korea's increased economic and military capacities—have allowed Seoul to turn towards greater international engagement. President Lee is now promoting the notion of "Global Korea".

International military missions

JAPAN

310. Following the trauma of defeat in 1945—the only significant military defeat in the country's history—strong pacifist and anti-militarist sentiment developed in Japan. Article 9 of the 1947 Constitution renounces war as an instrument for settling international disputes and declares that the country will never again maintain "land, sea or air forces or other war potential".

311. In the initial post-war period, Japan was wholly dependent on the US occupation forces, aided by a small number of police, for its security. In 1950 most occupation forces were transferred from Japan to take part in the Korean War, prompting anxiety among some conservative politicians about Japan's capacity to defend itself. In 1952 the US and Japan signed the Mutual Security Assistance Pact, under which US forces would defend Japan against external aggression, while Japanese forces would deal with internal threats and national disasters. In 1960 the US-Japan Security Treaty was signed; this reconfirmed the pledge by the US to defend Japan (while imposing no reciprocal duty on the Japanese to defend the US).

312. With US approval, the Japanese Government in 1954 created the Self-Defence Force (SDF). Military terminology was (and still is) avoided as far as possible, so the new armed forces were named the Ground Self-Defence Force (GSDF), the Maritime Self-Defence Force (MSDF) and the Air Self-Defence Force (ASDF) rather than the army, navy and air force. Successive Japanese governments have maintained that the Constitution permits Japan to maintain a minimum level of armed strength commensurate with self-defence.

313. Japan's "Basic Policy for National Defence", adopted by the Cabinet in 1957, sets out six guiding principles:

1. Maintaining an exclusively defence-oriented policy.

2. To avoid becoming a major military power that might pose a threat to the world.

3. Refraining from the development of nuclear weapons, and to refuse to allow nuclear weapons inside Japanese territory.

4. Ensuring civilian control of the military.

5. Maintaining security arrangements with the United States.

6. Building up defensive capabilities within moderate limits.

314. In recent years, and particularly since the 11 September 2001 terrorist attacks on the US, there has been much debate in Japan about the future role of the Self-Defence Forces. In its memorandum to the Committee, RUSI commented:

Japan is at a crossroads. It has been shifted by events, by its main ally, and by its leaders, from its Cold War position of strong economic policies combined with passive security and foreign policies. Although policy-makers display a desire to be involved in world affairs like a "normal" country, there remain significant sections of Japanese society uncomfortable with the implications of the changes.[578]

315. For most of the history of the Self-Defence Force, the Japanese Government interpreted its function as being strictly restricted to the defence of the home islands. This definition excluded participation in peace-keeping missions.

316. Since the 1990s there has been a change of thinking, prompted by the following changes in Japan's security environment:

Criticism levelled at Japan during the first Gulf War for "cheque-book diplomacy", i.e. offering financial support rather than risking its own troops in combat or peacekeeping operations
China's missile-firing and troop exercises, the discovery of submerged Chinese submarines near Okinawa, and China's successful Anti-Satellite Test in January 2007
The launch of North Korean missiles over Japanese airspace in 1998, the North Korean nuclear crisis, and the discovery that Japanese citizens had been abducted from the Japanese mainland by special teams of North Korean agents
The wish to support the United States in its "war on terror".[579]

317. RUSI comments that "policy-makers now seek to normalise Japan's military status in two different ways: as a reliable partner with its main ally the US, and as a responsible member of the United Nations".[580]

318. In December 2004 the Japanese Government adopted new National Defence Programme Guidelines, taking into account the new global situation. Dr Swenson-Wright described this as "a major overhaul of Japan's national security doctrine", intended "to shift Japan's approach to security from a rather narrowly regionally-defined role to a much more self-consciously global role, harmonising its capabilities with America's global force posture review".[581] In January 2007, in recognition of this enhanced role, the Japan Defence Agency was upgraded to being a fully-fledged Defence Ministry.[582]

319. Since 1992, Japan has taken part in non-military peacekeeping (PKO), election-monitoring (EMO) and disaster relief (DRO) operations, to a total of 21 countries. However, RUSI claims that

Japanese peacekeeping forces are still hobbled by Diet-imposed rules, related to interpretation of the pacifist constitution. According to a Japanese government official, restrictions placed on Japanese PKO missions make them frustrating partners for other countries.[583]

320. Japanese forces have also, more controversially, been deployed abroad in support of the US "war on terror" and of coalition forces in Iraq. Two pieces of legislation have enabled this. One is the Anti-Terrorism Special Measures Law, passed shortly after the events of 11 September 2001. It allows deployment of Self-Defence Forces to take part in co-operation and support activities, search and rescue activities, and disaster relief for affected people. Under this law, Japanese supply vessels and Aegis destroyers have since 2001 provided fuel to coalition vessels operating in the Indian Ocean in support of the US operation in Afghanistan. This deployment was briefly suspended from November 2007 to January 2008 after the DPJ used its upper-house majority to block the renewal of the enabling legislation. An extension to the Anti-Terrorism Special Measures Law was then pushed onto the statute book by then Prime Minister Fukuda in January 2008 against the wishes of the upper house, employing a rarely-used procedural device roughly equivalent to the Parliament Act in the UK, and the deployment was resumed.[584] In October 2008 the lower house of the Diet approved legislation further to extend the deployment until January 2010.[585]

321. In July 2003 the Diet passed an "Iraq Reconstruction Law". This was used by former Prime Minister Koizumi, against strong domestic opposition, to deploy 550 ground SDF personnel to Iraq between 2004 and 2006. Japan also maintains an airlift mission there.

Japan's participation in international military missions
Afghanistan
Operating Enduring Freedom
Ongoing since 2001: Japanese vessels (1 tanker and 1 escort destroyer) are refuelling coalition vessels conducting interdiction operations in the Indian Ocean (apart from a break in November 2007—January 2008 owing to an opposition block on the enabling legislation in the upper house)
Japan is also a major funder of the international humanitarian and reconstruction effort in Afghanistan, to the tune of $1.2 billion since 2002
Iraq
2004-06: 550 ground troops deployed to southern Iraq for humanitarian and reconstruction assistance
Ongoing: Intra-theatre airlift mission (3 C-130 transport aircraft), currently authorised until July 2009
Japan has disbursed $1.5 billion in aid to Iraq and signed agreements for development loans totalling up to a further $2.1 billion
UN operations
Nepal
Ongoing since 2007: Six troops with UN military observer mission (UNMIN)
Golan Heights
Ongoing since 1996: Two staff officers plus 43-strong transport unit with UN peacekeeping mission (UNDOF)
In East Timor, Japan has recently completed participation in a mission, which follows two earlier missions as follows:
2007-2008: Two civilian police officers and support staff with UN Integrated Mission in Timor-Leste (UNMIT)
2002-2004: c. 680 military engineers and 10 staff officers with the UN Transitional Administration in East Timor (UNTAET), followed by the post-independence UN Mission of Support in East Timor (UNMISET)
1999: Three civilian police officers plus support staff with the pre-independence UN Mission in East Timor (UNAMET)
Other completed peacekeeping operations include: Cambodia (600 engineers, 8 ceasefire observers, 75 police officers, plus support ships, 1992-93); Mozambique (5 staff officers and 48-strong transport unit, 1993-95); and Rwanda (humanitarian support, 1994)

322. The Anti-Terrorism Special Measures Law is due to expire by January 2009. The government has proposed the introduction of a new permanent law to remove the requirement for the Diet to give case-by-case approval to SDF deployments overseas.

323. The amendment of Article 9 itself has been much discussed. As presently interpreted by the cabinet, it allows Japan to exercise a right to self-defence, but not to participate with other states in collective defence. There is strong public feeling in favour of Article 9, but an equally strong feeling in the ruling LDP that it needs to be changed. The LDP has drafted a revision of the Japanese Constitution, amending the Article, but to be enacted the bill needs approval by two-thirds majorities in the two Houses and a majority of the popular vote in a referendum. Former Prime Minister Koizumi tried but failed to secure enactment of a similar proposal. The LDP accepts that amending the Constitution is now a longer-term prospect, not likely to be achieved within the next five years. The immediate debate, accordingly, is about how to remove restrictions on peace-keeping deployments within the current Constitution.

324. Japan's defence capability is structured around the alliance with the US. Japan does not possess aircraft carriers, nuclear-powered submarines or large transport aircraft such as the C-17. This would limit her capacity to play a major military role in large-scale missions such as ISAF in Afghanistan or Operation Enduring Freedom. If a political decision were taken to participate in such missions, the procurement implications would need to be explored. During our visit to Japan, we were told that Japan would certainly have the technical capacity to build, for instance, large submarines or carriers comparable to the UK's Invincible class.

325. In its written evidence, the FCO stated that the Government "would like to see Japan doing more [on international peacekeeping] despite the constitutional constraints, and has lobbied for a greater contribution in Afghanistan and Africa among other places".[586] The FCO says that the UK's "primary security co-operation objective" regarding Japan is to "help build Japan's capacity for joint operations, particularly in the area of peace support activities combining civil and military effects".[587] Lord Malloch-Brown told us that it was very much in the UK's interest to encourage Japan,

within the limitations of article 9 of their post-war constitution, to become active in peacekeeping missions such as Afghanistan […]. We do not want Japan to skulk back into itself, disappointed by its lack of a global role or recognition of that global role, or to be thrown off balance by its increasingly competitive relationship with China.[588]

326. We conclude that Japan has offered valuable support to the international community through its very generous funding of peacekeeping and reconstruction activities, not least in Iraq and Afghanistan. We further conclude that the Japanese Government has displayed political courage in deploying Japanese ground and air forces to Iraq, and Japanese naval forces to assist in refuelling coalition vessels conducting operations in the Indian Ocean, and that these deployments are to be welcomed. We recommend that the Government should continue to engage with Japan as a co-operative partner in promoting international security and the fight against terrorism, and to encourage Japan to expand its participation in UN peacekeeping and international military missions as far as permitted by its Constitution to do so.

SOUTH KOREA

327. South Korea has the world's sixth-largest army and spends more on defence per capita than the UK.[589] South Korea does not have Japanese-style constitutional limitations on the use of military force or its deployment overseas. The FCO told us that South Korea's "desire to play a greater role on the international stage and to maintain its alliance with the US has led to South Korean soldiers being sent overseas to play a valuable and important role in the last six years".[590]

328. South Korea deployed forces to the US-led operations in both Afghanistan and Iraq:

In Afghanistan, South Korea deployed around 50 army medics and 150 engineers between 2002 and December 2007, with the loss of one soldier. Seoul ended the deployment a year before its scheduled conclusion, after Afghan militants demanding the troops' withdrawal kidnapped a group of South Korean missionaries and killed two of them. A small number of South Korean military and civilian personnel are now in Afghanistan as part of a Provincial Reconstruction Team based at Bagram Airbase.
In Iraq, South Korea was at one point the third-largest contributor of troops to the US-led Multinational Force, with 3,000 soldiers deployed. South Korea now has around 650 troops in Iraq, deployed in Irbil under US command as part of the Force's Multinational Division North until the end of 2008.

329. During his visit to Seoul in August 2008, US President Bush asked South Korea for "as much non-combat help as possible"[591] in Afghanistan. In response to the US request, South Korea may send more personnel to the Provincial Reconstruction Team, and despatch police officers to conduct training.[592] President Bush did not request a further South Korean military deployment in Afghanistan, despite speculation in advance of the summit that he would do so. It is assumed that President Lee would currently find such a request too sensitive domestically, given anti-American sentiment in Seoul surrounding the beef import row, and the way in which South Korea's previous deployment in Afghanistan was brought to an end.[593] The FCO noted that there was a possibility that the South Korean Navy might participate in Combined Task Force 150, a multinational naval force conducting counter-terrorism and anti-piracy operations in the Middle East and Indian Ocean as part of the US operation in Afghanistan.[594] As regards Iraq, the US has been reported as wanting to see South Korea extend its deployment in Iraq beyond the end-2008 deadline currently mandated,[595] but the Defence Ministry in Seoul was quoted in September as ruling this out, and the end of the deployment appeared to be confirmed by late October.[596]

330. South Korea has contributed troops to several UN peacekeeping operations. Deployments include over 300 troops with the UN mission in Lebanon since July 2007—extended for another year in July 2008[597]—and small numbers of police deployed with the UN missions in Sudan and East Timor. South Korea also has small numbers of military observers with the UN missions in Georgia, Kashmir, Liberia and Nepal. Among completed South Korean deployments, South Korea contributed to UN peacekeeping missions in Somalia, Angola and Western Sahara, and a South Korean served as Commander of the UN mission in Cyprus in 2001-2003. In 2008, the possibility of South Korean participation in the UN mission in Darfur is under active consideration in Seoul.

331. The FCO identified South Korea as having "modern and capable defence forces", and therefore as possessing "considerable potential as a substantial contributor to international peacekeeping operations".[598] It added that "the UK's primary defence relations objective [in the country] is to persuade South Korea to contribute more to global PSO [peace support operations]".[599] South Korea is expected to create a force of 1,000 for participation in UN operations by the end of 2008, expanding to 2,000 by 2012. However, the FCO also noted that South Korea's regional security responsibilities have always taken precedence over any wider international role, and that the conscript nature of the country's armed forces acts as a further constraint on overseas deployments.[600]

332. Deployments of South Korean forces overseas require specific annual approval from the National Assembly. The FCO told us that legislation was likely to be proposed that would allow South Korea to deploy forces to UN-mandated missions without such approval. The FCO said that such legislation would "facilitate rapid deployment of Korean forces on UN PSO"[601] and help to "enhance Korea's ability to contribute to global PSO",[602] although it noted that similar proposals had failed on three previous occasions to go through the legislature.[603] We heard in Seoul that the possible legislation might also apply to missions other than those taking place under UN mandates.

333. We conclude that South Korea's growing willingness and ability to deploy its forces in international peacekeeping and peace support operations are to be welcomed. We further conclude that South Korea continues to make valuable contributions to the international efforts in Afghanistan and Iraq in which the UK is also engaged. We recommend that the Government should continue to encourage South Korea to participate more extensively in international peacekeeping and peace support operations and to enhance its capacities to do so.

Climate change

JAPAN

334. Action on climate change has been one of the major themes of Japan's G8 Presidency. Former Prime Minister Fukuda announced at the Davos World Economic Forum in January 2008 that he would follow his predecessor Mr Abe's proposal that the world should reduce total greenhouse emissions by half by 2050 ("the 50/50 proposal"). Mr Fukuda put forward the following programme to achieve this:

Japan would agree to set a post-Kyoto "quantified national target", which could be based on a bottom-up system of industry-based targets. However, the 1990 Kyoto base year "must" be reviewed: it is argued that Japan's 6% emissions reduction target under Kyoto was unfair because it did not recognise the energy-efficiency gains Japan had already made.

The "Cool Earth Partnership" will offer $10 billion of economic assistance to developing countries, to encourage them to reduce their emissions.

Japan proposes to set up a new multilateral fund jointly with the US and UK.

Japan will invest $30 billion in energy research and development over the next five years.

335. As regards the setting of overall national targets for emissions reductions, the FCO reports that Japanese representatives "coordinated their position very closely with the US" at the UN Bali meeting in December 2007 and "were consistently among the back markers" in resisting further mention of short-term emissions reduction targets for developed countries."[604] Dr Swenson-Wright told the Committee that:

Japan is trying to present itself as a mediating force between the European Union—with its preference for some sort of top-down, unified set of standards to deal with climate change, as well as a system of emissions trading—and the United States, which we know is very sceptical about the merits of binding national targets.[605]

336. Dr Swenson-Wright noted that tension between Japan's Environment Ministry, which favours more radical action on climate change, and the Ministry of Economy, Trade and Industry which favours a stance based on voluntary agreements, has led to "a reluctance to set formal targets or to establish a clear time frame".[606] Dr Swenson-Wright judged that climate change should be the FCO's top priority with Japan and identified the issue as "probably the area in which there is the most opportunity to enhance and develop the bilateral relationship".[607]

337. On 23 April 2008 a joint Japan-EU statement was issued following the annual summit between EU and Japanese leaders in Tokyo. On climate change the leaders accepted that "setting mid-term quantified national emissions reduction targets is an essential element of […] a fair and flexible framework in which major economies participate substantially". The EU and Japan undertook to ensure that the forthcoming G8 summit would contribute to reducing emissions. They stressed that "a highly ambitious and binding international approach is required to deal with the scale and urgency of the climate change challenge".[608] European Commission President Barroso welcomed the joint statement, saying that on climate change it represented a "convergence" between the positions of the EU and Japan.[609]

338. The G8 leaders met in Hokkaido in July 2008 and agreed the following statement of "vision":

We seek to share with all parties to the UNFCCC [the United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change] the vision of, and together with them to consider and adopt in the UNFCCC negotiations, the goal of achieving at least 50% reduction of global emissions by 2050, recognising that this global challenge can only be met by a global response, in particular, by the contributions from all major economies, consistent with the principle of common but differentiated responsibilities and respective capabilities.

339. Then Prime Minister Fukuda interpreted the G8 statement as giving support to, or at least not being incompatible with, three of Japan's goals:

The target of a 50% reduction in greenhouse gas emissions by 2050.
The desirability of setting different industrial sectors different targets with the aim of preserving competitiveness.
That the baseline year should be the present rather than 1990, which Japan argues effectively penalises her because she, unlike most other countries, had already made good progress in achieving energy efficiency by that date.[610]

340. On the final day of the meeting the G8 leaders were joined by the leaders of eight "emerging economies", and all 16, comprising a 'Major Economies Meeting' (MEM), agreed a further statement.[611] Environmental campaigners denounced both the G8 and MEM conclusions as being vague and unspecific, pointing out that none of the "big polluters"—the United States, India and China—had given binding undertakings that they would take particular steps to achieve the "50/50" goal.[612]

341. We recommend that the Government should, with its EU partners, continue to work with Japan to develop a common approach on developing realistic proposals for a reduction in emissions and other measures to tackle climate change.

SOUTH KOREA

342. Per capita, South Korea is one of the OECD's largest greenhouse gas emitters,[613] and the world's ninth-largest overall.[614] Lord Malloch-Brown noted that South Korea "has one of the bigger emissions footprints around".[615] This is largely owing to the way in which South Korea's economic development since the 1960s has been based on heavy industries.

343. South Korea occupies what the FCO described as an "anomalous" position in the current international regime against climate change.[616] Under the 1992 United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change, and the Convention's subsequent—legally binding—Kyoto Protocol, South Korea is not among the industrialised countries which are committed to reductions in their greenhouse gas emissions (so-called "Annex I" countries). This is despite the economy's size and status as an OECD member. Given South Korea's position, the FCO told us that the country had "a potential role to play in bridging the gap between developed and developing countries"[617] which has become evident in the discussions about a successor regime to the Kyoto Protocol, which expires in 2012.

344. The FCO reported conflicting indications regarding South Korea's likely action against climate change. On the one hand, the FCO said that "the South Korean Government and business are increasingly preparing for […] the possibility of taking on board a commitment post-2012".[618] It also noted that "some South Korean officials have expressed strong interest in carbon pricing and trading", and that in December 2007 the South Korean Government had announced plans to boost renewable energy use.[619] On the other hand, the FCO also noted "widespread scepticism" about carbon pricing and trading, and "concerns over negative impacts on competitiveness" which "pose a considerable obstacle" to stronger action.[620] The FCO concluded that "economic growth will remain the highest priority" for the new South Korean Administration, although it also noted "indications that the new Government may react to growing international pressure with a more constructive approach on climate change policy".[621]

345. Dr Hoare was somewhat sceptical about prospects for strong South Korean action on climate change. He told us that "South Korea often pays lip service to such things", but that there was "pressure […] still for economic development and growth [which] […] tends to override other considerations". Dr Hoare suggested that little in President Lee's ambitious economic plans "seems to take much account of the climatic consequences of such a push for growth".[622]

346. South Korea's energy needs are likely to be a major consideration in its evolving approach to climate change issues. South Korea is almost entirely dependent on imports for its energy supplies: the FCO noted that the country is the world's fourth-largest importer of oil and second-largest importer of liquid natural gas,[623] and according to President Lee its energy self-sufficiency rate is around 5.0%.[624] High international energy prices are bringing home the implications of this dependence: the costs of South Korea's imported oil were reported to have risen by 60% in the first half of 2008, and the country is among those to have seen protests over the price of fuel.[625]

347. In late May 2008, Environment Secretary Hilary Benn signed Memorandums of Understanding in Seoul with the Ministry of the Environment and the Ministry of Knowledge Economy, on co-operation between the UK and South Korea in areas relevant to climate change including the economics of climate change, clean development mechanisms, low carbon technologies and emission trading schemes. The UK and South Korea are to produce a list of collaborative projects within six months.[626]

348. At the G8 summit in July hosted by Japan, at which he was invited to address the expanded session on climate change, President Lee said that South Korea would "vigorously support" the goal agreed by the G8 of halving global greenhouse gas emissions by 2050, and that Korea aimed to "play a bridging role between developed and developing countries". He also said that South Korea was "in the process of building national consensus" and that he hoped in 2009 to announce a national emissions reduction goal for 2020. President Lee said that the aim should be to "harmonise economic growth with mitigation of greenhouse gas emissions".[627] In his blog, the British Ambassador in Seoul, Martin Uden, said that President Lee's speech "amount[ed] to a clear step forward by his government in their consideration of how Korea should tackle climate change".[628]

349. In his opening address to the new National Assembly later in July, and especially in his speech on the anniversary of South Korea's foundation in August, President Lee went further in developing a climate change agenda. He heralded an "environmental revolution" and an "age of new energy", and he announced the need for a "paradigm shift" in South Korean economic development. President Lee said that "low carbon, green growth" should be "the core of the Republic's new vision". President Lee suggested that the development of green technologies would be a source of growth and jobs. He promised a package of follow-up measures, and a framework law on climate change.[629]

350. In his August address, President Lee targeted an energy self-sufficiency rate of 18% by the end of his term in 2012.[630] South Korea is addressing the energy independence issue partly by expanding nuclear power generation, and by beginning to develop its own energy extraction and delivery involvement overseas, in Africa, the Arctic and Antarctic, Central Asia, the Middle East and Iraq. In addition, President Lee has announced a further increase in funding for research and development of "green" technologies including new and renewable energy, aiming to increase the latter's share in South Korea's total from 2% at present to over 11% in 2030.[631]

351. We conclude that recent signs that South Korea is coming to see efforts to mitigate climate change as a potential source of growth, not an obstacle to it, are greatly to be welcomed. We recommend that the Government should continue to encourage South Korea to develop its efforts against climate change, focusing on the potential which the development of "green" technologies offers for the country to exploit its industrial and technological strengths to boost growth and reduce energy dependence, but still aiming to secure a concrete national emissions reduction commitment which would help towards the achievement of a global Kyoto successor agreement in 2009. We recommend that the Government should ensure that British companies are aware of opportunities for climate change-related projects which open up in South Korea. We further recommend that in its response to this Report, the Government should update us on progress regarding the implementation of the bilateral Memorandums of Understanding on climate change co-operation which were signed in May 2008.

Development assistance

JAPAN

352. Japan's aid budget has declined in recent years, and Japan has slipped from being the world's largest single aid donor in absolute terms to being the fifth-largest. According to OECD statistics, Japan's net Official Development Assistance (ODA) in 2007 was $7.69 billion (compared to $21.75 billion from the US, $12.27 billion from Germany, $9.94 billion from France, and $9.92 billion from the UK).[632] Most Japanese aid has traditionally gone to Asia and the Pacific, particularly China, and Indonesia and other ASEAN states. The FCO states that:

Japan was a significant contributor to the aid efforts after the tsunami, giving $500 million as well as providing logistical help on the ground. However, Japan has reduced its aid budget in recent years, reflecting economic difficulties and growing political opposition to the scale of grant aid offered to China.[633]

353. Japan's development policy is marked by an increasing number of partners for the government. These include other donors and international organisations, where Japan has links not only with traditional donors such as the UK and France but also emerging donors such as South Korea, Malaysia, Indonesia and Thailand.

354. Despite the overall decline in Japan's aid budget, the proportion allocated to Africa is increasing.[634] Japan hosted a major conference on development for African countries at the end of May 2008, as part of the build-up to the G8 summit in July. This was the fourth Tokyo International Conference on Africa (TICAD IV). Japanese policy in Africa is to focus on countries with good governance and few natural resources.

355. The Japanese are very conscious of the growing influence of China in Africa. When we visited Tokyo, we were told that Japan has no wish to compete with China in accessing natural resources in Africa, and lacks the resources to do so, but that it aimed to ensure that China at least does not undermine what Japan is doing.

356. Giving oral evidence in early July 2008, shortly before the G8 summit, Lord Malloch-Brown told us that:

The Japanese have also done pretty well on development. They had the Tokyo international conference on African aid, which discussed Japan-Africa development. It was quite a success, and that has given new momentum to development issues as we come into the G8 meeting.[635]

357. We conclude that Japan continues to play a positive role with regard to development issues. We recommend that the Government should continue to work with Japan in the G8 and other forums to press for the implementation of the Millennium Development Goals.

SOUTH KOREA

358. The FCO characterises South Korea as "a key emerging donor with a great deal of promise" and said that South Korea had "the potential to have considerable impact on the world stage" in this field.[636] South Korea established its first fund for overseas aid in 1987. In 2007, it provided overseas development assistance (ODA) equivalent to around 0.09% of gross national income (GNI) (compared to 0.36% for the UK).[637] The FCO reported that Seoul plans to increase this to 0.15% of GNI by 2010 and 0.25% by 2015. If these plans were to be realised, by the end of the period South Korea would be among the ten largest donors in volume terms among members of the OECD's Development Assistance Committee (DAC).[638] South Korea is not yet a DAC member, but at the end of September 2008 it completed with the OECD the review process which precedes accession to the body, and Seoul hopes to join the Committee by 2010.[639] In his August 2008 address, President Lee had reaffirmed his intention of increasing South Korea's ODA, as part of his goal of making South Korea "an advanced country" enjoying "respect in the international community".[640]

359. The FCO told us that South Korea "looks to the UK as a role model for ODA work and has established a close working relationship with the Department for International Development" (DFID).[641] DFID holds an annual policy dialogue with South Korea's Ministry of Foreign Affairs and Trade. The FCO said that this "is a key partnership for the UK in terms of increasing aid volumes, effectiveness and co-operation."[642]

360. We conclude that, from a low base, South Korea's growing willingness and capacity to contribute to overseas development assistance are to be welcomed. We further conclude that the Government is correct to encourage and co-operate with South Korea in this area and recommend that it should continue to do so, as an opportunity to shape the development practice of a potentially important donor.

United Nations

JAPAN

361. Japan, with the support of the UK, is seeking to acquire a permanent seat on the UN Security Council. Japan's permanent membership has been mooted as part of a potential reform aimed at making the body more representative. In 2004 Japan, together with Brazil, Germany and India, collectively known as the 'G4' countries, put forward a proposal for six new permanent seats (for the G4 themselves plus two for Africa), and four new temporary seats. Supporters of Japan's bid argue that it would reflect the country's economic strength and also be a welcome further step in the 'normalisation' of Japan's role in the international community. They also note that Japan currently contributes more to UN funding than four of the five existing permanent members, supplying nearly a fifth of the total UN budget.[643] (In 2006 the United States contributed 22% of the budget ($383 million), Japan 19.4% ($332 million), Germany 8.7% ($147 million), the United Kingdom 6.1% ($104 million) and France 6.0% ($102 million).)[644]

362. However, permanent Japanese membership of the Security Council is opposed by some countries, not least by China. When the issue last came to a head at the World Summit in 2005,[645] the Chinese lobbied vigorously against the G4 proposal. The proposal was also opposed by the United States, and it was not adopted. Although Lord Malloch-Brown described achieving permanent membership of the Security Council as "an extraordinarily high priority for Japanese foreign policy",[646] we were told during our visit to Japan that this aspiration is modified by a realistic assessment that in the short to medium term a more likely outcome is an interim compromise on Security Council membership which would entail the creation of a new category of 'semi-permanent' members which could be re-elected at fixed intervals. The recent improvement in Sino-Japanese relations[647] may lead to a renewed attempt by Japan to secure China's support on this issue.[648]

363. It is accepted within Japan that permanent membership of the Security Council, if this were to be secured, would entail carrying a heavier burden of international responsibilities, in relation to peace-keeping missions and diplomatic activity. Dr Swenson-Wright told us that the efforts made by the Japanese Government in ensuring the passage of two key Security Council resolutions (Resolutions 1695 and 1718, in response, respectively, to North Korea's launch of ballistic missiles in July 2006 and its detonation of a nuclear device in October 2006)[649] reinforce its argument for permanent membership. Dr Swenson-Wright added that he did not see any contradiction between Article 9 of the Japanese Constitution and Japan enhancing its role in the UN.[650] Lord Malloch-Brown set out the Government's position on this issue:

We are very clear that we strongly support [Japan's] membership of the council. Because it is the second largest economy in the world, it is the second largest contributor to peacekeeping operations. On the simple Boston tea party principle of no taxation without representation, it seems inherently unfair that Japan is being asked to pay ever larger portions of a growing global peacekeeping bill but has no direct say over it. It has made Japan rather recalcitrant on the expansion of peacekeeping, and grumpy about it. It has turned Japan into budget cutters and all the rest of it. We are losing its support in the same way that we are, on a smaller scale, losing Germany's, and that has a real cost, because I think that we all assume that the multilateral portion of global peacekeeping is likely to increase.[651]

364. We conclude that, although the process of United Nations reform is currently stalled, the Government is right in principle to support Japan's case for a permanent seat on the Security Council, on grounds of Japan's economic strength, size of population, commitment to democracy, and ability to make continuing contributions to the finances and work of the United Nations.

SOUTH KOREA

365. An important element in South Korea's international emergence has been the appointment of its former Foreign Minister Ban Ki-moon as UN Secretary-General, from January 2007. The FCO said that the appointment "was viewed by many as heralding South Korea's arrival on the world stage."[652] We have held meetings with Mr Ban during both our visits to the UN in New York since his appointment, in October 2007 and 2008. Mr Ban has urged greater South Korean engagement with the UN, and in particular has encouraged more South Koreans to take up positions with the organisation (where they are under-represented).[653] During a visit to Seoul in July 2008, Secretary-General Ban also said that he was "somewhat ashamed" that South Korea did not contribute more to UN ODA funds or UN peacekeeping operations, reminding his audience that it had been a UN force that had defended South Korea in the Korean War.[654]

366. The FCO describes South Korea—like Japan—as a "committed" member of the UN.[655] Since 2006, South Korea has been among the 15 largest contributors to the UN regular budget, accounting for a 2.2% share.[656] It is responsible for a similar share of the budget for UN peacekeeping.[657] However, having paid off large arrears in 2007, South Korea is again reported to be accruing a growing debt to the organisation, largely as a result of the burgeoning costs of UN peacekeeping.[658]

367. The FCO told us that South Korea was "fully committed to the UN reform agenda, and the need to shape a more efficient, effective and responsible UN, headed by a Secretary-General empowered to run it."[659] We heard in Seoul that Secretary-General Ban's efforts to reform the UN organisation were being shaped partly by his experiences of reforming the Foreign Ministry in Seoul.

368. We conclude that South Korea's support for the UN and for UN reform is to be welcomed. We recommend that the Government should continue to encourage South Korea to enhance its tangible commitment to the UN. We further recommend that the Government should seek to engage South Korea fully with the UK's ideas for UN reform.

Japan and whaling

369. Whaling is one of only two issues highlighted by the FCO in its written evidence as points of contention between the UK and Japan (the other being the death penalty).[660] Under the Convention for the Regulation of Whaling, states parties have the right to conduct "scientific" whaling. Pointing to this right, Japan continues to carry out large-scale lethal whaling in the Antarctic and North Pacific. Japan also works actively to recruit developing countries at the International Whaling Commission (IWC) which will back its wish to end the ban on commercial whaling. The UK opposes all lethal whaling. The DEFRA website states:

The UK Government will continue to make our opposition to whaling known to Japan at every appropriate opportunity and argue that they undermine the credibility of the IWC as an effective organisation for the conservation of whale stocks world-wide.

370. Japan's whaling activities in the Antarctic have recently been the source of controversy. The Sea Shepherd Conservation Society and Greenpeace both sent ships to the region in an attempt to harass the Japanese fleet. They claim that they saved up to 500 whales (Japan failed to meet its target of 850 minke whales and 50 fin whales. It had, under pressure from Australia, already pledged not to hunt for 50 humpback whales). Japan's Institute for Cetacean Research has previously called both organisations "eco-terrorists" who are acting "illegally and dangerously".[661]

371. Dr Swenson-Wright commented that the commitment to whaling remains quite strong in Japan: "it is presented as driven by scientific research interest, but the reality is that it is still an important part of domestic political culture".[662] He noted some signs that the Japanese Government might be amenable to influence on this subject (for instance, the undertaking in respect of humpback whales referred to above), but he added that "it is quite difficult to see how the British Government can persuade Japan to undertake what would be a major cultural shift" by abandoning the consumption of whalemeat..[663]

372. Lord Malloch-Brown told us that, despite the UK's friendship with Japan, it differs with it "very fiercely" on the issue of whaling. The Government had expressed "our abhorrence of this activity and we go on fighting". He added that it was important to ensure that any restructuring or reform of the International Whaling Commission should not be "a cover for emasculating its anti-whaling position".[664]

373. During our visit to Japan we were told by government sources that although Japan is not intent on depleting natural resources, there were coastal communities in Japan whose livelihood depended on whaling, and the Government had to take their wishes into account.

374. The most recent annual meeting of the International Whaling Commission, held in June 2008 in Chile, ended without agreement on key issues such as Japan's demand that the global moratorium on commercial whaling be at least partially lifted to allow hunting in coastal waters, or on the opposing demand of anti-whaling nations that Japan should halt its scientific whaling programme in the Antarctic. Nonetheless there was a commitment to continue dialogue between the participating states.[665]

375. We conclude that support for whaling is culturally entrenched in Japan, and that this state of affairs is unlikely to alter in the short term. We further conclude that, notwithstanding this, the Government is right to lobby its Japanese counterparts vigorously on this issue, and to pursue all means at its disposal of dissuading the international community from turning back the clock in relation to the protection of whales.

575 Ev 56 Back

576 Ev 56 Back

577 See paras 361-4 below. Back

578 Ev 73 Back

579 Ev 73-5 [RUSI] Back

580 Ev 73 Back

581 Q 1 Back

582 Q 1 Back

583 Ev 74 Back

584 See para 17 above. Back

585 "Japan's lower house OKs anti-terror ops extension", International Herald Tribune, 21 October 2008 Back

586 Ev 58 Back