Submission from Dr Christopher Hughes,
University of Warwick
INTRODUCTION: WHERE
ARE UK-JAPAN
SECURITY REALTIONS
HEADING?
1. The UK and Japan have long enjoyed strong
economic relations, especially since the influx of Japanese investment
into the UK in the 1980s, and have increasingly developed a complementary
set of bilateral political relations. Since the end of the Cold
War, and accelerated by post-11 September events, the UK and Japan
have also begun to develop a more diverse set of security relations.
Japan first assisted the UK in security terms through its large-scale
financial and more limited human contribution to the stabilisation
of the Balkans in the 1990s. UK-Japan security cooperation has
now taken on a harder edge with the JSDF's provision of non-combat
logistical support for UK and other coalition forces in Indian
Ocean since 2001 as part of OEF, and with the JSDF's despatch
on non-combat reconstruction missions to work alongside the UK
in Iraq and Kuwait since 2004. For Japan, the UK in many ways
has been the long-term European partner of choice in the EU, G-7/8
and the UN.
2. The UK and Japanese governments, as indicated
by the January 2007 UK-Japan Joint Statement, are now seeking
to further expand security cooperation in their respective regions
and globally. Many Japanese policy-makers have seen the UK as
future model to be emulated in terms of gradually integrating
their nation into international security cooperation, and for
managing the opportunities and risks of a strengthening bilateral
alliance relationship with the US. Japan for some has even been
identified (admittedly often overly hopefully; disingenuously,
or in ignorance) as the new "Great Britain of the Far East"
(see Hughes 2007). Similarly, for the UK, an expanding security
relationship offers opportunities to engage Japan's still very
considerable "soft" economic power and qualitatively
upgraded "military" power in the service of shared international
security goals, and to leverage UK influence in East Asia and
globally. It might indeed be argued that 2008 is another opportune
year for pushing forward UK-Japan security cooperation, as Japan
renews its refuelling mission in the Indian Ocean; mulls the passing
of a new National Security Law which may routinise JSDF participation
in various "international peace cooperation activities";
and prepares to host the G-8 summit in Toyako, Hokkaido.
3. The purpose of this short memorandum
is to consider the areas of emerging opportunity for substantive
and meaningful security cooperation between the UK and Japan,
but also to point out areas of existing and new possible difficulties
that will continue to hamper the security relationship. Essentially,
it argues that the UK and Japan certainly have good reason to
propel their security cooperation forward, and this will be facilitated
by the ongoing process of Japan's self-disentanglement from many
of the past restrictions on its international security role; but
that the UK will also need to be conscious of the fact that forging
a new security relationship with Japan also means forging a relationship
with by definition a new Japan itself. This new Japan may prove
a more unpredictable security partner than previously imagined.
UK-JAPAN OPPORTUNITIES
FOR COOPERATION
4. Despite some recent signs of retrenchment
in Japanese security policy with the fall from power of Prime
Minister Abe Shinzo and succession of Fukuda Takeo at the end
of 2007, it is probable that there will be little divergence on
Japan's part from its overall trajectory over the past decade
of assuming the position of a so-called more "normal"
military power. Fukuda was forced to temporarily withdraw the
MSDF from the Indian Ocean in November 2007 due opposition from
the main opposition Democratic Party of Japan (DPJ) in the National
Diet's Upper House to the renewal of legislation enabling despatch.
However, Fukuda was eventually able to use the governing Liberal
Democratic Party's (LDP) "super-majority" in the Lower
House to force through new legislation enabling re-despatch, even
if with a contracted mandate to concentrate on refuelling and
with the same time bound limit of one year for operations. Fukuda
is undoubtedly more cautious than Abe on issues of national security,
and preoccupied with attempting to maintain his hold on power
domestically. However, there are a number of long-term factors
which will continue to drive Japanese security policy forward.
— External threats: Japan will of course
seek to maintain engagement with North Korea and China. Nevertheless,
the threat from North Korea's nuclear and ballistic missile programmes
short-term, and the long-term concerns over the rise of China
mean that Japan will have to continue to steel its deterrent capabilities
and regional security role.
— US-Japan alliance pressures: Japan
is aware that the US since the mid-1990s has essentially changed
the terms of their grand strategic bargain first forged at the
start of the Cold War. The US is no longer content with providing
security guarantees for Japan in return simply for regional bases.
US global strategy now dictates that Japan and other regional
allies should make their bases and national military capabilities
available for supporting US regional and global deployments, and
for participation in "coalitions of the willing". Japan's
facing of this relentless alliance pressure is unlikely to abate
regardless of who enters the White House in 2009.
— Domestic changes: Japan is experiencing
a state of relatively unprecedented domestic political fluidity,
the result of long-term structural change now coming to a head.
The old-style, politics of redistribution, conciliation and cooptation,
practiced by the previously dominant pragmatist wing of the LDP
hit the buffers with the Heisei Recession of the 1990s.
It has now been replaced by a new form of hybrid neo-liberal,
neo-conservative, confrontational, revisionist form of politics
practiced to varying degrees by the Machimura faction of the LDP,
which has produced the last four prime ministers, including the
incumbent Fukuda. The corollary of this domestic political change
has been a change in Japan's external foreign policy posture.
The low-profile, low risk posture of the LDP pragmatists in foreign
policy, has been replaced by the acceptance in Japan of the need
for expanded security commitments, in part to meet external threats
and satisfy US expectations, but also in large part to restore
Japan's perceived rightful place as a great power. The LDP revisionists
now refuse for Japan to be weighed down by history and consequently
argue for constitutional revision, a more equal less dependent
relationship with the US, and a relationship free of the burden
of historical apologies with Japan's neighbours. Fukuda is the
most moderate of the revisionists, as shown by his non-confrontational
stance on visits to Yasukuni Shrine and emphasis on good ties
with China and South Korea. But arguably Fukuda is now the aberration
within the LDP, and if/once he falls from power, then the forces
arguing for a more assertive Japan will once again be in a position
to seize power.
— Oppositional politics: The DPJ under
Ozawa Ichiro's leadership has certainly been more intent on forcing
the LDP from power, and has attempted to articulate a vision of
security more UN and Asian-centred in nature. However, even if
the DPJ were to secure victory in probable Lower House elections
in the summer of 2008, or to enter into coalition with the LDP,
this would not be the end of Japan's security normalisation. For
sure, Ozawa would focus more on strengthening Japanese international
security cooperation via the UN, and seek stronger international
mandates for cooperation in US-led operations outside Japan's
own region. But Ozawa is certainly not advocating the abrogation
of the US-Japan alliance (and indeed arguably much of his opposition
to the Indian Ocean mission can be interpreted as simply his desire
to force an election for domestic political gain, rather than
to deny Japan's expanding international security role), and in
certain instances Ozawa may even advocate more radical options
for Japan's external security role. If Ozawa's more UN-centred
security option were realised, then he has argued this should
mandate the JSDF to be despatched to Afghanistan with the necessary
legitimacy to use force if necessary. Ozawa will certainly have
to struggle to maintain the unity of his diverse party, but the
bulk of the party is generally in accord with this more radical
vision of Japanese security.
5. Hence, for these long-term, structural,
reasons it is certain that Japan will continue to expand its role
in international security, even if at times this expansion remains
incremental or stop-start. In terms of the UK relationship with
Japan, there are thus a number of opportunities that might be
exploited.
— UN PKO: Japan will continue to look
to the UK as an important partner from which it can gain experience
and training in peacekeeping operations. Although Japan's participation
in UN PKO has been strictly limited up until now to operations
that involve the non-use of force, there may be scope in the future
for an incremental expansion of the JSDF into more hazardous operations.
Japan's consideration of JSDF despatch to Darfur is one instance
of this.
— NATO and Afghanistan: Prime Minister
Abe raised NATO hopes in January 2007 when he addressed the North
Atlantic Council and indicated that Japan would prepared to make
an expanded commitment to international security cooperation,
including possible JSDF despatch as part of PRTs in Afghanistan.
In many ways, JSDF despatch to Afghanistan itself would represent
a more visible and useful contribution to post-war reconstruction
than the "floating gasoline stand" operation in the
Indian Ocean. Abe's government then disappointed NATO by its failure
to follow up on the proposal. As noted above, though, the DPJ
has some appetite for JSDF despatch to Afghanistan, and it might
become a reality if a National Security Law were passed. Prime
Minister Fukuda has talked up this possibility in 2008, following
his political ordeal in attempting to pass the legislation for
the re-despatch of the MSDF to the Indian Ocean. If a National
Security Law were passed, then it would provide a non-time bound
set of legislation, enabled by clearer standards of international
mandates, which would allow for the routine and fast despatch
of the JSDF overseas, and obviating the current need for separate
laws for each JSDF mission. The LDP and DPJ may have sufficient
consensus between them to pass such legislation. Hence, if the
UN mandates were deemed strong enough, the JSDF could indeed be
despatched on certain types of missions to Afghanistan, and to
work alongside UK forces (although expecting despatch to southern
Afghanistan and combat zones would be a step too far to expect).
— Non-Proliferation: Japan's expanding
maritime capabilities and ambitions would match those of the UK
in seeking to halt exports of nuclear materials or ballistic missiles.
Japan and the UK are already partners in the Proliferation Security
Initiative.
— Arms manufacture: Japan's defence
industry is beset by the twin problems of limited demand in Japan
itself (with stagnant defence budgets) and the lack of export
markets and co-development partners for increasingly expensive
weapons systems (a result of the 1967 and 1976 prohibitions on
the export of weapons technology). Japan's defence production
sector, however, is seeking to erode the ban on arms exports to
attempt to exploit the benefits of global markets and co-production
with partners from other developed states. Inevitably, the prime
target for Japanese defence industrial collaboration is the US
as Japan's alliance partner. Nevertheless, Japanese concerns at
over-dependence on US military technology means that there is
an interest in expanding defence production cooperation longer
term with European partners and especially the UK, which is seen
as a safe partner due to its own close links with the US. Japan's
recent interest in the possible procurement of the Eurofighter
Typhoon, for which BAE Systems holds the export rights, is
one example of this potential new type of military-industrial
cooperation.
UK-JAPAN OBSTACLES
6. Japan's long term trajectory as a more
active partner in the US-Japan alliance and its related search
for additional partners in Europe and NATO should thus serve to
elevate UK-Japan relations to a more central role in Japan's future
security calculations.
7. At the same time, though, any deepening
UK-Japan security relationship is likely to experience some limitations
or tensions over the following types of issues:
— US comes first: Although Japan is
constantly seeking to hedge against over-dependence on the alliance
with the US by seeking new security partners, its final allegiance
remains to its security ties with the US. As long as UK-US ties
remains convergent on many security issues, then there will be
no likely tension between UK-Japan ties. All the same, the UK
will need to remember that there may be issues or regions where
its perceived vital security interests may diverge with those
of the US, and in this event Japan may not be willing to provide
support to the UK. Such examples may include European-centred
humanitarian intervention missions.
— China: Japan's optimum policy approach
to China is to seek economic and political engagement, and thus
has many similarities to UK policy. However, Japan continues to
view China as the greatest threat to its national security and
much of its military transformation and the strengthening of the
US-Japan alliance is designed to counter-balance China. In this
sense, the EU's, and concomitantly the UK's, active engagement
of China, with what is often seen from the Japanese perspective
as an unduly soft touch on security issues, is a potential stumbling
block in UK-Japan cooperation. Japan remains implacably opposed
to any lifting of the EU arms embargo on China, and would react
with great disappointment at any UK move to supporting the selling
of weapons to China in the future.
— North Korea: Japan has certainly
been thankful for the UK's professed support for the Japanese
position on the abductions of its citizens. However, Japan's insistence
on a resolution to the abductions issue as the entry point for
bilateral normalisation with North Korea and for the provision
of significant Japanese economic support for the Six Party Talks
denuclearisation process has meant that Japan has threatened to
fall out of step with the international community on the North
Korean issue. In this way, Japan and the UK might find themselves
diverging if North Korea moves ahead with its denuclearisation
and this triggers calls for wider support from the international
community, but Japan is left isolated. The UK government also
needs to be conscious of the fact that the abductions issue has
very much been the property of the nationalist right-wing in Japan
over past years, and that its support on this issue needs to be
carefully calibrated so as to not stimulate an overly hard-line
position on North Korea from Japan.
— Reciprocity: The UK is certainly
faced with a more active Japan as a potential international security
partner. But the flipside of this is that the UK will also be
faced with a more quixotic and demanding partner. As Japan is
encouraged to do more in the international security arena, in
order to live up to its status as a major developed power, so
will it naturally expect greater reciprocation from its partners
on issues of vital importance to itself. Japan may lose its image
as an ATM providing cash when kicked for supporting international
security cooperation, and instead, now that it is making a human
contribution to security, expect others to bear the costs with
it. Abe's visit to NATO in 2007 was a portent of this type of
Japanese thinking. He offered expanded supported for international
security, but also demanded (if in oblique Japanese fashion) reciprocation
on issues such as China and North Korea. Japan has even made this
clear in dealings with the US, expecting expanded alliance commitments
to make for greater US support for its permanent UNSC bid. The
fact that this support was not substantially forthcoming only
served to injure Japanese national pride. Hence, the UK must avoid
similar possible tensions. If it expects more from Japan, then
the price will be to give more back diplomatically and politically,
and to actively and even materially support Japanese security
concerns in East Asia.
CONCLUSION: TAKING
THE NEW
JAPAN SERIOUSLY
8. If the UK wishes to investigate an expanded
security relationship with Japan, then it needs to continue to
recognise the deep-seated domestic and international changes affecting
Japan's orientation on the world. Japan is emerging long-term
as a more active security partner for the US and other developed
states, including most especially the UK. The current impasse
and retrenchment in security policy under Fukuda is only likely
to be short-term. The consequent terms of Japan's relationship
with the US and other partners are changing. Japan may be a more
reliable alliance partner of the US, but this has already been
accompanied by greater Japanese intransigence over policy towards
North Korea, China, and issues of the colonial past (see Hughes
and Krauss 2007). The UK needs to recognise that in reaching out
to the newly emerging Japan, it will have to wrestle with similar
problems. Japan, although it will not lose entirely its traditional
reticence in international relations, will do more potentially
for the UK, but the UK will also have to do much more for Japan;
that is if they want to have a truly substantial security relationship
and move beyond the niceties of much of past security cooperation
and the nostalgia for the Anglo-Japanese alliance. Japan and the
UK can do much together in their respective regions, and in the
Middle East and Africa. But closer cooperation also brings risks
of placing the relationship at loggerheads over issues that are
closest and most essential to Japan's national security.
26 March 2008
|
