Examination of Witnesses (Questions 60-70)
ANNE ALDIS,
PROFESSOR YURY
FEDOROV AND
JOHN ROBERTS
16 MAY 2007
Q60 Andrew Mackinlay:
I listened carefully to that. I believe that you said that the
Russians "stopped saying" that what goes for Kosovo
might go for other countries and what that "might indicate",
but there is no evidence to suggest that that is right. You are
saying nothing more than that Russia might have "stopped
saying" it, and that that "might indicate" something.
In fact, if you look at any statement from any Russian official,
you will see that they make it clear that they stand by Russia's
long historical and cultural relationship with Serbia, which goes
back to tsarist times. They also remind us that the Helsinki accords
said that the map of Europe should not be altered unilaterally
or arbitrarily, which is to say unless or until the free will
of a people has been expressed. They relate Kosovo consistently
to the frozen conflicts in Transnistria, and those other places
that I cannot pronounce, such as Nagorno-Karabakh. They say, with
some legitimacy, relying on the Helsinki accords, that there should
not be any alteration to the national boundaries. Surely they
have said that time and time again.
Anne Aldis: They have,
but they have now separated the Kosovo precedent from what they
would like to happen in those breakaway regions. I can provide
chapter and verse if the Committee wishes it.
Q61 Mr. Illsley: May
I quickly ask Professor Fedorov about his view that Russia could
hold the Kosovan question as a bargaining chip for some future
deal? Do you have any examples or ideas of what such a deal could
be, or how big a deal it would take to persuade Russia to cash
in that bargaining chip?
Professor Fedorov: It follows
the logic of what has been said and written in Russia in the past
12 months, including Putin's speech in Munich, his V-Day speech
and his Address to the nation, as well as the Review of Russia's
foreign policy prepared by the Foreign Ministry, that the No.
1 issue for Russia is to assure its special role and its special
position within the post-Soviet space. One of the most disturbing
prospects for Russia is the prospect of the probable or hypothetical
invitation of Georgia, Ukraine or Moldova to join NATO.
One of the main goals for Russia is to
prevent what it sees as the disintegration of the post-Soviet
space and to assure its special role in the space. Perhaps I am
wrong, but in my view what Russia would like most would be for
the west to agree on that special role in the former Soviet Union.
That would be the basis on which Russia might make deals with
western countries.
John Roberts: The role
of Russia and its relations with Georgia are critical in this
context. If there is a quid pro quo from the Russian perspective,
above all that will concern Georgia—where there are two
frozen conflicts, and which abuts on a third, in Nagorno-Karabakh—and
the question of the security of pipelines going through a very
narrow corridor in an area in which, were there to be unrest,
Russia would be in a very strong position to take advantage of
it if it so chose.
Chairman: Thank you. We
are now going to turn to the non-proliferation aspects of security.
Q62 Mr. Keetch: I will
turn to Iran in a second, but I want to kick off with North Korea.
Russia is obviously a member of the six-party talks, but there
is a suspicion in some quarters in the west that Moscow has some
sympathy with the idea of North Korea standing up to US aggression
in that part of the world. Is that suspicion justified?
Professor Fedorov: My guess
is that Russia's approach to the North Korean nuclear issue is
rather ambivalent. On one hand, Russia cannot and will not welcome
the nuclear dominance of north-east Asia which would be the probable
result of the nuclearisation of North Korea. At the same time,
Russia understands quite well that its own ability to influence
the results of the six-party talks is very limited. The main players
are China and the United States, and the second tier is Japan
and South Korea, while Russia has no real leverage—in my
view; perhaps I am wrong—or influence on the North Korean
Government. At the same time, Russia's current position is not
welcomed by the United States, so Moscow's ambitions to play the
role of mediator are futile. My question is: what can Russia really
do to influence the result of the six-party talks? Nuclearisation
of the region and arms races in the region are of absolutely no
interest to Russia, because they would diminish Russia's military
position in the far east reaches of the country, which is one
of its key regions.
Anne Aldis: If we look
at it from the other end of the telescope, we will see that Russia
sees the US as the main agent of proliferation in the world, because
of its abrogation of the 1972 anti-ballistic missile treaty, its
national missile defence and for various other reasons, as President
Putin said in his Munich speech. He saw a unilateral superpower
doing those sorts of things, which did not contribute to international
security. Russia would like to see itself as a guarantor of non-proliferation
and of international security, in opposition to the US if necessary.
To that end, Russia would prefer an element of multi-polarity
and a dialogue that included everybody. In my view, that does
not go as far as encouraging proliferation anywhere else.
Q63 Mr. Keetch: That
is fascinating. We will come back to the ABM treaty if we have
time. Let us now consider Iran, in whose alleged nuclear ambitions
there is much clearer Russian involvement. Russia also has great
exports to Iran, not least from its energy sector and in helping
to build its nuclear power system. Russia has constantly said
that it would not want to see any military action against Iran,
so what is its answer to the Iranian problem? If it rules out
the military option—I understand why you would do that—what
would it do if it had more leverage?
Professor Fedorov: The
official Russian position is that it does not like the prospect
of nuclearisation of Iran, which is quite understandable, because
nuclear Iran would mean that southern Russian cities were in distant
range of Iranian nuclear missiles.
That the military option should be excluded
is an integral part of Russia's approach. As I see it, the logic
behind that could be as follows. The military option is not in
the interests of Russia. It could have three outcomes. Outcome
No. 1 is that the operation is successful and a pro-western Government
in Iran is established. The probability of such an outcome is
minimal, yet it is possible, and it is absolutely not in the interests
of Russia. Outcome No. 2 is the Iraqi scenario, which means chaotic
developments in Iran after a military attack. That is not in the
interests of Russia either, because it would mean a hotbed of
instability and extremism emerging near its borders. The third
option, which is sometimes discussed in the expert community in
Russia, although not only in Russia, is the division of Iran along
ethnic lines. That would mean northern Iran and Azerbaijan forming
an large, integral Azerbaijani state, most probably with a pro-western
and pro-Turkey orientation, which is not in the interests of Russia.
The military option is therefore not in Russia's interests.
A political solution could be welcome
if there is no change in Iran's strategy as a result. That is
a little bit doubtful, because I am not sure that the current
Iranian Government are ready for a political solution. In my view,
the political solution of Iran's nuclear problem it would be possible
if more moderate, perhaps pro-western, forces were in office in
Iran. They may agree with the political solution, whatever it
could be. Yet a pro-western Government, as I have said before,
is not in Russia's strategic interests in the region. The answer
is that Russia would like to freeze the status quo at the moment.
Q64 Mr. Keetch: A further
quick question: how far would Russia go to support an international
consensus on further pressure on Iran, such as sanctions? What
more will Russia accept?
Professor Fedorov: At moment,
as I see it, there is no international consensus about Iran. That
is one of the main problems because, as far as I can judge, there
is no clear understanding in any capital in the world of how the
Iranian problem could be solved. If this understanding is emerging,
then Russia should decide what its approach to such a solution
could be. At the moment Russia cannot accept very strong sanctions
because it may lead to regime change in Iran.
Q65 Mr. Purchase: Russia's
current foreign policy seems to indicate an increase of hard military
power, and recently President Putin spoke of the need to strengthen
Russia's admittedly weakened military capability. Could you help
us by explaining further Russia's military doctrine in the context
of its wish for a greater independent international role? On the
tail of that, what is your assessment of the international security
risk represented by Russia's stock of nuclear, chemical and biological
materials?
Professor Fedorov: It is
important to distinguish between the official military doctrine,
which was approved by President Putin in 2000, and current strategic
views and attitudes expressed and articulated in the President's
speeches and in writings by authoritative figures in Russia. If
I try to summarise the Kremlin's current views on the international
security arena, I can do so in the following way. First, the global
balance of forces is shifting in Russia's favour. The causes of
this shift are that Russia has overcome its economic and political
crisis over the last decade. Secondly, enormous energy resources
provide Russia with a powerful lever of international influence.
At the same time it is important to emphasise
that current Russian strategic thinking is that the west is in
a difficult position at the moment and is weakening because the
USA is involved in Iraq without any clear understanding of how
to move out. There is a belief in Russia that after Iraq a kind
of post-Iraq syndrome might emerge in the United States, which
means that isolationist trends will increase a little. NATO is
challenged with growing problems in Afghanistan and if NATO fails
in Afghanistan, or if NATO has not achieved real success in Afghanistan,
it may question the very raison d'être of the alliance.
The EU is encountering some difficulties within the Union.
All those developments create favourable
conditions for Russia to return to its former status of major
global power. That is point number two. Yet also I think that
the Kremlin understands quite clearly that its present policy
does not bring the results that it wishes to have. There are no
successes within the post-Soviet space, and attempts to influence
developments in Ukraine and Georgia failed. I could continue the
list. These events—they are not absolute failures, but some
kind of failure—are seen in Moscow as resulting from American
influence and America's building of obstacles for Russia. Putin
himself has said more than once that nobody likes a strong Russia,
and I think that that is his real feeling.
So in the circumstances, Russia's strategy
now includes partial co-operation with the west on problems such
as non-proliferation and fighting terrorism. Yet at the same time,
Russia would like to use some of the west's vulnerabilities and
weak points, and issues such as Kosovo, Iran and North Korea,
as bargaining chips to obtain trade-offs and western recognition
of its special role in the post-Soviet space. In my view, that
could be an explanation—a picture, an outline—of current
Russian doctrine. Whether it will be successful, I do not know.
Q66 Mr. Purchase: I
wonder whether someone might deal with the second part. What is
the assessment of the international security risk from Russia's
stockpile of nuclear or other weapons?
Professor Fedorov: There
are a few sources of insecurity seen in Moscow. The first set
of insecurities, of course, relates to new threats such as terrorism,
Islamic radicalism or what is called international terrorism.
The other—it is the principal innovation of recent months—is
American policies. The United States is seen, if not as an enemy
or a rival, as a serious obstacle to the realisation of Russia's
strategic goals. There are two sources of threat to Russia's security
seen in Moscow.
Chairman: Do any of the
other witnesses want to comment on the specific point of the security
risks arising from the former Soviet WMD stockpile? No? Mr. Mackinlay,
you had a question on that, I think.
Q67 Andrew Mackinlay:
Since 2000, I think, G8 money has been made available to the Russian
Federation to secure some of its deteriorating nuclear arsenal.
On this Committee's last visit to the Russian Federation, we were
made aware that in the sea around the north of Russia, for instance—a
very depopulated area—there are installations and even some
civil functions such as lighthouses where there is stolen or unsecured
nuclear material. Often it is stolen by itinerants who perhaps
do not even realise what they are stealing. A pretty parlous situation
was painted for us.
There is also the deteriorating submarine
fleet of the former Soviet Union. What is the position today?
Can anybody help us on that? How bad is the lack of security of
such nuclear materials, either former military materials or unsecured
civil materials?
Anne Aldis: My understanding
is that the problem is not the physical security but the environmental
dangers of those stockpiles. I know that the Norwegians are at
least as concerned as we are, if not more so. The difficulty is
the culture of secrecy in the Russian military, which results
in successful treason prosecutions of people who try to help minimise
that environmental problem.
Professor Fedorov: One
of the main sources of insecurity and one of the main threats
from the former Soviet WMD arsenal—be it nuclear, chemical
or biological—is the possibility that sensitive information
and knowledge might leak from Russia in a way that would be more
dangerous than leakage of nuclear materials. It might provide
rogue regimes with critical knowledge.
Chairman: Thank you. We
now come to European missile defence.
Q68 Mr. Keetch: The
Americans are talking to the Poles, the Czechs and us about this
subject. Mr. Putin is not very happy; there was a big speech in
Munich. Are the Russians really upset about it or are they just
upset?
Anne Aldis: It goes back
to what I said previously about their seeing America as the main
destabiliser in the international system. They are playing a lot
of rhetorical games in a lot of forums, but there is no reason
to believe that they are not serious about those games. One of
their points is that although the Americans say that they do not
need the missiles to defend America, they are not consulting Europe
in general on deployment of the missiles, but only countries in
which they want to station them. The question to which the Russians
want an answer is how that will contribute to European security
if Europe does not have an opportunity to discuss it.
I know that the Russians have had detailed
discussion with the Americans. The conclusion that the chief of
the general staff, Yuri Baluyevsky, has reached is that it does
not matter what the Americans are telling us now; once the bases
are established their purpose might be changed, and that might
happen in the foreseeable future. He also pours much scorn on
the idea that Iran or North Korea are likely to launch missiles
at Europe. In view of that, he asks why we are spending so much
money on protecting against a hypothetical problem.
Q69 Mr. Keetch: What
does he fear the bases could be turned into and what is Russia
likely to do if the US continues with its present policy?
Anne Aldis: He sees the
American policy as a deliberate policy of encirclement of Russia
by the west, which I would argue is a traditional bunker mentality
that has persisted for as long as there has been a Russia. The
concern is not just about military encirclement; the Russians
see us as positively subverting their style of democracy by seeking
to impose our own. They fear that we will encourage another Orange
revolution, but in Moscow—next March. That is all part of
a psychological encirclement. In the cold war days, there were
maps of the NATO military bases up against the Warsaw pact border;
now, the maps show NATO military bases up against the Russian
border. That scares them.
Q70 Chairman: I have
one final question. As you know, President Putin recently made
a speech in which he said that Russia is going to examine the
possibility of suspending its commitments under the conventional
armed forces in Europe treaty. Can you give us your interpretation
of that? Why did he say it? Why did he choose the particular timing
that he did? What is its security significance—is it big
or is it sabre rattling?
Anne Aldis: I do not think
I want to comment on the first of your questions. The major significance
at least for the UK is that the inspection regimes, which I would
argue have been a major stabilising factor in mutual confidence
building since the signing of the treaty in 1990, will fail, and
we will have no right to know what is happening in Russia. Equally,
they will have no right to know what is happening in the UK. We
might have to consider other ways of continuing that dialogue
if that was felt appropriate. That, I would argue, was the main
impact of the withdrawal from the CFE provisions. In their defence,
the Russians point to the fact that only four countries ratified
the CFE treaty in its Istanbul incarnation in 1999, namely Russia,
Ukraine, Belarus and Kazakhstan. They say, "Why should we
observe the provisions of this treaty if there is no single other
European country prepared to do so?"
Professor Fedorov: My first
point is that the decision to suspend implementation of the CFE
Treaty or to establish a moratorium on implementation is politically
rather than militarily motivated. Political motivation can be
seen in the following case. The Russian military and political
establishment was looking to respond to a situation in which American
planes were to deploy anti-ballistic missiles in Europe. The first
option that was discussed publicly in Moscow was withdrawal from
the INF treaty. Yet, such a move could be very dangerous because
it could trigger a new missile crisis in Europe, something like
the crises in the late 1970s. Some response had to be found. It
was decided to take a move that would not provoke a serious response
from NATO. Nobody knew what was meant by suspension and how long
it could be.
We are talking not about withdrawal here,
but about suspension of the CFE Treaty. I am not sure whether
the information that was received from on-site inspections was
critical for NATO. At the same time, the strategic consequences
of that move could be counter-productive for Russia because it
blocks the ratification of the agreement on adaptation of the
CFE treaty, and that revised version of the Treaty is militarily
very important for Russia. It restricts the possibility of deploying
troops and military equipment to foreign territories. If the revised
version of the Treaty is not ratified and put into force, then
theoretically NATO can deploy substantial forces to the Baltic
states. Therefore, taking that step would be counter-productive
for Russia.
John Roberts: May I make
three very quick points on energy security in Russia?
Chairman: Very briefly, thank
you.
John Roberts: If the EU
in general and Russia and the UK in particular cannot develop
a policy of energy interdependence, then we will probably be too
late to develop a privileged relationship that forces the UK back
into rethinking its entire energy policy. With regard to gas in
particular, we are dependent on Russian gas—I am talking
about the EU here. At the same time, Russia's ability to meet
anticipated gas demand from EU suppliers is so doubtful, that
we may have to rethink how dependent we are going to be on gas
and whether we can afford to be that dependent. The same possibly
goes for coal.
The whole energy sector desperately needs
greater clarity from Russia concerning its energy plans. That
clarity is lacking at the moment. In return, Russia has the right
to ask energy consumers to clarify what prospective markets there
might be for Russian energy.
Chairman: Thank you very much
indeed, Professor Fedorov and Mr. Roberts, thank you very much
for joining us this afternoon, and for your very helpful answers
to our questions.
We will continue with the next session
straight away.
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