Examination of Witnesses (Questions 71-79)
PROFESSOR BILL
BOWRING, DAVID
CLARK AND
DR. ANDREW
MONAGHAN
16 MAY 2007
Q71 Chairman: Professor Bowring,
Mr. Clark and Dr. Monaghan, thank you for joining us today. I
am sorry that we kept you waiting slightly but, as you know, we
had a Division during the last evidence session.
In this session we shall focus particularly
on the UK-Russia bilateral relationship. Perhaps I could start
by asking for your diagnosis of the state of that relationship.
Is it in good health, or is it looking rather dicey and fraught?
Give us your views please.
David Clark: If I may start,
I recall from my previous role as a special adviser in the Foreign
Office—I was there when Vladimir Putin first became Prime
Minister and then President almost out of nowhere and within an
extraordinarily short space of time—that the assessment
of him then, from the little that was known of him, was that he
was essentially a liberal moderniser by instinct who may at times
be inclined to use slightly authoritarian methods to restore order
at the end of what had been a pretty chaotic period of Russia's
history under Boris Yeltsin, especially in the later years. Hindsight
has not been kind to that view, but at the time it was legitimate
to give it fair wind and to try as hard as possible to develop
a good relationship with Vladimir Putin.
As time has gone on, the relationship
has deteriorated badly, particularly during Putin's second term,
and I think it can now be described as thoroughly frosty, and
perhaps more frosty with the UK than with any other EU country,
except, obviously, the Baltic states and some eastern European
countries, such as Poland.
There are two real drivers for that.
One is, on a global level, Putin's growing opposition to what
he sees as America's unipolar dominance, which was expressed forcefully
in his Munich speech, and what he sees as the UK's supporting
role in upholding that. Inevitably, if Russia's strategy is geared
towards balancing American power, by extension it is also geared
towards balancing UK power, especially in Europe. You can see
that quite clearly in the way that Putin has tried to construct
trilateralism with Germany and France in particular, without thinking
of including the UK, especially latterly.
At a specific bilateral level—I
am told that we are to discuss this—the role that the UK
now plays as perhaps one of the two most significant centres of
Russian life outside Russia, and in particular as host to what
I suppose we can describe as a new dissident community, brings
us into direct conflict with Moscow, which sees our willingness
to provide asylum to certain individuals whom it regards as enemies
of the state as a deliberately hostile act.
Those two things together, the latter
tinged with a considerable amount of paranoia, are at the heart
of the deterioration.
Professor Bill Bowring:
I, too, think that there was a fairly dramatic change in 2003.
From my experience working as an adviser for the Department for
International Development during the period 1997-2003, there was
a serious engagement in reform of the legal system, the judiciary
and so on, and I think that was much appreciated. The changes
have included a dramatic change of policy by the Russian Government
since then, but also of course I would highlight what has been
happening with Yukos in a series of prosecutions in Russia since
that date.
As my colleague said, a large number
of people are now located in London and at the hearing last June
when the new Russian general prosecutor was appointed, he emphasised
that he wanted to make a much better stab at the extradition proceedings,
particularly in London. There is now a list of 30 or 40 people
who are being pursued by the Russian authorities and the fact
that they lost disastrously badly in a series of them means that
we will see more of them.
There seems to be a failure to understand
that there are independent judges who do not do what they are
told by the Government. I should add two other factors: one is
the Litvinenko effect. We are still awaiting the outcome of the
investigation and that has clearly caused irritation. The second—it
seems a long time ago now—is the famous "rock"
incident involving the British embassy in Moscow. All of that
adds to the general climate. Finally, the fact that the Government
and Government-run industry did not come to the economic forum
recently is a real indication of how things are presently.
Dr. Andrew Monaghan: First,
could I clarify to the Committee my position as a private individual?
I have an association with the Conflict Studies Research Centre
but it is on an individual contract basis; I am not a civil servant.
I also have a contract with the NATO defence college in Rome,
but, again, it is as a private individual on a consultancy basis.
I would support much of what my colleagues
have said, but I also remind them that we have a significant amount
of engagement with Russia that is reasonably positive. I do not
want to over-egg that, and I will come back to why in a moment.
We have military co-operation, the best example of which was the
UK-led rescue of the submersible Priz AS-28. We also have significant
energy and business interaction with Russia, not just with Shell
and BP, but with a range of other companies both up and downstream.
Many other UK companies are investing successfully in Russia at
the moment and, of course, Russians are coming here and investing
in the UK. The best example is listing on the London Stock Exchange.
In addition to what my colleagues have
said, I would say that there are quite evidently values differences
and a difference in social structure—for example, the separation
of powers—which means that there is very little of a political
relationship on top of this.
Q72 Andrew Mackinlay:
It is federal.
Dr. Monaghan: Yes. There
are a variety of differences within the two societies which mean
that these engagements are usually very disconnected. I would
say that it is a mix of the two.
Chairman: Do you want some clarification,
Mr. Mackinlay?
Andrew Mackinlay: No, I
am just saying that it is federal, isn't it? May I ask a general
question of the three of them?
Chairman: After Mr. Horam.
Q73 Mr. Horam: I take
what Dr. Monaghan said too, but given what you, Mr. Clark, and
Professor Bowring said and taking the view that things have got
worst since 2003, there has been a distinct cooling—I would
not say hostility—and the UK is being singled out as a difficult
country. How would you tackle that, from the UK's point of view?
If you were in Margaret Beckett's position and you wanted to do
something about this relationship, which is important to the UK,
how would you go about it?
David Clark: Personally,
I think that problems arise when you conceive of this in a bilateral
context. The strategy that Vladimir Putin has pursued in Europe
is very much one of divide and rule and you can see that affecting
British diplomacy quite dramatically if you speak to Ministers
and officials off the record. They express extreme nervousness
about standing up to Russia on the basis that they will be singled
out and punished. The UK is a large country within the European
Union, but in relation to Russia it does not, I think, have all
the resources required—
Q74 Mr. Horam: Does
that mean you are in favour of pursuing it in a multilateral,
European Union method rather than via a UK bilateral method?
David Clark: We have to
put the emphasis on developing a common European policy towards
Russia, because it is only by acting collectively within Europe
that we will begin to create within the minds of Russian policy
makers the need to behave differently from how they are behaving
at the moment.
If we behave as 27 countries, all dealing
separately with Russia, Vladimir Putin will see, as he does at
the moment, the opportunity to play this game of divide and rule,
particularly with the use of energy assets, rewarding behaviour
that he regards as acceptable and punishing behaviour that he
regards as unacceptable. I think that that puts us in a weak position.
So, although bilateral relationships do not disappear altogether
within the context of a common foreign and security policy, and
nor should they, I think that part of our strategy for coping
with the situation we are in is to emphasise European solidarity.
That means not just insisting on solidarity with us when we come
into conflict with Russia, but being willing to show solidarity
with other countries, such as Estonia and Poland, which perhaps
have not received as much support as they should in the last few
months.
Q75 Mr. Horam: Do you
agree with that, Professor Bowring?
Professor Bowring: I would
be inclined not to emphasise too much the negative side of it.
One can certainly see developments within the European Union,
particularly from Estonia and Poland, where there is a deterioration
of relations. However, it has always been my view that the UK
and Russia historically, and even in the recent past, have a certain
amount in common, and that we have quite a lot to contribute to
each other. When the bilateral relations were perhaps a bit stronger,
even after 2003, in my own field, which is the judiciary, law
enforcement agencies and so on in Russia, there was a real desire
to exchange experience and for them to learn from us, and perhaps
for us to learn from them. I think that there is still considerable
mileage in that process. Now, of course, with the EU renegotiating
its relationship with Russia, I would argue that the UK has a
very important role to play in how that renegotiation takes place.
Of course, there is the importance of
expressing solidarity with countries like Estonia and Poland,
but I would argue that there are also considerable opportunities.
The spending by the EU will increase by some 30%. It will be budgetary
support, rather than consultancy. I would say that all sorts of
things are happening that could be drawn in a more positive light,
although we must, of course, stand up on issues that are important
to us.
I should add that I am here in my own
capacity from Birkbeck. I am also a member of the advisory board
of the EU-Russia Centre, and therefore this issue is something
that I keep an eye on.
Dr. Monaghan: I want to
add to what my colleagues have said. We should not forget that
Russia has also preferred to pursue bilateral relationships within
the EU and also within NATO. There is not simply a multilateral
approach, with Russia going to Brussels; Russia has also dealt
with France, Germany and so on, as is very clear. So I think that,
alongside trying to support a more unified European approach,
which the UK has done, not least with the Permanent Partnership
Council in Energy and so on during the UK's presidency, we should
use the contacts we have in business and in the military to pursue
a bilateral relationship at the same time.
I think that, if we withdrew from a bilateral
relationship, the Russians would simply disengage from here as
well. We have the grounds for a bilateral relationship in position.
I know that the resources are few, and that there may not be broad
political support for that process, but the position is there.
Most of my contacts in business have said that they want to stay
in Russia—they need to stay in Russia—and the same
is true of the military. I know reasonably well the leader of
the UK team on the rescue of the Russian submersible and he says
that this is an excellent opportunity to develop that position.
It is not well developed at the moment; that is true. Since Litvinenko—I
would not say since 2003, but since last year and since Litvinenko—things
have deteriorated politically, but a basis is still there to contribute
to a broader NATO and EU co-operation. We should also pursue bilateral
relations in the light of the Russian preference for bilateral
relations with major powers.
Q76 Mr. Horam: May
I just get that point clear? Are you implying that there is a
difference between, on the one hand, the political relationship
with Russia, which may be going badly and you would want to see
that pursued through the EU or more collectively, because otherwise
Russia will just pick us off one by one, and, on the other hand,
a sort of commercial, legal and professional relationship, which
is going rather better and has definite advantages in being pursued
that way?
Dr. Monaghan: I am not
implying it. I am saying it very clearly. I reiterate that I do
not want to over-egg the level of co-operation, but it is clear
in the military, business and energy spheres that there is an
increasing—if troubled, yes—relationship among different
companies and different sectors of the military.
Q77 Mr. Horam: The
current disputes are embittering the relationship between the
European Union and Russia, which means that the European Union
and Russian summit is going very badly. How do you put that into
the context of what you are saying, Mr. Clark, about the need
to pursue things through the European Union channel?
David Clark: It is going
badly because one or two member states, in particular Lithuania
and Poland, quite rightly take the view that Russia's use of energy
supply interruptions against them in order to gain political leverage
is an unacceptable way in which to behave. They are entitled to
expect a degree of solidarity from the rest of the EU, when faced
with that situation. I happen to agree with that view. It should
not have been left to Poland and Lithuania to veto the start of
negotiations on a partnership and co-operation agreement. I think
that the EU should have said collectively to Russia that it was
not willing to start negotiations until Russia was willing to
accept civilised bilateral relations with its member states.
In that sense, the fact that relations
are going badly should be put squarely in Russia's court. The
root of the problem is its behaviour towards certain countries,
particularly those that used to be within the Soviet sphere of
influence, which may still be regarded as having more influence
over them than they would ideally like. Those countries are now
members of the European Union. They should be treated as such
and be entitled to the full rights that go with it. It would be
unthinkable for consideration to even have been given to negotiations
starting if, for example, France had been subject to an arbitrary
ban on dairy produce in the way that Poland has been, and still
is. It is inconceivable. We cannot have a two-tier European Union.
There has to be the same degree of solidarity for all its member
states.
Q78 Andrew Mackinlay:
Apart from the matters that we discussed earlier with Ms Aldis
and Dr. Fedorov, including encirclement, it seems from the papers
that I have seen that one of the biggest contributory factors
to poor bilateral relations relates to the people who have political
asylum here in the United Kingdom and/or related personalities.
Do you agree that that is one of the biggest causes of frost?
Someone mentioned the figure of 90.
Professor Bowring: It is
not as many as that, but a considerable number of people one way
or another are being prosecuted and the Russians are seeking them.
That is not so much a question of asylum. There have been a number
of cases in which asylum has been granted and that has been controversial.
I can think immediately of who was involved. A large number of
people are connected with Yukos in one way or another, and they
now include British and US citizens. One of the problems is that
the British courts have been satisfied in practically all the
extradition cases so far, first that the prosecutions are politically
motivated, which is the main barrier to extradition, and secondly,
that if extradited the individuals would not get a fair trial
in Russia. The courts have been able to find that on the basis
of what has been happening with the trials of Mr. Khodorkovsky
and others in Russia.
It is recognised in Russia that the extradition
cases have been badly handled by the Russian side. There does
not seem to have been an understanding of what is actually required
by the UK courts to achieve extradition. Unfortunately, that is
a vicious circle.
Q79 Andrew Mackinlay:
I take note of your last point that the process is a bit clumsy.
In reverse order, there is a lack of comprehension of the fact
that the courts are independent. Nevertheless, there has been
the political act in a number of cases of granting asylum, in
which the political decision must be taken by the United Kingdom
Government, has there not? We have a very controversial extradition
treaty with the United States of America. There is not a parallel
one with Russia, presumably because the British Government say
that they dare not do that because it is not a good justice system.
A political act is involved in making that decision. Do they not
have a point?
Professor Bowring: Russia
has ratified the Council of Europe extradition treaty and therefore
it is one of the countries to which extradition ought to be easier.
In fact the procedure is simplified. I would say that there has
been genuine incomprehension about what is required in order to
get people extradited if, indeed, there is evidence that they
have committed crimes for which they ought to be extradited.
Andrew Mackinlay: I get quite
uncomfortable with these multibillionaires coming to London. It
is only a few years since the collapse of the Soviet Union and
an amazing number of people managed to get rich quick. I think
that it defies belief that you could get that rich without breaking
norms of ethical handling of business deals.
Chairman: A question please,
Mr. Mackinlay.
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