Examination of Witnesses (Questions 80-93)
PROFESSOR BILL
BOWRING, DAVID
CLARK AND
DR. ANDREW
MONAGHAN
16 MAY 2007
Q80 Andrew Mackinlay:
The question I want to ask is about these people. Has not Russia
got a point that there is money laundering through London by these
people, or some of them?
Professor Bowring: I think
you put your finger on the exact point. There are two separate
questions. The first is the question of the morality of what happened
in the Yeltsin period during the 1990s and how some people got
extremely rich. That is a political question in Russia. If, on
the other hand, crimes are being committed, such as money laundering
or other crimes, and if there is evidence that they are being
committed—I am a lawyer so for me there has to be proof—people
should be extradited. If a complete mess is made of the extradition
proceedings, that is a different matter.
David Clark: I take your
point, Mr. Mackinlay. I sympathise with your point even though
I do think that even rich people have human rights. This is not
just about rich oligarchs either. Let me remind you of what Judge
Tim Workman said at the extradition hearing of Akhmed Zakayev:
"I find that as a fact the Russian Government are seeking
extradition for purposes of prosecuting Mr. Zakayev on account
of his nationality and his political opinions." Russia is
treated under various international instruments and indeed under
UK law as a country which respects human rights and is a respectable
actor in relation to various forms of mutual legal international
assistance. But the 1957 European convention on extradition and
the 1959 European convention on mutual assistance in criminal
matters, for example, both explicitly bar extradition in political
cases for political motives, and Russia is clearly in violation
of both of those instruments.
Russia has been granted category 2 status
under the UK Extradition Act 2003, on the basis that it meets
a certain standard of rule of law. As Judge Workman's opinion
on this case and many other cases clearly demonstrates, however,
Russia is not meeting that standard. This is an issue that the
UK Government need to look at. Do we continue to pander to Russia's
self image as a respectable country which respects human rights
or do we start to take it to task and say, "You are not meeting
those standards and therefore you are not entitled to these privileges"?
Dr. Monaghan: It is a crucial
point, but I think that the difference is that this has become
much more prominent since late last year. This issue has rumbled
on for a few years now, but it came up again with the poisoning
of Litvinenko. I am sure that everyone here will be aware that
this matter was raised in the House and immediately after his
poisoning a Member asked whether it would affect our agreement
with Russia. The answer was no. Again the issue rumbles on. In
the broader context it is just one of the elements that are going
wrong. It is being used as a different tool by people to claim,
"Ah well, look at the support for this person", which
might not, in fact, be true.
Q81 Andrew Mackinlay:
A final question: I do not mean to be rude, but none of you or
the organisations that you work for or represent are direct or
indirect beneficiaries of funds from Berezovsky, are you?
David Clark: No
Andrew Mackinlay: Good. That is
fair enough.
Q82 Ms Stuart: It was
very interesting, Mr. Clark, that you talked about European solidarity.
UK foreign policy for the last 50 years in terms of Europe has
always been that we do not want a Europe dominated by large members.
Helmut Kohl understood that the small ones need to be protected.
The Russians do not understand that. They want to talk to the
big ones. I put it to you that if I were a Russian listening to
this, I would say, "These are a whole lot of really nice
words that amount to nothing at the end of it".
What precisely can we do to make the
Russians change their minds? I suggest that we should start talking
about such things as saying to the Russians, "Do you think
that you continue to have a place at the G8? Why not replace you
with India?" We should start to put some serious suggestions
on the table that would make Russia change its behaviour rather
than using sweet words, which it knows amount to nothing.
David Clark: I agree. The
point that I was making about the privileges that Russia enjoys
in terms of mutual legal assistance could be extended to its status
in the Council of Europe, the G8 and other international instruments
and organisations, where it is treated as a respectable member
of a community of democratic nations even though, to my mind,
it clearly does not match up to the standards required of those
organisations.
When we continue to behave as though
it is business as usual, despite everything that has happened
over the last four or five years, we reinforce in the minds of
the current Russian leadership the idea that such values do not
really mean a great deal—that they are simply declaratory
and can be ignored at will, and that Russia will continue for
reasons of strategic importance to be treated as an equal member
of the club.
The rules of the game must start to change.
Russia must experience some pushback, and not just at the symbolic
level. Russia would react very adversely if it were to be thrown
out of the G8, for example, or suspended from the Council of Europe.
What would really hurt it is at the level of hard power and economic
interest.
The core of the EU-Russia relationship,
and what is distorting it at the moment, is the energy relationship.
We must get the energy relationship right. It cannot be done at
the bilateral level; it must be done at an EU level. The EU must
develop the instruments required to form a really effective common
external energy policy in relation to Russia, and there are a
number of things that it needs to do. I see Europe moving gradually
in that direction. I have seen progress during the last year or
two. You are shaking your head, but I have detected progress.
It is happening at a glacial pace, as it always does in Brussels,
but it is moving. I think that there is potential among a group
of new EU leaders, particularly Gordon Brown, Nicolas Sarkozy
and Angela Merkel, who already takes a more sceptical view of
Russia than her predecessor. There is potential even among the
big member states for a change of direction on policy toward Russia.
Q83 Mr. Purchase: On
the same point, I agree that the Russians do not behave well in
many aspects, but it would be a reversal of the whole history
of British capitalism if we were to consider even for a moment
the kind of thing that you might have been alluding to, Mr. Clark—things
that might damage any of our commercial interests. We are not
even disinvesting in Zimbabwe, let alone Russia.
What can we do that will allow us to
develop a better bilateral relationship? I accept your point about
the European front, but we have a bilateral problem. The Russians
truly believe that we have no appreciation of their side of the
story. How do we address that?
David Clark: Let me clarify
what I mean. I am certainly not talking about economic disinvestment
from Russia, sanctions or anything like that. I am talking about
the EU collectively developing policies that prevent Russia from
behaving in a monopolistic fashion, particularly in the energy
sphere. We need to insist that Russia be drawn into a rules-based
energy regime with reciprocal trade and investment rights that
are legally enforceable and fairly applied. Those already exist
in the form of the energy charter treaty, to which somebody else
referred earlier. The question of Russia's ratification of that
instrument is irrelevant, because it is already legally bound
by the treaty as a signatory. The treaty quite clearly states
that it is legally binding from the moment of signature, whether
ratified or not. We should be holding Russia to its obligations.
I think that we need to be particularly
wary of the proposal floated during the last session to allow
the ECT's principles to be incorporated into a new partnership
and co-operation agreement. Russia wants to go down the route
of transferring the ECT's principles into the partnership and
co-operation agreement to dilute their legal force. That is the
only reason why it wants to do that. If we are to go down that
kind of route, the EU collectively has to insist that Russia is
legally bound and, as such, should stand by the rules set out
in the energy charter treaty. That is just one example; I could
cite several more. We need to change the rules of the game and
the balance of the relationship. We should not cut Russia off;
we cannot afford to in energy terms, but we can act collectively
to prevent it from behaving in a monopolistic, abusive fashion.
Dr. Monaghan: In many respects,
we approach this from the wrong angle by saying, "What should
we do to counter Russia?" The discussion of Russia's G8 status
is an example of that. We have to say, "No more words, but
actions." If we really want to help secure European energy,
we have to look at it internally before we deal with Russia. Why
do not the other European Union members have the infrastructure
and ability to help Poland or Lithuania if they are being cut
off by Russia? That is where the first problem is. It is no wonder
that the Poles are standing up and saying that they think that
the new Baltic Sea pipeline has echoes of the Molotov-Ribbentrop
Pact.
The action of pushing the EU must come
before we start looking at Russia and threatening it with being
booted out of G8 or something. It is already quite defensive;
it looks aggressive, I agree, but as we heard in the last sitting,
it is worried about the furtherance of democracy and the revolutions.
It is concerned about a list of other things, so its policy is
quite defensive in that respect.
In response to the question, there has
been a big scaling back of resources. We are talking here about
Russia, ladies and gentlemen, a state of vast dimensions, with
16 international borders and 143 million people. Let us talk about
the constituent parts; let us know what the different ministries
are doing, what the Government are doing and what the different
companies are doing. That would tie into understanding what it
is going on in Russia, rather than dealing it another punch, pushing
it or trying to force it into the ECT, which the Russians, incidentally,
consider their national advantage. If anyone would like to go
to Moscow to try to negotiate the Russians out of their national
advantage, please feel free, but I do not think that you will
get very far. The same applies to the breaking up of Gazprom.
We should look for other methods. What are Russia's national disadvantages?
Wastage of gas. We can help with that. We should change tack on
the European method; we should get our own act in order, and start
saying, "What are your weaknesses?" We should not hammer
against the Russians' strengths, because then they will simply
say, "We will go elsewhere."
Professor Bowring: I have
three points. If one looks at things from Moscow's point of view,
one will see that there is orange paranoia, as it is called, which
is linked to the activities of Mr. Berezovsky, among other things.
What has happened in Ukraine, Georgia and Kyrgyzstan is seen by
Russia as very much of a threat, quite apart from what is now
being proposed for—
Q84 Mr. Purchase: That
does not mean that the Russians are paranoid.
Professor Bowring: When
the word "paranoia" is used, there is a feeling of encirclement
and closer encirclement. More significant, however, is the fact
that Russia is certainly not going to leave; there it is, it is
a huge neighbour to Europe, and a very large proportion of its
trade is with Europe. It is not going to disengage from the EU,
the OSCE or the Council of Europe. It is clearly seeking to renegotiate
its relationship with all three; one has to be conscious that
it is seeking to do that and why it is seeking to do so. In the
case of the OSCE, it wants to move it back towards being a functional,
rather than a geographical, organisation, which is not focused
simply on the former Soviet Union and central and eastern Europe,
but on security and co-operation aspects.
Russia pays the same subscription to
the Council of Europe as we do, and it is quite conscious of that.
It does not get the same number of staff—or all kinds of
other things—as we do. The Russian judge at Strasbourg is
first class; I am reading an interview with him from the last
few days. He frequently votes against Russia. With due respect
to Gisela Stuart, he shows that it can be a mistake to talk about
"the Russians", because Russia is the country of many
contradictions and constant surprises. We may well see a few in
the elections. I could name a series of excellent people in Russia
with whom we should be talking.
Finally, we in this country do not have
a brilliant record in the past few years, and we should not forget
that Russia was allowed in to the Council of Europe in 1996 in
the middle of the first Chechen war. It ratified the European
convention on human rights, to everyone's surprise, but immediately
began the second Chechen war in 1999. In April 2000, the Parliamentary
Assembly of the Council of Europe voted to have Russia suspended
after Frank Judd produced his hard-hitting reports. Within 10
days of the vote, Mr. Putin was here in London on a private invitation.
Also, he has publicly thanked the UK more than once for giving
him cover on the question of Chechnya in the Council of Europe.
Now is the time to think hard, but one has to be aware of the
complexities.
Q85 Mr. Illsley: In
response to the point made by Andrew Monaghan, who I believe said
that the European Union ought to get its act together to produce
mutually beneficial energy policies, when energy supplies were
threatened in the winter of 2005-06, the first thing that Germany
did was to agree the pipeline with Russia, regardless of other
member states. That was at a time when Austria, which held the
EU presidency, inserted a clause into its priorities for the EU
saying that there should be some co-operation on energy. Is that
an example of the Russians winning a round by divide and conquer?
Dr. Monaghan: I am not
sure that it is.
Q86 Chairman: Could
you reply as quickly as possible? We want to come on to UK energy
security.
Dr. Monaghan: I think that
the complexities of what happened in 2005-06 are not widely understood.
The fact that certain other members of the EU afterwards went
and signed deals with Russia reflects their own interests. I was
talking about this recently in Italy. The reason that the Italians
have gone toward Russia is that they view Russia as a more reliable
supplier than other major suppliers, which is to say those on
their southern flank.
There is such a range of suppliers, transit
routes and energy types within Europe that getting things together
is difficult. The problem to which I referred is one of infrastructure.
We have a number of small bilateral ties between a few European
states, which means that there is surplus in one state and insufficiency
in another. That is the point that I was making. The reaction
to what happened in 2005-06 is sometimes a little overblown. Politically,
it had a huge impact, which we should not deny, but practically
it had quite a small impact. On the cut-off of Ukraine, the difficulties
actually came up in February. The EU should keep an eye on the
main difficulty because it reflected the severity of the Russian
winter and the pressure on Russia's gas system. The main number
of shortages in Europe happened in February. The shortage in January
was quite small and short-lived.
Chairman: Thank you. We
have finally arrived at Malcolm Moss.
Q87 Mr. Moss: At the
moment, the UK takes very little of its energy supplies directly
from Russia, particularly gas. Is that likely to change in the
future and if so, how? Would it be sensible for the UK to seek
to negotiate bilateral agreements? Dr. Monaghan referred to the
deals that Italy has done, and we know about Germany's bilateral
agreements. Would that be a more profitable route for the UK to
go down or, as I think Mr. Clark said earlier, does there have
to be an EU framework for negotiating energy supplies?
David Clark: It is true
that the UK takes a smaller proportion of its energy import need
from Russia than other European countries do, particularly Germany
and those further east. From what I understand, the proportion
is going to go up, although projections are always difficult to
make in these cases. In the context of a single European energy
market, what affects other parts of Europe will inevitably affect
us if there are politically motivated supply interruptions. If
Russia cannot physically meet its export requirement, the countries
that are affected will go to the suppliers that we use. That will
inevitably impact on the price, so there will be a commercial
impact on us. There will also be the political impact that I have
described of excessive dependency on Russia on the part of certain
European countries. Our ability to frame a common European foreign
policy in ways that we like might then be affected, because those
countries will be nervous about upsetting Moscow—so it does
affect us.
If we are making moves towards a common
European energy market, a common external energy policy is a logical
corollary of that, just as the common external tariff was a logical
consequence of the common market. That, too, carries political
implications with it. I have a very specific idea about the way
in which that common external energy policy needs to be framed.
We talked a little bit about supply infrastructure, and I mentioned
before the energy charter treaty.
The second strand of an effective European
policy has to be to try to open up a new energy corridor to central
Asia and the Caspian basin that does not transit Russian territory.
If we want Russia to accept the transit protocol, the best way
to achieve that is to change the reality of the supply infrastructure
in a concerted way. That is what I meant about affecting Russia's
perception of its interests at a very practical level, such as
by pushing forward on the Odessa-Brody pipeline extension, pressing
ahead with Nabucco and developing relations with the Black Sea
countries that met in Krakow last week for the energy summit.
I think that it was a mistake that the European Union was not
represented at that summit. Those countries are keen to act as
a new energy corridor to the Caspian and central Asia. We should
be working with them to achieve precisely that. That will change
Russia's perception about what it can get away with.
Q88 Mr. Moss: You are
making the point that was made by Mr. Roberts. I am going to Baku
in a few weeks' time so it will be interesting to find out what
the thinking is there.
Dr. Monaghan: I think that
the UK's energy relationship with Russia is much broader than
people consider it to be. We do not have much gas from Russia
at the moment, but we have a significant amount of coal from there,
and I should like to point out the difference. Many people consider
Russia an unreliable gas supplier for both political and substance
reasons, but at the same time it is considered a reliable coal
supplier for both political and substance reasons.
Let me give a figure on the coal situation,
just to outline how important this is for us. More than 50% of
the imports of steam coal that come into this country come from
Russia, and 75% of steam coal needs are met from imports, so we
have a significant coal relationship with the Russians. I should
also like to point out that we are investing in the Russian coal
network and system, and the Russians are coming over here: a big
project of one of the major coal companies is to reopen the Hatfield
colliery.
The nature of gas interaction is also
very important. Gazprom views the UK as its target market—the
fastest growing and most profitable one for it, and therefore
the one that it wants to get into—to the extent that people
have said that the Baltic sea pipeline between Russia and Germany
is simply making Germany into a transit hub to the UK. At the
moment, Gazprom has a small interest in the north of the UK. It
has bought Pennine natural gas, which supplies Headingley, so
we must hope that when the lights begin to fade and Gazprom turns
off the energy, England is seven or eight wickets down rather
than winning. There is an increasing bilateral relationship. We
are investing heavily in Russia, both upstream and downstream,
and it is investing more and more here—not just in gas,
but in coal. We also need to think about electricity and, I would
suggest, nuclear. We are talking about energy security rather
than gas.
Professor Bowring: What
David Clark and Dr. Monaghan have said re-emphasises the importance
of trying to position the EU as a negotiating partner. Whatever
the UK does for its own energy needs and in its own interests,
it will be essential that the EU is there.
In the past couple of years, I have been
doing a lot of work in Georgia, whose relations with Russia are
crucial—that has to do with the oil transit, among other
things. Something that is absolutely clear there is that the EU
plays very little role apart from funding projects; co-ordination
between the various European agencies—the OSCE, the Council
of Europe and the EU—is minimal, and although there is a
strong American presence, politically and in terms of funding,
the European Union is not there. I stress the vital importance
of the UK promoting EU policy in this area.
Chairman: Thank you. I
understand that there will a Division fairly soon. May we therefore
move on to the last major area that we want to cover? Ken Purchase
will deal with the issue of the UK and the promotion of democracy
and human rights in Russia.
Q89 Mr. Purchase: How
might we best understand Russia's view of democracy and human
rights? Are Britain's efforts to promote democracy and human rights
productive or counter-productive?
Professor Bowring: In my
view between 1997 and 2003, when we stopped DFID funding in Russia
for a variety of reasons—one of the main reasons was the
war in Iraq—we had an excellent programme at a series of
different levels in the field of judicial reform and human rights,
with a very high level of co-operation. For example, Russian prisons
were twinned with UK prisons, there was work on alternatives to
imprisonment and there was a tremendous programme with the Russian
judiciary on law reform. A second very big programme had been
contracted—it had been let—and it was stopped, which
I think was a tremendous shame as it was much appreciated by a
lot of good people in Russia.
Now, the Global Opportunities Fund at
the Foreign and Commonwealth Office has picked up some of that
and is doing some good work. However, my view was always that
DFID had tremendous respect in Russia; it was seen as being one
of the most effective agencies in doing this kind of work and
it was engaged in genuine partnerships. So, if I could put in
a plea—
Q90 Mr. Purchase: But
could I have a discussion with a Russian—if language were
not a problem—about democracy and human rights where we
would both understand what we meant?
Professor Bowring: I would
say yes, entirely. I would refer again to the example of Judge
Kovler at the European Court of Human Rights, who is a really
independent judge. He votes against his own country quite frequently
and does tremendous work in Russia, carrying out propaganda work
for the Council of Europe and the values that it stands for. He
is not alone; there are lots of people like that.
There was a time when President Putin,
if you like, looked both ways. So, on the one hand it was nationalism
and Russia's interests; on the other hand, it was genuine reform
in Russia. Things have changed, but I would say that we could
play a very important role.
We are now in the situation with the
European Court of Human Rights, for example, where this year 19,000
cases are from Russia; they amount to a quarter of all the cases
at the Court, which has 46 countries involved. That means that
throughout Russia now every lawyer says to their client, "OK,
you lost, but we are off to Strasbourg." That is one of the
reasons why there are so many cases. That situation is now very
well known, and the way that law is being taught in Russia has
completely changed as a result. However, I would say that there
are things that one could do in order to build on some of those
changes.
Q91 Mr. Purchase: Professor,
you are very upbeat and that is most welcome, but how do you explain
the fact that Russia's relations with the Council of Europe appear
to be deteriorating somewhat on human rights issues?
Professor Bowring: I would
say, very briefly, that there are a couple of factors involved
there. On the one hand, there is irritation or even anger right
at the top. President Putin went public in January. It was not
to do with the oligarchs; it was to do with losing the case against
Moldova and Russia over Transnistria. Russia also lost another
case, which was against Georgia and Russia. In both those cases,
Russia was found really to have acted in bad faith. So there is
substantial irritation with the court in certain circles in the
Kremlin.
A current problem is that Russia is the
only country of the 46 not to have ratified protocol 14 to the
European convention on human rights, which concerns a substantial
reform of the Court to enable it to deal with that enormous wave
of cases. In the last week, the president of the European court
of Human Rights, Judge Costa from France, Judge Kovler from Russia,
and a quite a big delegation have been in Russia meeting with
the constitutional court, with the heads of the other courts,
the prosecutor and others, and even though the Duma voted to reject
protocol 14 in December, there is now considerable pressure in
Russia to get this done.
All I am saying is that there are some
very negative factors. None the less, one cannot say that this
is monolithic; it is not a totalitarian country. It is a country
that is moving in an authoritarian direction, and one has to do
what one can to help it to move in a different direction.
Dr. Monaghan: I would add
that, apart from the human rights aspect in terms of democracy,
Russia would perhaps question London's stance with Washington.
There is a defensive nature on the political side; the thought
is that the UK sides with Washington in forwarding democratisation
in states that are not yet ready for it. One particularly vivid
illustration was told to me: "You are exporting democracy
on the wings of a Tomahawk." That is a fundamental difference
in our understanding of what democracy is.
Secondly, if we talk about parliamentary
democracy, I am not sure that Russia has a coherent understanding
of loyal opposition, for example. They do not really see the parliamentary
position in the same way. As I mentioned at the beginning, there
is a difference in terms of the division of powers between Russia
and the UK. Although there is a positive basis for that, the political
difficulties to which I referred come from a series of value differences.
They do not really see what is going on, and they disbelieve and
distrust the Anglo-Saxon notion of democratisation, if one wants
to call it that—and they sometimes do.
There is also a lack of understanding
about the domestic nature of what a democracy might be in terms
of revolution rather than evolution. When there is an election
and a candidate is beaten, there is no chance that they might
be back in four or five years. They have to get themselves ready
and go. They tend to hold onto power a little more rigorously,
as there is no institutionalised view from many people's point
of view. There is debate about that, but many people would question
it at the moment.
David Clark: To answer
your question, I would say that most Russian leaders understand
very well the concept of democracy. However, they have rejected
it, or at least our understanding of democracy, as one that is
applicable in the Russian context. They say so very explicitly.
What Putin has described as being a model for Russia is a managed
democracy, which is something different. It combines two contradictory
notions: democracy, a bottom-up process, and management, a top-down
process. The top-down element predominates in Russia, in order
to prevent or forestall the possibility of change from below,
which it sees as being analogous to an orange revolution scenario;
Russia out of control and back to the bad old ways. Following
their experience in the 1990s, a lot of ordinary Russians have
a very negative association with what democracy means. However,
the nature of the system has the superstructure of a democracy,
with elections and parties that, at least theoretically, contest
elections. None of the non-electoral prerequisites of democracy
are there. Putin is supported by the Russian people but the conditions
in which public opinion is formed are not free. There is no free
media. NGOs operate under very strict bureaucratic control from
the centre. Political parties are not allowed to operate freely;
there are very strict conditions allowing them to register, and
they can be prevented from standing, as Yabloko was recently in
the local St. Petersburg elections.
Q92 Mr. Purchase: That
very much conforms with how I understand what is happening there.
Can you tell us whether Britain's efforts are productive or counter-productive?
We still persist with our views, even though that dissidence that
you have so well described is obviously clear. Are our efforts
worthwhile?
David Clark: At the moment,
no, because there is a failure to push forward enthusiastically
what I see as being the two key tracks that we need to pursue.
First, the Russian Government, state and political elite need
to understand that there are adverse consequences in rowing back
from the democratic standards and the direction of political reform
that existed in the 1990s. At the moment, they feel no consequences
of their actions, so there is nothing to fear from them. Secondly,
there is no consistent effort from countries such as the UK—although
I am not singling out the UK—really to try to help with
local democracy building, partly because the Russian state has
signalled its view that NGOs which receive foreign funding are
in some ways agents of foreign influence and are therefore enemies
of the state. That has motivated much of the crackdown on civil
society.
To prevent individual countries and individual
Governments being targeted by the Russians when those countries
or Governments try to help with local democracy-building efforts,
there needs to be detachment from national Governments. Maybe
what is needed is a European equivalent to the National Endowment
for Democracy, whereby work in promoting democracy and practical
nuts and bolts assistance can be detached from the governmental
level and handed to an agency that would carry out that work on
Governments' behalf. That would help to take some of the sting
out of the bilateral antagonisms that have arisen when countries
such as the UK have tried to help with democracy promotion.
Professor Bowring: On Mr.
Purchase's question, I think that there is a significant problem
with democracy in Russia, which is that the Opposition parties
self-destructed at the last election. Yabloko and SPS are simply
not credible. Putin did quite a bit to try to get Yabloko into
the Russian Parliament—he wanted them there. The problem
is something that we cannot change; I am afraid that the Russians
will have to do it themselves. It is very hard to see how the
people who are currently organising the marches in Moscow and
St. Petersburg—Kasparov, Kasyanov and Mr. Limonov, the National
Bolshevik, can constitute a credible Opposition force at the present.
I am sure that Oppositions will arise in Russia, but it will not
be because we arrange it that way.
I have mentioned the excellent work that
DFID is doing. Dr. Monaghan's comments reminded me that it is
a matter of great concern that the British Council appears to
be winding down some of its activities in Russia. The council
has come under pressure from the tax authorities, and it is not
clear whether that position has been resolved, but there seems
to have been less of the excellent work on language teaching and
all sorts of other things that the council was doing.
Given that historically Russia and the
UK have by and large been on the same side in every serious conflict,
and that relations go right back to the time of Elizabeth I and
Ivan the Terrible, there is a deep reservoir of respect and affection
for the UK. Every Russian of a certain generation knows their
Dickens, Galsworthy, Byron and so on. The tricky question is how
to mobilise that affection in a way that does not give the impression
that we are lecturing or telling them what to do, because only
they can do what they need to do. Nevertheless, there is a lot
that we can do to create a better climate.
Chairman: Thank you. The
final question is from Gisela Stuart.
Q93 Ms Stuart: If I
correctly interpret what you have said, would you also say that
the Government should support more bodies such as the Westminster
Foundation for Democracy, so that they can work in Russia?
Professor Bowring: That
foundation has funded me to go to Russia in the past. The more
that that can be done, the better.
Chairman: Thank you.
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