Written evidence submitted by the Foreign
and Commonwealth Office
The Foreign and Commonwealth Office welcomes
the opportunity to provide written input into the Committee's
inquiry into "Global Security: Russia". This memorandum
addresses the issues and questions the Committee will consider
in the terms of reference for its inquiry, published on 23 March
2007. An annex on the Foreign and Commonwealth Office's presence
and activities in Russia is provided separately.
UK-RUSSIA RELATIONS:
OVERVIEW
Close engagement with Russia is important
to the successful achievement of a wide range of the Government's
international priorities. We work with Russia at the UN and in
the G8 on policy issues such as Kosovo, Iran, MEPP, and energy
and climate security. We also work bilaterally with Russia on
the promotion of trade and investment, and in practical co-operation,
for example on serious crime. But the relationship is overshadowed
by tensions arising from the asylum/refugee status of individuals
in the UK and the Russian response to the continued presence of
those individuals. The Russian administration has not fully accepted
that these questions are matters of law, not of politics or diplomacy.
Regrettably this impacts upon other areas of potential co-operation
and upon British interests in Russia.
In a testing environment, where commercial
and political interests are closely entwined, we also need to
remain robust in the promotion of the interests of British investors,
notably in the oil and gas sector. The Foreign and Commonwealth
Office continues to pursue an approach to relations with Russia
underpinned by critical engagement. Where obstacles and disagreements
exist, our aim will continue to be to seek to resolve them by
means of a transparent, open and honest dialogue.
During Russia's 2006 G8 Chairmanship,
many UK Ministers visited Russia, including the Prime Minister,
the Chancellor, the Foreign Secretary, and the Attorney General.
The Minister for Europe visited three times in 2006, and the Secretary
of State for Trade and Industry visited in February 2007. A visit
by the Minister of State, Trade and Industry is planned for July
2007. In addition to regular and ongoing senior official level
contacts, the Russian Deputy Foreign Minister, Vladimir Titov,
visited the UK in March this year. The Government welcomes the
Committee's proposed visit in June, as well as Parliamentary engagement
more broadly, including recent outward visits by Members of the
All Party Russia Parliamentary Group and Members of the House
of Lords respectively.
ENERGY SECURITY
Are the United Kingdom and the European Union
doing enough to ensure that Russia is a reliable energy partner?
What is the significance of the energy principles
agreed under Russia's G8 Presidency and how can we ensure that
they are applied consistently to foreign investors in Russia's
energy sector?
How much of a constraint does Russia represent
on efforts to develop a more independent energy relationship between
the UK and EU and states in Central Asia and the Transcaucasus?
The UK government consistently underlines
to Russia the importance of being and being seen to be a reliable
energy partner. Against the background of disruptions in gas supply
from Russia that occurred in January 2006 and oil supply in January
2007, the Government has consistently stated, including in dialogue
with Russian partners, how important it is that energy producers
and transit states maintain reliability. The Government
welcomes the alignment of EU Member States with a statement in
support of the principles on global energy security, agreed by
the G8 at the St Petersburg summit in July 2006. The EU had an
opportunity to discuss the importance of these principles at its
Informal Meeting with President Putin in October 2006, and they
have remained an active and developing theme in UK/Russia and
EU/Russia discussions.
The Government also welcomes the agreement
by the European Council in March 2007 of an EU Energy Action Plan.
The Action Plan sets out the way in which significant progress
in the efficient operation and completion of the EU's internal
market for gas and electricity and a more interconnected and integrated
market can be achieved. This should result in a truly competitive,
interconnected and single Europe-wide internal energy market that
will have major benefits for competitiveness and EU consumers
as well as increasing security of supply. This, as well as the
full use of the instruments available to improve the EU's bilateral
co-operation with all suppliers, should ensure reliable energy
flows into the Union. The Action Plan develops clear guidelines
for an effective EU external energy policy.
At the July 2006 G8 Summit in St Petersburg,
G8 Member States agreed, under Russia's Chairmanship, a set of
key principles on the functioning of global energy markets. These
include principles derived from the Energy Charter Treaty (ECT):
transparency, predictability and stability in global energy markets,
and at all stages of the supply chain. The Government supports
strongly the consistent application of the St Petersburg principles
across all G8 Member States. The Government has also repeatedly
underlined to the Russian Government the importance for future
security of energy supply of conditions, which encourage and protect
investment in new production sources. We reiterated these concerns
in the context of the Russian Government's approach to the operating
arrangements for the Sakhalin II project. The Government has also
re-affirmed the openness of the UK to all foreign investors who
are prepared to operate within markets governed by competitive,
liberal market principles, most recently during the visit to Russia
by the Secretary of State for Trade and Industry in February 2007.
The Government notes that Russia signed
the ECT in 1994, but regrets that Russia has not yet ratified
it. The Government notes the particular importance of legally
binding agreement on transit arrangements, for which the ECT and
its Transit Protocol provide a framework. In its approach to the
negotiation of a successor Partnership and Co-operation Agreement
(PCA) between the EU and Russia, the Government attaches importance
to a component on energy that includes legally binding dispute
resolution mechanisms.
In keeping with the Government's commitment
to energy markets grounded in liberal market principles and mechanisms,
the Government supports diversity of supply—both of source
and export route. The Government believes that the move towards
market price levels in the energy sector across Central Asia and
South Caucasus is a welcome trend, but believes that a graduated
approach would assist the economies of the states in the region.
Russia itself advocated such an approach during its economic transition
in the late 1990s, in the context of its aspiration to accede
to the WTO.
INTERNATIONAL AND
REGIONAL SECURITY
What role is Russia playing in the United Nations
Security Council and the Non-proliferation regimes and what should
the United Kingdom's response be?
What is the state of Russia's relations with Central
Asian and Transcaucasian countries and Ukraine?
What are the prospects for relations between the
enlarged NATO and Russia?
What is the role of Russia in the Middle East
Quartet?
What are the prospects for Russia's relations
with China and the Shanghai Co-operation Organisation?
Russia plays an important role as a permanent
member of the UNSC, G8 and other international organisations and
groupings. Russia's foreign policy has become increasingly
assertive as its economic strength has grown over the last few
years. On a range of international issues, Russia has sought to
play a prominent, influential or blocking role. Its foreign policy
vision places much emphasis on "multipolarity" as the
key to success in meeting international security challenges. It
continues to place a special emphasis on its relations with countries
of the Commonwealth of Independent States (CIS). While recognising
that the CIS as an institution has modest (and diminishing) capacity
and cohesion, Russia remains acutely sensitive to developments
in CIS countries' relationships with Euro-Atlantic countries and
institutions. Russia has been explicit in its reservations about
the prospects of Ukraine and Georgia joining NATO. And it has
been an uncommitted and unsupportive partner in the European Union's
efforts to build success and promote modernisation and reform
in the region, notably through the European Neighbourhood Policy.
Russia's permanent membership of the
United Nations Security Council (UNSC) is a key element
in its foreign and security policy approach. As fellow permanent
members, there is close co-ordination between the UK and Russian
missions in New York, in addition to regular UK/Russia dialogue
on UNSC business in capitals. The UNSC has reached unanimous positions
on many issues of concern for the UK, including in recent months
on Iran. There are also issues on which Russia differs, such as
a recent draft UNSC resolution condemning the situation in Burma,
which Russia vetoed. It remains an important aim of British foreign
policy to work successfully with Russia to ensure the UNSC operates
with maximum effectiveness in addressing threats to international
peace and security.
It remains an important aim to work for
successful outcomes on the major WMD proliferation challenges
posed by North Korea and Iran. On these issues, Russia's view
has often varied from ours on the timing and nature of economic
pressure or sanctions, and on the role that the UNSC should play.
But we share the overall aim not to see the emergence of new nuclear-armed
states, and we will continue to seek cooperative ways of promoting
this objective.
Russia is a member of most of the major
international non-proliferation regimes (see box below).
The UK and Russia maintain a constant dialogue on non-proliferation
issues through a variety of international fora.
A key part of the UK response to proliferation
concerns within Russia is the Global Partnership Against Weapons
and Materials of Mass Destruction. The Programme was launched
at the 2002 G8 Summit in Kananaskis with the goal to "prevent
terrorists, or those that harbour them, from acquiring or developing
nuclear, chemical, radiological and biological weapons; missiles;
and related materials, equipment and technology". Work was
initially focused in Russia and on the four priority areas of
destruction of chemical weapons, the dismantling of decommissioned
nuclear submarines, the disposition of fissile materials and the
employment of former weapons scientists. The UK pledged up to
US$750 million over the 10-year life of the programme and has
played an important role in all four priority areas. This has
been made possible by the establishment of strong relationships
with Russian counterparts at the working level. As Russia's economy
has strengthened, its contributions have increased and current
estimates suggest it will have spent about US$6 billion of its
own money by 2012.
| Russia was an original signatory to the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons (NPT). Like the UK and the US, is a depositary state. It is one of the five recognised nuclear weapon States.
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Russia is also a depositary of The Biological and Toxin Weapons Convention (BTWC) along with UK and the US. In 1992, in a joint UK/US/Russian statement, Russia acknowledged inheriting an illegal BW programme from the Soviet Union. More recently Russia has appeared to backtrack and has been reluctant to engage in Global Partnership discussions on projects related to redirection of BW scientists.
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Russia is a Party to the Chemical Weapons Convention (CWC). It declared a stockpile of Chemical Weapons of nearly 40,000 tonnes of chemical agent, about 80% of which was highly toxic nerve agent. Work to destroy the stockpile was initially slow. But Russia is now spending far more domestically, and is working to hit their deadline to destroy 20% of their stockpile by 29 April 2007. G8 partners and others have provided substantial financial assistance for this programme through the Global Partnership. Russia recently agreed to improved transparency measures; it and the US will host visits to destruction sites by members of the Executive Council of the Organisation for the Prohibition of Chemical Weapons.
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EXPORT CONTROL REGIMES
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Russia is a member of the following export control regimes: Nuclear Suppliers Group (NSG), Zangger Committee, Missile Technology Control Regime (MTCR) and the Hague Code of Conduct Against Ballistic Missile Proliferation (HCOC). In all of these fora Russia takes an active and robust approach. Russia's membership of these regimes provides regular opportunities for discussion of issues of proliferation concern and on how to improve existing regimes, although the UK and Russia's positions do not always coincide. Issues being discussed at the moment include Iran/DPRK; controls of transfers of Enrichment and Reprocessing goods and technology and updating the MTCR Technical Annex. Within the HCOC, Russia contributes by far the most Pre-Launch Notifications (PLNs) of any of the Subscribing States. Russia has expressed interest in joining the Australia Group.
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Regarding conventional weapons, Russia is an active member of the Wassenaar Arrangement which aims to promote transparency and greater responsibility in the transfer of conventional arms and dual use goods. During 2007, the Arrangement will undergo a self assessment and we hope to agree a number of measures to improve its role and functioning. Russia abstained from the vote for the Arms Trade Treaty resolution at the UN General Assembly in December 2006. The UK is committed to securing a legally binding treaty to regulate the international trade in arms. We are engaged in a constructive dialogue with Russia on this initiative and are encouraging them to participate in the UN process which is now beginning.
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Russia, along with the US, retains by far the world's
largest stockpiles of nuclear weapons. Two main bilateral
arms control treaties currently drive reductions in these stockpiles:
the Strategic Arms Reduction Treaty I (START I) and the Strategic
Offensive Reductions Treaty (SORT). Under the terms of the latter,
both countries will reduce their operationally deployed strategic
nuclear warheads to a maximum of 2,200 by 2012 (representing a
reduction of around two thirds since the end of the Cold War).
However the deals expire in 2009 and 2012 respectively. Bilateral
talks on successor arrangement have begun, but there are no clear
indications as to whether firm commitments on further numbers
reductions will emerge.
Recent Russia-US and Russia-NATO interaction on strategic
issues has been dominated by US plans to site ballistic missile
defence (BMD) interceptors in Poland, with associated radar
in the Czech Republic. Russia remains concerned, challenging US
argumentation on the location of the interceptors and complaining
that BMD could upset the strategic balance in Europe. Moscow does
not accept that the proposed sites are demonstrably only intended
for—or capable of—defending against a limited missile
strike from the Middle East. Following announcement of US BMD
plans, senior Russian representatives have repeated public threats
to withdraw from the Intermediate-Range Nuclear Forces (INF) Treaty,
under which the US and Russia eliminated all of their mid-range
cruise and ballistic nuclear missiles. Russia has also announced
a moratorium upon the implementation of the Conventional Forces
Europe (CFE) Treaty. The UK Government does not agree with the
linkage that Russia has made between these issues. We will continue
to work closely with NATO allies to ensure that all these questions
are addressed with objectivity and transparency—including
in the NATO-Russia Council.
Russia's priority in international disarmament
talks is progress towards a Treaty on the Prevention of an
Arms Race in Outer Space (PAROS). Their proposals look to many
(particularly in the US) to be specifically aimed at restricting
any future deployment of missile defences in space. The UK maintains
consistent support for the UNGA resolution on PAROS and the associated
resolution on Transparency and Confidence Building Measures. The
UK could not agree to any measure that could limit the UK's inherent
right of self-defence as preserved in article 51 of the UN Charter.
Russia actively maintains close relations with the
republics of Central Asia (Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, Tajikistan,
Turkmenistan, Uzbekistan), both multilaterally through fora such
as the Commonwealth of Independent States (CIS) and the Collective
Security Treaty Organisation (CSTO) and bilaterally. Energy plays
an important part in this relationship; the Soviet-built pipelines
from the Central Asian Republics still run through Russia before
the oil and gas can reach European markets. Russia appears to
aspire to maintain and strengthen its control over energy exports
from the whole region, and its unwillingness to ratify the ECT
is in part based on a reluctance to allow the EU an opportunity
to access Central Asian gas supplies.
The collapse of the centralised planning system following
the break-up of the Soviet Union sapped Russian demand for goods
from the Central Asian states. However, commerce and trade between
the countries and Russia remains important. Russian firms are
active across the region, particularly in raw materials sectors.
Russia has significant energy investments in Kazakhstan, and is
seeking to expand activities in Turkmenistan.
Russia is generally supportive of the incumbent regimes
in Central Asia, citing the need to maintain stability in a volatile
region. We encourage both Russia and the countries of the region
to cement stability through the introduction of true democracy.
Russia co-operates with the countries on issues such as terrorism
through the CSTO and the Shanghai Cooperation Organisation (SCO),
one of whose goals is to combat "extremism, separatism and
terrorism".
There is also a high degree of military co-operation
between Russia and the countries of the region. There is a Russian
military presence in Tajikistan and Kyrgyzstan as part of deployments
under the Collective Security Treaty Organisation.
There are many migrant workers from the Central Asian
Republics in Russia (Tajikistan estimates that there are up to
800,000 Tajik labour migrants in Russia). There is concern that
a new Russian law, which bans foreigners from working in markets,
will reduce the flow of remittances back to these countries. Many
ethnic Russians also remain in Central Asian countries following
the break-up of the Soviet Union.
Russia's relations with the countries of the South
Caucasus region (Armenia, Azerbaijan and Georgia) are complicated
by the unresolved conflicts of Nagorno-Karabakh (Armenia-Azerbaijan),
South Ossetia (Georgia) and Abkhazia (Georgia). Overall Russian
foreign policy objectives towards Armenia and Azerbaijan follows
the same broad lines as towards the countries of Central Asia.
Relations with Georgia are more tense, particularly
since the inauguration of the current Georgian President Saakashvili
in 2004. One of President Saakashvili's election promises was
to regain Georgian control over the breakaway regions of South
Ossetia and Abkhazia. It is regrettable that there has been little
advance towards a peaceful solution to these conflicts. Russia
is a member of both the organisations tasked with seeking a solution
to these conflicts. But Russia also maintains close contacts with
the separatist leaders of these regions and Russian businesses
are the main investors there. Russian peacekeepers are present
in both regions under cease-fire agreements, but Georgia views
the presence of these troops as destructive and would like to
internationalise the peacekeeping operations. Tensions between
the two countries still flare up publicly. In the course of 2006,
Russia banned Georgian wine, water and agricultural products,
and closed land border crossings. Tensions escalated in October
2006 when Georgia expelled four Russian army officers whom they
claimed were intelligence officers. In response, Russia introduced
a series of further economic measures, including the cessation
of air links between the two countries, and took measures aimed
at Russia's Georgian community. There was also a widespread anti-Georgian
campaign in the media. In discussions with both countries, we
have encouraged a calm and constructive approach to reducing these
tensions.
Russia is a member of the Minsk Group which is working
towards a solution to the Nagorno Karabakh conflict between Armenia
and Azerbaijan. Russia continues to maintain good relations
with Armenia, where it is the main foreign investor. Armenia also
voluntarily hosts Russian troops. Relations with Azerbaijan have
been more variable, as Azerbaijan has pursued a more independent
foreign policy, particularly in the energy sector.
Russia's involvement in the politics of Ukraine
was evident during Ukraine's presidential election campaign
in 2004, when Russia openly backed Viktor Yanukovych's candidature.
Ukrainian President Yushchenko's pro-EU and pro-NATO policies
strained relations with Russia in 2005-06. The transit of Russian
gas through Ukraine to European markets plays a key role in the
relationship. Russia cut off gas supplies to Ukraine in January
2006 as the two sides had not been able to agree a gas price for
domestic use. The Ukrainian government under Prime Minister Yanukovych
appeared to have a better relationship with Russia than his predecessor,
and a price for the supply of gas has been agreed until the end
of 2007. The Russian Black Sea Fleet is stationed in Sevastopol,
Crimea, under a leasing agreement which runs to 2017.
NATO currently has 26 members. Following the
collapse of the Soviet Union ten former Warsaw Pact countries
joined in two waves of Alliance enlargement, in 1999 and 2002.
A further three countries (Croatia, Albania and Macedonia) are
currently participating in NATO's Membership Action Plan—a
programme that prepares aspirants for NATO membership. The decisions
on whether each of these countries are ready for membership will
be taken at the 2008 NATO Summit.
Russia's relations with NATO were formalised with
the 1997 NATO-Russia Founding Act. In 2002 the NATO-Russia Council
was created, with the aim of bringing a qualitatively new relationship
between NATO and Russia. It was conceived to provide a mechanism
for consultation, consensus-building, co-operation, joint decision
and joint action on a wide spectrum of security issues in the
Euro-Atlantic region. It meets regularly at Ambassadorial level
in Brussels, and there are frequent meetings at Ministerial level.
As well as carrying out joint exercises and discussing strategic
issues such as counter-proliferation and missile defence, the
NATO-Russia Council is the principal forum for discussion of further
NATO enlargement with Russia. Russia has expressed no difficulties
with the countries currently participating in the Membership Action
Plan, but it is clear that it does have concerns about the aspirations
of Georgia, and Ukraine, currently in Intensified Dialogue (the
stage before the Membership Action Plan). Russia does not have
a veto over NATO decisions but we continue, through the NATO-Russia
Council, to assure Russia that the principal reason for NATO enlargement
is to promote security and stability in the wider Euro-Atlantic
region—not to create tensions.
Russia, alongside the EU, the US and the UN, is an
active member of the Middle East Quartet. Following the
election of the Hamas Government, the Quartet, in their 30 March
2006 meeting in London, "noted with grave concern that the
new government has not committed to the principles spelled out
on 30 January". These principles are of non-violence, recognition
of Israel, and acceptance of previous agreements and obligations,
including the Roadmap. As the Hamas Government failed to meet
these, the "Quartet concurred that there inevitably will
be an effect on direct assistance to that government and its ministries".
Russia, unlike the other Quartet members, has engaged a policy
of contact with Hamas members. Hamas' political leader Khalid
Mishal visited Moscow in February 2007. In doing so, Russia was
not in breach of the Quartet principles.
There is close co-operation between Russia and China
on energy projects, economic ties and in the UN Security Council.
We welcome good relations and greater understanding between two
such key global players—the current negotiations on North
Korea's nuclear programme show where this can have concrete results.
There are areas of Russia's policy towards China with which we
do not agree, for example Russia's arms sales to China. We encourage
Russia to act responsibly in its conduct of arms exports, including
engaging on the Arms Trade Treaty.
Russia pays increasing attention to developing the
Shanghai Co-operation Organisation. In recent years, the
SCO's focus has moved beyond its original task of promoting cross-border
security and confidence building to encompass an ambitious, if
loosely-defined, agenda for economic and security co-operation.
The Presidents of Russia and China agreed to expand and deepen
trade and economic cooperation among the SCO members during President
Hu's visit to Moscow in March this year. The extent to which this
will develop remains unclear.
EU-RUSSIA RELATIONS
What are the prospects that the EU-Russia Partnership and Co-operation
Agreement will be successfully concluded and will prove an effective
framework for the pursuit of UK aims vis-a-vis Russia?
The EU has still to agree that talks can begin on
a successor to the current Partnership and Co-operation Agreement
(PCA). Poland has made clear it is unwilling to approve the
mandate (thus enabling negotiations to be launched) while a Russian
ban on imports of Polish food remains in place. Lithuania is similarly
reluctant for talks to start until Russia resumes oil supplies
to Lithuania's only oil refinery. These concerns have coincided
with difficulties experienced by Estonia following the relocation
of a Soviet War Memorial from the centre of Tallinn—though
the Estonians have not called for PCA talks to be delayed as a
result.
We believe that Russia should lift its ban on Polish
food exports. We support Presidency and Commission efforts
to resolve the dispute. We also understand why disruptions to
the oil supply to Lithuania cause the Lithuanians such
concern. The disruption affects supplies to their only oil refinery,
whose operation accounts for a significant proportion of GDP.
We believe that Russia should look to resolve this issue speedily.
We believe the location of war memorials in Estonia is
an internal matter for Estonia. We recognise the right of the
Estonian Government to relocate war memorials and war graves;
and we note that in this case the relocation was done with sensitivity
and respect. The Estonian Prime Minister himself attended a ceremony
commemorating all the victims of World War II, and held partly
at the new site of the statue, on 9 May. More widely, we were
particularly concerned about the violent demonstrations aimed
at the Estonian Embassy in Moscow, as well as the attack on the
Estonian Ambassador. We fully supported the EU Presidency and
NATO statements, which called for Russia to fulfill its obligations
under the Vienna Convention on Diplomatic Relations.
We nevertheless continue to believe that it would
be better for talks to open on a successor to the PCA sooner rather
than later. The talks will provide a framework for us to engage
Russia, critically as well as cooperatively, on issues of substance.
And despite the delay to the start of talks, there is broad agreement
on the text of the mandate among EU member states. The negotiating
mandate covers all the areas that matter to us: democracy, human
rights, energy, international issues, counter-proliferation, counter-terrorism,
and trade. It calls specifically for effective dispute settlement
mechanisms. During negotiations on the mandate, the UK ensured
there were clearly agreed mechanisms for Member States to oversee
and advise on the negotiations.
THE FUTURE
OF THE
BRITISH COUNCIL
AND BBC WORLD
SERVICE
As they report in a separate memorandum to the Committee,
the British Council has a network of Centres across Russia
and runs a comprehensive programme of cultural, educational and
scientific events in Russia. Events during 2006 included the Whistler
Exhibition, the development of the BRIDGE programme of partnerships
in higher education, and a Zero Carbon City exhibition. In Russia,
however, the British Council has, over recent years, experienced
numerous legal, administrative and practical difficulties operating
in the country as a result of intervention by the Russian authorities
and continuing absence of an agreement (see below) to clarify
the Council's legal status. We have frequently raised these issues
with the Russian authorities at both official and Ministerial
levels.
The Prime Minister was delighted to be able to open
the Council's new offices in St Petersburg in July 2006, indicating
the importance the Government attaches to the Council's work in
Russia. We welcome the prospect of the opening of a Russian Cultural
Centre in the UK, not least to allow Russian language learning
and teaching to flourish here. Given the mutual benefits of cultural
exchange, we would like to agree a Cultural Centres Agreement
(CCA) with Russia. We have worked closely with the British Council
for nine years to negotiate an agreed text with Russia. A text
was agreed at official level with Russia in 2001, but was not
signed. In March 2006, Russia submitted a revised text. Officials
in the Foreign & Commonwealth Office and the British Embassy,
Moscow have continued to work actively with the British Council
towards an agreement. We assisted the British Council to prepare
negotiations on the text in Moscow in January this year, and jointly
negotiated the text with the British Council during face to face
talks with the Russian authorities. The text has been largely
agreed with the Russian authorities, but they are currently reluctant
to guarantee consent, under the terms of the Agreement, for the
British Council to establish centres (which already exist), outside
Moscow. Among other things, successful conclusion of this Agreement
will clarify the Council's legal status in Russia and reduce the
potential for the hostile treatment it has undergone at the hands
of some parts of the Russian bureaucracy.
The BBC World Service has also submitted a
separate Memorandum to the Committee on their activities in Russia.
The Government believes that the BBC World Service plays an important
role worldwide as an authoritative source of independent news.
Given the decreasing plurality of print and broadcast media over
the last few years, this is particularly important in Russia.
The BBC has a professional Russian Service. Some of its programmes
discuss topics rarely raised in the Russian media scene (eg climate
change), and with speakers who are often unable to appear on mainstream
Russian media outlets.
At the moment the BBC Russian Service broadcasts on
Medium Wave and through an increasingly popular internet service.
It was unable to broadcast on FM in Moscow for a number of months
earlier this year—and is still unable to broadcast on FM
in St Petersburg. We believe that an FM frequency is important
for the BBC Russian Service to reach their audience.
We remain in close contact with the BBC World Service
on handling this issue with the Russian authorities. During a
previous interruption to BBC World Service transmission in 2006,
the former Foreign Secretary, Jack Straw, raised the issue with
the Russian Foreign Minister Sergei Lavrov. Mr Lavrov undertook
to investigate personally and the matter was speedily resolved.
The Ambassador has raised this issue on a number of occasions
with the Foreign Ministry, and the Embassy is in regular touch
with the BBC on the matter. We and the BBC are mindful of the
need to balance (a) the benefits of further lobbying on behalf
of the BBC with (b) the risk of the BBC being wrongly perceived
as an arm of the British government. The BBC are working on these
issues themselves, but we stand ready to raise continuing difficulties
with the Russian authorities when deemed necessary.
HUMAN RIGHTS
AND DEMOCRACY
How can the UK and the international community best promote
human rights and the rule of law in Russia?
International efforts to promote human rights, democracy
and the rule of law in Russia are often challenging. Russia has
not made the democratic progress that optimistic observers in
the mid-late 1990s had hoped for. However, the UK Government is
committed to continue its bilateral and multilateral engagement
with the Russian Government, its support for civil society, and
its financing of project work, to advance international standards
in Russia. Whilst the Russian authorities acknowledge certain
deficiencies, they remain combative in defence of the democratic
path that Russia is taking and their adherence to international
human rights standards. The FCO set out a range of concerns about
human rights, democracy and rule of law in Russia in its Annual
Report on Human Rights, released on 12 October 2006. The Russian
Foreign Ministry responded to our report in a statement on their
web site:
Unfortunately, the section devoted to Russia ... as in previous
years, is based on distorted conceptions of the actual state of
affairs, and it abounds in gross errors and references to unverified
sources. The facts cited in the document have been collected under
previously formulated conclusions which are of a purely political
nature.
Our position regarding tendentious criticism of Russia ...
has been explained to our British colleagues on several occasions
at various levels, but it would appear that the United Kingdom's
foreign policy department has developed the determined practice
of ignoring it. One gains the impression that London has still
not realized that it is counterproductive and fruitless to try
to apply "double standards" in the field of human rights,
as it is to politicize the subject of human rights.
Since the publication of our report there have been
further negative trends:
— The murder of Anna Politkovskaya in October
2006.
— UN Committee against Torture November conclusions
of "numerous, ongoing and consistent allegations of acts
of torture committed by law enforcement personnel".
— Russian NGOs suffering under the bureaucratic
burden of NGO legislation.
— Restrictions on the participation of some
political parties in local elections.
— Restriction on, and heavy handed policing
of, political demonstrations.
The Government regularly discusses the progress of
democratic reforms and human rights in Russia with the Russian
authorities, including at Ministerial level. We take this approach
because we believe that an open and democratic Russia will provide
better opportunities for Russians and consolidate Russia as a
stable and reliable international partner. We invest significant
effort and resources in support of the promotion of human rights
in Russia through international institutions such as the EU, the
UN, the Council of Europe, the OSCE and the G8.
In addition to ad hoc engagement on specific human
rights questions, we hold regular and structured bilateral
human rights dialogues with the Russian Ministry of Foreign
Affairs. The most recent round of talks took place at the FCO
on 22 and 23 January 2007. The FCO Minister responsible for Human
Rights, Ian McCartney, headed the UK delegation. The talks covered
a broad range of our human rights issues including; Russia's adherence
to its international obligations; violations in the North Caucasus;
the environment in which NGOs and civil society operates; media
freedom; torture; independence of the judiciary and treatment
of minorities. We had a constructive and practical exchange on
the question of how to respond effectively to racially-motivated
violence—a problem of topical relevance in both countries.
Another example of the Government's commitment to
human rights in Russia is the dialogue that we maintain with NGOs
and civil society in Russia. In addition to ongoing working level
contacts, five FCO Ministers, including the Foreign Secretary,
met with a number of Russian NGOs during 2006. The Government
also supports practical projects in co-operation with local and
international NGOs and the Russian Government. The aim of these
projects is to promote international human rights standards in
Russia. In financial year 2006-07, the FCO committed approximately
£1,000,000 to projects in the field of human rights, democracy
and the rule of law. Our funding last financial year, for example,
helped extend a system of public prison inspectors and supported
the Russian Union of Journalists in their defence of journalists'
rights. We are concerned about the regularity with which Russian
official representatives complain that other governments' support
of NGOs is part of a subversive or hostile agenda. We have made
particular efforts to show that the mechanisms and objectives
of all our support for NGOs in Russia are entirely open and transparent.
The EU holds structured human rights consultations
with Russia twice a year, which enable in-depth discussion of
a wide range of our concerns. Strengthening human rights cooperation
will be an important objective for the EU in the negotiation of
a successor Partnership and Cooperation Agreement. We made a special
and successful effort during our 2005 EU Presidency to secure
President Putin's agreeement to the EU's €20m TACIS Special
Programme for the North Caucasus. Implementation of this programme
was finally agreed in September 2006. We will continue to see
this as an important and developing role that the EU can play
in helping to apply recipes for socioeconomic development and
success in a troubled region.
Russian and UK approaches diverge on a number of issues
addressed by UN human rights fora. The UK Government will continue
to work to ensure that UN human Rights machinery continues to
make an effective contribution to the promotion and protection
of human rights, including in Russia.
The Council of Europe in Strasbourg is another
key forum in which we engage with Russia on human rights, democracy
and the rule of law. Council of Europe monitoring mechanisms encourage
Russia's fulfilment of its commitments and obligations as a member
State. Russia's membership also gives its 140 million citizens
access to the European Court of Human Rights. We believe that
a key mechanism to improve the Court's effectiveness is Protocol
14. This measure would reduce the number of sitting judges on
each case and thus alleviate the significant backlog in cases
before the court—including those lodged by Russian citizens.
Although the Russian Government has stated its support for this
measure, the Russian State Duma failed to ratify it in December
2006.
The Organisation for Security and Co-operation
in Europe (OSCE) deals with three "dimensions" of
security—the politico-military, the economic and environmental
and the human. A few OSCE states, including Russia, have expressed
concern about the balance between the OSCE's three dimensions.
They allege that there is too much emphasis on the human dimension
and are particularly uncomfortable with the organisation's election
observation work. We believe it is important that OSCE has the
autonomy to carry out its mandate on election observation work
separate from the politics of member States. Russia's discomfort
appears to be increasing as their parliamentary and presidential
elections approach.
TERRORISM
How should the UK and international community engage with Russia
to tackle extremist threats?
As elsewhere, where terrorists have made attacks in
Russia, they are indiscriminate and have in the past targeted
heavily populated areas frequented by foreign nationals. British
citizens were taken hostage, and later released unharmed, during
the Dubrovka theatre siege in Moscow in 2002. The threat from
terrorism in Russia comes from extremist groups linked to the
Chechen separatist cause. The continuing instability in and around
Chechnya has radicalised many Muslims in the North Caucasus. A
number of factors contribute to the instability, including popular
discontent with poor socio-economic conditions, corruption, ethnic
and clan-based tensions, as well as ongoing security problems
related to the recent history of conflict in the region.
International terrorists, especially senior figures
in Al-Qaida, have claimed the Chechen separatist cause as a jihad.
A relatively small number of foreign extremists have in the past
participated directly in the conflict but now external support
is largely confined to propaganda messages posted on jihadist
web-sites. The financial, material and human support which was
thought to have been provided to separatist groups from individuals
in the Middle East has subsided.
The Government acknowledges the real security threat
Russia faces, and we work with Russia to address it in United
Nations Security Council, G8 and OSCE, as well the EU-Russia Troika
format and the NATO-Russia Council. In all of these fora, the
United Kingdom, Russia and the rest of the international community
engage on a range of counter-terrorism measures and activities
designed to tackle the extremist threat. The UK and Russia also
continue to address the full range of counter-terrorism issues
on the international agenda through the work of the G8, not least
in the Roma Lyon Group. Examples include tackling incitement by
assisting the United Nations to get UNSCR 1624 (see below) implemented
by third countries, tackling the growing problem of radicalisation
and recruitment, improving transport security, addressing the
need to protect critical energy infrastructure and tackling terrorist
financing.
We have consistently reminded both federal and local
authorities bilaterally and through the EU that all security measures
must be combined with full respect for human rights. Security
measures that do not respect international humanitarian law are
counter-productive, and a long-term solution to the problems in
the North Caucasus is only possible once an end has been put to
human rights violations. HMG has welcomed the current Russian
administration's public commitment to tackling the problems, which
may contribute to radicalisation and recruitment to extremist
causes. But progress has been slow. Within Russia there is a growing
problem with racist, xenophobic and extremist activity, especially
in large urban areas. There are also credible reports that the
police routinely target Caucasian and Central Asian men. The President's
Special Representative for the Northwest Federal District announced
that during 2006 the number of extremist crimes in the district
has risen by 127%. Ella Pamfilova, Chair of the Presidential Council
on Human Rights, has also protested that many racist attacks have
been labelled as "hooliganism", meaning that those prosecuted
are rarely convicted of committing an offence on the more serious
charge of ethnic hatred.
There has also been widespread concern about the Russian
government's attempts to combat extremism through domestic legislation,
including fears that the law may be applied to restrict critics
or political opponents and that amendments were passed with minimal
consultation. Although some of the law's provisions are to be
welcomed, most campaigners against racism in Russia agree that
the problem is not the wording of previous legislation, but its
implementation. HMG continues to raise these and similar issues
with the Russian authorities, most recently at the UK-Russia Human
Rights Consultations in January 2007. Since 2001 we have held
several bilateral Joint Working Groups on counter-terrorism with
the Russian authorities. These have led to constructive discussions
on radicalisation and recruitment, as well as important work on
countering terrorist financing.
In their April 2006 report on "Tolerance and
Combating Extremism in Russian Society" the Russian Public
Chamber identified socio-economic factors as one of the driving
forces behind extremism and picked out education as the key to
solving potential conflicts. This mirrors the Prevent strand of
the UK government's counter-terrorism strategy. HMG is actively
assisting development in the North Caucasus through our bilateral
£1 million North Caucasus Education Initiative, individual
projects supported through the Global Conflict Prevention Pool
and the Global Opportunities Fund. At the United Nations, Russia
was very supportive of the UK in calling for adoption of UNSCR
1624 by the Security Council. UNSCR 1624 is a UK initiative that
calls upon all states to continue and enhance an international
dialogue aimed at preventing the indiscriminate targeting of different
religions and cultures, to counter the incitement of terrorist
acts motivated by extremism and intolerance, and to prevent the
subversion of educational, cultural and religious institutions
by terrorists and their supporters.
HMG remains concerned about allegations of torture
and illegal detention during counter-terrorism operations, which
have been made against security forces in the North Caucasus.
The UK unreservedly condemns the use of torture. We work hard
with our international partners to eradicate this abhorrent practice.
International action against torture has been a priority for the
UK Government since the launch of the UK Anti-Torture Initiative
in 1998. The FCO has intensified its efforts to combat torture
wherever and whenever it occurs through diplomatic activity, practical
projects and funding for research. The British Government, including
the intelligence and security agencies, never uses torture for
any purpose, including to obtain information. Nor would we request
others to do so.
The granting of asylum in the UK in 2003 to Akhmed
Zakayev, whom Russia has accused of terrorist-related activity
in his role as a prominent Chechen separatist leader, has caused
significant tensions in the UK-Russia relationship. Representatives
of the Russian government have accused HMG of double standards
and of harbouring terrorists. HMG continues to assert the importance
of the rule of law and independence of the judiciary. Mr Zakayev
was granted asylum after due assessment by the relevant authorities
of his case and of the UK's obligations under the 1951 UN Convention
on Refugees and domestic law. A grant of asylum does not imply
support from the UK Government for an individual's views, activities
or statements. We have noted Mr Zakayev's statement aligning himself
with the events in Nalchik in 2005, and deplore such sentiments.
There can be no circumstances in which it is right to condone
or encourage acts of terrorism.
CLIMATE SECURITY
How is Russia responding to climate change and how are the
EU and UK engaging with Russia on this issue?
Russia is the world's third largest greenhouse gas
emitter. This is despite the fact that emissions are currently
some 40% lower than 1990 levels (the Kyoto benchmark). Russia's
energy intensity per unit of GDP is almost three times higher
than the OECD average. Electricity and heat generation account
for approximately 60% of all Russian GHG emissions. The IEA estimates
that in 2004, 70 billion cubic metres of gas were lost during
the transmission process or flared at source. This equates to
just over one third of annual Russian gas exports. There are therefore
significant gains to be made in energy efficiency in Russia. It
is also important to secure Russia's commitment to action on climate
security as an impetus for Brazil, India and China to do likewise.
Russia has been slow to recognise the impact which
climate security will have on its economy. Risks include the damage
to forestry and agricultural sectors, as well as oil and gas pipelines,
caused by melting of the permafrost and flooding. Russia has been
quicker to recognise the benefits of improved energy efficiency,
which was made part of its agenda during its presidency of the
G8 in 2006. Russia has huge scope for energy efficiency improvements
(particularly in the oil and gas sector as well as in other industry
and domestic heating). Gas flaring is substantial (Russia is the
second-worst global offender, after Iran), with around 28% of
associated gas wasted. Russia's Energy Strategy to 2020 aims to
lower Russia's energy consumption by 50%. However, substantive
practical action by Russia is absent. The Kyoto Protocol's flexible
mechanisms offer the potential for significant foreign investment
in energy efficiency in Russia and government approval of Joint
Implementation guidelines is imminent.
The Government works with Russia bilaterally and
multilaterally to promote implementation of the Kyoto Protocol
and action on climate security. In February 2007 the Secretary
of State for Trade and Industry and Viktor Khristenko, Russian
Minister of Industry and Energy, met in Moscow and agreed to establish
a UK-Russia Energy Forum. The Secretary of State said that work
needed to be done on energy efficiency, reducing gas flaring and
investigating carbon capture techniques and Khristenko agreed
that these were important areas.
The Foreign and Commonwealth Office currently has
a number of bilateral Global Opportunity Fund projects
on climate security in Russia. The projects aim to promote change
in the governance and use of energy resources and systems to help
secure the UK's global climate change objectives. Our projects
in Russia include: promotion of energy efficiency and greenhouse
gas emissions reduction in combustion plants; sustainable energy
training for Russian decision-makers; and supporting the development
and implementation of renewable energy laws in Russia. The FCO
has also targeted the scientific and economic debate surrounding
climate security, to encourage continued commitment to Kyoto,
to improve Russia's forest management and to raise the profile
of climate security with government, business, academia and the
public.
In the EU context, the energy efficiency working
group of the EU-Russia Permanent Partnership Council on Energy
has developed an Action Plan focussing on comparison of legislative
and regulatory frameworks in the area of energy efficiency and
energy savings, in order to exchange experiences and identify
areas for improvement. The EU and Russia hosted a joint seminar
in Moscow in April to discuss post-2012 action on climate change,
and the inclusion of language in the PCA successor with Russia
will be a further means to promote attenuating the risks of climate
change.
The EBRD is a substantial investor in Russian
energy efficiency, having invested around $1 billion in the Russian
power sector to date, and aims to invest a further $1.5 billion
in energy efficiency over the next three years through its Sustainable
Energy Initiative. As part of this initiative, and with DFID funding,
the EBRD is working on studies of the potential for deployment
of clean coal technologies in Russia, and on an analysis of the
challenges involved in investment in energy efficiency projects
in Russia, particularly on the demand side.
The Government also works with Russia on climate change
through the G8 and its mechanisms. Climate security will
be a key issue at this year's G8 summit in Heiligendamm. We are
working closely with and through the German Presidency on these
issues. The Gleneagles Dialogue group is also following up on
the commitments made during our G8 Presidency in 2005. Integral
to this follow up is the International Energy Agency (IEA). The
IEA's current work programme with Russia (with the participation
of the European Commission and EU member states) incorporates
technology co-operation through Russian involvement in the IEA's
Implementing Agreements for energy R&D, development of energy
efficiency indicators as part of the Gleneagles Plan of Action,
and increasing dialogue with Gazprom on energy saving and reform
in the gas sector.
Annex 1
THE BRITISH
EMBASSY
Overview
1. Moscow is a large overseas mission,
with 70 UK-based and 210 locally engaged staff. The UK-based work
for five different government departments, agencies or joint directorates.
FCO staff account for around 50% of the total.
2. Responsibility for the UKTI operation
throughout Russia is held by Moscow, operating in conjunction
with the Consulates-General in St Petersburg and Ekaterinburg.
The British Council, which operates as the Cultural Section of
the Embassy, has a network of centres in Moscow, St Petersburg
and across Russia.
3. The Missions' work is directly linked
to all but one of the FCO Strategic Objective (the exceptions
being SP10—Dependent Territories). The 2006-07 post objectives
are attached.
Counter Terrorism/Weapons of Mass Destruction (WMD) (SP1)
4. The Embassy maintains an active dialogue
with the Russian authorities on a range of proliferation and arms
control issues, from the Iran nuclear programme to negotiations
on an Arms Trade Treaty. The Embassy also plays a key role in
managing the implementation of UK-funded Global Partnership projects.
5. There is no direct terrorist threat
to the UK emanating from Russia, though Russia faces a terrorist
threat from extremists linked to the Chechen separatist cause.
Post maintains an active dialogue with the Russian authorities
on a range of Counter-Terrorism issues, which feed into the broader
dialogue between capitals, both bilaterally and multilaterally.
International Crime (SP2)
6. The Embassy has a team with representatives
from SOCA and HMRC dedicated to co-operation with the Russian
authorities for mutual benefit. They focus on liaison with host
law enforcement agencies on threats from organised international
crime that may adversely impact on the UK. This is achieved by
close co-operation on intelligence gathering and operational fronts.
7. Notable recent successes include:
— Close co-operation on high-tech crime with
long sentences imposed on three Russian hackers (eight years each)
who extorted millions from UK online companies.
— Excellent co-operation with Federal Drugs
Control Service against international cocaine and weapon smugglers.
— The Kirov Project, which promoted British
policing values to future law enforcement personal from the Russian
Federation.
Conflict Prevention and Resolution (SP3)
8. Post maintains a regular dialogue with
key Russian interlocutors, including in the Foreign Ministry,
the Presidential Administration, and the Security Council on issues
related to conflict and conflict prevention.
9. Post, together with other Allied embassies,
is engaged in promoting the benefits and further potential of
the NATO Russia Council. As well as dialogue with the Russian
authorities, this includes public diplomacy to highlight the advantages
of Russia and NATO working together, for example to counter terrorism
and in Afghanistan.
10. Post also supports continued reform
of the Russian Armed Forces through a more productive Military-Military
relationship, including by continuing to prepare personnel leaving
the Russian Armed Forces for worthwhile civilian careers.
11. Post engages directly with the Russians,
on the "frozen conflicts" and other aspects of the Russian
relationship with Georgia, aiming to promote and support constructive
dialogue.
12. The North Caucasus has
been identified as a priority area for projects under the Global
Conflict Prevention Fund. Post also uses a proportion of its Bilateral
Programme Budget in support of activities which will contribute
to normalisation and, therefore, conflict resolution in the region.
EU (SP4)
13. Post maintains a regular dialogue with
key Russian interlocutors, including in the Foreign Ministry and
the Presidential Administration, to promote co-operation and inform
Russian policy on the EU, particularly on issues such as the successor
to the EU-Russia strategic partnership agreement, and the energy
relationship. In addition, the Post regularly discusses with key
Russian interlocutors, the Common Neighbourhood, including frozen
conflicts in Georgia and Moldova, and Ukraine and Belarus.
Support for UK Economic and Business Interests (SP5)
14. As an emerging market, Russia is now
a priority for trade and investment activity under the new UKTI
Global Strategy. Post offers a wide and growing range of services
to companies seeking to export or invest in Russia. Output of
our major product (On-line Market Information Service reports)
rose 16% last year. In 2006 the UK was the largest source of foreign
investment in Russia. Post has a close and active relationship
with the UK business community in Russia. It assists companies
with difficulties, through lobbying and other activities.
15. Post organises Ministerial visits to
promote trade and investment and engage on economic reform issues.
Alistair Darling's visit in February, with the most senior CBI
delegation ever to come to Russia, revived the Inter-Governmental
Steering Committee on Trade and Investment, and established a
new UK-Russia Energy Forum. The Lord Mayor's vist in April, also
with a senior business group, promoted the City as a provider
of financial and related services.
16. The 2006-07 Whitehall Survey of Economic
Work ranked Moscow as the number 1 major Post for economic reporting,
and number 2 for economic policy work. The Survey described Post's
Economic Governance programme under the Global Opportunities Fund
as "rightly respected as one of the most productive in the
Network". Last year this programme delivered £350K of
projects supporting the dissemination of best principles and practices
across a range of economic policy issues.
Climate Security (SP6)
17. The Embassy helps drive forward the
UK's climate security agenda. We lobby in support of UK positions,
particularly with regard to the UNFCCC negotiations and G8 processes,
and inform UK policy-making and negotiating positions by regular
reporting.
18. The Embassy works to secure Russian
commitment to Kyoto, including post 2012, to move forward the
scientific and economic debate on climate security, and to encourage
improved energy efficiency. We manage a £760,000 portfolio
of Global Opportunities Fund projects supporting all these objectives.
We are also engaged, working with DEFRA and DFID, on the crucial
linked issue of improved forestry management.
Sustainable Development/Democracy and Governance (SP7)
19. The Embassy actively engages in dialogue
with civil society organisations across Russia to support their
work. These organisations work in a wide range of areas, including
democratic development, access to a free media, improving the
rule of law, and monitoring the situation in the North Caucasus.
20. Post maintains a constructive and frank
relationship with the Russian Government on these issues, including
regular bilateral human rights consultations, which last took
place in January 2007. The next round of these will take place
in Moscow. The Embassy also regularly raises human rights issues
directly with contacts at all levels.
21. Through the Global Opportunities Fund
(GOF) and Bilateral Programme Budget the Embassy supports partners
from civil society, NGO and government-affiliated bodies. With
this support our partners implement projects focusing on human
rights issues such as torture, freedom of expression and access
to justice.
22. The DFID bilateral programme in Russia
was completed on 31 March 2007 and the devolved DFID office located
in the Embassy in Moscow was officially closed. Programme closure
reflects a changing nature of DFID's engagement with Russia. Although
DFID will continue to support the Government of Russia's governance
reforms through provision of DFID funds to a World Bank public
administration reform programme, the main focus will be to enhance
UK-Russia dialogue on important global issues such as climate
change, energy efficiency and sustainable development. DFID will
also support Russia with its development aspirations as an emerging
donor. DFID will resource a First Secretary Development to work
within the Economic Section of the Embassy on these issues.
Managing Migration (SP8)
23. Visa applications in the Russian Federation
are rising year on year by approximately 20%. Last year, we processed
approximately 120,000 visas. Outsourcing was introduced in 2006,
and has contributed to continued achievement of PSA targets.
Support for British Nationals Abroad (SP9)
24. There are an estimated 10,000 British
nationals resident in Moscow alone, and a much larger number in
the Russian Federation as a whole. Accurate numbers are difficult
to specify as not all residents register with the Embassy despite
frequent notices and invitations to do so. There is also a substantial
transient population, comprising people on short-term contracts,
consultants and company representatives who move in and out of
the country on a regular basis.
25. The Consular Section processed 711
passport applications in FY 2006-07 and has consistently met PSA
targets. Assistance activity is relatively low level, and mostly
focuses on lost passport replacement, assistance with expired
visas, and occasional assistance to people taken ill or for sudden
deaths. There are currently no British national prisoners in the
Russian Federation.
PROGRAMME WORK
26. The British Embassy in Moscow supports
work on Strategic Priorities 3,5,6,7 through programmes funded
mainly by the Foreign and Commonwealth Office but also other Whitehall
departments. The principle programmes are the Global Opportunity
Fund (GOF), Global Conflict Prevention Pool, Public Diplomacy
Fund and Bilateral Programme Budget. Climate change, human rights
and economic governance are the main focus of our project work.
But the Bilateral Programme Budget enables us to support a wider
range of Post Objectives and Strategic Priorities. A full time
UK based officer is responsible for co-ordination and oversight
of project activity across Russia with programme management devolved
to specialists in the relevant sections of the Embassy. Post aims
to exploit linkages across projects and programmes in order to
maximise the success and impact of our activities.
MANAGEMENT ISSUES
IN MOSCOW
27. The Estate comprises offices and residential
accommodation with recreational facilities on a single compound,
plus the Residence and some staff accommodation in another compound,
and off-compound housing for around 50% of the UK-based staff.
The main compound at Smolenskaya Naberezhnaya was built in the
late 1990s and the Embassy moved to the new site in 2000.
28. The Residence at Sofiiskaya Naberezhnaya
(which formerly also housed the Embassy) is currently under complete
refurbishment. While this work is going on, HMA is housed in the
building which formerly accommodated the DHM and Defence Attache.
Refurbishment work is expected to be completed by the end of 2008.
29. The Embassy contains a clinic headed
by a Regional Medical Adviser. Tour lengths in Moscow are a standard
three years. Staff at C4 and above serve a minimum of three years
with the option to bid for a fourth year. Staff at Bands A and
B serve three years, with a fourth year being granted only in
exceptional personal or operational circumstances.
BUDGET
30. The local budget for 2007-08 is £6.1
million.
SECURITY
31. There is a continuing very high espionage
threat. Embassy staff remain subject to harassment and surveillance
from the Russian Security Service. The threat from crime is moderate;
theft is quite common. Drink-spiking is a major concern—one
member of staff was the victim of a serious attack a few months
ago. Terrorism presents a moderate threat, but there have been
no major attacks in Moscow since two outbound airliners were blown
up with serious loss of life in 2004.
THE BRITISH
EMBASSY POST
OBJECTIVES 2006-07
1. To increase UK-Russian co-operation
on Weapons of Mass Destruction proliferation (including implementation
of the Global Partnership), terrorism, drugs and organised crime,
so reducing the threat to the UK.
2. To support continued reform of the Russian
Armed Forces through a more productive Military-Military relationship,
including by continuing to prepare personnel leaving the Russian
Armed Forces for worthwhile civilian careers.
3. To promote EU/Russia co-operation and
dialogue, including on democracy and security in the neighbourhood.
4. To achieve progress in resolving regional
conflicts by political engagement on frozen conflicts in neighbouring
countries, and support to conflict prevention in the Northern
Caucasus.
5. Through briefing, advice and logistical
support, to contribute to a smooth, effective, and well-informed
G8 process under the Russian Presidency, producing summit outcomes
that meet UK objectives.
6. To develop a strengthened bilateral
dialogue, facilitating delivery of HMG's strategic policy objectives,
underpinned by a constantly improving understanding of political
activity and thinking in Russia.
7. To support the development of Russian
civil society, with particular emphasis on encouraging respect
for human rights, promoting the rule of law and supporting freedom
of expression.
8. To promote understanding and support
for HMG's policies, especially FCO Strategic Priorities, in Russian
media and amongst informed public opinion. Build a positive image
of the UK amongst opinion formers by creating and using public
diplomacy opportunities. Promote a coherent and positive view
of contemporary Britain by co-ordinating HMG public engagement
with that of British Council, Visit Britain, and other PD partners,
and by implementing the recommendations of the Carter Review of
public diplomacy.
9. To promote our economic interests, by
promoting better economic governance; by developing our a Global
Opportunities Fund economic governance programme; deepening our
engagement on energy issues; promoting the City as a centre of
excellence among Russian businesses; and producing timely, high
quality economic reporting for a diverse Whitehall audience.
10. To bring to a satisfactory conclusion
DFID programmes at federal and regional level supporting public
administration reforms, particularly social and public health
reforms that will help improve the livelihoods of poor people.
11. To support energy reform through an
enhanced energy dialogue under the new Permanent Partnership Council,
which will enhance efficiency and security of supply to the UK,
improve business opportunities for UK firms.
12. To contribute to global climate security
by promoting improved energy efficiency, the implementation of
the Kyoto Protocol in Russia, and post 2012 commitment, including
through GOF projects and public diplomacy opportunities.
13. To facilitate the implementation of
the UK's £37 million per annum Global Partnership Programmes
in Russia, thereby ensuring the successful delivery of major projects
in the areas of Chemical Weapons Destruction and nuclear non-proliferation,
security and safety.
14. To provide a high quality service to
British companies and institutions seeking to develop their business
in Russia, and enhance the competitiveness of British companies
through trade and hi-tech collaboration.
15. To deliver high quality, cost-effective
entry clearance services that meet UKVisas targets on service
delivery and timing and Best Practice requirements, and to maximise
co-operation with the Russian authorities.
16. To continue to meet Citizen's Charter
targets for all consular activities, by providing accurate, up-to-date
information to the visiting and expatriate British community,
and maintaining prompt, efficient and considerate service standards.
17. To promote the UK migration agenda
and raise awareness and engagement on migration issues with the
relevant Russian authorities.
18. To operate the Mission effectively
and efficiently, by optimising the human, financial, technical
and security resources available, developing staff capacity and
skills bases, achieving year-on-year efficiencies and making full
use of Value For Money savings.
Foreign and Commonwealth Office
May 2007
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