House of Commons - International Development

Select Committee on International Development Ninth Report

2 Ownership

18. The Paris Declaration defines ownership as "partner countries exercising effective leadership over their development policies and strategies and coordinating development actions."[24] Christian Aid's submission identifies a link between ownership and the successful implementation of development policies: "the current development consensus is that countries are more likely to implement a policy if they 'own' it".[25] Given this consensus, it is understandable that ownership is one of the five key principles in the Paris Declaration. Indeed in evidence from Mr Tujan of the International Civil Society Steering Group and the Reality of Aid Network we were told that it is the "over-arching" and "most fundamental" principle of the five.[26]Other non-governmental organisations (NGOs) that submitted views to us also gave great weight to the concept. The OECD agreed:

"It would be a big error to think that donor countries can organise development; no, they are supporters. The donors can support and help but they have to listen."[27]

DFID's evidence says that ownership is a key aspect of its approach to aid effectiveness:

"Partner country ownership is important because, while aid can contribute to poverty reduction, it will never alone be the solution to global poverty. However good individual aid programmes may be, the prosperity of citizens will be affected more by the actions of their own governments and the effectiveness of the state in which they live."[28]

19. The five Paris Declaration Principles are divided into 12 indicator targets to be measured nationally and monitored internationally. Of these targets, one is linked to measuring ownership. The 2006 Survey on Monitoring the Paris Declaration focuses on eight of the 12 indicator targets but these do not include the single indicator to measure progress against the ownership principle. The OECD explained the background to the choice of targets in the Survey:

"Certainly, the Survey can be criticised because if any of us started with a blank sheet and wrote out how we would monitor aid effectiveness we would not come up with the Survey that we have, but it was in part driven by a partnership. This is something that the partner countries and donor countries could sign up to; and it was also crucially driven by what could be measured."[29]

The Minister commented on the monitoring process for the Paris Declaration:

"Paris is not perfect; it was probably the best that was available at the time […] If you cannot measure a target then there are going to be question marks about what it actually means in real terms, both for the donor and the partner country."[30]

20. It is anomalous that the Paris Declaration places so much emphasis on ownership as central to effective development and yet the process set up to monitor the Declaration places so little emphasis on it. We understand the argument that ownership is one of the more difficult principles to measure. Three years on from the Paris agreement, however, the principle of ownership seems to us to be more rather than less critical to the success of international commitments on aid effectiveness. It is therefore imperative that DFID work to agree more effective mechanisms at or following the Accra High Level Forum to monitor progress against a greater range of targets linked to ownership.

Democratic ownership

21. One of the difficulties associated with measuring ownership is the debate around how broadly the concept should be applied. For example, UK Aid Network said in its evidence that the term ownership is often used by donors to mean central government ownership or "maybe just Ministry of Finance, maybe just three people in the Ministry of Finance".[31]ActionAid's submission says that the Paris Declaration is, in itself, very focused on governments: "The Paris Declaration has a strong focus on governments widely ignoring the role parliaments and civil society should play in any discussion on aid."[32]

22. We discussed the definition of ownership with the Minister. He said:

"I do not think there is a precise definition that would give anybody satisfaction; in terms of ownership the fact is that we will be aware of what the government policy is in certain sectors and our job is to work with the governments in those sectors to support the vision and the plans that they have for their country."[33]

23. As part of this inquiry, we exchanged views with our Swedish parliamentary colleagues and the Swedish development agency Sida. Sida has substantially reduced the number of countries in which it engages in bilateral aid programmes. It has also reoriented its programme in the last two years to acknowledge explicitly that "poor people are actors, not passive recipients".[34] It is this sort of approach that a report on prospects for the Accra Forum by the International Civil Society Steering Group suggests should underpin a re-appraisal of the concept of ownership:

"Country ownership of development programmes should be understood not simply as government ownership but as democratic ownership […]. Citizens' voices and concerns must be central to national development plans and processes, they must have access to resources, meaningful and timely information, and be active in implementation, monitoring and evaluation."[35]

24. Governments' natural interlocutors are other governments. But ownership can no longer be understood simply to mean government ownership of the development effort. DFID must consistently define ownership as a democratic process which involves parliaments, civil society and citizens more broadly. We recommend that DFID adopt a strategy to ensure that its programmes secure a broader level of ownership by involving organisations and individuals outside government regularly and meaningfully in its development dialogue with developing country governments. DFID should also make a commitment, as the Swedish Government has done, to place citizens actively at the heart of its development policy, emphasising that they are not simply passive recipients. We also urge DFID to give more active support to parliamentarians in developing countries, including opposition members, to enable them to take a more active part in shaping and monitoring aid to their countries.

The limitations of ownership

25. Despite the apparent broad consensus in development circles that ownership is a pre-requisite for effective aid, some of the evidence we received emphasised the importance of establishing a solid evidence base to underpin this assertion. Evidence from Professor Mick Moore of the University of Sussex questioned whether ownership should have the central position in aid effectiveness discussions which it is currently afforded:

"The term both addresses a real problem but is a fudge. People still argue about what it means and how one measures it. It is a politically convenient way of signalling a general concern—and one that is very appealing to recipient Governments. It does not relate directly to what should be our central concern: the quality of aid."[36]

26. Other evidence we received suggested that effective aid was possible without ownership. Howard White of the International Initiative for Impact Evaluation told us:

"Of course it would be possible to design an intervention, target it and achieve positive development impacts with no local consultation whatsoever. We have a lot of experience of that. In conflict zones, we often have to do something like that […] designed top down, inserted top down—the expanded programme for immunisation for example is a largely top down programme and highly successful."[37]

27. We believe that broad ownership and leadership by developing countries of their own development effort is intrinsically necessary, fair and right. This argument would however be stronger with the support of a solid evidential base linking ownership to better development outcomes. Without such a base, DFID is acting in accordance with a broad consensus and with good intentions, but without proof that ownership is right not only in principle but also as a means to achieving effective aid and therefore good value for UK taxpayers. We recommend that DFID pursue such research urgently.

28. Ensuring that recipient governments provide effective leadership of development efforts is particularly difficult in fragile states. In our 2006 Report on Conflict and Development, we noted the particular challenges for donors in building capacity in conflict-affected states.[38] We received evidence in this inquiry on the relationship between weak government structures and aid effectiveness. The submission from Muslim Aid said:

"The political context in which aid is implemented affects the nature of the co-ordination required. Muslim Aid's experience in Somalia, for example, demonstrates that in the absence of a single stable governing authority the humanitarian imperative demands that civil society coordinates with those who have authority on the ground."[39]

To illustrate a similar point, Merlin took the example of the health sector in the Democratic Republic of Congo:

"One of the greatest challenges in fragile states centres on the capacity constraints of national policies and systems; in the Democratic Republic of Congo little bilateral or multilateral aid is aligned to national priorities owing in part to the absence of the government's development strategy combined with significant capacity constraints and shortages of technical skills. Although the Ministry of Health is responsible, in principle, for policy stewardship of the health system, in practice administration and enforcement at central level is poor and the Ministry has lost a considerable degree of its autonomy to decide, orient and direct national and regional health policy."[40]

29. In his evidence, Myles Wickstead, formerly head of the Commission for Africa secretariat, argued that the UN should be the "fallback" institution around which donors should align in such circumstances.[41] We put this to the Minister who responded:

"In fragile states our position would be that we ought to look to the UN to give a lead—that is not always a humanitarian lead, but quite often it is—and to support them."[42]

30. Effective leadership by recipient governments of development efforts is particularly difficult in fragile states. We agree with DFID that the UN, despite the many concerns about the effectiveness of that organisation, can play a leading role in such environments. We encourage the Government to include in its strategies for such states complementary engagement with local stakeholders on the ground.

Technical assistance

31. Technical assistance (TA) is the provision by donors of advice or skills, usually in the form of specialist expert personnel or training. According to the OECD, TA accounts for between 25% and 50% of global aid.[43]DFID notes that France, Germany, the US and Japan account for almost three-quarters of all technical assistance given by bilateral donors.[44]We were told by the OECD that technical assistance was a "big battleground for aid effectiveness".[45]

32. The Paris Declaration requires that by 2010 all OECD donors provide 50% of their TA through coordinated programmes which are consistent with national development strategies. In the 2006 OECD Survey on Monitoring the Paris Declaration, a number of partner countries felt that none of the assessed TA could be counted as coordinated.[46]The Survey assessed that the UK is meeting the target, though others are falling behind—for example, just 23% of European Commission TA is assessed as coordinated.

33. A report by ActionAid in July 2007 identified lack of coordination on TA as a clear failing by donors. It said that as a "progressive donor" DFID should be taking the lead to "improve this deeply problematic aid instrument".[47] ActionAid recommended that DFID sign up to coordinating 100% of its TA by 2010 and that the UK commission an independent review of TA costs and the TA 'market'.[48]

34. Moreover, there are concerns among recipients and others about the effectiveness of this aid channel, whether coordinated or not. ActionAid's report said that "concerns remain about the cost of DFID TA, the degree to which it is fully demand driven, and the limited use made of partner country systems".[49]According to a report by the International Civil Society Steering Group (ICSSG), "several developing country governments believed that none of the technical assistance they received responded to their demands."[50] Mr Tujan, Chair of the ICSSG, told the Committee:

"When [technical assistance] is demand-driven […] then in effect the demands will pair up with which donor has the comparative advantage […]. The question of comparative advantage, the question of improving the quality of technical assistance, I think is predicated not so much on coordination but coordination under ownership."[51]

The International Initiative for Impact Evaluation told the Committee that there was a demand from developing countries for technical assistance but that this 'market' was too donor-driven:

"There is demand for international technical expertise that can be purchased by Government from the international market for technical assistance. That market has been very seriously distorted by the donors who have required governments to take technical experts that the donor wants them to have […]. The key here is […] only to supply technical assistance that is demanded by the government and then the coordination function falls into place."[52]

35. Where there is demand from developing countries for technical assistance, we believe that it can be a useful channel for British aid. All too often, however, developing countries assert that technical assistance is a fig leaf for tied aid which allows donors to keep tight control of the assistance on offer. Those donors, such as DFID, who are responsive to these concerns should take a lead in persuading others away from a supply-led approach to technical assistance. On the other hand, DFID must ensure that it has programmes in place to increase the capacity of developing countries to manage and procure technical assistance effectively. We recommend that DFID commit to achieving a technical assistance portfolio which is 100% coordinated and demonstrably demand-driven.

Predictable aid

36. In some of the evidence in this inquiry predictability emerges as a necessary condition for effective aid. Donors' ability to guarantee funding is limited by their own fiscal cycles and the need to retain control of aid flows for the purposes of accountability and performance monitoring. The ODI, however, said that this can be a major hurdle to more effective and better coordinated aid:

"The benefits of coordination are reduced by the lack of predictable aid flows, with clear consequences for partner governments. Donors should do more to provide longer term and more reliable financing commitments."[53]

37. During our visit to Ghana, we were told by the Ministry of Health about the negative impact of unpredictable, project-focused aid on the ability of the Ministry to plan its programme. Merlin's evidence noted that "increasing the predictable nature of aid disbursements is a central tenet of the aid effectiveness agenda and critical to the development and strengthening of health systems."[54] UK Aid Network reinforced this view in its evidence, saying that predictability was essential: "from a recipient-country point of view you just cannot plan long-term health interventions or anything else if you do not have it".[55] UK Aid Network also told us that, while the UK should look to increase the proportion of bilateral aid that it commits for three years or more, DFID was a potential role model for predictable funding:

"The fact that DFID are able to make 10-year commitments, even though obviously they do not have 10-year budgets, demonstrates that donors ought to be able to get around this. To me, the main reason it does not happen is that in many donor countries aid is highly political."[56]

38. ActionAid's evidence suggests one way forward on predictability would be for DFID to adopt a form of funding contract with developing countries:

"To improve ownership and predictability of aid, DFID and its partners need to agree on transparent and binding contracts. These agreements should be reached after widespread consultation with parliaments and civil society, including women's rights organisations, and should include clear donor commitments on aid volume and quality, with sanctions against donors who fail to live up to promises. The agreements should be agreed on a multi-year basis and be transparently and independently monitored including by parliaments."[57]

Eckhard Deutscher, Chairman of the OECD DAC, told us that he expected some progress on predictability of aid at the Accra High level Forum.[58]

39. It is common sense that budgets are made very difficult for partner countries to manage if they do not know when or how much money will be available. Predictable aid flows allow recipients to plan effectively and for the longer term. We urge DFID to show leadership on this issue at the Accra High Level Forum, drawing on its experience of 10-year development commitments.

24 See Appendix Back

25 Ev 71 Back

26 Q 37 Back

27 Q 66 Back

28 Ev 48 Back

29 Q 54 Back

30 Q 109 Back

31 Q 18 Back

32 Ev 61 Back

33 Q 107 Back

34 Sida, Sida's Direction, December 2006, p 5 Back

35 ICSSG, From Paris 2005 to Accra 2008: Will aid become more accountable and effective?, p 4 Back