Select Committee on International Development Ninth Report


3  Division of labour

40.  In our discussions with donors during this inquiry, division of labour among them emerged as a key issue in terms of implementation of the Paris Declaration. The Minister told us:

"Our position is really that we cannot lead everything. We are committed to a logical division of labour […]. Our view is that where we have a comparative advantage in country then our role would be to push to lead; the reverse is true where others have a comparative advantage."[59]

41.  In this inquiry, we have been keen to establish the principles and mechanisms by which division of labour already happens and can become more effective. During our visit to Ghana, we saw division of labour in action. Donor groups drew together all the main active donors in Ghana into 14 sector groups, such as the education group or the water and sanitation group. Leadership of the groups rotated among the donors with greatest expertise and capacity in the particular sectors, for example the Netherlands acting as sector lead for health but handing this over to UNDP in the next rotation. Moreover, we saw examples of donors working through other donors in particular sectors—for example, the UK working through a Dutch health adviser and a Danish HIV/AIDS adviser.

42.  Division of labour at a sectoral level in-country is a useful first step in ensuring that donors play to their strengths and are able between them to address as much need as is possible. In our discussions with other donors, it was clear that there is no mechanism at the macro or strategic level which drives this process. However, two major international donor organisations—the OECD, as the sponsor organisation of the Paris Declaration, and the European Commission—have claimed roles for themselves in encouraging donor activity which is complementary and coordinated.

The Role of the EU and OECD as coordinating institutions

European Union

43.  Collectively, the European Union is the largest donor in the world. The Minister gave us DFID's perspective on this:

"The EU is critical: 57% of global aid is what the EU represents, that is about £37 billion and £7 billion approximately of that is through the European Commission. The EU obviously has a very important role to play in terms of the coordination amongst EU states."[60]

While the volume of EU aid is unchallenged, some of the evidence we received in this inquiry challenged the effectiveness of the EU as a coordinating body. Howard White of 3ie said:

"This is patently not the case. No one thinks the EU is coordinating the aid of the various EU donors on the ground in recipient countries. The multilateral agencies, by and large, are not playing that role either."[61]

44.  The European Commission plays a central role in managing parts of the global EU aid budget. The 2006 Survey on Monitoring of the Paris Declaration showed that the Commission had performed significantly less well in this role against the Paris Declaration targets than some of the better performing donors, such as the UK.[62] Beyond the management of European Community aid, the European Commission also claims a coordinating role across all European development actors. The Commission told us that it viewed itself as a "federator of Member States" and that the EU Code of Conduct on the Division of Labour was "an instrument" for the Commission in pursuing that role.[63] We were interested, therefore, to examine the role and impact of this "instrument" in the course of this inquiry.

The European Union Code of Conduct on the Division of Labour

45.  In 2007, the EU agreed a voluntary Code of Conduct with the aim of enhancing "complementarity and division of labour amongst EU donors".[64] The ODI summarised the Code as follows:

"The Code is voluntary […]. Two central guiding principles are, firstly, that donors restrict themselves to a maximum of three sectors per country and either redeploy out of other sectors or work as a silent partner, allowing another EU donor to take the lead. Secondly, that no more than 3-5 donors should be present per sector (the Code of Conduct does not say whether this means all donors or only EU donors)."[65]

The Commission explained how the Code was being implemented in practice:

"The Code of Conduct was adopted only in May of 2007. We have to prepare the ground by engaging our delegations, and we are now in the process of reflecting on what part of the work on the ground we can delegate to Member States […]. We could address situations of donor congestion in different countries. We should build on comparative advantages. We are globally present but in some countries Member States are better represented and rooted and they can build on their comparative advantage. We can then delegate to them and they can run the programmes on behalf of the EU."[66]

46.  ODI evidence said that, despite the Code of Conduct, "EU bilateral aid and EC aid remains fundamentally fragmented" and that "the challenges of making the Code of Conduct a reality are formidable".[67] It also challenged the robustness of the Code given that some terms and targets are not well-defined.[68] World Vision discussed in its evidence the limitations of the Code, and recommended that rather than a "voluntary and self-policing" Code, it should be "promoted and monitored".[69] In response to such concerns about problems implementing the Code, the Minister said:

"It is true to say that the Code of Conduct is of a voluntary nature but we still see it as a significant milestone in moving forward. There are some barriers to the implementation of division of labour and sometimes that is suspicion and mistrust by partner countries when division of labour is donor-led […]. They sometimes feel powerless when faced by a coordinated group of donors."[70]

47.  We asked the Minister for examples where the Code of Conduct has had a significant impact. He cited Zambia as a country where division of labour has led to significant savings for the Zambian authorities.[71] ODI evidence, however, highlighted the difficulties of attempts to implement the Code in Zambia where "the number of donors per sector barely reduced, and […] the willingness of donors to withdraw from sectors in which they are engaged is limited."[72]

48.  The European Union has particular responsibilities as the world's largest donor in leading efforts to ensure complementary and coordinated donor activity. The Code of Conduct on the Division of Labour is a useful starting point for this task. We endorse this attempt to draw together good practice principles and guidance into a agreement around which EU governments and the Commission can focus their work. We accept that the Code is in its early days of implementation. But if it is to be credible as a practical agreement, the EU must soon be able to show that it is having an impact on the ground. We recommend that DFID work with the Commission to identify countries in which there is the potential for the Code to have a positive impact and where the recipient government is supportive of the Code, and to prioritise efforts in these countries.

49.  We record our disappointment that the Commission is not able to lead by example on questions of aid effectiveness by putting in a stronger performance against the Paris Declaration indicator targets. We challenge the Development Commissioner to take a more pro-active role in promoting practical coordination both among member states and between member states and the Commission. We understand that the percentage of EU aid which falls under the direct control of the Commission will diminish as national budgets increase. But the Commission's coordination role needs to be strengthened irrespective of its share of the EU's total development budget.

OECD Development Assistance Committee

50.  The OECD Development Assistance Committee (DAC) provides the leading forum for donors to co-ordinate their aid efforts and to agree best practice in development. The Committee has 23 members—all the major bilateral western donors and the European Commission. The DAC's key functions include promoting best practice, defining and publishing statistical analysis of Official Development Assistance (ODA) and peer reviewing members' development assistance policies.

51.  The OECD DAC was instrumental in drawing up and facilitating agreement on the Paris Declaration in 2005. It was agreed that monitoring of the international standards and targets set out in the Declaration would fall to the OECD. The OECD has published the 2006 Survey on Monitoring the Declaration and a second Survey is being conducted in advance of the Accra High Level Forum. Data were collected up to March 2008 and are now being analysed. The OECD shared with us headline results from the 2008 Survey in advance of the Forum.[73] In a separate work stream, Denmark and Sri Lanka are co-chairing an Evaluation of the Paris Declaration, which will run to 2010 and beyond and will use the data from the periodic Surveys "to assess the relevance and effectiveness of the Paris Declaration and its contribution to development aid".[74]

52.  Some of the evidence we received from NGOs raised concerns about the extent of OECD influence over the Paris Declaration process. ActionAid said that "The Paris process has suffered from being based in a donor institution [OECD] and being donor driven". ActionAid's evidence goes on to suggest that,

"The 2006 OECD DAC survey of implementation of the Paris Declaration was fatally undermined by donors insisting on 'negotiating' on the figures, so that the figures in the final document were in many cases significantly different from earlier drafts."[75]

DFID said that this confusion was related to the absence of a set of agreed definitions for some forms of assistance in the 2006 Survey but that this had been resolved in advance of the 2008 Survey.[76]

Working with non-DAC donors

53.  Some of the evidence we received drew attention to the changing nature of the donor 'club'. Donors are no longer simply confined to the OECD DAC membership and it is clear that these new donors are far from marginal to global aid figures. For example in 2006, China committed $12.7 billion for investment in infrastructure in Africa, more than all OECD countries combined.[77] China is, however, a signatory to the Paris Declaration as an aid recipient rather than a donor. We are looking at China's role as a donor in more detail in our inquiry into DFID and China.

54.  We have observed a separation between DAC and non-DAC donors during our visits to developing countries. In Ghana, we were told by a donor group that China did not consider itself as a donor in Ghana but rather as a commercial partner. China, India and Brazil did not participate in the groups set up in Ghana to harmonise donor action by sector. Professor Mick Moore of the University of Sussex says in his evidence:

"The new aid donors (China and other fast-growing middle income countries that were 'traditionally' aid recipients; the big private foundations) have made the [donor] field much more diverse. The system is now out of control. The Western donors' club—OECD DAC—can no longer coordinate it."[78]

55.  A recent World Bank report on trends in ODA flows welcomes the contribution of 'non-DAC' donors to international development efforts. But the report raises concerns about the degree to which non-DAC donors comply with the best practice guidance and standards established by the DAC:

"New donors bring with them more resources to help developing countries reach their MDGs. At the same time, new challenges for harmonisation and alignment are created. Non-DAC donors are a heterogeneous group: the degree to which DAC approaches and norms as regards the provision of aid finance are applied by non-DAC donors varies from country-to-country."[79]

56.  We asked the OECD how it planned to draw new donors into compliance with DAC best practice guidance and standards. Brenda Killen of the OECD Development Co-operation Directorate told us that some developing countries had set out their own role in this process at a recent preparatory meeting for the Accra High level Summit:

"On the question of new donors, what emerged was that the onus was now on African countries themselves to manage the complexities; they should reach a common position and use the Paris Declaration to deal with new partners and say that they want the aid but set out the basis on which they want it."[80]

57.  The proliferation of donors in recent decades brings welcome new resources to the international development effort but also brings new challenges for recipients in managing a range of donor relationships. The principles contained in the Paris Declaration are as applicable to new donors, such as China, India and Brazil, as to the OECD Development Assistance Committee member countries. We recommend that DFID seek opportunities to share with new donors its own experience of working towards more effective aid but also to support efforts by developing countries to draw new donors into a recipient-led dialogue on aid effectiveness.


59   Q102 Back

60   Q147 Back

61   Q 28 [Mr White] Back

62   www.oecd.org/dac Back

63   Q 77 Back

64   ec.europa.eu/development Back

65   Ev 88 Back

66   Q 77 Back

67   Ev 89 Back

68   Ev 89 Back

69   Ev 96 Back

70   Q 127 Back

71   IbidBack

72   Ev 89 Back

73   Ev 82 Back

74   OECD, Evaluating the Paris Declaration (Factsheet), 2007, p 1 (www.oecd.org/dac) Back

75   Ev 61 Back

76   Q 134 [Mr Hammond] Back

77   Ev 50 Back

78   Ev 78 Back

79   World Bank, Aid Architecture: An overview of the main trends in ODA flows, Executive Summary, February 2007  Back

80   Q 71 Back


 
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