Memorandum submitted by Stephanie Koury,
Senior Research Fellow at the School of Oriental and African Studies
1. POLITICAL
DEVELOPMENTS WITHIN
THE OPT SINCE
JUNE 2007: ISRAELI
SETTLEMENTS
1.1 The issue of settlements impacts both
the political process and economic development. Despite the launch
of the Annapolis political process, settlement expansion has not
slowed down in the West Bank including in occupied East Jerusalem.[186]
Several studies have documented the relationship between Israel's
settlements and its closure policy to facilitate movement of settlers,
and their negative impact on the Palestinian economy and development.[187]
Continued expansion of and presence of settlements and the accompanying
restrictions on movement (ie closed roads, 569 physical obstacles
to movement,[188]
etc) undermine international efforts for peace and donor government
support for "quick start" economic projects or longer-term
development. In light of these findings, this section will briefly
illuminate the shortcomings of Israel's definition of and actions
pertaining to a settlement freeze, a freeze which is required
under the Quartet Roadmap and Israel's obligations under international
law.
1.2 On 12 March, Israeli Foreign Ministry
spokesperson Arye Mekel is reported as saying that Israel's policy
on construction in the settlements and a freeze was based on the
following four principles:[189]
(a) no expansion of existing settlements
beyond the originally approved master plan of each community;
(b) no establishment of new settlements;
(c) no appropriation of land for settlement
construction; and
(d) Economic incentives to residents of existing
settlements in Judea and Samaria have been cancelled.
1.3 Mekel said the government viewed this
policy as fulfilling Israel's commitments under the road map and
as in line with the understandings discussed at the Annapolis
conference in November. While the above may represent the Israeli
government's view of its obligation, it does not amount to a freeze
in any reasonable definition of the word "freeze" nor
by standards that are required under international humanitarian
law and principles of international law.[190]
Rather, this policy articulates loopholes to a settlement freeze
for the following reasons:
1.4 Regarding 1.2(a) "No expansion
of existing settlements beyond originally approved master plan
of each community". This criterion allows Israel to continue
to expand geographically existing settlements, and several times
their current size. For example, according to a 2007 Israel Peace
Now Report, the built up areas of settlements constitute only
1/5 of the settlements currently approved jurisdiction areas.[191]
Settlements such as Ariel, Ma'ale Addumim, Mitzpe Shalem, among
many others, could expand several times their current geographical
size.[192]
Existing approved master plans could house approximately one million
additional settlers.[193]
This criterion also permits Israel to expand the current master
plan or jurisdictional area and continue construction, all the
while maintaining it is within its definition of a freeze.
1.5 Regarding 1.2(b) "No new settlements".
This term has no meaning in terms of stopping construction; rather
it is a term which Israel uses for administrative purposes. This
loophole allows Israel to continue construction in existing settlements
or already constructed areas, many of them which could expand
several times their current size as noted above in 1.4. Moreover,
this loophole permits Israel to undertake construction of a new
settlement area but under the guise of designating it as a "neighborhood"
of an existing settlement. The settlements of Alon and Nofei Prat
are examples of creating new settlements while designating them
as a neighborhood of the settlement Kfar Adumim.[194]
Talmon and its satellites settlements of B, C, and D offer an
example of the types of semantics of not designating construction
as new settlements but rather as a neighborhood or extension of
an existing settlement.
1.6 Regarding 1.2(c) "No appropriation
of land for settlement construction". This loophole permits
Israel to continue to confiscate land which has already been appropriated
or requisitioned by military order but not actually seized by
the military. This loophole also permits Israeli confiscation
of land for settlement agricultural purposes, for erecting fences
and creating "buffer zones" around existing settlements,
or for constructing portions of the Wall which follow existing
and planned settlement expansion.
1.7 Regarding 1.2(d) "Economic incentives
to residents of existing settlements have been cancelled".
This language does not exclude economic incentives to attract
potentially new residents (as opposed to existing residents) or
other designated types of incentives to take up residency or invest
within settlements.
1.8 Moreover, the Israeli government's position
that current settlement construction is private and non-governmental,
does not exempt Israel from its obligation to bring to an end
to and prohibit such construction for the following reasons: First,
it is misleading to suggest that the construction is private.
Although the final stage of construction (the actual building
of the housing unit) may be carried out by a private company,
the Israeli government is responsible for the settlement process
at all stages: land classification and subsequent appropriation
and seizures; approval of master plans and other administrative
aspects related to construction; financial incentives for settling
or investing; construction of settler "by-pass" roads,
provision of military support to undertake the seizure of the
land and secure it; and military orders which prevent Palestinian
residents from accessing their lands in or near Israeli settlement
areas or roads on which settlers travel.[195]
Second, as the occupying power, Israel exercises effective control
of the territory and is responsible for maintaining law and order.[196]
It is obliged to ensure that its nationals respect international
humanitarian law throughout the occupation and not engage in settlement
activity.
1.9 Moreover, the Israeli government position
that it has frozen the issuance of new construction permits does
not address construction that is permitted under outstanding permits.
Some estimates place that number of outstanding permits to be
in the thousands; hence, the focus should be on cessation of all
construction.[197]
1.10 Statements from the Israeli Prime Minister's
office that construction is allowed to continue in "large
settlement blocs" or areas which Israel has decided it will
keep in a final settlement with the PLO, clearly contravenes any
definition of a settlement freeze.[198]
Such a policy also begs the question of what then is the purpose
of negotiations if Israel has unilaterally determined final borders.
1.11 Finally, the Israeli government's position
that occupied East Jerusalem is not included in its formulations
of a freeze also does not accord with international law. The International
Court of Justice in its 2004 Advisory Opinion on the Legal
Consequences of Israel's Construction of the Wall in the occupied
Palestinian territory (Wall Advisory Opinion) affirmed the
findings of the Security Council that all of the territory Israel
occupied in 1967 remains occupied and that all settlement activity
therein is illegal.[199]
The European Union in its 28 January 2008 Conclusions on the Middle
East Peace Process and the 14 March 2008 Declaration by the Presidency
on behalf of the EU on the Middle East affirmed the illegality
of settlements including in occupied East Jerusalem. The Security
Council maintains the same position.[200]
1.12 The following elements must constitute
a freeze and serve as the benchmark by which to determine Israel's
compliance with its Roadmap obligations and those under international
law:
a cessation of all settlement construction;
a cessation of the appropriation
and confiscation of land under any circumstances related to settlements
and of the use of land already appropriated for settlement construction;
a full cessation of incentives for
settlers (existing or potential) or that are designated for a
particular settlement area; and
the territorial scope of the freeze
must include all of the occupied Palestinian territory, including
East Jerusalem.
1.13 Recommendations
1.13.1 Require the British Government to
put its citizens on notice that buying property in occupied Palestinian
territory may not give clear title. Historically, sales of property
in occupied territory by the occupying power have been declared
null and void or subject to judicial review once the occupation
is ended.[201]
This recommendation comes in response to UK registered companies
advertising property for sale in Israeli settlements. The UK government
provides notice to its citizens that any property bought in northern
Cyprus may not have clear title as northern Cyprus is considered
occupied under international law; the same should be done for
the Occupied Palestinian Territory.
1.13.2 Slow or deny the expansion of Israeli
ties and/or participation in EU programs until Israel complies
fully with its obligation to end settlement expansion.
1.13.3 Call on all members of the Quartet
to hold Israel properly to account for what effectively is a game
of semantics in respect of its obligations regarding a settlement
freeze and adhere to the elements described above in 1.12.
2. THE ROLE
OF THE
MIDDLE EAST
QUARTET
2.1 The events over the last six months
have shown a extensive disregard for international humanitarian
and human rights law, both of which remain applicable to the parties
"conduct". Several international and local human rights
and United Nations organizations have documented actions which
violate provisions of both bodies of law and hence I will not
be restating those here. What I would like to briefly address
however is the role of the Quartet in contributing to a climate
in which these violations occur.
2.2 The Quartet was established in 2002
by its members to consult more closely over the Israeli-Palestinian
conflict and its resolution. It takes decisions, elaborates principles
in order to influence the peace process, and issues declarations
which embody those principles. These declarations are the result
of discussions among the four members, although no one within
the Quartet appears to be bound by the position adopted.[202]
2.3 Of concern is that the Quartet's absence
of reference to international law, particularly international
humanitarian and human rights law, is contributing to a creating
a climate of disrespect for these legal obligations by the concerned
parties. The Quartet will refer to the Roadmap, which does not
mention humanitarian law or human rights, or relevant Security
Council Resolutions which are directed more at the outcome of
a negotiated process (ie United Nations Security Council Resolutions
242 and 338); it does not refer to resolutions which embody humanitarian
or human rights law which are applicable to the conflicting parties
pending a final peace agreement. Any Quartet references to "law"
appear to be solely in the context of the Quartet Envoy's mandate
to help promote the rule of law within the Palestinian Authority
or a call for the respect for human rights in response to the
fighting between Hamas and Fatah members.[203]
There are not calls on Israel to abide by its obligations as an
Occupying Power under humanitarian and human rights law Moreover,
in response to rocket attacks or suicide bombings, the Quartet
condemns such actions but there is no direct reference to the
illegality of such actions under these relevant bodies of law.[204]
2.4 This phenomenon is not new with Hamas's
assumption to power in Gaza in June 2007.[205]
The 2004 International Court of Justice's Wall Advisory Opinion
requires Israel to cease construction of the Wall, remove
constructed portions and respect international humanitarian and
human rights law.[206]
The Opinion also calls on both parties to respect human
rights and humanitarian law.[207]
In its 24 statements issued since that Opinion, the Quartet has
referred to the Wall Advisory Opinion or the legal obligations
embodied therein, only one time.[208]
In contrast, some members of the Quartet will refer to international
law in their individual capacities. Most recently the European
Union, in its 28 January conclusions on the Middle East Peace
process and in its 14 March 2008 Declaration on the Middle East,
stated that it considers settlements to be illegal. The UK government
has stated that "it is also the long-standing position of
the British government that any response by Israel should be in
accordance with international law"; however similar references
or pronouncements to international law and the parties' legal
obligations do not appear in Quartet statements.
2.5 Obviously, references to international
law alone are not sufficient to stop the violations of humanitarian
and human rights law; the will to enforce those obligations by
third states is also what is needed. Nonetheless, references to
international law and use of legal statements have a greater pull
than not in seeking to compel actors, particularly state actors,
to change their behaviour. States do not like to appear to be
acting outside the bounds of international law.[209]
Nor do non-state actors seeking acceptance by the international
community. Were the Quartet to include references to the applicable
international law and ultimately begin to shape its engagement
with all parties on that basis, the Quartet could play a more
effective role in bringing the violence to an end, reviving the
Palestinian economy, and facilitating a political solution which
would more effectively guarantee the personal security, freedom,
and the economic well-being of all involved.
2.6 Recommendations
2.6.1 As a first step, the UK Government
should take the lead and call on the EU in its membership in the
Quartet to incorporate international humanitarian and human rights
international law in its statements; otherwise, it should consistently
issue separate statements that accompany the Quartet declarations
and which reference and reiterate the parties' legal obligations.
3. THE RESPONSE
OF THE
UK GOVERNMENT TO
THE CHANGING
SITUATION, AND
IN PARTICULAR,
THE CONTRIBUTION
OF THE
DEPARTMENT FOR
INTERNATIONAL DEVELOPMENT
3.1 In keeping with the International Development
Committee mandate to examine the expenditure, administration and
policy of the Department for International Development, it is
important that the Committee ensure that the provision of donor
aid is not provided in such a way which contravenes the United
Kingdom's legal obligations. Those obligations, articulated inter
alia in the Wall Advisory Opinion, obliges all states
not to recognize the illegal situation resulting from the construction
of the Wall in the occupied Palestinian Territory, including in
and around East Jerusalem.[210]
States are also under an obligation not to render aid or assistance
in maintaining the situation created by such construction.[211]
3.2 In the immediate aftermath of this Opinion,
donors appeared to comply with their obligations. For example,
in late 2004, Israel requested donor governments to fund the construction
of a separate road network in order to facilitate Palestinian
movement and economic development. Many donors refused to fund
this project as it was deemed that funding such a project would
be in breach of their obligations as articulated in the Wall
Advisory Opinion because the proposed separate road network
would help maintain the illegal regime of the wall and settlements.[212]
Donors also developed guidelines to assist their decision-making
as to whether a potential assistance or development project is
in accordance with their obligations articulated in the Wall
Opinion.[213]
3.3 Governments, in their good intention
to support the peace process, at times fund proposals which promise
short-term movement but which "accommodate" the illegal
acts by Israel (ie the settlements, wall and closure regime).
Support for such projects can serve to "normalize" Israel's
closure policy and the illegal presence of its settlements within
the occupied Palestinian territory rather than projects which
would be designed and implemented to help compel the reversal
of such illegal activities. Since Annapolis, restrictions on movement
have increased and the tendency persists to fund projects which
accommodate the "illegal situation." An example of such
a violation could include donor support for proposed housing projects
which would entail construction of separate roads or tunnels to
ensure the separation of Palestinian traffic from Israeli settlers.
Nor would it serve donor states' interests to support projects
that facilitate fast movement (eg tourist entry into Bethlehem)
while Palestinians remain consigned to using the illegal terminal
built as part of the regime of the Wall.[214]
3.4 Recommendations
3.4.1 Ensure that all projects put forward
by the Quartet Envoy and/or funded by DFID are in compliance with
the UK's obligations under international law in light of the ICJ
Wall opinion and its other international law obligations. An assessment
should be undertaken for each project prior to securing the support
of the Quartet envoy's office and the provision of funding.
http://www.jpost.com/servlet/Satellite?cid=1205261308516&pagename=JPost%2FJPArticle%2FPrinter
(last viewed on
14 March 2008).
http://www.peacenow.org.il/data/SIP_STORAGE/files/1/3201.pdf
(last viewed on 14 March 2007).
http://www.aad-online.org/2005/english/7-July/16-21/16-7/aad8/4.htm
(last viewed on March 14, 2008); see also Report on Israeli Settlement
in the Occupied Territory, vol 17, no 6, November to December
2007, p 6, at Foundation for Middle East Peace, at www.FMEP.org.
http://www.haaretz.com/hasen/spages/962368.html (last
viewed on 14 March 2008).
186 Prior to the Annapolis meeting, 138 tenders had
been issued in 2007. After the Annapolis meeting, 747 tenders
were issued in the remaining four weeks of 2007. Back
187
See eg the May 2007 World Bank report, Movement and Access
Restrictions in the West Bank: Uncertainty and Inefficiency in
the Palestinian Economy and the July 2007 Office for the Coordination
of Humanitarian Affairs (OCHA) report, The Humanitarian Impact
on Palestinians of Israeli settlements and other Infrastructure
within the West Bank. Back
188
OCHA, The Humanitarian Monitor, January 2008. Back
189
"Shas vows more settlement construction," Jerusalem
Post, 12 March 2008, by Tovah Lazaroff and Gil Hoffman, Back
190
Those principles would require, as a first step, a cessation of
the unlawful activity. The unlawful activities amount to the direct
or indirect transfer of its population into the occupied territory;
the requisitioning, expropriation, and seizure of land not required
for military purposes (the establishment of settlements do not
constitute or serve a lawful military purpose); and Israel's extraterritorial
extension of its personal and territorial jurisdiction to the
Occupied Palestinian territory, including the provision of economic
incentives for settling. In response to any illegal act, a state
is required to immediately cease such action, including all elements
of that action and undertake reparations. Back
191
See And Thou Shall Spread: Construction and development of
settlements beyond the official limits of jurisdiction, Special
Report of the Peace Now Settlement Watch Team, June 2007, p 8,
at Back
192
Ibid, p 9-13. Back
193
This number is based on an estimate by an Israeli government official
responsible for advising on settlements. He stated in 1999 that
approved master plans could accommodate 1.5 million settlers.
See Report on Israeli Settlement in the Occupied Territory, Vol
9, No 3, May to June 1999, Foundation for Middle East Peace, at
www.FMEP.org. Back
194
Ibid, p 13. Back
195
For a detailed account of the Israeli government's involvement
in the settlement process, see Land Grab, Israel's Settlement
Policy in the West Bank, of May 2003, by B'tselem, The Israeli
Information Center for Human Rights in the Occupied Territories.
Moreover, the Israeli government does retain the power to end
those private contracts. Although the Israeli government might
be responsible for restitution were it to end such contracts,
it would not be responsible for lost profits to those private
companies, thus minimizing compensation it would owe. Israeli
government liability is based on an study on file with the author.
Also, ceasing construction now helps to minimize the amount of
future compensation owed by Israel government to its citizens
and to Palestinians for inter alia the illegal use of their
land. Back
196
Article 43, Regulations concerning the Laws and Customs of War
on Land of the The Hague Convention (IV) respecting the Laws and
Customs of War on Land of 18 October 1907. (1907 Hague Regulations). Back
197
"Sharon freezes tender announcements in settlement blocs,
but thousands of housing units are being constructed using old
permits," Nadav Shragai, in Ha'aretz of 7 April, 2005, at Back
198
"Olmert Approves Construction of 750 new homes in Givat Ze'ev",
by Barak Ravid, Ha'aretz, Back
199
Legal Consequences of Israel's Construction of a Wall in the
Occupied Palestinian Territory, Advisory Opinion, I.C.J. Reports
2004, p 136, at p 184, para 120. Back
200
See eg S.C. Resolution 446 of 22 March 1979. Back
201
Declaring land sales void was particularly common during World
War II but also subsequent occupations as well. Back
202
For example, after the Quartet issued its principle conditions
in response to Hamas's election, Russia hosted a delegation of
Hamas members. On the other hand, the UN Secretary-General issued
instructions to his staff to not meet with Hamas officials of
a certain level. Back
203
See eg Quartet Statements of 20 July 2007 and 24 August 2007;
on the call for human rights, see Quartet Statement of 18 June
2007. Back
204
See ie Quartet Statement of 30 May 2007. Back
205
Political commentators note that Hamas won the January 2006 elections
in large part due to the worsening situation on the ground for
Palestinians-the expansion of illegal settlements, assassinations,
home demolitions, (all prohibited under the laws of occupation),
etc and the failure of the negotiation process to address these
concerns. Back
206
Wall Advisory Opinion, supra n 14 at p 195, para 149-153. Back
207
Ibid, at p 200, para 162. Back
208
This period covers August 2004 to February 2008. The one statement
"takes note of the ICJ opinion on the subject" is from
22 September 2004. The subsequent statement of 1 March 2005 reaffirms
the principles and positions outlined in its May 4 2004 and 22
September 2004 statements. The 4 May 2004 statement, prior to
the Wall Advisory Opinion, " . . . recognises Israel's
legitimate right to self-defense in the face of terrorist attacks
against its citizens, within the parameters of international humanitarian
law". Back
209
See Omar M Dajani, Shadow or Shade: The Role of International
Law in Palestinian-Israeli Peace Talks, 32 J Yale Int'l L 61,
2007, at pp 78-81 for a discussion of legal theories on state
compliance with international law. Back
210
Wall Advisory Opinion, supra n 14, at p 200, para 159. Back
211
Ibid. Back
212
"Donor Countries Won't fund Israeli-Planned Separate Roads
for Palestinians", by Amira Haas, Ha'aretz, 30 November
2004 as reported in LAAC Secretariat, Wall Mitigation: Implications
for Donors and Implementing Agencies Operating in Areas affected
by the Separation Barrier, Report to the Local Aid Coordinating
Committee, 30 January 2005. Back
213
Ibid. Back
214
Quartet Envoy Blair and other members of the international community
have expressed their displeasure at Israel's failure to remove
roadblocks and cease construction and expansion of settlements.
Past experience has shown that initiatives or projects aimed at
economy recovery projects which are not based on a reversal of
the closure and settlement policy, but rather accommodate it,
have limited effect and no long-term sustainability and certainty.
See May 2007 World Bank report, Movement and Access Restrictions
in the West Bank: Uncertainty and Inefficiency in the Palestinian
Economy. Back
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