Memorandum submitted by Palestinian grassroots
Anti-Apartheid Wall Campaign—Stop the Wall
OUR APPROACH
AND EXPERTISE
1. Stop the Wall is a coalition of 13 Palestinian
non governmental organisations and over 50 popular committees
that mobilise and coordinate efforts against the Wall on local,
national and international levels. Research plays an important
role in our mobilising and advocacy efforts. We are in a unique
position to be able to combine field experience with desk studies.
2. Since 2005 our research focus includes
economic aspects of the Wall project. We have carried out extensive
research on the World Bank proposals for economic development
in the West Bank, which is to date the only comprehensive critique
of the basic assumptions for development in the West Bank.[215]
We offer updated research to international donor organisations
and diplomatic missions via briefings, presentations and submissions.
3. Our research is published by a number
of internationally recognised NGOs including Bretton Woods Project,
Transnational Institute, Corporate Europe Observatory and Focus
on the Global South. Our economic analysis on Palestine has been
granted the Project Censored Award as one of the ten most important
stories not to have been reported on in mainstream media.
4. Our advice on international funding strategies
is based on the ICJ decision of 2004 on the illegality of the
Wall, which obliges state parties to the IV Geneva Convention
"not to render any aid or assistance to the construction
of the Wall or the regime created by it".[216]
We advocate for an approach to aid and development that is rooted
in the needs and demands of the people.
SUMMARY
Political developments since June 2007
5. There are no signs of the existence of
a Middle East Peace process on the ground. Occupation policies
continue and have escalated after the Annapolis conference.
6. The will of the Palestinian people expressed
in democratic and fair elections has been completely undone to
create a Western backed government. This has been critically influenced
by EU governments and their aid and development policies.
7. The creation of TIM and the continued
withholding of aid even after the Palestinian Unity Government
(PUG) was installed destabilised first the elected government
and then the PUG.
8. After the Annapolis conference, Palestinian
civil society has seen a large increase in repression by the PNA.
Economic developments in the OPT
9. Palestinian sovereignty over borders,
lands and movement is a prerequisite for meaningful development.
There can be no development under occupation: at best, poverty
levels in the oPt will not increase. Framing the solution to the
question of Palestine in terms of economic development is fundamentally
unhelpful. The occupation has to end.
10. The AMA agreement is simply a yardstick
to measure how far Israel is making the existing system of the
Wall, settlements and closure economically sustainable. The AMA
is not currently being implemented. However, even full implementation
of the AMA under the current circumstances would not challenge
the occupation or work in the interest of long term Palestinian
development.
11. Israel is effectively dictating the
terms of development to suit its strategic interests.
12. The Paris donor conference was instrumental
in financing the Palestinian Reform and Development Plan (PRDP)
and the complementary Quartet Quick Impact Projects (QIP). The
main proposals risk pre-empting the final status agreements and
coercing Palestinians into accepting Israeli occupation, in particular:
(a) Industrial zones that risk legalising
Israeli violations of international law and contribute to the
sustainability of the Wall and its associated regime, infringing
the prescriptions of the ICJ advisory opinion.
(b) An agro-industrial zone, which includes
"Israeli migrant businesses" (Israeli companies working
illegally within the West Bank). Rather than allowing farmers
to develop their own businesses, they will be labourers in large-scale
agro-industry.
(c) Tourism in and around Bethlehem which
will bring more than four times as much profits to Israeli than
Palestinian economy.
(d) The PRDP includes a fiscal reform on
net lending that risks having serious negative impacts on Palestinian
access to basic utilities.
Recommendations
13. The UK's funding strategy has to be
radically reviewed. The foremost responsibility of the UK is the
implementation of international law and human rights in Palestine,
including the ICJ decision. The UK must ensure that development
proposals:
(a) are legal under international law and
do not pre-empt the outcome of final status;
(b) reflect the needs of the people to remain
steadfast on their lands; and
(c) contribute more effectively to the Palestinian
than Israeli economy.
14. Funding projects should include small
scale projects that facilitate Palestinians' need to continue
life on their lands and projects that challenge the occupation
and assert the Palestinian's right to their lands.
15. The UK must use its influence to pressurise
Israel to comply with international law and to end the occupation
of Palestinian land. The suspension of the EU-Israel Free Trade
Agreement is the most obvious tool.
16. Companies working or contributing to
the occupation and the colonisation of the West Bank and Jerusalem
have to be banned from international investments and cooperation
to stop Israel from profiting from the occupation and international
aid.
17. UK must stop supporting the active destruction
of Palestinian democratic institutions and start engaging with
democratically elected representatives.
FULL TEXT
Background
18. Coordinated and large scale donors investment
in the oPt began with the Oslo agreements. The World Bank had
initially been approached by the organisers of the 1992 Madrid
conference to prepare a study of "economic prospects and
development challenges".[217]
This culminated in the report of September 1993, "Developing
the Occupied Territories: An Investment in Peace". The
Bank was praised for this report by global players for being "technically
competent and politically neutral"[218]
as it did not challenge in its analysis any of the facts on the
ground created by Israel. The paradigm of development discourse
in the West Bank and Gaza had been developed, completely neglecting
the crucial precursors for genuine development such as dismantling
of the settlements, the end of the Occupation and the right of
the refugees' return.
19. In order to make the Oslo Accords sustainable
and bring about a period of "calm" amongst Palestinians,
the World Bank was charged with the responsibility of coordinating
economic policies in the WBGS and directing the flows of donor
pledges. At the October 1993 "Conference to Support Middle
East Peace", this amounted to $2.4 billion over the ensuing
five years to "develop and build-up the Palestinian economy".[219]
Additional pledges increased the sum to $3.4 billion from 38 countries
and several international organisations.[220]
20. While donor contributions increase,
the Palestinian economy is systematically de-developed by Israeli
occupation polices. The donor community has been dragged into
a spiral of increasing contributions in order to facilitate basic
services which under international law should be provided by the
occupying power, and which allow the Palestinian people to survive
while their basic rights are infringed.
21. In this context, donor contributions
have achieved no net improvement for Palestinians. One would have
thought that this would cause donors to reevaluate their approach.
In fact the reverse seems to be the case: at Paris donor conference
the PNA received pledges for 7.7 billion dollars for only three
years, apparently with no increased commitment to pressure for
full implementation of international law and restoration of fundamental
Palestinian rights.
Political developments in the oPTs since June
2007
22. The political developments since June
2007 as far as the occupation policies in West Bank are concerned
are marked by constant military attacks and raids, settlement
expansion and ongoing attempts to expel entire communities from
their lands. Gaza has experienced complete siege and repeated
mass killings at the hands of the Israeli army. There has been
no change in this policy after the Annapolis conference. On the
contrary settlement expansion has actually accelerated, particularly
in Jerusalem; in Gaza some 120 people were killed by Israeli attacks
in just five days.
23. The Palestinian internal political developments
in WBGS since June 2007 are mainly characterised by the assertion
of control by Hamas in the Gaza Strip that lead to the dismissal
of the Palestinian Unity Government and its replacement in the
West Bank and within Western diplomatic circles with a caretaker
government led by Salam Fayyad. The results are:
(a) temporary political division between
the West Bank and the Gaza Strip;
(b) a weak government in the West Bank whose
prime minister and ministers have no democratic mandate;
(c) legislative processes, budgetary decisions
and political negotiations in hands of a leadership without democratic
accountability and no popular mandate; and
(d) a disproportionate increase of influence
on Palestinian decision making by the donors community. It is
notable that the draft of the Palestinian Reform and Development
Plan (PRDP) has been circulated and widely discussed among international
donors and NGOs before its presentation at the donors conference
in Paris while Palestinian public and civil society has not been
allowed debate on the document that reflects most strategic economic
decision for the coming years.
24. In the last nine months the will of
the Palestinian people expressed in democratic and fair elections
has been completely undone. These Palestinian internal developments
have been critically influenced by Western governments including
the UK. Withholding of donor funding played a crucial role in
this.
25. US influence on the developments in
Gaza was recently exposed by David Rose in his article "The
Gaza Bombshell: Politics & Power" published in Vanity
Fair April 2008.[221]
Considering previous leaks in Arab media in April last year,[222]
it is likely that other Western governments were at least partially
aware of the US plans to orchestrate a coup in Gaza. The continued
withholding of international aid even after the Palestinian Unity
Government was installed has had the effect of destabilising that
government and seems to have been linked to these US plans. The
withholding of aid arguably can be considered an act of collective
punishment.
26. The Quartet's demands on the PNA—non-violence,
compliance with previous agreements and recognition of Israel—served
as a reason for withholding funding to the PNA and refusing diplomatic
ties with its officials. Similar demands have never been made
of Israel and the EU and UK maintain a high level diplomatic relations
and preferential and free trade agreements despite its escalation
of abuse against Palestinians and non-compliance with basic tenets
of international law. The Quartet is effectively demanding that
the occupied make concessions to the occupier.
27. It is particularly curious that the
donor community has demanded that the PNA pledge non-violence,
while at the same time the international community has provided
the PNA and pro-western PNA officials with military training and
weapons. The implication seems to be that violence is permissible
if used for internal repression by the PA against Palestinians
but not for resistance to the occupying power, which is sanctioned
by international law.
28. Palestinian civil society has seen a
large increase in repression by the PNA, particularly after the
Annapolis conference. On 27 November 200 demonstrators were detained
and 30 injured in Ramallah when PA forces attempted to prevent
demonstrations demanding that the PA fully uphold Palestinian
national rights at the Annapolis conference. In Hebron one person
was killed. The demonstration in Ramallah was organised jointly
by the coordinating committee of all Palestinian political parties
and a range of civil society organisations. On January 10, between
15 and 25 people were arrested and many more injured after Palestinian
Authority forces attacked a demonstration organised by the same
large alliance of Palestinian forces in protest of the US President
Bush's presence in Ramallah. Other demonstrators were attacked
in Bethlehem.
The role of the UK and the EU
29. The TIM and subsequent restarting of
direct aid to the caretaker government were essential for the
overthrow of the democratically elected Palestinian government
and the dismantling of Palestinian democratic institutions.
30. The aid embargo was maintained until
May, just weeks before the unity government broke down. The process
towards the resumption of direct aid is telling. On May 14, the
US sent a letter to the EU, which presumed to authorise the European
Union to channel funds to Palestinians through the PLO account
now controlled by Fayyad.[223]
Weeks later, Salam Fayyad was nominated prime minister of the
unelected caretaker government and diplomatic relations and the
process of fundraising and direct funding were fully resumed.
31. The UK has actively contributed to the
militarisation of the relationship between the PNA and its people.
The UK has contributed to policing training and weapons for the
PNA police forces. The UK has further provided a Policing Adviser
to the US Security Coordinator's Team—working on policing
aspects of the Team's Security Sector Transformation plan. The
results of this policing training have been experienced by Palestinian
civil society in united and peaceful demonstrations. DfID's "work
to enhance the capacity of civil society organisations to [ .
. .] monitor and evaluate government performance" is at best
incongruent with the UK's overall funding strategy for Palestine.
32. Finally, it should be noted that Palestinian
civil society has an almost unparalleled history of struggle against
colonialism, occupation and other forms of repression and over
100 years has not been subdued. It is difficult to imagine that
Palestinian society will accept the destruction of democracy in
the long term.
Progress in the Middle East Peace Process since Annapolis
33. Since December 2007, Israel has killed 318
people, injured 858 and arrested 1,330.[224]
Between December and January the Occupation carried out 2,239
military raids and attacks.[225]
Some 50 new demolition orders have been distributed in the West
Bank, 18 of them alone to the small village of Khirbet at Tawil
(Nablus district). 49 homes and dozens of animal pens and agricultural
sheds as well as wells and water infrastructure have been destroyed.
The most severe attacks have been waged on the Bedouin communities
in Arab Jahalin (Jerusalem district) and al Hadidiya (Jordan Valley).
34. In February more than 2000 dunums of
land were confiscated in South Hebron. In Beit Hanina (Jerusalem),
lands of the university have been destroyed to build a new settler
road. One hundred dunums of land have been confiscated to build
a fence along the Qalqiliya—Nablus road.
35. Between January and February, occupation
authorities have announced 30,000 housing units in and around
Jerusalem. The process of construction of a new settler ring road
has been started. On 15 January occupation authorities started
to add 60 settlement units in the settlement of Ma'ale Zetim in
East Jerusalem, during that period occupation authorities announced
a bid to build 440 units in Talpiyot. Israeli newspapers revealed
that the occupation municipality in Jerusalem plans to construct
almost 10 000 new settlement units (distributed in: Ramot (500),
Ramat Schlomo (500), Pisgat Ze'ev (1000), Nave Yacov (700), Talpiyot
(500), Har Homa (2000), Gilo (500), Giv'at HaMatos (4000). On
9 March, further plans for 750 housing units in Pisgat Ze'ev were
announced.
36. The internal Palestinian situation has
worsened. No dialogue between the political factions has been
initiated though it becomes ever more evident that progress on
this side is imperative. This is also due to thinly veiled Israeli
and international pressure on Abu Mazen not to open dialogue with
Hamas.[226]
37. There are no conditions or signs of
the existence of a Middle East Peace process on the ground.
Economic development in the OPT
38. Even under the World Bank's most optimistic
forecast, given full implementation of the PRDP and AMA, the outlook
is extremely poor: Palestinian poverty to remain at the same level,
and continued dependence on international funding.[227]
39. There can be no development under occupation.
Trade cannot flourish if Israel can close down checkpoints, terminals
and roads at will. Agricultural productivity cannot increase while
Israel continues to confiscate and raze farm lands, confiscates,
pollutes and diverts water resources and tightly limits import
of agricultural equipment and chemicals.
40. Whenever conflicts arise over profitability
of economic arrangements, Israel imposes its unilateral solutions.
To mention only one example, Bethlehem gas stations are since
a month on strike as the occupation authorities have prohibited
import of gas and fuel through Bethlehem terminal and rerouted
it to Tarqumiya terminal (Hebron district) against all indicators
that this is economically not profitable. This makes transport
significantly more expensive and dangerous.
41. The terms of development are literally
dictated by Israel. In particular:
(a) Donors require authorisation from the
occupation authorities for any infrastructural projects implemented
in area C, the majority of West Bank land and the large majority
of lands that are not inhabited and which are open for infrastructural
investments. Permission is granted or declined on the basis of
Israel's strategic objectives. To take one example, the Japan
International Cooperation Agency (JICA) in early 2007 discussed
with Palestinian planning officials the construction of an airport
north of Jericho as part of the "Peace Corridor" project.
The Israeli government vetoed the proposal, stating that it would
threaten their control of the airspace. It is stated Israeli policy
to retain control of the Jordan Valley as a "security border".
(b) Severe limitations are placed on material
allowed to be imported.
(c) Israeli exerts control over supply of
water, fuel and electricity.
Implementation of the Agreement on Movement and Access
42. The AMA agreement sets out a list of
measures the occupation authorities are required to implement
in order to make the existing system of the Wall, settlements
and closure sustainable. It does not challenge the occupation
policies as such.
43. Palestinian sources concur with the
World Bank that the AMA agreement is not implemented[228]
and that this has a strong impact in terms of accelerated de-development
of the West Bank and Gaza. However, it is simply an illusion that
the AMA agreement could bring any significant change in terms
of development, let alone the implementation of the basic internationally
sanctioned rights of the Palestinian people. In fact, the World
Bank assumption that successful implementation of the PRDP can
only stop the further degradation of the economic situation already
assumes implementation of the AMA agreement and the pledged flow
of donor money.
44. There will be no tangible impact of
the donors money as long as the political questions are not resolved.
In order for Palestinian development to happen, the Palestinian
people have to be able to have sovereignty over borders, their
lands and their movement. In other words, the occupation has to
end.
The Paris donor conference and development projects
45. The Paris donor conference was instrumental
in financing the Palestinian Reform and Development Plan (PRDP)
and the complementary Quartet Quick Impact Projects (QIP). Both
proposals have reportedly received very high appreciation and
no major criticism has been reported in the media. However, these
proposals have inbuilt fallacies that make them at best incapable
of stimulating development and at worst ensure that Palestinian
economy enters into an even more debilitating dependency on the
occupation.
46. Part of the developmental proposals
promoted by the World Bank, the PRDP and the QIP is the creation
of industrial zones. These industrial zones risk legitimising,
legalising and cementing Israeli violations of international law
within the West Bank. The QIP include, for example, the stipulation
that "Israel, the PA and the project developer should develop
a security protocol for the industrial site". This gives
Israel security control over West Bank land. The projects would
not only cement Israeli presence in the West Bank as an occupier
but likely extend their control to so far only indirectly controlled
area A, in case the site will be located there.
47. The ongoing discussion between Palestinians
and Israelis in joint industrial projects over which set of labour
rights is to be implemented in these areas within the West Bank
and the fact that Israel has to approve these laws is a further
indicator on how industrial parks are used by the occupation to
extend its grasp over the West Bank.
48. In both proposed cases the industrial
sites are located at the terminals created by the Wall and effectively
contribute to the sustainability of the Wall and the regime it
has created. They risk infringing the prescriptions of the ICJ
advisory opinion.
49. The map above, showing the possible
site of the Jalame industrial estate, shows clearly the complete
dependency on Israel for the entire project as well as its integration
with the system created by the Wall. This is directly counter
acting to Palestinian rights and quest for self-determination.
50. The experience of a similar project
in the Eretz industrial park further puts doubt on the viability
of such projects. Israel has continuously blocked access to and
export from the park, even though there are "security protocols"
in place.
51. A second proposal mentioned both in
the PRDP and the QIP is an agro-industrial zone to be implemented
by a triangle of PA, Israeli and Jordanian partners and financed
mainly by the Japanese International Cooperation Agency (JICA).
The preliminary studies done so far by JICA on this initiative
are deeply flawed.
52. JICA's interim document includes proposals
for supporting "Israeli migrant businesses"—companies
currently operating illegally on confiscated land in the Jordan
Valley—as part of a package to create jobs for Palestinians.
This pre-empts the final status agreements by normalising the
Israeli occupation of the Jordan Valley: it is further an attempt
to coerce Palestinians in the area into accepting the presence
of the Israeli occupation through economic means.
53. The overwhelming majority of farmers
in the Jordan Valley run small-scale farms, which are unable to
develop due to lack of infrastructure, which is the result of
40 years of occupation. Rather than allowing these farmers to
develop their own businesses, JICA and QIP apparently envisage
that they will work as labourers in large-scale agro-industry,
which will presumably be owned either by Israeli companies (the
"migrant businesses") or by wealthy Palestinian elites.
The project is clearly not being developed for the benefit of
ordinary Palestinians.
54. Studies further state that "according
to Israeli agricultural experts, current Israeli agricultural
infrastructure and markets can enable an increase of agricultural
exports by as much as 30% (equivalent to some US$300 million)
if an adequate and stable supply of Palestinian workers is assured".[229]
While Palestinians are to offer the cheap labour for export crops,
Israeli agriculture will gain sizable profits by still maintaining
a monopoly of export via Haifa and providing inputs and services
to the agro-business.
55. Finally, a third sector, the tourism
industry in and around Bethlehem, is contemplated in the PRDP
and the QIP. Part of the plan are what the Office of the Quartet
Representative called "tourist friendly checkpoints".[230]
It is disturbing to Palestinians to know that the international
community promotes checkpoints that are acceptable to international
tourists, implicitly acknowledging that the ones designed for
Palestinians are inhuman, instead of challenging the entire system.
56. Studies further highlight that "the
Palestinian average income per tourist was around US$200, only
15% of the Israeli income per tourist (PCBS and the Palestinian
Ministry of Tourism, cited in International Alert report "Local
Business Local Peace" 2006, p 383)[ . . .] Christian tourists
in Israel can generate an average direct income per tourist that
is similar to the current Israeli average of US$1,300 with an
additional US$300-500 per tourist that will be spent in the PA".[231]
This raises the question whether it is at all justified for UK
and international funding mechanisms to disburse money in a situation
where a fully developed country, which is the occupant and responsible
over the Palestinian economic de- development, is the main beneficiary.
57. Finally, the PRDP includes a fiscal
reform that risks having serious negative impacts on Palestinian
access to basic utilities. The World Bank states in its consideration
of the PRDP that a reduction in net lending is a crucial part
of the PA's fiscal reform. The measures to ensure full payment
of utility bills is likely to include "deductions from the
salaries of public sector staff, as well as requirements for a
`certificate of payment' of utility bills for anyone seeking municipal
services".[232]
In fact, the attempts to force these measures have already created
large scale strikes and protests. In the West Bank, where already
in 2006 18.5% of households have been living in deep poverty and
30.5% were poor,[233]
the non payment of utility bills in most of the cases is due to
the effective level of poverty of the households. While the proposals
suggest that together with the reduction in net lending a social
security system should be built up, no such efforts have been
seen yet and the entire operation is likely to produce a largely
reduced access to basic utilities for Palestinians who are thrown
into poverty by occupation policies while it guarantees full payment
to Israeli service providers. The costs of the occupation will
thus be effectively removed from Israel and the donor community
which has taken up the task to finance the PNA net lending and
put on the backs of the occupied.
Conclusion and Recommendations
58. Framing the solution to the question
of Palestine in terms of economic development is fundamentally
unhelpful. In a written answer on 11 July 2007, Douglas Alexander
asserted his opinion that "A thriving private sector in the
West Bank and Gaza will be an indispensable element of a lasting
peace. Private sector initiatives will play a critical role once
restrictions are eased on the movement of goods and people. We
call on all Palestinians to end violence, and on Israel to relax
its controls on movement and access, including by implementing
the 2005 Movement and Access agreement".[234]
The basic assumptions for UK's funding strategy expressed in this
statement have to be replaced with a realistic assessment of the
reality of occupation in Palestine.
59. The foremost task and responsibility
of the UK must be to support the implementation of international
law and human rights, including the ICJ on the Wall. To this end,
the UK must use diplomatic pressure and economic sanctions on
Israel.
60. Funding strategies must be completely
re-evaluated. Large and medium scale economic projects within
the system of occupation are doomed to support its sustainability
and counteract to the UK's obligations under international law.
Small scale projects have to aim at the creation of an "economy
of steadfastness" based on the people's need to continue
to live on their land. Projects that effectively challenge the
occupation and assert the Palestinian's right to their lands have
to be devised.
Recommendations
61. The UK has participated in a concerted
international effort to use economic pressure to change the leadership
and policies of occupied Palestinians.
62. Economic pressure should be used to
push for the implementation of international law and to support
democracy and human rights, not to undermine democratically elected
governments.
63. The UK must reevaluate its policies
and use economic pressure to push Israel to comply with international
law and end the occupation of Palestinian land. The suspension
of the EU-Israel Free Trade Agreement is the most evident tool.
Though Israel consistently violates the human rights clause of
the treaty, it still enjoys preferential treatment and tax exemption.
64. Israel profits from the occupation and
the donors money that comes to Palestine. This has to stop. Companies
working or contributing to the occupation and the colonisation
of the West Bank and Jerusalem have to be banned from international
investments and cooperation.
65. The UK has to stop supporting the active
destruction of Palestinian democratic institutions and has to
start engaging with democratically elected representatives. In
the same commitment to democracy, undemocratic policies of Israel,
including systematic racist discrimination of Palestinians and
the denial of the right to return of the refugees, have to be
targeted.
66. Prior to disbursement of funding, the
UK has to scrutinise all PRDP and QIP projects as to whether they:
(a) are legal under international law, and
do not pre-empt the outcome of final status talks by lending support
to the Wall and its associated regime or to Israeli colonisation
and presence in the West Bank;
(b) reflect the needs of the people to remain
steadfast on their lands;
(c) Contribute more effectively to Palestinian
or Israeli economy; and
(d) help Palestinians challenge the facts
on the ground created by the Israeli Occupation.
http://lnweb18.worldbank.org/oed/oeddoclib.nsf/DocUNIDViewForJavaSearch/DB1BC6952F401E0785256B8A0067B726/$file/west_bank_and_gaza.pdf,
Washington, p 7.
http://www.jerusalemites.org/articles/english/2007/May/20.htm
http://www.ochaopt.org/documents/Commercial%20Crossings%20V5.pdf;
"The Closure of the Gaza Strip: the Economic and Humanitarian
Consequences", UM OCHA,
http://www.ochaopt.org/documents/Gaza_Special_Focus_December_2007.pdf
http://siteresources.worldbank.org/INTWESTBANKGAZA/Resources/294264-1166525851073/ParisconferencepaperDec17.pdf
http://www.publications.parliament.uk/pa/cm200607/cmhansrd/cm070711/text/70711w0005.htm
215 Do-it-Yourself Apartheid in Palestine-Israel,
the World Bank, and the "Sustainable Development, Palestinian
grassroots Anti-Apartheid Wall Campaign, http://stopthewall.org/activistresources/983.shtml) Back
216
International Court of Justice, Legal Consequences Of The Construction
Of A Wall In The Occupied Palestinian Territory, Advisory Opinion
of 9 July 2004, http://www.icj-cij.org/docket/files/131/1671.pdf Back
217
World Bank (2002), West Bank & Gaza: An Evaluation of Bank
Assistance, Back
218
Ibid. p 7. Back
219
Khadr, A M (1999), Donor Assistance in "Development
Under Adversity: the Palestinian Economy in transition",
(ed) Ishac Diwan and Radwan A Shahan, Palestine Economic Policy
Research Institute (MAS) and the World Bank, Washington, p 149. Back
220
Ibid p 149. Back
221
www.vanityfair.com/politics/features/2008/04/gaza200804 Back
222
Document details "US" plan to sink Hamas, Mark
Perry and Paul Woodward, Back
223
http://www.alertnet.org/thenews/newsdesk/L28330737.htm Back
224
Data taken from Palestinian Monitoring Group and Palestinian Center
for Human Rights. Back
225
Data from Palestinian Monitoring Group. Back
226
"These officials add that they know for a fact that US Secretary
of State Condoleezza Rice plainly told Abbas that her efforts
to soften the positions of Israeli Prime Minister Ehud Olmert
would be gravely undermined should Abbas re-engage Hamas. Olmert
for his part has publicly all but directly prohibited Abbas from
resuming relations with Hamas if he wishes to continue regular
meetings with the Israeli prime minister". http://weekly.ahram.org.eg/2007/857/eg1.htm Back
227
"The PA's macroeconomic framework assumes: (a) the successful
advancement of reforms, including law and order; (b) sufficient
donor funding; and (c) a gradual easing of movement and access
restrictions subject to Israeli security concerns. It does not
assume a resolution of the situation in Gaza. Therefore most of
the growth would be in the West Bank, driven by Government investment
and consumption, both of which are linked to aid. Successfully
reaching the PRDP goals will lead to modest growth, averaging
5% per year, which- given current demographics and distribution
of income- will barely affect poverty levels". Back
228
"Increasing Need, Decreasing Access", UN OCHA, Back
229
"The Untapped Potential-Palestinian-Israeli Economic Relations:
Policy Options and Recommendations", by Paltrade and Peres
Center for Peace, 2006. Back
230
"Quick Impact Projects", Office of the Quartet Representative,
11/08/07. Document available from Stop the Wall. Back
231
"The Untapped Potential-Palestinian-Israeli Economic Relations:
Policy Options and Recommendations", by Paltrade and Peres
Center for Peace, 2006. Back
232
Investing in Palestinian Economic Reform and Development, Report
for the Pledging Conference, World Bank, Paris, 17 December
2007 Back
233
PCBS, Poverty in Palestine, August 2007. Back
234
Question 148666 by Rosie Cooper, 11 July 2007, Back
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