The
gap between expectations and capability
16. We found that there is a large gap between the
Afghan people's expectations about how long reconstruction will
take and the capacity of the international community and the Government
of Afghanistan to deliver this. In a recent survey by the Asia
Foundation only 42% of respondents thought that the country was
moving in the right direction and only 49% considered themselves
better-off than under Taliban rule. Evidence from AfghanAid states
that, "unmet reconstruction and development expectations
on the part of Afghan rural populations are further destabilising
the country."[23]
Yet building a successful state, which can deliver a wide array
of services, is a long process, often not without setbacks.[24]
Increasingly, even amongst donors, there is an expectation that
state capacity to deliver services can be achieved within a few
years. This is unrealistic, especially where such capacity has
never existed historically.
17. On our visit we were repeatedly asked what the
UK was doing in Afghanistan in terms of reconstruction and development.
In Helmand and Balkh some Provincial Council members were not
aware of the fact that DFID channels 80% of its funding through
Government of Afghanistan mechanisms. Similarly in Kabul we found
amongst Community Development Council members a lack of awareness
of how the UK is indirectly helping to fund the schools which
these Councils were building. Most Afghans responding to the Asia
Foundation survey were not aware of projects funded by the UK.
They cited the USA, Japan and Germany as having provided most
aid for projects in their district.[25]
The reality is that the UK is the second largest bilateral donor.[26]
Expectations need to be managed
so that they accord more realistically with the capacityboth
of the Government of Afghanistan and of the donor communityto
deliver. Greater publicity of successes and of the nature and
scope of DFID's work in Afghanistan would help in this regard.
We recommend that DFID develop
a new communications strategy in Afghanistan to ensure accurate
information about the scale of its work is widely circulated.
The structure of the report
18. The structure of the report is as follows: Chapter
2 provides an outline of DFID's programme in Afghanistan and a
discussion of the tools available to work in such insecure environments.
Chapters 3 to 7 each focus on one of five areas we consider to
be the main challenges and priorities for DFID and other donors.
These are: donor coordination, security, governance and sub-national
governance, counter-narcotics and rural livelihoods. Because of
the UK's focus on Helmand, Chapter 8 looks specifically at the
UK effort here and especially at the work of the Provincial Reconstruction
Team which is a joint civil and military effort.
19. Throughout the report we have sought to identify
the impact of development on the role and position of women in
Afghan society. Whilst there have been many gains for women in
Afghanistan since 2001 in terms of the constitution and public
commitments to safeguarding women's legal and civil rights, there
remain a number of serious challenges to women's human rights
and position in society. The realisation of their politically
acknowledged civil and political rights and social and economic
status is not currently guaranteed.[27]
We believe it is fundamental
to the rebuilding of Afghanistan that international commitments
made by the Government of Afghanistan and by donors on the rights
of women are honoured and given greater priority.
1 International Development Committee, First Report
of Session 2002-03, Afghanistan: the transition from humanitarian
relief to reconstruction and development, HC 84. Back
2
International Development Committee, Session 2005-06, Reconstructing
Afghanistan, HC 772 Back
3
DFID, Why we need to work more effectively in fragile states,
January 2005. Back
4
DFID, ibid. p 5 Back
5
HC Deb, 6 November 2007, col 23-34 Back
6
Ev 50 [DFID] Back
7
Q 2 [Mr Drummond] Back
8
Ev 82 [BAAG] Back
9
BBC News 24, "UK in Afghanistan for decades,"
20 June 2007, bbc.co.uk Back
10
Ev 52 [DFID] Back
11
Speech by the Prime Minister, the Rt Hon Gordon Brown MP, The
Lord Mayor's Banquet, 12 November 2007 Back
12
Q 7 [DFID] Back
13
Q 2 [DFID] Back
14
Ev 50 [DFID] Back
15
Ev 50 [DFID] Back
16
Ev 61 [DFID] Back
17
Q 31 [DFID] Back
18
Ev 51 [DFID] Back
19
Ev 67 [Afghanaid] Back
20
Ev 51 [DFID] Back
21
Centre for Strategic and International Studies, Breaking Point:
measuring progress in Afghanistan, 23 February 2007. Back
22
Paul Collier, The Bottom Billion: Why the poorest countries
are failing and what can be done about it, Oxford University
Press, 2007. Back
23
Ev 81 [AfghanAid] Back
24
See, Federal Ministry for Economic Cooperation and Development,
Transforming Fragile States: examples of practical experience,
Nomos: Germany, April 2007. Back
25
The Asia Foundation, Afghanistan in 2007, Asia Foundation,
2007, p43. Back
26
DFID, Afghanistan Development Facts. Figures are for 2005 according
to the OECD DAC. The USA is the largest bilateral donor (US$1.34
billion) Back
27
Ev 83, 103 [BAAG; GAPS] Back