House of Commons - International Development

Select Committee on International Development Fourth Report

2 Working in insecure environments

20. The British Mission in Afghanistan, which includes all FCO, DFID and other civil servants is one of the largest in the world. There are 143 UK civil servants based in Kabul alone. DFID Afghanistan has 43 staff and the Foreign Office has a political team of 10 which is the largest anywhere in the world. In addition there are counter-narcotics, HM Revenue & Customs, rule of law, Serious Organised Crime Agency and Intelligence staff. The large number of civil servants reflects the priority which the UK Government attaches to Afghanistan.

21. In our report on DFID's Departmental Report 2006 we questioned whether DFID had a comparative advantage in fragile states or if it was simply acting as the donor of last resort, seeking to fill those gaps which other donors had failed to.[28] The Department reports that "between 2001 and 2006 DFID increased bilateral expenditure in fragile states from £243.5 million in 2000-01 to £745.6 million in 2005-06. This represents an increase from 17% to 30% of DFID's overall bilateral spend. In 2006-07 this increased further to £800.1 million or 31% of our bilateral spend."[29] According to DFID, international commitments on poverty reduction and peace and stability will not be met without engaging with fragile states.[30]

22. Questions about where DFID has a comparative advantage apply not only to the choice of country in which it works but also to the terms and conditions for DFID staff. Because of its continuing insecurity, Afghanistan is considered to be a difficult environment in which to work for long periods at a time. DFID staff work in-country for six-week periods followed by a two-week break or 'breather' during which they must leave the country. Most staff sign-on for a 12-month posting although we were told that some intend to stay longer. All posts are unaccompanied which means that staff with families have to cope with long periods of separation from spouses and children. Consequently staff attracted to the posting tend to be young and without dependants. Housing is generally shared and movement is restricted and dependent on the availability of close protection and armoured vehicles. We requested information from other donors about the conditions of work for their staff. From the responses we received, UK conditions are broadly comparable with other donors although the UK package is considered by others to be among the best.

23. Nevertheless for some people there is no adequate compensation for the loss of family or social life. This means there is a limited pool of people who will agree to work in fragile states and an even more restricted number will stay for longer than one year. Institutional knowledge and capacity is easily lost when there is a high staff turnover. Such factors need to be taken into account if DFID is intending to continue and indeed to expand its work in insecure environments and fragile states. It may be appropriate for DFID to consider increased use of contracted staff with relevant experience to increase the pool of expertise available.

24. Another concern is that DFID staff are given less time to prepare for deployments abroad than their colleagues in the FCO. The work DFID staff undertake in environments such as Afghanistan is demanding and context-specific. We believe that they should be given a level of support which is commensurate with the responsibilities they are asked to bear, including an appropriate level of language, cultural and security training.

25. It also strikes us that the practice of having a two-week breather every six weeks has implications for the efficiency of Embassy staff work. It is necessary to have someone else take over your work when you are away which means that much time is lost in the handing over process before and after breathers. In the absence of the person with lead responsibility a decision may be made which that person might not have made. We learned of a specific example of where this had happened in Helmand. Increasing the numbers of civilian staff is one way around this problem. Another might be to extend the continuous work period to two months.

26. We agree that Afghanistan should be a priority for DFID. We understand that consideration is being given to how best to encourage staff to work in insecure environments and to increasing the length of postings. We believe that this is an important issue if DFID intends to remain in countries such as Afghanistan since there is a limited pool of staff who will undertake such postings. Current working conditions are comparable with those of other donors but consideration should be given to the impact of six-week periods of work on overall efficiency. We would urge DFID to encourage those staff who gain experience of working in Afghanistan to return to similar posts after a sufficient break so as to build up a cadre of DFID staff with experience of working in insecure environments.

Logistical support

27. Afghanistan is a fairly large country, divided into 34 administrative provinces, with a mountainous terrain which makes travel and communications difficult. Although UK troops have special responsibilities in Helmand Province, the DFID programme is a country-wide one. This means that DFID and other civil servants periodically need to be able to travel outside Kabul to other parts of the country including Helmand to monitor projects and to build up relationships with provincial leaders. Security considerations and the lack of passable roads mean that travel by air is usually the most appropriate method. However they are currently dependent on military air transport, itself in high demand.[31] The Prime Minister has recently announced that more helicopters will be made available to assist the military effort.[32] The Secretary of State for International Development, Rt Hon Douglas Alexander MP, told us that such helicopters could also assist the civilian effort.[33]

28. We were able to travel north to Balkh province in a fixed-wing Beechcraft aeroplane which belonged to HM Customs & Revenue but access to this is dependent on their need for it. Those of us who travelled to Helmand did so in military aircraft. We were accompanied on these visits by a number of DFID and FCO staff who used the opportunity to travel to Helmand and Balkh. In Afghanistan we learned that there had been a request for a non-military aircraft to assist the civilian effort but that a bid for a suitable aircraft had to be cancelled, and the deposit forgone, because HM Treasury had not approved the funds. The Secretary of State said that consideration was being given to purchasing a fixed-wing aircraft from the Stabilisation Aid Fund.[34] We welcome the approval of an increased number of helicopters in Afghanistan for the military effort announced by the Prime Minister on 12 December 2007. We would also welcome an update on the deployment of those helicopters and confirmation of how much increased effective capacity will be available. In addition we noted the use we made of US operated helicopters in Helmand and would like to know if they will still be available after the increase in the UK contribution.

29. We also note that DFID and Embassy employees are hindered in carrying out their jobs in a timely fashion when they are subject to lengthy waits for secure transport. Given the priority which the UK Government has placed on Afghanistan, we consider that appropriate logistical support for the civilian effort is essential. We recommend the early provision of a dedicated aeroplane for the use of DFID and other Embassy staff to carry out their work in Afghanistan.

30. In Kabul and elsewhere international staff frequently undertake short journeys in armoured vehicles with close protection teams. This is unavoidable at present. UK close protection teams adopt a low-key approach and ensure their weapons are not visible. We regard this less confrontational and less visible approach as preferable.

DFID's programme in Afghanistan

31. DFID is committed to providing £330 million in development assistance to Afghanistan in the three year period 2006-09. In the 2007-08 financial year DFID provided £107 million, excluding administrative costs. Of this, DFID committed £20 million to Helmand Province, an increase from £16 million in 2006-07, of which £4 million went through the cross-departmental Global Conflict Prevention Pool (GCPP) for Quick Impact Projects[35] (see chapter 8). On 12 December the Prime Minister announced development and stabilisation assistance of £450 million for the period 2009-12.[36] The Secretary of State informed us that £345 million of this was for development assistance and £105 million was for the newly created Stabilisation Aid Fund which replaces the Global Conflict Prevention Pool.[37] DFID told us this represented a very significant scaling-up of effort in terms of stabilisation and reconstruction activity. However, how the additional funds would be spent had not yet been decided, except that there would be an increase in staff levels in Helmand.[38] We welcome the allocation of additional funds for development and stabilisation assistance across Afghanistan. We wish to be given more details on the allocation of the funding in response to this report.

32. DFID's programme in Afghanistan has three main objectives. These are:

Building effective state institutions;
Improving economic management, and the effectiveness of aid to Afghanistan; and
Improving the livelihoods of rural people.

These priorities have been decided upon in consultation with the Government of Afghanistan which requested that donors identify only three priority sectors each.[39] In addition DFID's wider goals are: improving donor coordination, supporting the development of the Afghanistan National Development Strategy (ANDS), and contributing to the wider UK government effort in Helmand.

33. Because DFID attaches significant importance to building up effective state institutions, over 80% of its funding is channelled through the Government of Afghanistan. DFID told us:

"we direct over 80% of our assistance through Government channels because this helps the Government to develop the capacity to deliver basic services; to manage public finances effectively; and to build credibility and legitimacy with the Afghan people." [40]

The funds are mainly channelled through the Afghanistan Reconstruction Trust Fund (ARTF) administered by the World Bank.

THE AFGHANISTAN RECONSTRUCTION TRUST FUND (ARTF)

34. The Afghanistan Reconstruction Trust Fund was established as a means of providing support to an inexperienced government in an insecure environment. In order to ensure full accountability the World Bank reimburses the Government of Afghanistan for approved expenditure and all the accounts are audited by an external agency, Pricewaterhouse Coopers. Currently 27 donors contribute to the Fund and DFID is the largest single contributor. The ARTF has two strands: a "recurrent window" to support the operating costs of the Afghan Government (predominantly public sector wages) and an "investment window" to fund development programmes.

35. A number of NGOs have expressed concerns about the large percentage of DFID funds which go through the ARTF and the consequent implications of this for NGO funds. For example Oxfam writes:

"A number of donors, including the UK's Department for International Development (DFID), provide significant funds through the Afghan Reconstruction Trust Fund (ARTF), which provides a predictable and accountable source of funds for recurrent government expenditure. However, it is regrettable that DFID has very substantially reduced its funding for Afghan and international NGOs, who play an important role in grassroots capacity building, rural development and support for delivery of essential services."[41]

36. The allocation of DFID funds is based on the assumption that the state must be built-up and enabled so that it can carry out the normal functions of the state including development and reconstruction. In his statement to Parliament the Prime Minister commented that the UK Government believed that channelling aid through the Afghan government was "the best route to achieving sustainable progress and the best value for money."[42] DFID told us that:

"We are very conscious of NGO concerns about this. We made a conscious decision to try to shift the way we did business to give the Government authority over it, but when we look at the way government does business a lot of the money put through it is then delivered by NGO programmes. The health sector is a good example. The Ministry of Health subcontracts NGOs to deliver programmes. So they still have a big role to play. Obviously, there are things that NGOs do which are beyond service delivery, and we need to ensure the capacity of advocacy NGOs is still being built up to hold government to account."[43]

Building a robust civil society capable of holding the government to account is crucial in newly-formed democracies and NGOs are often best placed to facilitate this important task. In Afghanistan it is particularly important that NGOs promoting women's rights are also funded.[44]

37. DFID went on to clarify that if NGOs could deliver services in more insecure areas it would be appropriate to use them in these areas:

"As the security situation improves in some places but not others there is a constant question in our mind as to how to deliver services in the less secure areas. One must also take account of where the NGOs are able to deliver. If NGOs are to help to deliver services in the more difficult places where the Government's national programmes find it hard to operate we should think hard about helping them. If the NGO proposals for delivering services are in places where the Government's programmes can start to reach, then there is much more of a case for the delivery of those services to be provided or subcontracted by government."[45]

However we were told that many NGOs have stopped programmes in insecure provinces because of security concerns. ActionAid reported that "field activities have been severely hampered due to increased acts of violence and threats to staff; as a result of this volatile environment programme costs have significantly increased."[46] Moreover NGOs may be reluctant to receive government funding directly because it affects their perceived neutrality.[47] We were told that only four NGOs are operational in Helmand Province. We will examine in chapter 8 the difficulties for non-military actors attempting to deliver development in provinces where security is poor.

38. We agree that DFID's objectives should be to help build and support a viable sovereign state in Afghanistan and that the majority of DFID funds should therefore continue to be directed through the Government of Afghanistan. The priority for donors should be the "Afghanisation of development"—building up Afghan capacity at all levels for successful development and reconstruction. However DFID must also continue to ensure that funding is available for NGOs in their key advocacy tasks including helping to establish a robust civil society capable of holding the government to account. DFID should also ensure that NGOs promoting women's rights are adequately funded.

Improving economic management

39. Another key element of DFID's assistance to the Government of Afghanistan is in improving economic management. While economic growth has been steady, the Government is heavily dependent on foreign aid to meet its recurrent costs. The Government of Afghanistan currently raises only 6% of its revenue through taxation.[48] DFID is working with the Ministry of Finance to increase tax revenue and manage it more effectively.

40. On our visit we saw the beneficial impact of economic growth, especially in Kabul and Mazar-e-Sharif. The International Monetary Fund (IMF) has forecast 12% economic growth this year.[49] The IMF has also established a set of targets for the Government to support economic reform, including increasing revenue mobilisation. We were told that the Government of Afghanistan was working towards these targets. We encourage the Government of Afghanistan to continue to work towards International Monetary Fund revenue mobilisation targets as a means to ensuring that its future funding base is secure. We believe that DFID's assistance in this respect is vital to progress.

The distribution of DFID funds

41. Approximately 20% of DFID funds is allocated directly to Helmand Province to support the wider UK effort there. DFID told us:

"We support development in Helmand both through our rural livelihoods programme and through HMG's Quick Impact Projects, designed to deliver immediate benefits to local communities. DFID spent around £16 million in Helmand in 2006-07, and we have committed to spend up to £20 million this year."[50]

The Helmand Agricultural and Rural Development Programme supported the construction of four roads, 554 wells, and 482 community projects.[51] The programme also provides access to micro-credit to promote non-opium livelihoods.[52]

42. Concerns have been expressed that the geographical focus of UK aid is based on military imperatives. For example BAAG suggests that:

"DFID should consolidate gains already made in areas that are stable, for example Balkh and Jowsjan. The British focus on Helmand may lead to a situation where gains made in stable provinces cannot be consolidated. BAAG members have been encouraged to suggest projects in Helmand and Kabul areas but find it difficult to identify and maintain funding for projects in equally poverty-stricken areas."[53]

Similarly the Institute for State Effectiveness writes that:

"Countries which have greater troop presence are being placed under increased pressure to allocate development funding in line with political and military-protection strategies using the civilian arms of PRTs as "development" agencies. An exaggeration of this funding strategy will have long term consequences for both donor harmonisation as well as equity of funding across different provinces. Numerous examples already exist from north eastern provinces where claims are being made that insecure provinces in the south are benefiting through increasing aid, as compared to the relatively stable north where the perception is of reductions in aid funding." [54]

43. In fact most DFID funding for Helmand is channelled through Government of Afghanistan programmes and not the Provincial Reconstruction Team. The recent increase in stabilisation assistance for Helmand is evidence that the Government considers Helmand to be a UK priority. These funds will be channelled through the Stabilisation Aid Fund (see paragraph 31).

44. We do not consider that the UK Government's development programme is unduly slanted towards Helmand at present. 80% of DFID's funding is channelled through the Government of Afghanistan. The UK effort in Afghanistan is thus a "whole of Afghanistan" one. Misunderstandings about this need to be countered in Afghanistan, and in the UK, by improved media strategies.

45. Given the UK leadership of the Provincial Reconstruction Team in Helmand it is important that sufficient resources are available to ensure that stabilisation and development follow military action speedily. This need not be solely the responsibility of the UK since other donors are present there. DFID should also try to ensure that gains made in more secure provinces are not lost for lack of funds and should coordinate with other donors more effectively in this regard.

46. During our visit we were told that in Afghanistan 'everything is a priority' because 'everything is broken'. As a country emerging from conflict the establishment of security and the rule of law is important for the survival of the state. At the same time people's unmet needs in terms of employment and access to basic services threatens to undermine their faith in the newly created state. Simultaneously tackling security and development is a large part of the challenge of working in environments such as Afghanistan. Yet Afghanistan is a large country with many regional variations which means that priorities and needs vary across the country. In the following chapters we examine the major issues which we think need to be addressed by the international effort in Afghanistan.

28 International Development Committee, First Report of Session 2006-07, Department for International Development Departmental Report 2006, HC 71, paras 20-24. Back

29 Ev 53 [DFID] Back

30 DFID, Why we need to work more effectively in fragile states, January 2005. Back

31 Defence Committee, Thirteenth Report of Session 2006-07, UK Operations in Afghanistan, HC 408, paras 112-116. Back

32 HC Deb, Col 303-307, 12 December 2007 Back

33 Q 179 [DFID] Back

34 Q 179 [DFID] Back

35 Ev 53 [DFID] Back

36 HC Deb, Col 303-307, 12 December 2007 Back

37 Q 130 [DFID] Back

38 Q 140 [DFID] Back

39 Q 5 [DFID] Back