Impact
of aid
52. The impact of development assistance is greatly
reduced without effective coordination.[60]
The Institute for State Effectiveness writes that:
"One of the challenges regarding aid and development
in Afghanistan is proliferation of projects, funding channels,
and mal-coordinated bilateral initiatives. This itself generates
a coordination problem. In 2002, the UN agencies and NGOs prepared
a large appeal based on hundreds of atomised projects, which failed
to deliver a real dividend to the population. Rather, the Afghan
population resent enormously the perceived lack of effectiveness,
appropriateness and accountability in these projects."[61]
Similarly ActionAid told us that:
"There is insufficient direction and support
provided by the UN and JCMB, both of which are substantially under-resourced,
and too little coordination between donors and the government
of Afghanistan. Of all technical assistance to Afghanistan, which
accounts for a quarter of all aid to the country, only one-tenth
is coordinated among donors or with the government. Nor is there
sufficient collaboration on project work, which inevitably leads
to duplication or incoherence of activities by different donors."
[62]
53. Coalition member states have also been criticised
for failing to ensure that military, humanitarian, stabilisation
and reconstruction efforts are sufficiently coordinated.[63]
The importance of this aspect of coordination—joining up
different sectors—was made evident to us in Helmand. We
visited a newly built maternity teaching unit at a local hospital.
The unit had been built with UK funds in July 2007. Unfortunately
the building was not being used as there had been delays in organising
the delivery and funding of the training. DFID reports that these
problems have now been dealt with and they expect the training
programme, funded by the World Bank, to start in the next few
months.[64] We
look forward to receiving confirmation of the start of the maternity
training programme in the unit built with UK funds in Lashkar
Gah.
54. The deficit in harmonisation between donor approaches
is problematic and incompatible with commitments made in the Paris
Declaration. It means that the Government of Afghanistan has to
respond to the different priorities and objectives of different
donors.
55. In addition to problems with harmonisation there
is insufficient focus on ensuring that donor programmes are aligned
with those of the Government of Afghanistan. Indicator 3 of the
Paris Declaration seeks to increase the percentage of donor assistance
which is reported on the national budget. The Afghanistan Compact
commits donors to channelling an increased percentage of their
aid through Government channels, either directly to the budget
or through trust fund mechanisms. Where this is not possible the
Compact asks that donors use national rather than international
partners to implement projects, increase their procurement within
Afghanistan and use Afghan goods and services.[65]
56. The Institute for State Effectiveness (ISE) points
out that DFID together with Norway, Canada, the Netherlands, the
EC and the World Bank have been exemplary in supporting Government
of Afghanistan initiatives including the interim-Afghanistan National
Development Strategy. According to the ISE other donors led by
the UN have pushed for an alternative approach and as a result
projects rather than national programmes have proliferated.[66]
57. Of a total of $4.3 billion in donor expenditure
for 2007 $1.9 billion was channelled through the core budget,
of which $500 million went to the Afghanistan Reconstruction Trust
Fund, and $2.4 billion was provided off-budget.[67]
As discussed in the previous chapter the UK Government puts 80%
of its funding through government channels of which a significant
portion, £70 million in 2007, goes to the ARTF.[68]
The USA, the largest donor, will put only 3% of its aid budget
into the ARTF in 2007-08.[69]
This means that although such assistance may be aligned with objectives
set out in the Afghanistan National Development Strategy, it has
a much lower impact on the local economy. The Secretary of State
assured us that the US did seek to align its programmes with Government
of Afghanistan priorities but DFID was continuing to press the
US to put more funds through Government of Afghanistan channels
and was hopeful of change in this regard.[70]
58. The funding of disparate projects also means
that the Government of Afghanistan does not actually know what
funds are coming into the country. DFID told us that there was
quite a serious issue about how much control the Government of
Afghanistan has over donor funding.[71]
ActionAid writes that, "a lot of aid money coming to the
country is going through external budget. Not all donors are reporting
their contributions to the Ministry of Finance thus making it
difficult to know the exact amount of money coming into the country."[72]
59. A recent report by the Peace Dividend Trust
Fund points out that funds have a much greater impact when resources
are provided directly to the government compared with funds provided
to NGOs or international companies to carry out projects because
in the latter case donors often use foreign contractors and supplies
rather than Afghan ones. We
note that, according to the Peace Dividend Trust, out of a total
of US$1.36 billion spent between March 2005 and March 2006 from
major donors the local impact was around 31% or the equivalent
of $424 million.[73]
Data provided by the
Peace Dividend Trust for 2005 also suggests that, although US
Official Development Assistance was six times as large as UK ODA,
its local impact was only twice as much.[74]
60. The military have the benefit of military doctrines
which have been developed on an international basis over many
years within NATO. There is no parallel body of agreed principles—or
"doctrine"—for civilian post-war reconstruction
and development. PRTs work in different ways in different parts
of Afghanistan. Some have budgets of tens of millions of dollars—others
hardly any resources of their own. Some donors, like the UK, put
the majority of their assistance through the Afghan government,
while others, like the USA, do not. The need for development assistance
in post-conflict and insecure environments, which require a military
presence to impose security, is not going to go away. Development
agencies need to come to international agreements among themselves
about what constitutes good practice for post-war reconstruction
and development in fragile states, especially when they are working
in partnership with the military. The development community needs
a body of agreed principles every bit as much as the military.
61. During our visit we discussed with the World
Bank its procedures for monitoring expenditure under the ARTF.
In addition we were given the results of an independent review
of the Fund carried out in 2005. The review found that the ARTF
structure and procedures were functional and in line with best
practice in post-conflict settings. The Fund is also in accordance
with the Paris Declaration's "good partnership principles"
on ownership, alignment, harmonisation and mutual accountability
for donor funding. Moreover it has allowed the Government of
Afghanistan to provide key public services across the country.[75]
62. DFID told us that it is helping to improve donor
coordination by encouraging donors to help the Government develop
a comprehensive Afghanistan National Development Strategy (ANDS)
and by working towards the development of a joint donor strategy
process which aligns donor support to the ANDS.[76]
As lead donor for coordination this is an important role but we
were told that some donors continue to pursue pet projects.
63. The international
community committed themselves to the Afghanistan Compact under
which they have agreed to provide an increased proportion of their
assistance through the core government budget. While DFID is exemplary
in this respect, other donors are not. This means that the Government
of Afghanistan does not "own" the development and reconstruction
process and that the local impact of donor assistance is greatly
reduced. DFID's efforts at improving donor coordination in this
regard are commendable but the results are currently unsatisfactory.
The Afghanistan Reconstruction Trust Fund has been shown to be
effective. The use of parallel structures to deliver assistance
by the US does nothing to build up Afghan capacity, and will therefore
lengthen the time-period for which aid is necessary. Such policies
are also contrary to Paris Declaration principles and commitments
made under the Afghanistan Compact. We believe DFID should make
renewed efforts to encourage the US and other donors to channel
a greater proportion of their funding through the Afghanistan
Reconstruction Trust Fund.
64. When we visited the government hospital in Lashkar
Gah we learnt that it provided a child immunisation service in
both government and insurgent controlled areas. It treated patients
from the insurgent controlled countryside as well as government
controlled towns. When it trained staff, community midwives for
example, some went to work in insurgent controlled areas. There
are good humanitarian reasons to provide health services to all,
and it doubtless helps the battle for hearts and minds in insurgent
controlled areas for health services to be seen to be available
from the Afghan government. It is difficult to imagine health
services provided by a western government being tolerated in an
insurgent controlled area. This underlines the value, wherever
possible, of channelling development aid through the Afghan government.
Health was the only government provided service in Helmand which
we saw reaching out to insurgent held areas. We
urge the UK to use its leadership role in the Provincial Reconstruction
Team to encourage donors to provide more resources to Afghan government
health services in Helmand.
A high level UN coordinator
65. In its recent report on Afghanistan the Defence
Committee called on the Government to press the UN to appoint
a high-profile individual responsible for coordinating the international
effort.[77] The idea
of a joint UN, EU and NATO coordinator has been discussed. In
his statement to Parliament the Prime Minister confirmed that
such an envoy would be in place by February 2008.[78]
66. Recent press reports state that plans to create
the role of UN super-envoy to coordinate the international effort
in Afghanistan have been abandoned. Instead there will be a replacement
for the existing role of UN Special Representative.[79]
The Secretary of State confirmed to us that discussions were ongoing
but he was optimistic that the EU, UN and NATO would better align
their work in the future.[80]
There was strong speculation that Lord Ashdown would be appointed
as the next UN Special Representative. However he has withdrawn
from the process because he felt that he did not have the full
support of the President of Afghanistan. The Secretary of State
told us that the UK had been unyielding in its support for increased
donor coordination which an effective UN representative could
bring and that the identification of a suitable candidate was
therefore urgent.[81]
67. We are disappointed
that sufficient international momentum could not be gained for
the appointment of a high level joint UN, NATO, EU coordinator
for Afghanistan. Criticisms by the Afghan Government of the UK
and the international community's efforts seem to be becoming
more frequent. Problems of donor coordination are leading to a
proliferation of disparate projects, low local impact of funding
and creating a poor impression in Afghanistan about donors' lack
of agreement. We believe such outcomes are harmful to the international
effort in Afghanistan and may set back progress in reconstruction.
If the international community will not agree the appointment
of a super-envoy, ways must be found to ensure that the role of
UN Special Representative is properly resourced and that the incumbent
has sufficient weight in dealing with partner countries. We hope
that the Government of Afghanistan can recognise the long-term
benefits for them of the UN appointing a strong representative
to improve coordination.
55 OECD Development Cooperation Directorate, The
Paris Declaration on aid effectiveness, www.oecd.org Back
56
Ev 52 [DFID] Back
57
Ev 52 [DFID] Back
58
Peace Dividend Trust, Afghanistan Compact Procurement Monitoring
Project, April 2007,p vi. Back
59
DFID, Afghanistan Development Facts. Back
60
James Manor (ed)"A framework for assessing programme and
project aid in low-income countries under stress" in Aid
that works: successful development in fragile states, World
Bank, 2007,p 43. Back
61
Ev 108 [Institute for State Effectiveness] Back
62
Ev 116 [Oxfam] Back
63
T. Noetzel and S. Scheipers, Coalition Warfare in Afghanistan:
burden sharing or disunity? Chatham House, October 2007. Back
64
Ev 61 [DFID] Back
65
The Afghanistan Compact, Annex II, www.unama-afg.org Back
66
Ev 108 [Institute for State Effectiveness] Back
67
Ev 61 [DFID] Back
68
Ev 54 [DFID] Back
69
USAID, US Assistance Briefing 2007-08. Back
70
Q 137 [DFID] Back
71
Q 8 [DFID] Back
72
Ev 63 [ActionAid] Back
73
Peace Dividend Trust, Afghanistan Compact Procurement Monitoring
Project, April 2007, p vi. Back
74
Excluding contributions to the UN for which there are no calculations
of local impact. Back
75
Scanteam, Assessment: ARTF: final report, Oslo 2005. Back
76
Ev 51 [DFID] Back
77
Defence Committee, Thirteenth Report of Session 2006-07, UK
Operations in Afghanistan, HC 408 para 30. Back
78
HC Deb, Col 303-307, 12 December 2007 Back
79
Daily Telegraph, 7 January 2008 Back
80
Q 126 [DFID] Back
81
Oral Evidence from the Secretary of State for International Development,
31 January 2008 (on Iraq), Qs 52-53 Back
