THE AFGHAN NATIONAL POLICE (ANP)
88. The International Security Assistance Force (ISAF)
told us that the Afghan National Police were still five to six
years away from being an effective force which has the trust of
the Afghan people. The intention is to have a force of about 82,000
and currently there are 50,000.[106]
Many people told us that the police were corrupt and that top
positions could be bought in strategic areas. The Head of the
Afghan Drug Inter-Departmental Unit, Mr Holland, told us that,
"particularly in the south one sees real anxieties
about the way the police behave. The police are perceived to be
part of the problem as well as the solution […] Until people
have confidence in the police they will not be able to fulfil
their role." [107]
Corruption was partly attributed to low pay. In addition
drug use amongst the police was reportedly extensive. One obstacle
to rooting out corruption is the lack of political will within
the Government of Afghanistan. The Ministry of Interior is, according
to the Afghanistan Research and Evaluation Unit (AREU) report,
"corrupt, factionalised and criminalised". Without reform
of the Ministry of Interior, donor contributions to police reform
are likely to be wasted.[108]
89. A key problem is the lack of police trainers.
While military duty requires and anticipates service overseas,
it is difficult to release senior police officers from their jobs
to train police officers in other countries. We were told that
"the quality [of Afghan police officers] varies but there
are consistent problems in terms of both levels of training received
and capability. That is particularly true in the most insecure
areas in the south."[109]
The majority of training is carried out by a US company, DynCorp,
which has about 500 police trainers and mentors in Afghanistan.
Mr Holland told us that the US has recently carried out a review
of its training programme:
"It recognises that more needs to be done. Essentially,
it is looking at it on a district-by-district basis, taking the
police out of the districts for some intensive training over a
two-month period to sort out the problems and then putting them
back into the community and mentoring them intensively over the
next few months to ensure much better quality." [110]
90. According to an Afghanistan Research and Evaluation
Unit paper there is a fundamental difference between the "German
vision" of the police as a civilian law and order force and
the "US vision" of the police as a security force with
a major counter-insurgency role. The Secretary of State agreed
that these two visions need to be reconciled and consensus reached
on how to meet the policing needs in Afghanistan.[111]
91. Progress
in creating an effective and legitimate Afghan National Police
force has been slow. Corruption and bribery are rife and this
is hampering acceptance of the police as a force for good. There
are insufficient police trainers and there is no clear consensus
about what type of police force—paramilitary or civilian—is
required. We believe that the issue of remit must be clarified
as quickly as possible.
The EU Police Mission in Afghanistan (EUPOL)
92. From 2002 to 2007 the Germans were responsible
for coordinating international support for the Afghan National
Police (ANP) as the lead donor in this sector. In 2007 Germany's
lead role was subsumed within a newly established EU Police Mission
in Afghanistan (EUPOL). The intention is for the mission to be
fully operational by March 2008 and to comprise 190 EU police
officers but there are concerns about the slow start-up pace of
the EU mission, again mainly due to the difficulty in finding
sufficient police trainers and mentors. The Secretary of State
told us there were also problems with procurement of security
equipment and a lack of effective leadership. He said that the
UK was determined, while respectful of others' roles, to have
a key role in EUPOL looking forward.[112]
Women police officers
93. AREU also points out that not enough has been
done to ensure that there are sufficient female police officers.
Of the 63,000[113]
police being paid salaries in 2006 only 180 were women.[114]
This is especially important in Afghanistan where women and men
are often segregated and it is culturally inappropriate for a
male police officer to interrogate or search a woman. Provision
of more female police would help to ensure that domestic crime
against women does not go unrecorded and that women are not imprisoned
unlawfully. According to AREU:
"most women would be reluctant to go to an all-male
police station to seek assistance or protection, or to file a
criminal case—especially if their problems relate to sensitive
topics such as rape, domestic violence or forced marriage."
[115]
The Ministry of the Interior has facilitated a US
initiative to create a women's police force. This is a step in
the right direction. The German government had previously built
a women's only dormitory for training purposes but was unable
to fill it because women are either not permitted or are unwilling
to join the police force.
94. We believe
that the new EU Police Mission in Afghanistan (EUPOL) is a step
in the right direction in that it makes policing a shared EU responsibility.
However we are disappointed that progress has been so slow. This
mission should ensure that the recruitment, training and retention
of female police officers is given appropriate priority within
the overall imperative of building an efficient and effective
police force.
Community defence initiatives
95. In his statement to Parliament the Prime Minister
suggested that one way forward for policing was to "increase
our support for community defence initiatives where local volunteers
are recruited to defend homes and families."[116]
In response to our questions about this initiative the Secretary
of State said that the Government would not be paying for arms
for this force. He said it was simply a small-scale pilot project
which would seek to use existing community leaders in a more organised
fashion, based on a traditional form of self-defence, Arbakai,
to help maintain security.[117]
Reports suggest that the US general in charge of training the
Afghan police has expressed reservations about the project which
risks arming local militias.[118]
Efforts since 2006 to create an auxiliary police force in Afghanistan
have been problematic.[119]
96. We have
reservations about the suggestion of arming local communities
to defend themselves. While we accept that there are many people
who already have weapons, we believe that it is important that
donors do not encourage or exacerbate factionalism and tribalism.
The justice sector
97. Reform of the justice sector has also been slow.
A reformed justice sector would be less vulnerable to corruption
and more capable of tackling corruption in other sectors. Afghanaid
told us there is a definite lack of faith in the justice system
and this is reflected in the latest human rights report on Afghanistan
by UNDP.[120] In Afghanistan
we were told by ISAF that creating rule of law and a functioning
justice system would take time. There were only 1,500 prosecutors,
many of whom were not properly educated and their pay was so low
that they were often open to bribery. Christian Aid and other
NGOs have expressed concerns about the balance in donor funding
between the police and army and the justice sector:
"A proper balance also needs to be found between
spending in these sectors [army and police] and other, currently
under-funded areas, such as the justice sector and agriculture.
An example of the existing problems in the criminal justice system
was illustrated by a recent survey undertaken by a Christian Aid
partner on the issue of domestic violence in western Afghanistan.
In only 10% of cases of
chronic domestic violence had women sought help from the police
and the courts." [121]
98. Particular concerns have also been raised about
the ability of the justice sector to defend the rights of women
and children, who make up the majority of the population, despite
the fact that Afghanistan has signed a number of international
covenants committing it to the equal treatment of women. For example
BAAG writes that:
"Despite much progress in the area of human
rights, such as the establishment of the Afghan Independent Human
Rights Committee (AIHRC), evidence shows that the situation for
women and girls in Afghanistan, in terms of their access to justice,
continues to remain extremely limited." [122]
According to AREU:
"The majority of women in Afghanistan's prisons
are incarcerated for allegedly having committed "moral crimes",
such as prostitution, adultery, or simply running away from their
homes or husbands. According to one report, 56 percent of the
women in Kabul prisons in 2005 were detained for "moral crimes".
Running away is not codified as an offence in the formal justice
system, yet according to one study, 20 of the 80 women in Kabul's
Pul-i-Charkhi prison were accused or convicted of running away
from home, with prison terms ranging from 6 months to 14 years
imprisonment. It is very often the girls and women who run away
to escape domestic violence or forced marriages that are prosecuted,
while the perpetrators of violence escape prosecution."
[123]
Similarly the NGO Gender Action for Peace and Security
reports:
"there is little access to justice for women
in Afghanistan, they are poorly represented within the police
and formal justice sector institutions, they have little representation
in the informal or traditional dispute resolution mechanisms and
the Ministry of Women's Affairs operates at a low capacity and
with minimal influence on government policy." [124]
99. The lack of a functioning state justice sector
means that Afghans are resorting to traditional justice mechanisms.
The Secretary of State confirmed that 80% of justice was still
delivered through informal systems.[125]
This is problematic for women as aspects of traditional law discriminate
against women and children. The President of Afghanistan told
us that there was a need for a national approach to justice rather
than the current dual system. While some progress had been made,
for example in the creation of a supreme court and a high court
as well as district courts, a fully functioning state justice
system would take years to establish. We discussed the issue with
the Secretary of State who felt that this was an issue which had
to be worked out with the Government of Afghanistan and could
not be imposed by donors.[126]
The UK Government has contributed £2 million to reform
of the justice sector.[127]
100. Violence
against women is still pervasive and without a functioning formal
justice sector threatens to set back progress made thus far in
the realisation of women's rights. A key part of protecting women's
rights is ensuring they have proper access to justice. Funding
for the justice sector is disproportionately low and we believe
its reform should now be a priority for donors and for the Government
of Afghanistan. We recommend that the UK Government play its part
in this through increased funding for the justice sector from
the Stabilisation Aid Fund. We accept that changing the values
of society is a long-term process; however, we reiterate that
the Government of Afghanistan should seek to honour its commitments
to international human rights law in respect of women. Consideration
should also be given to inviting Islamic countries to advise
the Government of Afghanistan on establishing a justice system
that would meet the needs of women, children and minorities and
protect their fundamental human rights.
82 Ev 63 [ActionAid] Back
83
Ev 124 [Oxfam] Back
84
"Can the war in Afghanistan be won?" bbc.co.uk/news,
17 June 2007. Back
85
"At least 50 dead as bomber hits MPs' school visit,"
The Independent, 7 November 2007; Survivors recall Baghlan bomb
horror", Error! Bookmark not defined. Back
86
"Taliban attack luxury Kabul Hotel" bbc.co.uk/news,
15 January 2008 Back
87
Q 124 [DFID] Back
88
"Warning shots turn into lethal new development as violence
drifts north," The Guardian, 7 November 2007. Back
89
"The Taliban can lose every battle-yet still win the war",
The Daily Telegraph, 12 December 2007; "Britain's Afghan
mission is a fruitless and failing pursuit," The Guardian,
12 December 2007. Back
90
HC Deb, Col 303-307, 12 December 2007. Back
91
Lord Malloch-Brown "Taliban no longer a credible threat,"
Letter to The Independent, 29 November 2007. Back
92
Ev 96 [Christian Aid] Back
93
Q 20 [DFID] Back
94
UN Department of Safety and Security, Afghanistan Accessibility
Maps; UNDSS, Half-year Review of the Security Situation in
Afghanistan, 13 August 2007. Back
95
Q 126 [DFID] Back
96
David Kilcullen, "Three pillars of counterinsurgency,"
remarks delivered at the US Government Counterinsurgency Conference,
28 September 2006. Back
97
"Aid map reveals expansion of no-go zones", The Times,
5 December 2007. Back
98
Noetzel and Scheipers, Coalition warfare in Afghanistan, p
1. Back
99
Ev 126 [Oxfam] Back
100
Q 180 [DFID] Back
101
www.nato.int Back
102
Noetzel and Scheipers, Coalition warfare in Afghanistan,
p 3. Back
103
Defence Committee, Thirteenth Report of Session 2006-07, UK
operations in Afghanistan, HC 408, para 45. Back
104
Ev 97 [ActionAid] Back
105
"Brigadier strides into battle against Taliban", The
Times, 17 December 2007. Back
106
Q 24 [DFID] Back
107
Q 26 [Mr Holland] Back
108
Andrew Wilder, Cops or Robbers? The Struggle to Reform the
ANP, AREU, July 2007. Back
109
Q 24 [Mr Holland] Back
110
Q 24 [Mr Holland] Back
111
Q 166 [DFID] Back
112
Q 165 [DFID] Back
113
The exact number of police in Afghanistan is not known. It is
likely that salary payments are based on the number of authorised
police positions rather that the actual number of police, which
DFID told us was 50,000. Back
114
Andrew Wilder, Cops or Robbers? p 9. Back
115
Ibid Back
116
HC Deb, Col 303-307, 12 December 2007. Back
117
Q 175 [DFID]. Arbakai is limited mainly to the south-east of Afghanistan. Back
118
US attacks UK plan to arm Afghan militias, The Independent,
14 January 2008. Back
119
Andrew Wilder, Cops or Robbers? p 15. Back
120
Q 102 [Afghanaid] Back
121
Ev 97 [Christian Aid] Back
122
Ev 83 [BAAG] Back
123
Andrew Wilder, Cops or Robbers? p 10. Back
124
Ev 103 [GAPS] Back
125
Q 170 [DFID] Back
126
Q 171 [DFID] Back
127
Q 168 [DFID] Back
