Select Committee on International Development Fourth Report


5  Governance and sub-national governance

101. The creation of an effective state is one of the three objectives of DFID's programme in Afghanistan.[128] To this end DFID has directed 80% of its funds through the Government of Afghanistan because it argues that, "this helps the Government to develop the capacity to deliver basic services; to manage public finances effectively; and to build credibility and legitimacy with the Afghan people. It is also more cost effective."[129]

102. The main financing instrument used by DFID is the Afghan Reconstruction Trust Fund. As discussed in chapter 2 this includes a "recurrent window" and an "investment window". While the former is mainly used for public sector salaries, the latter is used for a number of Government of Afghanistan National Priority Programmes. These include the National Solidarity Programme which supports the Community Development Councils (see section on sub-national governance below).

103. When we were in Afghanistan, DFID told us that since 2001 international attention has focused on developing a strong central state on the assumption that it would then extend its influence and legitimacy throughout the rest of the country. This has not happened and the lack of service delivery and accountability at the sub-national level has created a vacuum which if not addressed will undermine the Government's ability to assert its authority across Afghanistan.

Sub-national governance

104. For administrative purposes Afghanistan is divided into 34 provinces which provide the top layer of sub-national governance and administration. Below the province are the district level, the municipal level and the village level.

105. Evidence from Oxfam states that the reach of the central government has not extended into many rural areas and that for many people in these areas the quality of life has not improved significantly. According to Oxfam, "the development process has not sufficiently benefited the majority of the population who live in rural areas, where essential services, such as water or electricity, remain scarce or insufficient."[130] Oxfam also suggests that:

"urgent action is required to promote comprehensive rural development, where progress has been slow, through building local government to deliver essential services, reforming sub-national governance, and channelling more resources directly to communities."[131]

For example:

"Line ministries are over-centralised and dominate resource allocation, management and planning from Kabul. Provincial line departments have limited autonomy and are subject to interventions by Governors' Offices which creates operational problems and deters the de-concentration of resources. In villages and districts government is either non-existent or weak and ineffective having limited capabilities and profoundly inadequate human and financial resources. There has been very little donor or government activity to build institutional capacity at district and provincial level, and no such efforts with national coverage." [132]

106. In June 2007 the World Bank published a report on sub-national governance which outlined a number of problems with the existing structure.[133] These included systemic contradictions between the responsibilities of Provincial Line Ministries and the powers of the Provincial Governor to intervene in a way which "blurs and undermines accountability and creates significant operational difficulties."[134] This issue was raised with us, and the ramifications of it became apparent, on our visit to Helmand Province.

107. The report also highlighted that the current system was unresponsive to local requirements and produced inequitable outcomes and that Municipal Councils faced a problem of legitimacy because they were unelected. Community Development Councils on the other hand did enjoy legitimacy but their funding base, and indeed their future existence, was uncertain. In addition low capacity, shortages of equipment, and the lack of infrastructure, characteristics unexceptional in post-conflict states, exacerbated structural problems.

THE INDEPENDENT DIRECTORATE FOR LOCAL GOVERNANCE

108. The Government of Afghanistan's response to the World Bank report was to create an Independent Directorate of Local Governance (IDLG) reporting directly to the President and with supervisory responsibility at the provincial level. The IDLG was launched in September 2007.

109. On our visit we met with the head of the IDLG, Minister Jelani Popal, who explained to us his strategic plans. The goals for the Directorate include establishing and strengthening institutions at the sub-national level which are open, transparent and accountable and which ensure people's participation; to eliminate discrimination against women and promote their involvement in leadership; and the fight against corruption in the public sector.[135]

110. In addition the IDLG has proposed a range of launch activities which are designed to demonstrate the Government's capacity in security and service delivery at the sub-national level. These include the setting up of community defence initiatives discussed in the previous chapter.[136]

111. In his statement to Parliament the Prime Minister announced UK support for two new programmes in support of local governance from existing funds. The first of these will include building up the capacity of the Independent Directorate of Local Governance.[137] DFID will provide £1.5 million to the IDLG in 2007-08. [138]

112. The Government of Afghanistan has recognised the need to address sub-national governance and to make the existing system work better. To this end the Independent Directorate for Local Governance has been established and has set out for itself an ambitious programme. We believe that clarification of the role of provincial governors and the establishment of local tax-raising powers should be a priority. We welcome the allocation of £1.5 million of DFID funding to support the work of the IDLG.

Community Development Councils

113. Unfortunately the IDLG strategic framework does not discuss the future of Community Development Councils (CDCs) and the National Solidarity Programme (NSP). Instead government involvement in CDCs has been through the Ministry of Rural Rehabilitation and Development. ActionAid expressed their disappointment that soon after the creation of the IDLG an opportunity to engage with CDCs was missed when the Minister did not attend a meeting to discuss their future:

"Three hundred delegates are sitting there to discuss and make recommendations on how CDCs should function. Everybody—donors and civil society organisations—is there, but we learned that the independent commission on local governance was reluctant to participate, thinking that that would give legitimacy to the recommendations that came out of it and that might not fulfil its expectations. Their participation in organising the national consultation process was also missing. It has been driven very much by the Ministry of Rural Rehabilitation and Development."[139]

114. The National Solidarity programme (NSP) was set up to strengthen local participation in decision-making about development. Through the NSP, Community Development Councils have been established in all 34 provinces. These are representative decision- making bodies but they are not formally recognised in the constitution. The NSP provides grants to the CDCs for projects decided upon by the Councils in collaboration with UN Habitat and 23 local NGOs.[140] ActionAid's evidence describes how CDCs work with NGOs:

"ActionAid has been facilitating implementation of the NSP since 2004, and last year its contract budget was US$1.4 million. Currently ActionAid works in 298 communities establishing community development councils, facilitating the elaboration of Village Development Plans, supporting the communities in problem prioritisation and developing sub-project proposals. The communities then submit these proposals to the government for approval and NGOs facilitate the implementation of these projects." [141]

115. On our visit we met with members of CDCs in Balkh province and Kabul. We also saw examples of projects which CDCs had chosen to fund, often in collaboration with other CDCs. These included water projects and schools as well as community centres for hosting village shuras (councils). Oxfam told us that:

"The National Solidarity Programme (NSP) has succeeded in channelling resources directly to elected Community Development Councils (CDCs) representing over 25,000 villages, over 70% of Afghanistan's communities. Through the Programme NGO assistance is provided for community-directed development projects, for example water supply or school construction, and there have been several positive assessments of the Programme in terms of project implementation, governance and stabilisation." [142]

116. The fact that Community Development Councils are present in every province and over 25,000 villages is a significant achievement. In rural areas in particular CDCs provide a vehicle for small community-led development projects which strengthen local communities and help to provide important infrastructure and local services which might not otherwise exist. In chapter 7 we discuss the importance of rural development as part of the counter-narcotics effort.

117. Community Development Councils have not been without problems. NGOs have complained that their funding has been erratic and that there have been long delays between decisions about which projects to fund and the dispersal of funds.[143] Afghanaid told us about some of the difficulties it was experiencing:

"What we are disappointed and worried about is the fact that NSP funding as such for the whole programme is always unpredictable. As we speak today, there is an anticipation of a shortfall of something like $200 million in March next year. There are constant cash flow problems. For example, between April and September of this year Afghanaid has been paying staff out of its own reserves. There was a six-month delay in receiving the payment for the work."[144]

118. In the creation of the CDCs much emphasis has been placed on ensuring fair representation, especially of women and other marginalised groups. Afghanaid writes that "the National Solidarity Programme requires the establishment of Community Development Councils with equal participation of women, it also requires that female CDC members plan, implement and manage at least 1 sub-project proposed under NSP."[145] We witnessed for ourselves the positive impact of women's involvement in CDCs. But the future of CDCs in sub-national governance structures remains undecided. ActionAid told us that:

"There is no coherence at government level which makes things quite ambiguous at village level where people are not clear whether CDCs will or will not stay. Their performance also varies depending on the quality of facilitation and the time NGOs can spend working with them. There is a definite recognition that they are an important institution. A lot of money has been invested and capacity developed in those institutions. One should not let go of CDCs; as a project of NSP they should be taken forward." [146]

119. Community Development Councils have created elected forums for inclusive community level decision-making. Communities have been empowered and linkages established between neighbourhoods. Funding from the National Solidarity Programme has enabled CDCs to identify needs and acquire funding for specific community priority projects which deliver basic services. Such developments are important for creating an active and engaged civil society. CDCs have also been effective in encouraging the proper involvement of women in local decision-making.

120. Concerns have been raised about the future of Community Development Councils as the future of their funding mechanism, the National Solidarity Programme, is itself uncertain. We consider that the tangible benefits of CDCs are significant. Decisions about future NSP funds need to be made before current funding expires. Community Development Councils have enabled valuable community level decision-making in a context where the rest of government is highly centralized. Given the limited reach of central government and the need for rural development as part of the counter-narcotics effort, we recommend that the UK Government actively encourage the continuation and formalisation of CDCs in the medium term recognising it will require a significant share of the limited funds under Government of Afghanistan control.


128   Ev 50 [DFID] Back

129   Ev 50 [DFID] Back

130   Ev 118 [Oxfam] Back

131   Ev 114 [Oxfam] Back

132   Ev 118 [Oxfam] Back

133   World Bank, Service Delivery and Governance at the sub-national level in Afghanistan, July 2007  Back

134   Ibid, p vii  Back

135   Independent Directorate of Local Governance, Strategic Framework, September 2007 Back

136   Independent Directorate of Local Governance, Communities Self-Defence Programme.  Back

137   HC Deb, Col 303-307, 12 December 2007 Back

138   Q 161 [DFID] Back

139   Q 107 [ActionAid]  Back

140   Ev 50 [DFID] Back

141   Ev 66 [ActionAid] Back

142   Ev 118 [Oxfam] Back

143   Ev 64, 68 [ActionAid; Afghanaid]  Back

144   Q 80 [Afghanaid] Back

145   Ev 67 [Afghanaid] Back

146   Q 106 [ActionAid] Back


 
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