House of Commons - International Development

Select Committee on International Development Fourth Report

6 Narcotics and counter-narcotics

121. In 2007 Afghanistan's net opium poppy cultivation increased to 193,000 hectares—an increase of 17% over 2006 according to the UN Office of Drugs and Crime.[147] The total area under cultivation as a percentage of agricultural land increased from 3.65% to 4.27%. Afghanistan as a whole now produces 93% of the world opium supply, up from 92% in 2006 (see Table 1). However regionally there are significant disparities in cultivation. There are now thirteen poppy-free provinces, in the north and the centre, up from six last year.[148] Decreases in these provinces are coupled with increases in others. Helmand Province alone is responsible for 50% of Afghanistan's cultivation according to the UNODC.[149]

Table 1: 2007 Annual Opium Poppy Survey in Afghanistan

2006
2007 % change 2006-07

Net opium poppy cultivation 165,000ha¹ 193,000ha +17%

As a percentage of agricultural land 3.65% 4.27%

Number of provinces affected 28 21

Number of poppy free provinces 6 13

Eradication 15,300ha 19,047ha +24%

Potential production of opium 6,100mt² 8,200mt +34%

As a percentage of global production 92% 93%

Number of persons involved in opium cultivation 2.9 million 3.3 million +14%

As a percentage of total population (23 million) 12.6% 14.3%

Source: United Nations Office on Drugs and Crime, Afghanistan Opium Survey 2007, Executive Summary, August 2007.

Key: ¹hectares^,² metric tons

122. These regional disparities reflect and are intricately linked to the level of security in the provinces. DFID told us that "opium production is heavily concentrated in areas of insecurity with Helmand now the world's biggest source of illicit drugs."[150] The link between opium production and insecurity means that until provinces such as Helmand become more secure, opium poppy production is unlikely to decrease significantly. The International Security Assistance Force (ISAF) in Afghanistan told us that the situation in terms of poppy production was unlikely to change dramatically in the next few years. New research funded by DFID and the World Bank on alternatives to opium poppy production also states that "there should be no illusions about the prospects for quick success against opium, particularly if conflict and insecurity continue in many parts of the country."[151]

123. The share of the economy represented by opium fluctuates depending on the price of opiates and the growth rates of the licit economy. The DFID-World Bank study estimates that the size of the drug sector relative to GDP decreased from 62% to 38% between 2002 and 2006 mainly due to growth in the licit economy.[152] In addition there is currently an oversupply of opium on the market which has caused prices to fall. However the study also comments that, despite its decreasing contribution to the overall economy, opium poppy production was contributing significantly to corruption:

"The sheer size and illicit nature of the opium economy mean that it infiltrates and seriously affects Afghanistan's economy, state, society, and politics. The opium economy is a massive source of corruption and gravely undermines the credibility of the government and its local representatives." [153]

124. Thus opium poppy cultivation is both a result of, and a causal factor in, insecurity and instability in Afghanistan. It was suggested to us that the narcotics industry was both condoned and controlled by elements in the establishment. Opium poppy production is causally linked to insecurity and corruption in Afghanistan. Suggestions of the involvement in narcotics of high-ranking officials are worrying. We believe greater effort on the part of the President and donors is essential to ensure that involvement in opium poppy production is stamped out at every level of government.

125. Opium poppy production flourishes in insecure areas because the market functions and indeed thrives in such conditions. Poppy traders often offer credit to poor farmers or purchase their crop in advance thus ensuring a reliable income. In addition traders may collect the crop directly from the farmers so that they do not have to pay the check-point and road-side bribes or face the insecurities of open and dangerous roads.[154] Poppy is thus a low-risk crop in a high-risk environment.[155] While other crops, such as mint or saffron, may offer greater returns per acre, the sustainability of such alternatives depends on replicating what drug traders are able to offer.

126. Poppy cultivation is the main source of income for about 14% of the population.[156] The DFID-World Bank study identifies four types of poppy farmers: the better-off farmers who have diversified livelihood strategies, often live near provincial and district centres and are not dependent on poppy for a decent living; the less affluent farmers who have limited access to markets, land and water but also some alternative sources of income; poor and highly dependent farmers with small landholdings, living in remote areas with very limited alternative income potential; and landless sharecroppers who hire out their labour and are very dependent on poppy cultivation.[157] The report argues that the first category is composed of opportunistic farmers who should be subject to counter-narcotics measures. The others should be the target of development interventions.

127. Opium poppy production is also a source of income for the Taliban although it is difficult to quantify this with any accuracy since those involved have strong incentives to conceal their income sources. In addition distinguishing between Taliban insurgents, drugs traffickers and others opposed to foreign presence is difficult. The UNODC thinks that in recent months the Taliban have become more reliant on the drug economy.[158] The ISAF Commander estimated that the Taliban relied on the opium economy for 20 to 40 per cent of their income. In evidence to us David Mansfield, an independent researcher and consultant, accepted that this was plausible but warned that the Taliban were unlikely to disappear even if Afghanistan became poppy-free since they had other sources of income.[159]

128. It is also important to recognise the growing problem local use of poppy is creating for the population. Children involved in the harvest, through their contact with the crop, develop an addiction. In addition, in the absence of readily available alternative medication, it is often used as an analgesic and even to tackle teething problems in babies.

Counter-narcotics policy

129. The goal of the Afghan National Drugs Control Strategy (ANDCS) is to secure a sustainable decrease in the cultivation, production, trafficking and consumption of illicit drugs with a view to complete elimination.[160]The Strategy identifies four priorities:

Targeting traffickers;
Strengthening and diversifying legal livelihoods;
Developing state institutions; and,
Reducing demand for illicit drugs.

David Mansfield commented that while all the policy objectives were sound and in line with good practice, there were questions about the sequencing and prioritising of goals and doubts about the ability of the line ministries of the Government of Afghanistan to implement the policy.[161]

130. The UK Government supports the ANDCS. Its Afghan Inter-Departmental Drugs Unit, and the British Embassy Drugs Team based in Kabul are responsible for coordinating UK support to the ANDCS which focuses on the first three of the Strategy's objectives.

DRUG TRAFFICKING

131. An effective counter-narcotics policy will need to tackle the traders of opium. Intercepting the opium trade (interdiction) in Afghanistan is made extremely difficult by porous borders. According to the Government of Afghanistan there are at least 167 unofficial border crossings between Afghanistan and its neighbours.[162] Oxfam told us that "there is extensive trafficking of opium and heroin across Afghanistan's northern and southern borders, including several thousand tonnes of precursor chemicals, required for refining opium, across the southern border every year."[163] A key part of any counter-narcotics policy is tackling the traders of opium. Controlling drug trafficking between Afghanistan and Pakistan in particular requires, as a necessary condition, greater knowledge of and control over the borderlands and assistance from the Government of Pakistan.

CROP ERADICATION

132. The main forms of intervention in the cultivation and production of opium poppy in Afghanistan have been crop eradication—often implemented after banning production— and the encouragement of alternative livelihoods. Crop eradication is seen by some as counter-productive, especially in insecure provinces, because it can alienate the very population you are trying to win over by removing their livelihood without offering anything in return.[164] Crop eradication can take place either by ground eradication or aerial spraying. The UK supports the Government of Afghanistan policy that aerial spraying of poppies should not be permitted. Aerial spraying has been suggested by the US as the most efficient way of eradicating poppy as land-based eradication is slow and often dangerous. However the Government of Afghanistan's view is that aerial spraying will simply push poor farmers into the hands of the Taliban and in addition is thought to be potentially harmful to water supplies and to other crops. We agree with the UK and Afghan Governments that aerial spraying of poppies is not desirable for health and safety reasons and because it risks increasing insecurity in already insecure provinces.

133. General McNeill, the ISAF commander, described some of the problems with eradication. If a farmer was told that 50% of his field was going to be destroyed, he would simply plant 50% more poppy. In addition it has been found that eradication in 2007 mainly destroyed marginal fields and that deals are often struck between the village elders and eradication teams which result in the poorest farmers being targeted.[165] More significantly, in some provinces where poppy production was banned and eradication was carried out, poppy cultivation has since returned and production increased.[166] The province of Nangahar, for example, which had previously seen a 96% decrease in poppy production in 2004-05 saw its area under production increase by 285% in 2006-07.[167] David Mansfield noted that some of those involved in opium poppy production in Nangahar had moved to Balkh province as casual labourers when the ban was enforced, thus shifting the problem elsewhere. Balkh province was declared poppy-free in 2006-07, but there are concerns that this reduction is not sustainable.[168]

134. Wide-scale eradication has not contributed to a sustainable reduction in poppy cultivation in many provinces. We believe that while eradication has a legitimate role, for example in targeting large landowners, an excessive focus on it and on reducing acreage under poppy cultivation has been at the expense of the creation of qualitative changes in rural livelihood opportunities.

Alternative livelihoods

135. The majority of farmers (98%) in a UNODC survey reported that they would be ready to stop poppy cultivation if access to alternative livelihoods was available.[169] There are many different approaches to alternative livelihoods in Afghanistan. Traditionally these have focused on discrete projects designed to replace the poppy with an alternative crop. The assumption has been that once this alternative crop was available, poppy production would cease. However such approaches fail to take account of the complexity of poppy production in Afghanistan.

136. David Mansfield explains that opium poppy cultivation plays a multifunctional role in rural Afghan households. Farmers rarely rely on poppy as their only crop but it is one which they may or may not plant depending on the price of other commodities, the availability of off-farm income or promises of development assistance.[170] Development agencies are rarely able to generate sufficient economic activity over a single growing season to prevent farmers from reverting to poppy production.

137. When we were in Afghanistan DFID told us that on-going research on economic incentives for alternative livelihoods found that offering subsidies to farmers was too expensive and not sustainable; access to markets was crucial; and focusing only on alternative crops was not sufficient—other non-farm alternatives such as taxi-driving, small businesses and agricultural processing, which all offered potentially higher incomes and greater security, were needed.

138. A different approach is emerging which seeks to mainstream counter-narcotics into broader development policy. This involves moving away from small local projects and adjusting the focus of development programmes so that they take account of the impact of interventions in different sectors on opium poppy production.[171] Thus alternative livelihoods would become a more integrated and holistic approach to rural livelihoods.[172]

139. The increase in opium poppy cultivation is directly linked to continuing insecurity in many parts of Afghanistan. Insecurity prevents the development of alternative and sustainable income sources. Poppy cultivation can be an attractive choice in a high-risk environment, especially for poor farmers. We believe that expectations that poppy cultivation will be reduced over a short period are misplaced. Given the heavy reliance on poppy cultivation for household income, any enforced dramatic reduction would have significant negative social, political and economic consequences. We welcome the shift in thinking towards a more holistic and integrated approach to alternatives. We commend the World Bank and DFID for their commitment to undertake research and reformulate policies based on evidence.

THE COUNTER-NARCOTICS TRUST FUND

140. As part of the effort to encourage alternative livelihoods the Counter-Narcotics Trust Fund (CNTF) was created alongside the ARTF. However it has been slow to disburse funding. In Afghanistan we were told that only $3.4 million had been spent out of a total of $82.9 million which had been pledged. The CNTF is managed by the Minister of Counter-Narcotics and a donor team led by the United Nations Development Programme. Strong criticism of the operation of the CNTF and the difficulties in trying to access funds was made by Afghanaid.[173] A review of the CNTF in September 2007 found that it was overly centralised and bureaucratic. Concerns were also expressed about the capacity of the relevant line ministries, especially the Ministry of Counter-Narcotics. The review found that, while capacity of ministries needed to be built up, the Fund also needed to devolve more decision-making to the provinces.[174] It also noted that there was a lack of clarity about what type of projects the CNTF should fund. There had been a focus on infrastructure including roads. At ISAF headquarters we were told that one of the unintended consequences of road-building initiatives had been to facilitate the narcotics trade. We are disappointed that the Counter-Narcotics Trust Fund has not been more successful in its efforts thus far. Given research findings on the need to include a counter-narcotics perspective in all development programmes, consideration should be given to whether a separate counter-narcotics fund is the appropriate mechanism for driving this forward.

147 UNODC, Afghanistan Opium Survey 2007, p iv. Back

148 Ev 57 [DFID] Back

149 UNODC, Afghanistan Opium Survey 2007 p iv. Back

150 Ev 50 [ DFID] Back

151 Ward, Mansfield, Oldham, Byrd, Afghanistan: Economic incentives and development initiatives to reduce opium production, 20 December 2007, p 1. Back

152 World Bank, Economic Incentives to reduce opium production in Afghanistan, Unpublished draft chapter. Back

153 World Bank, Afghanistan: Drug Industry and Counter-Narcotics policy, November 2006. Back

154 Ward, Mansfield, Oldham, Byrd, Afghanistan: Economic incentives and development initiatives to reduce opium production, 20 December 2007, p 3. Back

155 D. Mansfield, Evidence from the field: Understanding changing levels of opium poppy cultivation in Afghanistan, AREU, November 2007, p 2. Back

156 UNODC, Afghanistan Opium Survey 2007, p 10 Back

157 Ward, Mansfield, Oldham, Byrd, Afghanistan: Economic incentives and development initiatives to reduce opium production, 20 December 2007. Back

158 UNODC, Afghanistan Opium Survey 2007, p v. Back