House of Commons - International Development

Select Committee on International Development Written Evidence

Memorandum submitted by the British and Irish Agencies Afghanistan Group (BAAG)

EXECUTIVE SUMMARY

BAAG welcomes the International Development Committee's Inquiry at this critical stage to examine the UK government's development assistance in Afghanistan. We support and commend the UK government's commitment to Afghanistan and recognise that DFID is one of the largest donors of aid and that Afghanistan is DFID's fifth largest programme. This report presents an overview of perspectives from the ground and challenges faced by international NGOs and their local partners.

Since the last Inquiry by the International Development Committee, increasing insecurity has been the greatest concern for ordinary Afghans in many parts of the country. Over the past year levels of violence have been at their highest since 2001. There have been increased civilian casualties in the insecure areas in the South, and concerns have been raised by the Afghan and international human rights groups and the UN. As Afghan communities become increasingly disillusioned with the pace of change and the level of services they receive, the threat to the state building exercise currently undertaken by the Afghan government with the support of the international community is all too evident.

Decisions by key donors to channel the majority of funding through the UN and to the Afghan government through the Afghanistan Reconstruction Trust Fund (ARTF) have significantly reduced funding and restricted opportunities for innovation for non-governmental organisations (NGOs). DFID, in particular, has drastically reduced UK funding available for frontline services and livelihoods programmes delivered by NGOs.

While many development NGOs support the objectives of promoting effective and accountable authorities, they are concerned that current aid policies are imbalanced. Donor policy emphasises central "state-building" at the expense of providing basic services to populations in regions outside of the capacity of the government to deliver and of its political or geographic reach. This has led to what the Overseas Development Institute terms a "service gap": when relief assistance is phased out but state capacity is insufficient to ensure the provision of services.[6]

Aid agencies under the umbrella of BAAG and ACBAR have highlighted serious concern at the growing vulnerability of the development and humanitarian effort in Afghanistan as a result of deteriorating security, unmet aid pledges, lack of government capacity and a marked erosion of donor funding for front-line work (refer to section—Erosion of donor support for services delivered by NGOs). Specific concerns include the inadequate support for key sectors such as the development of Afghan civil society (refer to section Support to Civil Society), including support to women's rights' NGOs to enable women and girls to take an active role in the development and reconstruction of the country; unbalanced regional development plans (and concern that the geographic distribution of humanitarian and development assistance could be partly influenced by military imperatives.

The opium economy in Afghanistan is a deeply rooted and complex phenomenon, which requires a long-term and multi-faceted response. Short term and military led approaches to counter-narcotics are ineffective and non-sustainable. Emphasis should be placed on tackling the root causes of the opium trade and using local government structures and civil society in these efforts.

Support for returning refugees and internally displaced people (IDPs) needs to be maintained, including continued financial support for housing and shelter together with livelihoods programmes to enable their sustainable return (refer to section Refugees and IDPs).

British NGOs have raised their concerns with the British government, seeking a review of current aid policy, and outlined specific recommendations to DFID at the end of this report. NGOs offer decades of project delivery experience at grass roots level, and a history of relationships of trust with rural communities. In light of this we urge the Committee to urgently consider the recommendations contained in the last Section.

INTRODUCTION

1. BAAG welcomes the International Development Committee's inquiry into Afghanistan to examine the UK government's development assistance in Afghanistan at this critical juncture. The aim of this paper is to reflect BAAG members' views on the current situation with regard to aid policy and development in Afghanistan and present the Committee with specific recommendations from British NGOs and their partner organisations based in Afghanistan.

2. BAAG has been privileged to give written and verbal submissions to the International Development Committee on several occasions, (2001, 2002, 2003, 2005, 2006) and earlier this year. Although there is still a very long way to go there has undoubtedly been progress in Afghanistan since 2001 as a result of international assistance, especially in the sectors of health and education. Nonetheless it is striking how little some of our concerns, conclusions and recommendations have changed over the years. These include the need to address a deteriorating security situation, the need for long-term commitment from the international community, for funding to go through the Afghan Government but to be complemented by effective capacity development, and continuing support to NGOs during the transition to the time, when the Afghan Government can be entirely responsible for managing and implementing all reconstruction and development.

3. Increasing insecurity is the greatest concern for ordinary Afghans in many parts of the country. Over the past year levels of violence have been at their highest since 2001. There have been increased civilian casualties in the insecure areas in the South, and concerns have been raised by the Afghan and international human rights groups and the UN.

4. The Taliban and other illegal armed groups have exploited government weaknesses, challenging its legitimacy through intimidation and violence. The security risks for government civil servants outside the area of law enforcement, such as teachers and health workers, as well as aid agencies, appear to have increased significantly in 2006.[7] Suicide bomber attacks are on the rise in Kabul and in some areas of the north and east. From January to July 2006 over 100 violent attacks against schools, teachers or pupils were reported. These tactics are used both directly and indirectly against civilians, including children, rendering many areas in the southern and eastern parts of the country largely inaccessible to international NGO staff.

5. According to a BAAG member agency in Kandahar unofficial estimates indicate that more than 105,000 children may be denied access to education in the south alone as a result of school closures due to insecurity.[8] The data from a referral hospital in Kandahar province confirms the increasing trend in the number of children under the age of 15 years admitted to hospital due to "weapons-related wounds"; a total of 42 children were admitted between January and June 2006, with 19 children admitted in June alone.[9] Attacks against civilians and aid workers are on the increase, limiting agency operations and access to those most in need.

6. Aid agencies under the umbrella of BAAG and ACBAR have highlighted serious concern at the growing vulnerability of the development and humanitarian effort in Afghanistan as a result of deteriorating security, unmet aid pledges, lack of government capacity and a marked erosion of donor funding for front-line work. These disturbing trends have become more marked over the last year and NGOs working in Afghanistan have been raising the matter urgently with the international community. ACBAR,[10] submitted a briefing paper on these issues to the UN Security Council mission that visited Afghanistan in November 2006.[11] The British Overseas Agencies Group (BOAG), which brings together five leading British aid agencies, wrote in September to the British government making similar points and seeking a review of current aid policy.

7. In December 2006 and March 2007 BAAG undertook surveys to determine the extent to which front-line service delivery programmes are under threat. The findings show a marked decrease in funding support for a range of vital programmes, such as alternative and rural livelihoods, water and sanitation, employment generating schemes, TB control and child protection, traditionally delivered by NGOs. It also shows that in many provinces front line services for rural communities are being closed for want of donor support, affecting thousands of households.

8. A key concern of BAAG members is the reduction of funding available for NGOs to continue doing front line work in community development providing services essential for food security and sustainable livelihoods. These might include health education, vaccinations and preventive health care for livestock, promotion of kitchen gardens, food storage and preservation, as well as literacy and skills training for rural enterprises. While some of these services may be scheduled to be re-initiated through Government of Afghanistan programmes, there will be a considerable time gap before capacity to deliver these programmes is in place and in the meantime, numerous communities are left without any kind of rural skills training and extension services. These services are essential to food security and well-being in rural communities. Although current national priority programmes such as NSP reach a number of poor rural communities, none of them focus on livelihoods skills. Long-promised livelihoods assistance through the Counter Narcotics Trust Fund (CNTF) is completely stalled for NGOs, and some have already withdrawn their proposals from the CNTF after losing hope.

9. In the absence of viable alternatives some of the poorest communities will bear the brunt of the curtailment of programmes with serious consequences for security and stability. As Afghan communities become increasingly disillusioned with the pace of change and the level of services they receive, the danger to the state building exercise currently undertaken by the Afghan government with the support of the international community is evident. State building is a complicated and lengthy process and HMG are therefore to be commended for attempting to tackle some of the difficulties and to commit the UK to a long-term effort. The London Compact was a significant milestone. However it contains no benchmarks for donors and while the architecture of aid continues to grow there is too little to show for it in terms of improving the lives of the people and governance it aims to support. This is also now true at the sub-national level.[12]

AID VOLUME

10. Inadequate levels of aid: Afghanistan is receiving a considerably lower per capita ratio of aid than other post-conflict situation in recent times.[13] (ACBAR, 2006). Increasing donor fatigue has resulted in reduced resources for frontline livelihoods programmes and essential sectors, such as education and health, as this paper will demonstrate.

AID EFFECTIVENESS

11. Current donor aid policy for Afghanistan places significant emphasis on state-building; linked to wider political and military objectives of stabilisation and political transition. While many development NGOs support the objectives of promoting effective and accountable authorities, they are concerned that current aid policies are imbalanced. Donor policy emphasises central "state-building" at the expense of providing basic services to populations in regions outside of the capacity of government to deliver and of its political or geographic reach. This has led to what the Overseas Development Institute terms a "service gap": when relief assistance is phased out but state capacity is insufficient to ensure the provision of services.[14]

12. DFID, in particular, has drastically reduced UK funding available for frontline services or livelihoods programmes delivered by NGOs. This follows DFID's decision to place an overwhelming emphasis on channelling aid through state-centred mechanisms. This is also partly shaped by the broad trend in DFID aid policy in non-conflict contexts towards larger-scale disbursements channelled through direct budgetary support to recipient governments. Whilst the rationale for this allocation strategy is partly legitimate, we believe it is also driven by other imperatives, including the pressure to reduce DFID staff numbers and transaction costs.

Unbalanced state building

13. Most bilateral and multilateral donor funding is now channelled predominantly through the Government of Afghanistan for national priority programmes (NPP). These programmes were designed to "accelerate Afghanistan from a position of recovery and rehabilitation to that of sustainable development" (GOA 2004). While in general there have been some great achievements from these programmes,[15] they are not the complete solution.[16] And programmes to support agriculture and irrigation—core to livelihoods in Afghanistan—are often absent.[17] A "uni sectoral" approach cannot be expected to meet the multi development needs of a community; instead a broad based and multi sectoral effort is required over a number of years (ACBAR, 2006).

Government capacity to absorb the aid and process it efficiently

14. Midway through this financial year, the Government of Afghanistan has spent less than fifty percent of what it has been granted for the development budget. This is primarily due to (i) limited capacity in some ministries to turn plans into resourced programmes, (ii) delays in approval processes within and between ministries, and (iii) in some cases, delays amongst donors in giving money to the Afghan Government on time (ACBAR 2006). There are numerous examples of NGOs seriously affected by late payments, and for example, the role of the Community Development Councils (CDCs) is undermined by late delivery of block grants.

15. BAAG has consistently recommended that funding should be put through the Afghan Government (though allowing for some direct funding to NGOs to continue) and it was the expectation of the International Development Committee that if the UN and NGOs would be "each required to bid for allocations, the funding will then flow to whichever organisation has the capacity to deliver". Unfortunately some parts of the Government have lacked the capacity to manage this process. In the Ministries that have had the capacity, such as Health and Education, NGOs have willingly ceded implementation to them.

CONTRIBUTION OF BUDGET SUPPORT TO STRENGTHENING INSTITUTIONAL CAPACITY

Budget support through Trust Funds

16. Since 2002, increasing amounts of donor funding have been channelled through the Afghanistan Reconstruction and Trust Fund (ARTF). The purpose of the ARTF is to co-ordinate funding for reconstruction in line with agreed national priorities. To date, 85% of ARTF funds have been spent on the Afghan government's recurrent costs. Although Canada and the UK are the largest of the more than 25 donors to the fund, the US government, EU and Netherlands are also major contributors. A multi-donor review of the ARTF conducted in mid-2005 indicated that the ARTF "... responded well to the government of Afghanistan's top priority—a single, predictable, accountable source of untied funding for the recurrent budget."[18] Despite the success of the ARTF, almost 75% of funding is still provided "off-budget"—85% of that through the UN and private sector. Only 15% goes through NGOs and other channels.[19] Although all major donors still provide short-term emergency funding through NGOs, very few are willing to channel significant amounts of development funding directly to them. USAID and the EU are exceptions to this, with both supporting the contracting-out of health service delivery through NGOs.

17. Decisions by key donors to channel the majority of funding through the UN and to government through the Afghanistan Reconstruction Trust Fund (ARTF) have dramatically reduced and/or restricted funding opportunities for non-governmental organisations (NGOs). For BAAG members, managing the implications of a major change in strategic direction has also been particularly challenging for their programmes in Afghanistan.

18. National Priority Programmes are supported through the ARTF, but they have suffered from debilitating cash flow interruptions that negate the positive impact that programmes may be achieving. The National Solidarity Programme (NSP), for example, is an excellent vehicle for community driven investments in infrastructure to over 15,000 communities throughout rural Afghanistan, yet many of those communities had to wait many months[20] over several years to receive assistance which only served to confirm community level mistrust of the government and the international community. Some of that delay was related to inadequate donor pledges, but much of it was related to low capacity for financial forecasting and in the co-ordination of processing funding requests. (NGOs are taking the blame for this delay). In other words, there is not yet adequate institutional capacity within the Government of Afghanistan to ensure sufficient liquidity or consistent absorption of funds. Capacity building efforts through budget support in this way would therefore appear to be less than successful. While it is important to continue these capacity building efforts, service delivery in the meantime should not suffer and donors have a responsibility to find ways to prevent that happening.

19. There has been a general problem in getting funding through from the ministries, particularly for those programmes which are funded by the World Bank through the Afghan government. There are examples of member agencies having to borrow significant funds from their headquarters in order to prevent the suspension of NSP programmes. Specific examples include an invoice for USD 1.6 million submitted to the MRRD in mid December 2006 was released only in late August 2007. According to the ministry's procedure, the funding should have been released at the end of January 2007, six weeks after submission. The problem is partially due, according to the ministries, to delays in funding coming through from the World Bank. In this instance the member organisation was able to rely on internal financial resources. It should be noted that smaller organisations may not have this safety net.

20. Basic Package of Health Services The Ministry of Public Health (MOPH) has contracted out provision of basic health services, through a Basic Package of Health Services (BPHS) in all but three provinces to NGOs, with funding and technical assistance from donors. As a result, the number of functioning health facilities has increased by more than 60%. A health facility assessment, commissioned by the Ministry of Public Health, indicates a 25% improvement in overall quality of health services since 2004.

21. Nevertheless, outside this basic package, there are serious gaps and weaknesses that have yet to be addressed. On a recent assessment visit, a BAAG member agency identified a number of priority areas that need to be addressed. They are largely complementary to and expand upon the BPHS, yet funding for this is not available.

22. Some of the gaps highlighted include: inadequate funding for training and capacity building of health staff at community and district level; resultant lack of continuing education programme for health staff; inadequate funds for community level activities, community mobilisation and rights awareness raising (eg reproductive and sexual health rights, health rights and child rights); no funding for technical support and training in the management of malnutrition and in community based nutrition at district level; inadequate funding for adolescent friendly health services including HIV/AIDS awareness and addressing drug abuse. Overall, the lack of female service providers remains a key constraint for women and children to access care at all levels in the health system. While DFID's recent announcement to contribute to salaries of health staff is welcomed, the current level of support for the health system is considered inadequate and does not address the wide and far-reaching needs (see section on inadequate support for key sectors: health).

23. Unrealistic development transition plans: Support for the national programmes aimed at integrating community organisations into district, provincial and national development programming is short-term and lack adequate exit strategies. A lack of cohesion between donor programmes at the provincial and district level is limiting joint planning and co-ordination. Planning and consultations with CSOs/NGOs also remain minimal both at a sectoral and national "home country" level. Civil society service providers are often prematurely expected to deliver essential services, despite having both little capacity and few resources. Hastened exit strategies are the norm in Afghanistan with little consolidation of programme activities. This is a missed opportunity for Afghanistan to benefit from both technical and in-country expertise.

24. Current support by donors through NPPs thus does not meet wider "livelihoods" needs; it also does little to promote the growth of a strong civil society. As many front line projects close down for want of donor funding, the country is witnessing a loss of development potential and initiative in a number of provinces.

25. The Counter Narcotics Trust Fund (CNTF) has been extremely disappointing not only because its funding mechanism requires an unfeasible degree of co-ordination between ministries, but also because the funding mechanism was first unclear, then frequently changed over the course of the first year of operation. Although presented to NGOs as an important new source of funding for alternative livelihoods programmes following DFID's policy decision not to fund NGOs directly, it soon became clear that NGOs were effectively barred from accessing funding through the CNTF. That is because NGO proposals, after months of delay, were eventually judged to fall foul of a procurement requirement. NGOs were told their proposals would have to be publicly tendered and awarded to another agency (since the applicant NGO would not be allowed to bid on their own proposal). This requirement completely contradicts the way NGOs work since their proposals (unless responding to a specific tender) are built on a unique history of relationships with communities, and their project designs remain the NGOs' intellectual property and should not be tendered out. The poor design and governance of CNTF resulted in a near complete paralysis of project funding for alternative livelihoods through that vehicle,[21] tying up many millions of donor pledges in an extremely unproductive way.

26. With the failure of CNTF, no other national mechanism for processing unsolicited proposals for rural livelihoods from NGOs exists, thus depriving people in the rural areas of programmes that would improve their lives. Failure to provide any mechanism by which NGOs can propose good funding ideas will also result in a reduction of the innovative approaches for which NGOs are famous. This in turn means a dearth of pilot experiences on which the government can draw for scaling up.

Erosion of donor support for services delivered by NGOs

27. As funding expires for many essential services there is little support in the pipeline to continue to support rural livelihoods front line work. NGOs, as key development partners, with valuable sources of knowledge, have been and are a critical cost-effective resource for the international community and the Government of Afghanistan to meet both the gaps in service provision as well as to build up civil society. It would be a missed opportunity for Afghanistan to lose these key development partners, and a withdrawal of NGOs from the provinces warrants serious attention. A key indirect benefit of their work is the creation of an enabling environment for other actors. British NGOs remain particularly challenged due to little direct support from their national government.

28. Limited funds are now being disbursed directly to NGOs. With an increase in national programming and contracting in recent years (and decrease in direct grants), over 80% of NGO activities are currently tied to government programmes. This funding shift to predominantly government contracts has jeopardised the continuation of some key basic services not covered under the remit of the current government programmes. The lack of flexibility arising from this change has also reduced the ability of NGOs to develop innovative programmes together with Afghan communities. It is also worth mentioning that, since some NGOs have become so closely associated with predominantly government programmes (and have little independence), they are now considered to be representatives of the Afghan government and therefore are targeted by the insurgency.[22]

29. With such a large percentage of donor money distributed through the NPPs through competitive tenders more suited for large for-profit firms, NGOs that participate as implementing partners end up having their roles reduced to being government sub-contractors, which endangers their independence, neutrality and opportunity for innovation, particularly in community and civil society development. It is recognised that while the involvement of NGOs in the provision of national services is politically sensitive, "NGOs are and will remain a key feature of the service delivery framework in Afghanistan and the (Afghan) government has publicly stated its continued commitment to working with NGOs".[23]

30. The UK emphasis on channelling aid through the Afghan Government is placing the programmes and, in some cases, the ongoing survival of NGOs at risk. UK NGOs, including smaller, Afghanistan-focused NGOs such as Afghanaid, can offer distinct comparative advantages, in terms of their institutional memory and long-term good relations with local communities. These comparative advantages, if lost due to cuts in UK funding to NGOs, will be hard to recover in future.

31. Many international NGOs operate directly and through local partners. In order to do this effectively, there needs to be a certain level of funding assurance that is needs based. In order to ensure that the impact of NGO's programmes are fully realised, long term funding is needed, as are predictability and funding assurances.

The geographical balance in the distribution of funding, especially between the north and the south

32. NGOs are concerned that the geographic distribution of humanitarian and development assistance is, in part, influenced by military imperatives. While increased donor attention on the PRT provinces is partly inevitable, this should not be at the expense of resources for other provinces. Indeed, while it proves difficult to spend assistance in the southern provinces because of the prevailing insecurity, programmes in other parts of the country are currently under-funded. One provincial governor in central Afghanistan recently remarked that local populations in that province might need to initiate violence and increase poppy cultivation in order to attract the necessary funds for reconstruction.

33. DFID should consolidate gains already made in areas that are stable (eg. Balkh, Jowsjan etc). The British focus on Helmand may lead to a situation where gains made in stable provinces cannot be consolidated. BAAG members have been encouraged to suggest projects in Helmand and Kabul areas but find it difficult to identify and maintain funding for projects in equally poverty-stricken areas.

34. An analysis into the transition period between crisis response and state-building, [24]of contexts where state capacity is weak and stability is not achieved, warns, "the quality of transition strategies and how the withdrawal of the assistance provided during the crisis response is managed may prove significant factors in determining how the state functions subsequently. The ineffective management of transition risks jeopardising the achievements of the initial crisis response, to the detriment of longer-term stability, security and livelihoods."

INADEQUATE SUPPORT FOR KEY SECTORS

Alternative livelihoods

35. DFID has three main program areas (1) building state institutions, (2) improving economic management and aid effectiveness, and (3) improving the livelihoods of local people. Yet most of DFID's investment in rural livelihoods is actually targeted towards "enabling" environments such as improved local governance, finance, and infrastructure implemented under national priority programmes. Meanwhile, support for the backbone of the rural economy (agriculture) is covered in a very piecemeal and inadequate fashion because the Ministry of Agriculture, Irrigation and Livestock (MAIL) currently has very little capacity to provide the outreach and extension needed. As a percentage of DFID's portfolio, support to agriculture features hardly at all. That is regrettable, since support in that sector (and related off-farm enterprise development) is essential for helping rural communities meet basic needs, and thus become more stable and less prone to succumb to illicit activities. Sufficient support for a range of social protection and safety net measures is also necessary to alleviate wide-spread food insecurity that is still very prevalent, particularly in more remote and inaccessible areas.

36. Yet even if DFID were to significantly increase funding in these vital areas that target the most needy and vulnerable tomorrow, there would be no way to effectively channel it on the scale needed under current DFID policies of routing most aid through government programmes. Current government programmes do not yet have capacity for outreach and effective rural livelihoods targeting required in rural areas, and this capacity will take years to build. In the meantime, unmet reconstruction and development expectations on the part of Afghan rural populations are further destabilising the country.

37. DFID should concentrate more on sustainable livelihoods programmes as an alternative to a counter-narcotics focus. The aim of addressing poverty and welfare is often overlooked in fragile states as donors focus on "state-building" and NGOs on service delivery. All partners need to take an overview on what poverty looks like, how the economy does/not function and how to create pro-poor growth.

Education

38. Although it is claimed that 6 million children are now in school[25] and under 14s making up 44.6%[26] of a total population of approximately 32 million people, it is clear that there is still a lot of work to do. This was acknowledged in April by Afghanistan's Education Minister Haneef Atmar[27] who highlighted that whilst, "... the return of five million Afghan children to school is one of the major success stories of post-conflict reconstruction in the country ... ... However, at best it represents 50-55% of our school-age children." The number of teachers has increased from 21,000 to 143,000, 28% of those are women. The number of schools has increased to 8,400. Of these, 5,000 schools lack adequate buildings. An estimate 73,000 classrooms need to be constructed; in addition, 80% of teachers were untrained. [28]

39. DFID's recent announcement[29] of £55 million to help pay the salaries of teachers, doctors and nurses is welcomed. Enormous challenges remain: almost 75% of Afghans over the age of 15 are illiterate and for women and girls in rural areas the figure rises to 92%.[30] Girls are unable to access quality education because of cultural beliefs that prevent them once they reach puberty from attending school together with boys, or in some cases from moving outside of the home at all.[31] In addition, there are not enough schools or trained teachers. Children, therefore, have to attend school in shifts: girls in the morning and boys in the afternoon. In some schools almost twice as many teachers are needed as girls can only be taught by women or mature and trustworthy men. This system reduces the amount of quality attention students can receive from their teachers.

40. Despite evidence of need, a BAAG member agency that would like to expand their work in this area, has had to close projects over the past year due to funding gaps.

Health

41. According to the 2004 UNDP Human Development Index, Afghanistan is ranked 173 out of 178 countries listed. Life expectancy is only 47 years with 600 children under five dying every day and 25% of all children dying before their fifth birthday. The maternal mortality rate is the second highest in the world, only Sierra Leone's is higher. For every 100,000 women who go into labour in Afghanistan, about 1,900 die.[32] According to UNICEF, one in nine women in Afghanistan will die during or shortly after pregnancy.[33] Fewer than 10% of women in rural areas give birth in a health facility. Of those children who do survive, 54% are stunted and 40% are underweight.

42. There has been some progress. Infant mortality rates (the number of children who die before one year) in Afghanistan declined from an estimated 165 per 1,000 live births in 2001 to about 135 per 1,000 in 2006, according to preliminary findings of Johns Hopkins University (JHU) household survey. This means that 40,000 fewer infants are dying each year compared to during Taliban rule.

Refugees and IDPs

43. The Afghanistan Compact benchmark 7.5 highlights the need for the right conditions for returning Afghans.[34] Specific needs that are crucial for a sustainable return strategy include housing, access to safe drinking water, education, health facilities and employment opportunities.

44. The recent forced deportations of Afghans from Iran and announcements to close camps in Pakistan highlights the precarious situation facing refugees and IDPs. [35]Over a three week period in April-May 2007 some 96,000 Afghans were expelled from Iran. Afghanistan remains a fragile environment, and lacks the infrastructure and local governance structures to support the needs of its own population, it is therefore unable to cope with a sudden arrival of a large number of people over a short space of time. In addition there is concern that this type of situation will create further displacements internally, mainly in the insecure areas of Afghanistan. Returnees will face additional suffering from the ongoing conflict in the southern and south western parts of the country.

45. Shelter assistance is one of the most significant needs for returning refugees. Currently UNHCR with the Ministry of Refugees and Repatriation administers land allocation sites (LAS) to returnees. This initiative is at the pilot stage so far; it takes around six months to allocate land, therefore some kind of interim solution is often needed but none provided.

46. Many returnee Afghans in the rural areas are not being supported to rebuild their lives and hence see no benefit from the new Afghanistan. This does nothing to win the "hearts and minds" of the people which is critical if the war against the Taliban is to be won. Continued financial support for housing is highlighted, as is support for livelihoods programmes for returnees in terms of their sustainable return.

Support to Civil Society

47. Civil society development is severely under-funded. At a time when human rights abuses and corruption are widespread and the democratic process still young, donors need to deliberately support NGOs/CSOs in the development of civil society to allow space for voices from civil society and the growth of independent associations / organisations. The OECD Principles for good international engagement in fragile states and situations refer to the key role of civil society in demanding good governance and in service delivery in the wider context of state-building and peace-building.

48. Donor delegation of responsibility and authority for programme management to the UN and Afghan government, and the resultant lack of direct contact with NGOs and communities they work with, makes it more difficult for donors to get feedback on civil society issues and perspectives. This can result in donors becoming out of touch with realities on the ground and pockets of exclusion developing as a result. In fragile states such as Afghanistan, where lack of infrastructure and continuing conflict have exacerbated social fragmentation, it is crucially important that donors support civil society development. There are very few credible secular grassroots organisations in Afghanistan and those that do exist need to be supported and nurtured if a more pluralistic civil society is to develop in the country. In the absence of predictable funding and capacity-building support, these institutions are likely to wither and die. Donors should heed the OECD Principles for engagement in fragile states, which require them to "...mix and sequence their aid instruments according to context, and avoid blue-print approaches".[36]

49. From the recent BAAG survey on NGO funding (March 2007), a significant finding includes the lack of donor support for Afghan local organisations for the development of civil society. This in turn curtails some of the innovative work done by NGOs and the potential for successful projects to be replicated in other provinces. A quote from one of the respondents reflects this view: "We think that donors are doing very little to support an independent civil society in Afghanistan by channelling all their money in to private and public sectors and missing the third important piece, civil society."

50. There is specific concern about the lack of government support to national women's rights' NGOs. Local women's rights' NGOs play a crucial role in reforming laws relating to women's rights and violence against women; in providing support services and building the skills of Afghan women and girls; and in enabling women and girls to find the civil space and skills to take a real active role in the development and reconstruction of the country.

51. The provisions to mainstream gender equity within the various sectors of the Government of Afghanistan's national policy frameworks, including the ANDS (Afghanistan National Development Strategy), the Afghanistan Compact and the NAPWA (National Action Plan for Women) are to be welcomed. However, it is crucial that the political will and resources are both provided to ensure such policies are implemented across each and every government department. For example, there is still no gender unit within the Afghan Ministry of Finance and no budget allocated specifically for women or women's projects.

52. DFID's Gender Equality Action Plan outlines ways to improve gender mainstreaming across its programmes. Section C4[37] "DFID should support civil society to support voice and accountability for gender equality and women's empowerment". However, there is little evidence that DFID have acted on these commitments either through policy or provision of resources through NGOs or the Afghan Government.

53. Despite much progress in the area of human rights, such as the establishment of the Afghan Independent Human Rights Committee (AIHRC), evidence shows that the situation for women and girls in Afghanistan, in terms of their access to justice, continues to remain extremely limited. In July 2007 for the Rome Conference on the Rule of Law the BAAG/ENNA statement outlines recommendations for the international community to ensure women and girls' human rights are protected and prioritised under the Rule of Law in Afghanistan.

Unbalanced Regional Development Plans

54. Inconsistent regional development: Uneven distribution of aid across predominantly opium poppy intensive or highly insecure areas in Afghanistan has intensified the impression that the existing donor aid policy is tightly linked to strategic objectives of the major donor countries. International focus on the South and East is creating the impression that the international community is ignoring the needs of other provinces which are often teetering on the edge, frustrating both the local government and communities alike (ACBAR, 2006). CSOs have been harnessed to donor objectives and progressively assumed the role of government sub-contractors. This has restricted the capacity of civil society to capture emerging aspirations in the context of local struggles for peace, development and wellbeing.

Civilian "space", NGO aid programmes and civil-military relations

55. BAAG submitted written evidence to the Defence Committee in March 2007 and raised issues concerning civil military relations and aid policy. A key recommendation from the BAAG submission to the Defence Committee is for the UK government to commission independent research on the contribution of integrated civil-military operations, such as PRTs, to improved governance in Afghanistan. This recommendation has been given added weight by the finding in the World Bank report Service Delivery and Governance at the Sub-National level, July 2007 that "PRTs confront—in fact they constitute—a critical dilemma: in trying to create the space for the Afghan state to develop and cohere they run the risk of undermining it ... PRTs should really only exist where security conditions make them absolutely necessary and the ESC[38] should begin to phase them out."

56. 89 aid workers have been killed since 2003, as compared to a very small number who were targeted during the preceding 14 years. The few agencies continuing to operate in the south and east either benefit from long-established programmes in specific locations, which enable them to negotiate a degree of protection from local communities, or they opt to take considerable risks. The Afghan NGO, Afghan Health and Development Services, has had a significant number of its staff killed in its efforts to provide health services to the camps for internally displaced people to the west of Kandahar.

Military Implemented reconstruction and development projects

57. Problematic development projects implemented by the military: There are reports of poor quality outcomes of development projects implemented by the military. This is due to the lack of experienced oversight and questions raised over cost effectiveness/sustainability. Military actors are not trained in development and their approaches are often undertaken with little community ownership or capacity to support community maintenance over time. These interventions can also significantly damage the reputation of genuine aid agencies operating on the basis of community trust and acceptance; it can also threaten their neutrality.

58. Private military companies (PMC), often in consortia with other private sector actors, are looking to increase their involvement in aid programmes in Afghanistan. In the words of one industry representative, the PMC sector wants "to raid the humanitarian space in Afghanistan". This is of concern to NGOs in terms of the principles and practice of aid. PMC involvement in the delivery of aid programmes, indeed any armed provision of assistance, is based on security provided through armed deterrence, rather than acceptance. As such, it undermines the basis for humanitarian access negotiated through the humanitarian principles of independence, impartiality and neutrality. In view of this, NGOs would dispute that PMCs present an effective strategy for reconstruction in Afghanistan. PMCs' activities in training of the police and auxiliary forces are also of concern and it is unclear if they meet the most basic UN standards for police training, particularly in firearms handling. Moreover, their mandates are unclear and their accountability is questionable.

Tensions between the development and security agendas

59. NGOs can only operate in insecure provinces on the basis of neutrality, independence and good relations with local communities. Across much of Afghanistan, associations, whether real or perceived, with a contested military operation and central government compromise our legitimacy and acceptance among local populations.

60. The operational experience of BAAG member agencies in Afghanistan suggests that the military approach to CIMIC has often proved ineffective, or even counter-productive, in terms of both military and civilian objectives. Instead of facilitating military-implemented or funded QIPs, civil-military relations capacities should rather focus on promoting effective co-ordination between the military and the full spectrum of civilian actors, emphasising their different roles and mandates.

UK civil-military relations strategies in Helmand

61. The UK Government should consider undertaking an independent evaluation of the contribution of integrated civil-military operations, such as PRTs, to improved governance in Afghanistan. International forces, including PRTs, have an inevitably political character and so must relate to local powerholders as well as operate in accordance with their mandate, which emphasises strengthening central government authority across the country. Several PRTs have sought to facilitate linkages between central and provincial-level governance in Afghanistan. Different NATO PRTs contain a varied mix of civilian expertise to provide support on these political and diplomatic aspects, while PRT Commanders assume a political representative role at the provincial and local levels. NATO has also played a role in establishing the Afghan-led "Policy Action Group" (PAG) initiative to support co-ordination on reconstruction and security at central and provincial levels. The constraints, challenges and efficacy of different approaches to this aspect of civil-military relations have only just begun to be evaluated, for instance by the Norwegian Government in Faryab province.

62. Although the ISAF southern Afghanistan strategy since 2006 resembles—in intent—a more joined-up and civilian-led approach than exercised in past years, concerns have been raised regarding continued military dominance of decision-making processes. This can be compounded by variables in military culture—so that paratroopers are more likely to emphasise military preeminence than line infantry, for example. Reconstruction requires civilian leadership and capacity to provide the necessary context understanding; political analysis and engagement with local power-holders and communities. Notwithstanding the political acumen of certain individuals within the military, the military intrinsically lacks these capacities and qualities. Indeed both their capabilities and their strategic, operational and tactical imperatives militate against effectively navigating and affecting change in local politics. For example, a significant component of the military CIMIC support capability consists of technical experts, for example engineers, who analyse local needs and promote QIP strategies reflecting that technical worldview. Yet, as experience in both Afghanistan and Iraq demonstrates, building wells or pumps in particular locations because local power-holders identify that as the priority does not equate to an effective political or reconstruction strategy.

63. While to date there has been no thorough evaluation of the developmental value of UK PRT aid projects, a joint-donor evaluation report of assistance given by five European countries to Afghanistan since 2001, which included the UK, stated that these projects "could have been delivered more cheaply and efficiently by other aid providers" and that "time pressure for delivery during short assignments promotes a "just do it" approach with limited concern for long-term impacts and sustainability."[39] BAAG is conducting research into these issues and hopes to be able to report preliminary findings to the International Development Committee during the course of the Inquiry.

COUNTER-NARCOTICS

Sustainability and effectiveness of counter-narcotics and alternative livelihoods policies:

64. Reviews of counter-narcotics literature and analysis of economic factors driving poppy production indicate that success will be primarily linked to overall improvements in governance, security and reconstruction/development progress rather than through a separate counter-narcotics initiative working in isolation. An alternative livelihoods objective should be mainstreamed into general rural development efforts which in turn should receive adequate and consistent financial support over a multi-year period. The literature also indicates that it is "land poor" rural inhabitants and those living in remote areas with little access to markets that are the most dependent on cultivating poppy. Although DFID counts rural livelihoods as a component of its counter narcotics effort, actual investment in that area other than through the dysfunctional CNTF is low and not targeted towards the neediest groups.

65. Short-term and military-led approaches to counter-narcotics are ineffective. Emphasis should be placed on tackling root causes of the opium trade, and local and civilian leadership of these efforts.

66. The international community is increasingly concerned by Afghanistan's opium economy, which has evident implications for security and stability. Some parliamentarians, the media and other commentators in donor countries push for a "quick fix" to poppy cultivation. However, a short-term approach to counter-narcotics would be ineffective and counter-productive. Our operational experience, that of local partners and the communities we work with, suggest that an effective strategy must involve holistic and properly sequenced assistance to tackle problems of security, governance and development: "One cannot speak of creating legal livelihoods until there is a legal and legitimate context within they can function."[40]

67. The premise that farmers can be strong-armed into abandoning opium cultivation is flawed. Eradication and cultivation-bans alienate the very communities we need to work with. For example, in Thailand, after early failed experiments in eradication, the Thai Government waited until more than a decade of development efforts had produced sufficient economic alternatives before resuming eradication.[41] Recent experience in Afghanistan suggests that eradication merely displaces production to new regions. Furthermore, in some regions, such eradication programmes have been used to target political opponents or economic competitors; thereby contributing to weak and corrupt governance.[42] This contributes to local-level conflict and further erodes support for counter-narcotics efforts and the Government of Afghanistan. Eradication should only be implemented when the state is capable, trust in communities has been built, and poor people have access to economically-attractive, legal livelihoods.

68. The opium economy in Afghanistan is a deeply rooted and complex phenomenon, which requires a long-term and multi-faceted response. Critical factors include inequitable and exploitative patterns of land tenure, share-cropping arrangements, and credit/debt systems. Many small farmers simply have no viable alternatives; their access to land, credit and livelihoods depends on participating in poppy cultivation. The first measure of success for programmes dedicated to fostering alternatives to opium poppy cultivation must be the quality of life of poor farmers and their families.

The role of NGOs in the new environment

69. Latest figures from ANSO[43] (August 2007) demonstrate a clear escalation of the use of kidnap tactics. Country-wide, between January-July 2007 an estimated 195-210 persons have been abducted in 45 incidents, including Afghan and international civilians, ANP or Government of Afghanistan workers. There is a heightened threat of suicide attacks within Kabul, heightened abduction threat for ransom and prisoner exchange purposes. The resultant restrictions on NGO staff movement is hindering the implementation of programmes. NGOs have had to improve their security arrangements, including additional investment in security measures, provision of security advisors for their staff, thereby increasing their operational costs. International staff are restricted in movement and access to project beneficiaries; similarly national staff, particularly women, are affected by safety concerns and therefore travel to remote areas is severely restricted. The ongoing ambient insecurity, together with changes in donor policy and issues of funding insecurity, means that it is difficult for NGOs to attract and retain staff. Member agencies report that the turnover rate for both expatriate and national staff is very high.

70. In insecure areas across Afghanistan, NGOs can only operate on the basis of neutrality, independence, low visibility and the acceptance of local communities. The notion of "humanitarian space" captures the moral, political and operational dimensions of our capacity to operate safely and effectively in such a chronically insecure situation. Ironically, the concept of "humanitarian space" provides a kind of correlate to the military concept of "campaign authority". It is every bit as apparently abstract and ideological, and yet every bit as real and important to the sustainability and legitimacy of operations on the ground. [44]

71. NGOs offer decades of project delivery experience at a grass roots level, including several British NGOs, and a history of relationships of trust with rural communities. A poll conducted by the Asia Foundation in 2006 confirmed that the Afghan people continue to trust NGOs more than government initiatives. This is in spite of a few Afghan politician blaming NGOs[45] for all reconstruction failures and the confusion around the true definition of NGO that arose during Taliban time when construction businesses were also registered as NGOs. But NGOs do not wish to work in isolation and most are fully engaged in partnerships with the government of Afghanistan since they are, after all, implementing most of the national priority programmes.

72. Many NGOs are excited by the facilitating role they are playing and can continue to play in building capacity of local governance, preparing community groups to represent their constituencies in district and eventually provincial level planning. Many NGOs are also designing innovative rural livelihoods initiatives that build on the governance foundation provided by Community Development Councils (CDCs) and other community-based groups.

73. The "added value" of NGOs should be emphasised, particularly with regard to DFID's stated commitment to gender mainstreaming, strengthening civil society and processes to support the development of local governance. NGOs play an important role in Afghanistan. Not only do they contribute with innovation and creativity in solving the challenges Afghanistan faces, they are also historically an important "backup" service provider when the government fails to provide basic services. Considering the unstable state that the country is still in, it is important that this capacity, which has been created over many years, is not lost.

74. For example, the National Solidarity Programme has established Community Development Councils (CDCs) in 34 provinces of the country, the local level participatory mechanism for NSP. The future of the CDCs is intertwined with the question of Afghanistan's future governance, and mechanisms for development at the local level. NGOs as Facilitating Partners (FPs) called for an informal review of the CDC Bylaw. The subsequent consultations highlighted some important failings in the current version of the Bylaw and looks at questions around the legal status of CDCs and institutional mechanisms of local government; and articulates the concerns of FPs and civil society actors. Concerns include the lack of a mechanism to ensure the participation of women in the decision-making process by requiring that the CDC is composed of an equal number of men and women. The role of NGOs in this context provides a vital link between ministries and consultation at the local level, in designing local governing structures, and the participation of donors in this process needs to be ensured. (The FPs are developing a position on the CDC Bylaw with practical recommendations and further information can be provided).

75. It should be recognised that NGO "coverage" includes some of the most remote areas in the country, including Farah, Badghis, and Faryab. Much of the community based work requires NGOs to have a flexible and pragmatic approach in the context of Afghanistan. BAAG members aim to develop and implement the work as much as possible in line with national plans and strategies. However, where the government has little presence or capacity, NGOs are able to identify gaps where communities can be supported in a way to promote links and synergies with government structures and authorities once the opportunity arises. The findings of the surveys carried out by BAAG on NGO funding gaps highlighted the need for flexibility and innovation in the Afghanistan context.

76. An international NGO with many years' experience in Afghanistan, has demonstrated that NGOs can play a key role in building government systems and capacity to deliver comprehensive, good-quality, public health services with the active involvement of service users in Afghanistan. A number of innovative approaches were used to improve quality and the participation of children and their communities, enabling them to better hold government to account. The approach taken and success achieved contradicts a common perception among donors that NGOs' service delivery programmes in fragile states operate parallel to, rather than in alignment with government systems. Another INGO reports on the positive experience working with the Government of Afghanistan particularly in relation to water and wells—a jointly managed national database is one of the key outputs in this regard.

77. The following example demonstrates how global institutional experience offered by INGOs can be adapted for the Afghanistan context. Although not conceived as a tool for fragility analysis, the Child Rights Situation Analysis (CRSA) and child rights programming tools have been useful in helping the BAAG member's programme to analyse and address violations of children's rights and the root causes of violations, while also emphasising the need to build the capacity of duty-bearers, such as the Afghan state, and civil society to respect, protect and fulfil these rights, including the development of legal and institutional frameworks. This rights-based approach has also enabled the INGO to identify more clearly the most vulnerable and marginalised groups for its programme work. The child rights programming approach has also enabled the programme to maintain a longer-term vision even in the absence of predictable longer-term funding. The global institutional knowledge of INGOs is a valuable resource from which Afghanistan can benefit.

78. Distance or "remote" management can be an effective strategy to ensure continuity of operations in a large country as Afghanistan where infrastructure is poor and insecurity prevails. However, care needs to be taken to guard against passing on security risks to national staff and partners in the process. Empowering and working through strong national teams and partners has enabled one NGO to reach more children in Kandahar and Uruzgan. The agency works closely with several national partners and local government departments, providing training in child rights, child protection and listening to and working with children. The national team understands local attitudes and sensitivities and is able to find appropriate ways to present difficult and potentially contentious concepts around child rights and protection to partners. National partners are able to negotiate access to locations that the INGO staff—both national and international—cannot reach.

CONCLUSIONS AND RECOMMENDATIONS

Recommendations to DFID regarding aid policy

79. The UK Government, and specifically DFID, should review and change course in its current aid policy for Afghanistan. An emphasis on state-centred aid modalities to deliver "state-building" has led to the emergence of a "service gap". Particular attention should be paid to the NGO capacity to provide basic services and livelihoods support for populations outside of the capacity and political or geographic reach of government to deliver. DFID should identify creative mechanisms to provide funding to NGOs for frontline services, such as support to consortia funding, use of "local funds" arrangements, joint programming and increased DFID staff capacity to manage NGO funding.

80. Decisions on aid allocations should be made according to levels of humanitarian need and the potential for sustainable reconstruction; and not driven by the geographic focus of military operations.

81. NGOs should be supported in their efforts to innovate through less rigid funding mechanisms. These mechanisms can still be co-ordinated by the government of Afghanistan, but a continued insistence that aid be channelled only through the government of Afghanistan does not seem responsible in the face of the overwhelming and immediate need for development throughout the country for which the government does not yet have capacity to respond. Failure to do so will result in under-utilisation of an important reconstruction resource which Afghanistan can ill afford.

82. There should be an Afghanistan-specific approach by donors which does not approach the country as a part of a group of "conflict" or "fragile" states.

83. NGOs welcome DFID's consultation with NGOs/CSOs on its funding policies. DFID should develop stronger partnerships with NGOs within new funding modalities to capitalise on NGO experience and knowledge, support scaling-up and replication of NGO successes and improve accountability to communities. UK-based charities need to be intimately involved in this approach and strategy formulation. NGOs are willing to continue this engagement and find ways to develop a constructive exchange on policy development. In line with the OECD Principles, "wherever possible, international actors should work jointly with national reformers in government and civil society to develop a shared analysis of challenges and priorities."

84. DFID needs to evaluate its strategy of redirecting funds via the Afghan government. In undertaking this, DFID should draw upon an advisory group of in-country representatives from various UK based NGOs.

85. We ask DFID to review their current policy of reducing funding for smaller scale development projects to lower the transaction costs and seek alternative methods for disbursing funds for these projects

86. Monitoring and evaluation of pooled mechanisms—DFID should continue to monitor the effectiveness of the ARTF and other pooled funding mechanisms focusing on impact on the ground as well as on building government capacity and ownership and meeting UN reform and donor harmonisation and cost-efficiency objectives. Feedback from civil society should be proactively sought and NGOs engaged as partners to support this. Lessons learned should be fed back through OECD work streams and the Inter Agency Standing Committee (IASC) as well as disseminated to other fragile states.

87. Pooled fund accountability—DFID should hold the UN accountable for UN overhead costs charged against the pooled "pass-through" funds they manage, and work with the UN and NGOs to streamline and expedite approval, disbursement and procurement processes for UN-managed funds.

88. Funding characteristics—Core characteristics should be as follows:

(a) Predictable and long-term, to enable successful interventions to be piloted and scaled-up.

(b) In-country decision-making using input of NGOs and civil society

89. DFID should acknowledge the additional costs associated with supporting staff and operations in a high-risk security environment when reviewing NGO requests for overhead costs.

90. DFID should review its gender equality plan in the context of Afghanistan.

91. We call on HMG to redouble its efforts to build Afghan government capacity and to improve the resourcing of National Priority Programmes and to remove bottlenecks in the delivery of funds

92. We also seek an urgent review of HMG's existing development strategy in order to ensure more geographically balanced, inclusive and broad-based development. Such a review also needs to look at how development can practically be delivered in the present transitional phase.

93. We ask HMG to support British NGOs and their Afghan partners, to continue to commit time and resources necessary and to persuade other donors to honour their pledges, including to the NSP.

Recommendations to donors

94. Donors should ensure that NGOs are able to maintain their independence and continue critical areas of work that may not be considered the highest priority by the Afghan government but which may benefit it in the long term through improving people's lives. The suggestion from the BAAG survey to set up an "innovation fund" for NGOs to implement their own projects that can be used as models for the Afghan government would require more flexibility from donors. The need remains for an interim phase to allow time for relevant Ministries to gain sufficient capacity to provide services themselves. It should be recognised that local and national NGOs can play a role in both holding the government to account, especially in the area of human rights, and in building government capacity. In a specific request to the UK government one BAAG member states "Even with the political will, it would enable a significant amount of capacity building within government to enable them to take on this role in the near future. As such, ... it is crucial that the British government ensures funding reaches these local women's rights NGOs to enable them to continue their work at this pivotal time."

95. The Afghan government needs to be careful that government accountability, essential to building trust with both civil society and the international community, is not undermined as a result of its capacity problems and governance challenges.

96. We believe that until the Afghan government has the capacity to deliver a full range of development services, NGOs remain essential to the development effort and need to be utilised to deliver progress on the ground for ordinary Afghans.

97. We ask for improved donor co-ordination, as articulated in the NSP evaluation report[46] "An integrated approach should be adopted by the donor community, both to ensure that international funding helps to support national development priorities and to provide for better coverage."

98. We request that donors are more innovative in developing mechanisms to spend more aid in fragile states. Whilst aid is already reaching conflict affected countries for example through budget support (eg. Rwanda, Sierra Leone), through donor co-ordination and insurance mechanisms (the GEMAP in Liberia), through projects (as is most common currently) or through social/community funds, innovative mechanisms need to be further developed in order to scale it up. In the case of Afghanistan, we feel that aid delivery is too heavily invested in budget support, and that there needs to be a better balance with other forms of delivery.

99. Existing commitments made by the UK government on gender equality and women's rights (in particular the Convention for the Elimination of All Forms of Discrimination against Women (CEDAW), the Beijing Platform for Action and UN Security Council Resolution 1325 need to be reinforced.

100. We urge the Government of Afghanistan and international partners to prioritise their support to the gender mainstreaming process to secure commitment to gender equality by all stakeholders in the justice sector.

Regarding counter-narcotics

101. Political pressure for NATO military forces to become involved in counter-narcotics operations, in particular eradication programmes, should be opposed.[47] Sustainable and consent-based strategies should be led by local and civilian authorities, with a particular emphasis on effective action by the police and judiciary.

102. Counter-narcotics strategies should rely on an appropriately sequenced combination of economic development within the communities on the one hand and eradication and law enforcement efforts on the other. The first measure of success for programmes dedicated to fostering alternatives to opium poppy cultivation should be the quality of life of poor farmers and their families.

Regarding civil-military relations

103. The UK Government should support initiatives to develop country-specific civil-military relations guidelines that are explicit about good and bad practice in civil-military relations. Such initiatives should draw on the lessons learned from UN-facilitated country-specific civil-military guidelines in Iraq and Afghanistan.

104. The UK Government should support an initiative to establish an additional, higher-level forum for dialogue on civil-military relations issues; possibly on a quarterly basis. Its purpose would be to ensure greater follow-up and political engagement on issues raised in the operational-level discussions of the NGO civil-military relations working-group, co-hosted by UNAMA and ACBAR.

105. The UK Government should commission independent research on the contribution of integrated civil-military operations, such as PRTs, to improved governance in Afghanistan.

106. The UK Government must ensure that UK forces abide by international humanitarian law and its human rights obligations. Specific concerns regarding the conduct of US Coalition and NATO ISAF operations should be addressed, with particular attention to issues of detention and use of "rendition" practices and interrogation at US facilities; and the detention and the transfer of prisoners to Afghan national authorities.

Regarding health

107. There needs to be a much greater focus on technically feasible and affordable community-based interventions that address the most important causes of illness and death, and on those age groups that are most vulnerable (women, infants, and young children).

108. Much more needs to be done to develop effective health services and health staff in more remote areas. Delivery of programmes to these areas is more expensive (staffing, logistics, security) and logistically difficult. This is not sufficiently considered in current funding mechanisms.

109. Whilst nutrition, disability, mental health and testing, counselling and treatment of HIV have been added to the BPHS, the funding to deliver this package did not increase correspondingly. Therefore BPHS providers are forced to prioritise and these activities are not being done to the quality or coverage that the needs indicated.

110. The lack of female service providers remains a key constraint to access to care at all levels in the health system. Women must play a critical role in designing and implementing programs that address the needs of women and children. The international community still needs to make greater efforts to address this.

Regarding human rights

111. Donors should be reminded of the existing international instruments regarding the protection and promotion of human rights in Afghanistan. In line with UN Security Council Resolution 1325 we recommend that the Afghan Government reaffirms its commitment to putting an end to impunity and to prosecute those responsible for crimes against humanity; war crimes, including those relating to sexual violence against women and girls; and to exclude such crimes from amnesty provisions.

The British and Irish Agencies Afghanistan Group (BAAG) is an information and advocacy network of British and Irish Non Governmental Organisations that support relief and development programmes in Afghanistan. BAAG also provides a secretariat function for European NGOs through the European Network of NGOs in Afghanistan (ENNA). It is the only network of NGOs within the UK, Ireland and Europe with a primary focus on Afghanistan. For a list of current members, please see BAAG's website: http://www.baag.org.uk/about_baag/current_members.htm, which also provides links to individual agencies websites.

BAAG was originally set up in 1987, as an umbrella group to draw public attention to the humanitarian needs of the population of Afghanistan and of Afghan refugees in Iran and Pakistan. BAAG's role and structure has changed over the years reflecting the evolving situation in Afghanistan. BAAG's primary aim is to help create "an environment where Afghans can take control of their own development and bring about a just and peaceful society". It works towards this goal by means of advocacy work, research and analysis, and information sharing informed by staff from member agencies that are based in Afghanistan and transnational networks.

The content of this submission may not represent the views of all BAAG member agencies.

October 2007