Supplementary memorandum submitted by
the British and Irish Agencies Afghanistan Group (BAAG)
The British and Irish Agencies Afghanistan Group
(BAAG) very much welcomed the opportunity to give evidence to
the Committee on 15 November 2007 and to discuss with you issues
of development and reconstruction in Afghanistan.
During the course of the oral evidence session,
a number of issues arose in relation to capacity development and
human resources within Afghanistan, agriculture and the security
of NGOs (see oral evidence, para. Q95, 080 and Q74 respectively),
on which we hope that you might allow us the opportunity to comment
further. We apologise that we are only able to offer our response
at this late stage, but it was necessary for us to speak with
BAAG members in Afghanistan and unfortunately, Eid, and the Christmas
and New Year holiday periods all served to interrupt lines of
communication.
CAPACITY DEVELOPMENT
WITHIN THE
STATE SECTOR
IN AFGHANISTAN
During the IDSC oral evidence session, the inference
was made that NGOs are undermining the capacity of Afghan government
by recruiting qualified staff away from the state sector at a
time when the state sector is seriously lacking In capacity.
With reference to this specific point, we wish
to make the following comments:
1. There has been, since 2002, outspoken
criticism of aid manpower costs, in terms of both the inflation
of costs and the "poaching" of manpower in Afghanistan.
During the course of this debate, both in Afghanistan and internationally,
the term "NGOs" in written and spoken comment[48]
has been used to encompass a broad range of organisations, from
international and donor organizations to private contractors and
local and international NGOs. This in turn has fostered a perception
in the general public of a group—called NGOs—who earn
high salaries, and undermine state-building efforts. While this
discourse highlights genuine problems, it also serves to conflate
in the public's mind NGOs with multinational organizations that
have very high salary scales, such as UN Agencies and "for
profit" contractors, subcontracted to carry out reconstruction
projects. This conflation in terminology, in turn, runs risk of
turning NGOs into scapegoats for the very real issue of a human
resources crisis in Afghanistan.
2. Civil service reforms in Afghanistan
have resulted in some career paths within the Government of Afghanistan
which are fully competitive with that which many NGOs are able
offer. As a result, movement of qualified Afghan personnel from
NGOs to the state sector has been considerable in the past few
years.
3. Many national personnel working for local
and international NGOs gain valuable experience and training within
the NGO sector before moving to the state sector. A considerable
number of NGOs have experienced high staff turnover over the past
five years, losing committed, experienced and qualified staff
not only to the UN and other international organizations, but
also to government departments. For example, within one organization
over the last 12 months, seven senior and highly valued staff
members have moved to the Ministry of Rural Rehabilitation and
Development, Ministry of Agriculture, Irrigation and Livestock,
the Ministry of Public Health and the Ministry of Education respectively.
A recent independent report into civil military relations carried
out for BAAG found that "There is a relatively small pool
of qualified and experienced Afghans with English or European
language skills in Afghanistan. These are being pulled between
donors, the diplomatic community, aid agencies, the military and
the private sector. This has had a profound impact on International
and Afghan NGO staffing and capacity".
4. The contribution of NGOs to developing
local human resource capacity in Afghanistan is significant, sustained
and for the most part, in accordance with national government
planning. The philosophy that underpins the work of many NGOs
is based on a commitment to strengthening and supporting local
systems now and laying foundations for the future. (Please see
attached Appendix: Examples of human resource capacity development
in the state sector.)
5. In its report looking into state-building
processes in Afghanistan, the Afghanistan Research and Evaluation
Unit found that "The role of non-state actors, such as NGOs
in developing capacity is currently largely ignored as a public
resource. For example, NSP facilitating partners have trained
thousands of young, motivated and gender balanced community organisers
that could represent a future pool of state employees; The Independent
Afghanistan Reform and Civil Service Commission implementation
plans for pay and grading reform should consider long-term capacity
transfer from the non-state sector" Aiding the State, AREU
(April 2007).
6. As indicated in the AREU's report, NGOs,
through the NSP and other programmes, have contributed significantly
to community development, and improving the ability of the poor
to participate in decision making, access information and take
control of resources. Yet, there has been an absence of a consistent
and strategic approach to capacity development across the state
sector (and within civil society) that would allow for long term
and sustained capacity development at both national and provincial
level (For further reading see World Bank (2007), Service Delivery
and Governance at the Sub-National Level). We would encourage
a review and evaluation of the capacity development work that
has been undertaken within the state sector.
7. We believe that it is the introduction
of strategic, long-term, clearly defined capacity development
programmes with the necessary resources and support from the government
ministries and international donors, rather than an audit of qualified
personnel within NGOs that will reinforce the development of the
public sector in Afghanistan in the longer term.
CIVIL SOCIETY
CAPACITY DEVELOPMENT
In contexts of weak governance, civil society
can and should play a critical role in strengthening the responsiveness
of state and local government to improve the ability of national
government institutions to secure peace and social justice and
human security. Civil society in Afghanistan has a critical role
to play in capturing emerging aspirations in the context of local
social struggles for peace, development and well-being. To this
end, we would like to make the following points:
8. BAAG supports the points made by the
Chairman of the International Development Committee in his letter
to the Secretary of State for International Development, which
state that:
"the balance between military and civil
and development activities needs to be reassessed. It is important
that the pace of military engagement does not exceed the capacity
of local governance structures and civil society in relation to
stabilisation and development activities" (Point 4.)
"insufficient progress is being made
on the status and rights of women who are too often the victims
of domestic violence and who are not yet properly protected by
the justice system". (Point 6.)
9. BAAG continues to have concerns regarding
the involvement of the British army in aid projects in Afghanistan.
These relate to five aspects of existing Provincial Reconstruction
Team projects; the impact on "humanitarian space"[49]
the risk of security objectives dominating their conception; the
lack of scrutiny by Parliament of this type of aid spending; the
fact that the long-term development value of such projects has
not be publicly evaluated; and the fact that they divert troops
away from their core mission of stabilisation and training Afghan
security forces. The World Bank has also recently questioned the
value of PRT involvement in community led initiatives[50]
and expressed concerns about their long-term effect on government
institutions and processes. [51]
10. Often opportunities to extend civil
society development work to help develop local capacity is curtailed
by a lack of available funding, particularly core funding that
would allow Afghan civil society organisations to achieve sustainability
and growth. There is also a lack of long-term funding for Afghan
civil society capacity development that allows for sustained and
predictable programming.
11. It is of concern that there is very
little support for civil society initiatives in Afghanistan, and
even those national priority projects meant to stimulate participation
of civil society groups in local governance, such as youth groups,
parents groups, women's groups and other interest groups, that
appear in the NSP methodology are also dangerously under-funded.
The multi million dollar NSP funding deficits are well publicised,
but if more funding is not committed on top of that which is needed
to overcome the deficit to ensure continued capacity building
of Community Development Councils (CDCs) and their interaction
with civil society interest groups, much of the initial investment
into NSP will have been wasted. There is a need for real clarity
and an agreed strategy and plan across government for the future
role of CDCs, in general, and civil society, in particular, in
local governance; one that will capture not lose or undermine
the experience that has been build at local level through programmes
such as the NSP.
12. Two years of support to CDCs is not
sufficient, and cost effective ways to continue engaging them,
linking them to district governance and monitoring and promoting
human rights in a meaningful way, and enhancing their capacity
to strengthen rural livelihoods options should be investigated.
Ear-marked funding to build female CDC members' and women's groups'
leadership skills and ability to liaise with Government would
contribute to the gender mainstreaming commitment promoted by
DFID. Establishing district level small grant funds for female
CDC sub-committees would enable them to implement projects that
are responsive to strategic gender needs, such as literacy and
business skills training, and training in the monitoring and responding
to violence against women.
INCREASING SECURITY
COSTS FOR
NGOS IN
INSECURE OPERATING
ENVIRONMENTS
13. Due to a deterioration in security in
Afghanistan, NGOs' security management costs are rising and NGOs
are finding it increasingly difficult to fund security needs from
project or central budgets. Such costs relate to increased costs
on communication equipment, to security training to ensure the
safety of staff, to costs relating to robberies and attacks on
offices as well as to the costs associated with delays in project
implementation resulting from specific security incidents.
14. The sources of insecurity are complex
and variable differing between and within provinces and districts
across Afghanistan. The level of threat comes not only from armed
opposition groups, but also from the high levels of crime, lawlessness
and impunity. Incidents of looting, intimidation and abductions
are growing. Funders should be urged to allow for security costs
to be built into projects. There is also a very real need for
regular in depth conflict analysis work on the part of donors.
SPECIFIC EXAMPLES
OF HOW
INSECURITY HAS
AFFECTED NGOS
INCLUDE
15. Example 1: In the north-eastern
Province of Kunduz, Merlin is working to support a local Afghan
NGO, Care of Afghan Families, to implement the Basic Package of
Health Services. Although Kunduz is considered to have a relatively
good security profile, the financial impact of increased levels
of insecurity can be considerable. Merlin recently submitted a
funding request for an additional 1.5% of the total project funding,
over a period of 22 months to address rising security costs to
the organisation in Kunduz. Prior to the funding request, the
area in which the programme was located experienced attacks on
clinics, suicide bombings and attacks on police posts.
In spite of these challenges however, Merlin
was unable to secure additional funding for security costs from
the donor in question. Despite the difficult nature of the operating
environment, at present no additional funding has been allocated
for rising security costs. The impact of increased insecurity
may well impact on NGOs ability to deliver services and this remains
a critical concern within the current operating environment.
16. Example 2: Tearfund is working
in Kandahar and the cost related to security are:
All staff, both national and international,
are now required to fly to Kabul. Whereas up until recently, they
could still use the road for national staff, this is no longer
possible. A return ticket Kabul—Kandahar on UNHAS is 540
US dollars. This costs the organisation on an annual basis around
18,000 USD extra.
Due to insecurity, Tearfund has decided to move
its office inside the security area as declared by ANSO and UNDSS.
Obviously, the house prices in this area are higher than in the
previous location, and it will have to pay an additional 1,700
USD per month on housing rent
Tearfund have also had to adopt security identity
management measures to protect staff as they travel which have
in turn resulted in an increase in costs associated with travel.
The total extra security costs are 56,400 US
dollars, on a total budget of around 500,000 US dollars. 10% of
the total budget.
17. Example 3: WOMANKIND Worldwide
has recently decided to revise its' Women's Empowerment Programme
in Afghanistan. The programmes have had a positive impact on Afghan
women's lives to date in Mazar, Jalalabad, Peshawar and Kabul
through the hard work of our three partner organisations—AWN,
AWEC and AWRC.
However, recently a mid-term evaluation of the
programme made it clear that for the programme to meet its planned
outputs until 2010, significant additional resources are now required
due to the deteriorating operating environment in which the programme
is being implemented; resources to which WOMANKIND do not currently
have access at present.
WOMANKIND has been increasingly concerned about
the deteriorating security situation in Afghanistan and has been
mapping and monitoring the risks to the Women's Empowerment Programmes
on an ongoing basis throughout the year. Poor security has had
a negative impact on our local coordinators, partners, partner
staff, beneficiaries and programmes. As a small development agency
WOMANKIND does not have the capacity to work in very insecure
environments—it has inadequate access to security support
and advice. This has been impacting on WOMANKIND's ability to
visit the programme sites as well as its ability to engage directly
with partners and build their capacity.
In light of these growing security risks to
the programme activities, beneficiaries and staff, the need for
additional financial and organisational resources, and after careful
consideration it has reached the conclusion that reducing the
scope of activities and partners is the most sensible option for
continuation of the programme in a way that delivers tangible
benefits until March 2010. It has therefore reduced funding to
two of its partners—AWN and AWEC—that work in Peshawar,
Mazar and Jalalabad—and will withdraw all funding to these
partners by October 2008.
THE IMPORTANCE
OF FUNDING
FOR AGRICULTURE
AND SUPPORTING
RURAL ECONOMIES
18. Evidence from Afghanistan suggests that
agriculture, the key economic sector in Afghanistan, remains largely
underfunded. Meaningful investment in agricultural development,
both in terms of medium to large scale irrigation infrastructure
and high value horticulture, is important for economic recovery
and counter-narcotics efforts. DFID and other donors should use
the expertise NGOs have developed over the years to maximise farm
related income opportunities employing a country wide approach
to reduce vulnerabilities to poverty and offering alternatives
to narcotics production. An integrated `value chain' approach
to agriculture that addresses issues of land, water, credit management
and labour is needed. Please see attached chart on recommended
rural development/agriculture interventions (Mansfield, David,
`Treating the Opium Problem in World Bank Operations in Afghanistan:
Guideline Note' http://www.davidmansfield.org/data/Mainstreaming/WORLD—BANK/OpiumGuideline.doc)
19. BAAG welcomes recent discussions in
the Ministry of Rural Rehabilitation and Development on how best
to support rural enterprise and we hope that this will lead to
the development of a long-term programme that will be responsive
to the needs of local communities.
We are happy to provide further information
in relation to the issues raised in this letter, if the Committee
feels it would be of use. We continue to believe that it is important
for HMG to review its aid programme to Afghanistan, and we are
grateful to you for providing this opportunity for dialogue on
this issue.
January 2008
48 Examples can be provided on request. Back
49
BAAG has recently commissioned independent research into Civil-Military
Relations in Afghanistan, and the research report is currently
in draft format. Once the report is in final draft (In February),
we would welcome the opportunity to discuss the research findings
in detail with the Committee. Back
50
World Bank (2007), Afghanistan: Service Delivery and Governance
at the Subnational Level, p xiv. Back
51
World Bank (2007), Afghanistan: Service Delivery and Governance
at the Subnational Level, p v Security-driven investment approaches
(often, but not exclusively, emanating from the PRTs), which focus
mainly on the rapid creation of physical assets using non-government
systems, have sometimes conflicted with government institutions
and processes. Back
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