Examination of Witnesses (Questions 120-139)
RT HON
DOUGLAS ALEXANDER
MP, MR MARSHALL
ELLIOTT AND
MS PHILIPPA
ROGERS
17 JANUARY 2008
Q120 Chairman: Good morning, Secretary
of State, and welcome to the first formal occasion you have appeared
in front of the Committee, and I am sure it will not be the last.
We welcome you and your team. We know Marshall of course but I
think for the record it would helpful if you could introduce your
team.
Mr Alexander: Marshall Elliott,
as you know, is the Head of our DFID Afghanistan office based
in Kabul. Many of you met him during the course of the Select
Committee's recent visit to Afghanistan. Philippa Rogers is the
acting Head of the Afghan Drugs Inter-Departmental Unit, physically
based in the Foreign Office but a cross- government unit which
leads the UK's work on counter-narcotics.
Q121 Chairman: Two or three things
have happened since our visit which I thought we could explore
with you first of all. Perhaps the most topical, sadly, is we
as a Committee stayed in the Serena Hotel (and most people do
although not everybody) which was subjected to a recent attack
where a number of people were killed. I just wondered whether
that was seen as a deterioration in the security situation and
whether that has any implications for the Government's and DFID's
work in Afghanistan, which is, after all, insecure and difficult
enough as it is?
Mr Alexander: I would be cautious
of drawing significance out of a single event, even one as serious
as the attack at the Serena Hotel, where I know a number of you
stayed in Kabul. Clearly as a British Government we have condemned
in the strongest possible terms the attack that took place on
the civilians in the hotel. I understand that the Taliban have
claimed responsibility for the attack, but of course we want to
see the perpetrators and sponsors of this crime brought to justice
within the Afghan justice system. That being said, I think it
is fair to say that when I visited Afghanistan prior to your visit,
the force commanders who I met, particularly in the south and
in Helmand, were clear that British military forces were prevailing
in the specific engagements that they were having with insurgency
forces, but were mindful of the possibility that in the light
of the success that was being enjoyed by British forces working
in support of the Afghan National Army, there was always the possibility
that there would be moves towards a more asymmetric form of conflict.
There have been a number of attacks, as you know, in Kabul in
recent weeks and months of which the Serena Hotel is just one
of the latest, so it is a matter which is of concern both to the
British Government and to the Government of Afghanistan, but it
really is for others, both our force commanders on the ground
and the Government of Afghanistan, to judge how best to respond
to what is inevitably a changing security challenge that we face.
Q122 Chairman: Can I say on behalf
of the Committee that we were very well looked after by the close
protection (CP) team that was allocated to us. We were impressed
by the seriousness of what they were doing and the seriousness
of the potential threats. I am sure you will have appreciated
when you actually go through that hour's training and presentation
it brings it home to you what might or might not happen, and although
we were very fortunate that there were no incidents, that attack
last week demonstrates that all of that was absolutely necessary.
Mr Alexander: Yes, I could not
agree more. On my own visit, there was a suicide bombing of the
airport gate at Kabul when I left, and indeed the day preceding
my visit to Kandahar in the south, there was an international
force soldier lost to an Improvised Explosive Device (IED) incident.
It is a very real security challenge that is faced, and it would
be remiss of me to do anything other, as you have been generous
enough to do, than to pay tribute to not just our own staff but
the staff who support our operations within Afghanistan, because
it is a challenging security environment.
Chairman: And they are very professional
indeed. James?
Q123 James Duddridge: Whilst we were
there we saw a balance between the security but also getting out,
seeing the projects and actually feeling what the country is about
and how it works and talking to the people. Given the threat of
further attacks, particularly in Kabul, particularly targeted
at the ex-patriate community, has DFID's ability to get out and
about been further constrained subsequent to the attack on the
Serena?
Mr Alexander: Firstly let me try
and contextualise the security challenge that we face. This was
best described to me by one of the Afghan ministers, who I met
who said the best way to understand the challenges facing Afghanistan
at the moment is to realise that we face four simultaneous challenges.
Firstly, there is the insurgency; secondly, which no doubt we
will touch on today, there is the issue of narcotics; thirdly,
there is the issue of governance, and fourthly, there is the issue
of poverty, which is the core work that we are addressing in the
Department for International Development. We have always been
mindful that security is one of the key challenges which contextualise
the efforts that we make. There are a number of procedures in
place whereby assessments are made as to the security environment
in which we ask our staff to operate. We co-operate very closely
with the Foreign Office in that endeavour. It might be helpful
if Marshall as head of the country office sets out for you the
steps that we take in country to be assured of the safety and
security of our staff. There are two instances that I would cite.
Firstly was obviously the attack on the Serena Hotel which is
used by a number of internationals. Secondly there was a bomb
that inflicted damage on properties in which DFID staff were present.
Immediately following that attack, as you would expect, there
was work undertaken by officials, at my request, to ensure that
there was a further full audit of the security arrangements in
place for our staff to ensure that all necessary measures are
being taken. Once Marshall has set out the specifics of the steps
taken in relation to the Serena, I would be happy to say a word
or two about the implications more broadly across the country.
Q124 James Duddridge: It would be
very helpful if Mr Elliott did that and focus his comments on
the change in risk assessment and practices and the impacts on
DFID since the attack on the Serena. Prior to that I think we
are fully aware of the very comprehensive risk assessment process
that you have gone through.
Mr Elliott: It is worth mentioning
the incident which the Secretary of State has just mentioned.
It was a device which exploded close to properties you saw during
your visit. We have taken steps since then to strengthen security
at these locations. Thankfully, testimony to the strength of the
systems already in place, when the device went off, no-one was
hurt. It does affect our social movements. Both that incident
and the recent incident this week at the Serena have affected
our ability to go out and about to do things other than work.
In terms of doing our business it has not changed the situation.
We are still getting out to do meetings. We can still go out and
make visits elsewhere in the country, where we are supported very
solidly and very professionally by CP, so it has not changed our
business movements.
Mr Alexander: I would add at the
policy level that while of course it is incumbent upon both myself
and my officials to have due regard for the safety and welfare
of DFID personnel working in Afghanistan, we also need to send
out a very clear message that such attacks on civilians will not
in any way diminish our resolve and our determination to continue
to act in support of the Government of Afghanistan. In that sense,
clearly it is not appropriate for us in every instance to discuss
all the measures that are taken or the assessments that emerge
from particular incidents, but I can assure you that the resolve
and commitment to continue work in Afghanistan is in no way diminished
by the attack on the Serena Hotel.
Q125 Chairman: In the light of press
reports yesterday and today, which appear to confirm that Lord
Ashdown is to be the UN Representative in Afghanistan, are you
able to give us a formal confirmation of that and any more information
as to how that will operate? In this specific context, according
to the Financial Times it just put a comment at the end:
"There is concern in Kabul that Lord Ashdown's appointment
will heighten anti-British sentiment among ordinary people. One
senior European diplomat warned Lord Ashdown that he should expect
such antipathy." Firstly, could you comment on the general
principle of his appointment and what he is going to be doing
and, secondly, whether his being British, in the light of the
previous discussion, has any further implications?
Mr Alexander: Firstly, I am not
in a position to officially confirm because obviously the position
of the United Nations Special Representative of the Secretary-General
is a matter for Ban Ki-moon, although of course I have seen the
same reports to which you refer. Let me begin by saying the term
of the Special Representative of the Secretary-General finishes
in February, although in fact Mr Koenigs left, I understand, late
last year, so in that sense there is no secret that there are
discussions underway in terms of what we are looking for. Let
me therefore, if you would indulge me, speak in terms of what
we are looking for from the senior high-level candidate who we
hope will fill the position, and then let me say a word in terms
of whether it would influence the views of the United Kingdom
if such a candidate as Paddy Ashdown were to emerge, as the press
reports indicate. What are we looking for first of all? This role
has to be recognised as supporting the Government of Afghanistan,
and in that sense the work that Paddy Ashdown did in Bosnia, while
outstanding—and I was Europe Minister at the time and I
had the opportunity to discuss with him the challenges that were
being faced in Bosnia—the nature of the job is somewhat
different from the High Representative role that he discharged
with such distinction in Bosnia. There is of course a parallel
to the Bosnian situation which is the need to effectively co-ordinate
both the military and civilian dimensions of the work. It is crucial
for us, in particular in tackling insurgency, that there is coherence
in terms of the counter-insurgency work that is being taken forward.
We would like to see a national counter-insurgency strategy, a
COIN strategy, being accepted across Afghanistan. Thirdly, and
this leads me naturally into the point that you raise about the
possibility of it being a British representative, I think it is
important that there is one face and one voice for the international
effort. One of the points that I understand has already been raised
in the course of discussions before this Committee, following
your visit, is the perception that somehow there is a large proportion
of the Afghan population who are unaware of the nature of the
support being offered by the international community. In that
sense, I regard it as an opportunity rather than a threat to better
align the effort and work and the financial resource that has
been put in, with a recognition of the supportive but vital role
being played by the international community. In that sense, the
United States obviously have been supportive of Paddy Ashdown's
candidacy, he is an individual of outstanding integrity and ability,
and we are very hopeful in terms of the role that this Special
Representative can play in Afghanistan in the months to come.
Q126 Sir Robert Smith: Do you see
the role being fulfilled through the personality of the holder
of the office or will there be a change in terms of the office?
Will there be a buy-in from the EU or NATO into recognising that
if we are going to create this coherent strategy, it will have
to be a bit more than symbolic?
Mr Alexander: Candidly, I do not
see it as either/or. Of course the fact that both the EU and the
NATO representatives are up for replacement around the same time
offers opportunities for there to be effective co-ordination and
discussion. There were some suggestions that have been floated
in terms of a single candidate for all three offices. My understanding
is that there are some difficulties in that proposed way forward
in terms of the respective organisational structures of NATO and
the EU. That being said, I am optimistic as to the ability for
those organisations—the UN, the EU and NATO—to better
align their work in the future, but clearly the character and
attributes of the individual brought into the Secretary-General's
Special Representative's role will be absolutely key to that not
simply being a theoretical hope but being a practical result.
Q127 Chairman: I think General McNeill[1]
characterised the requirements as being an 800 lb gorilla. I am
not sure whether Paddy Ashdown would concur with that description!
Mr Alexander: I shall leave it
to you. You have known Paddy for longer than I to judge whether
he is equipped for that role!
Q128 Chairman: Another incident was
the expulsion of two international diplomats by the Government
of Afghanistan for apparently negotiating with the Taliban. That
raised a slightly difficult area which is how you define negotiations
with the Taliban. It was clearly stated to us by both the Afghan
Government and representatives of the international community
that there had to be some process where you tried to draw people
away from the Taliban and back into co-operation with the Government,
and that involved some kind of dialogue, not necessarily with
the leadership but with elements of it. Obviously there was a
concern here that two experienced diplomats had incurred the wrath
of the Government of Afghanistan. I just wonder whether that was
to do with who should be taking the lead on it, namely the Government
of Afghanistan feeling that it was their job to lead on this,
not the international community's, or some breakdown in communication,
and what effect that has on where we go from here between the
Government and the international community in trying to bring
about that reconciliation of the disaffected people, the people
who are being pulled back from the Taliban?
Mr Alexander: Firstly the policy
and then the specific matter to which you refer. The clearest
articulation of our policy in relation to this, notwithstanding
some misplaced headlines the day before, was the statement offered
by the Prime Minister in the House of Commons towards the end
of the year,[2]
which made it clear that we were supportive of the efforts that
were being made and being led by the Afghanistan Government to
be able to move forward a process whereby a number of former fighters
had re-entered the mainstream of Afghan society. Clearly when
we talk to our own force commanders on the ground, they are clear
that, notwithstanding the progress that has been made in the kinetic
phase of the campaign, there does also have to be a political
dimension to counter-insurgency, and they are themselves supportive
of the work that has been taken forward by the Government of Afghanistan.
In relation to the specific incident that you describe, our Ambassador
Sherard Cowper-Coles, who I know you have met, discussed the expulsions
with President Karzai on 29 December, at the turn of the year.
In the course of those discussions, he strongly refuted the suggestion
that as the United Kingdom we did not clear reconciliation projects
with the relevant Afghan authorities in Kabul and Helmand, and
I think in that sense the description that you offer in terms
of respective roles and responsibilities lies at the heart of
this issue rather than there being any fundamental divergence
as to the need to align the kinetic phase of the counter-insurgency
operation with other necessary aspects of that.
Q129 James Duddridge: For clarity's sake,
given that British diplomats, the British Army and possibly (I
do not know) DFID staff have discussions with the Taliban, what
is the difference between discussions and negotiations and when
do discussions technically become negotiations?
Mr Alexander: The position of
the British Government in relation to that is that we have made
clear that we are not negotiating with the Taliban. The Prime
Minister made that clear in the course of his statement. On the
other hand, it is of course the case that whether in terms of
our responsibilities in the south and Helmand through the PRT,[3]
and for example the work that has been undertaken in Musa Qala,
or whether it is through the work of our embassy in Kabul, there
is a wide range of discussions with a wide range of interlocutors.
I cannot better the words that our Prime Minister offered at the
dispatch box in making clear that we wish to isolate and to remove
the leadership of the insurgency, at the same time as supporting
the efforts of the Government of Afghanistan in terms of bringing
into the mainstream those who want to leave behind the insurgency
and come back. My recollection is that the figure quoted was around
5,000 former fighters who have already chosen to move back into
the mainstream. Clearly we are supportive of that work, but this
has to be a matter that is led by the Afghans.
Q130 Chairman: In the Prime Minister's
statement on 12 December, he announced the increase in development
funding to £450 million for the period 2009-12. That is an
increase on £330 million over 2006-09. Is that extra £120
million additional money or is it coming from the Stabilisation-Aid
Fund? How much of it is going into development and how much is
going into stabilisation activities?
Mr Alexander: The announcement
that the Prime Minister made combines both money for the Stabilisation-Aid
Fund, which supports the particular work of stabilisation, and
the on-going development needs. We are doing development work
in Helmand and there are also decisions that will be reached in
terms of allocations for the Stabilisation-Aid Fund. In terms
of the proportions that are anticipated being spent from the Prime
Minister's statement—DFID's £345 million, that is £115
million each year—that is new money and an additional and
bigger allocation than our previous commitment of £330 million
over the equivalent period of 2006-09. The total figure that was
spoken of in the statement was £450 million and £105
million of that is for stabilisation activities. So of the £450
million, £105 million is for stabilisation activities and
the additional money, the £345 million, is development.
Q131 Chairman: In that context I
am going to bring in John Battle, but what we did find both in
the UK and when we were in Afghanistan, inevitably and understandably
because of the high level of military engagement in Helmand, is
there was a presumption that all the British aid development was
going into Helmand. I think it is perhaps important both on the
record and from you to make it clear that a significant amount
of our development activity is going directly towards the Government
of Afghanistan and presumably the whole country?
Mr Alexander: I would fully accept
that responsibility. I was looking at the figures in preparation
for the Committee. My recollection is that from a budget of £107
million, £20 million is being spent in Helmand. When I was
in Afghanistan, I visited work that we are doing in terms of allocation
outside of Kabul. I also took the opportunity to visit a school
where through the support that we are providing to the Government
of Afghanistan we are helping to pay for the teachers' salaries
at that school. I very much regard it as my responsibility to
reflect the breadth of work that we are undertaking in the country,
not least to the British public. I think it is probably inevitable,
and certainly appropriate, that much of the coverage of Afghanistan
in the UK media centres on the work that is being taken forward
by the British troops principally in Helmand in the south, but
in terms of the efforts that we are making, you are absolutely
right to recognise that it is only a proportion of the development
work that is underway. I think that bears on two issues. Firstly
is our financing and secondly the nature of the challenges that
Afghanistan faces. I think it is important for people to realise
the scale of the challenge. One in five children die before their
fifth birthday, average life expectancy is 46; they are off track
on every one of the MDGs. Even if there were no insurgency, this
is a desperately poor country and therefore even if there was
not the immediate challenge that we face in terms of stabilisation
there would be a responsibility on us to be working to support
the development objectives of the Millennium Development Goals.
Q132 John Battle: I concur with that
last point; it cannot be underlined enough. It is not just the
figures now but too often a glib comparison is made with Iraq
because there seem to be parallels of tackling insurgency and
working on development. When I joined this Committee in 2001,
if I remember rightly, all the World Bank statistics showed Afghanistan
at the bottom of the whole world in terms of all the poverty indices.
We forget how far back Afghanistan was before the whole issue
of the military insurgency and the movement to try and do something
about it. Those figures from 2000 are still burned in my brain.
Afghanistan was at the bottom of the league on every single one
of the MDGs, so start from there and measure it from there. Even
if there were no insurgency, it would be the biggest task in history
to bring about development, to move Afghanistan society into the
20th century, never mind the 21st. I think that is often forgotten.
On those terms though, I want to explore the relationship between
the amount of aid going into development and the capacity to deal
with the money and the expectations of what can be done. The resources
are there but you cannot spend them, it is sometimes said. The
DAC[4]
figures show that Afghanistan receives about $67 per capita. I
think that was the figure in the 2006 DAC report. That is a lot
less than Bosnia Herzegovina, for example, and I think it is more
than the Democratic Republic of Congo and Sierra Leone. The question
has been raised, and DFID officials have raised it, that even
if we have a budget for aid, there is not the capacity to actually
do anything with the budget. My question to you would be is it
a case of increasing the aid because the capacity is getting there
now or is the emphasis on creating the capacity in order to be
able to absorb more aid?
Mr Alexander: I do not want to
give a very New Labour response but it is not either/or; it is
both, in the sense that we have long recognised post-2001 the
immediate challenges that Afghanistan faced. In terms of what
shaped our work in the years immediately following the fall of
the Taliban regime, it was firstly to develop a mechanism whereby
the international donor community could effectively contribute
resource, and we were key to the development of the Afghanistan
Reconstruction Trust Fund (ARTF), but simultaneously we had to
build the capacity of the institutions of governance to allow
that money to be spent effectively. Of course, all members of
the Committee will be aware that approximately 80% of our spending
is now through the Government of Afghanistan. That reflects the
priorities which as a Department we have identified can make the
biggest contribution to the work of poverty reduction within Afghanistan.
One of the key contemporary challenges that we face is developing
that capability of governance, the capacity of the state to spend
money effectively. That is one challenge and explains, as I say,
the work of the ARTF. Secondly, there is the issue of economic
management. If you look at the proportion of revenue raised by
the Government of Afghanistan against the GDP, that is desperately
low, I think it is about 7%; far lower than many of the Sub-Saharan
African countries who we would regard as desperately poor. In
that sense, whether it is in terms of revenue-raising capability
or indeed just basic state capability, it is vital that we strengthen
economic management as well. So that is state capacity, economic
management and, thirdly, of course livelihoods, given the desperate
poverty and the fact that many people are agricultural workers
who are looking for a means of sustaining themselves through a
range of different livelihoods. I would certainly accept the analysis
which says that capacity is a huge challenge for the emerging
Government of Afghanistan. I would certainly accept that there
do need to be increased aid flows, and the statement that the
Prime Minister made reflected an up-lift, as I suggested, from
the previous three years. I also would not diminish the scale
of progress that has been made in a relatively short period of
time. For example on the number of children going to school, when
the Taliban fell, there were about 900,000 boys in education in
Afghanistan; girls were barred. We are now in a position where
there are in excess of five million children in school of whom
more than two million are girls. One of the force commanders said
to me when I asked him about the nature of the insurgency, "It
is said here where the roads end the Taliban begin." More
than 9,000 kilometres of roads have been rehabilitated in recent
years. I think in terms of both the policy work we do but also
our public messaging, we have to recognise this is for the long
haul, we have to recognise the need for Afghan leadership, be
honest about the scale of the capacity challenge and the need
for continued external resources, but equally be clear that progress
is being made in what, as you say, is a desperately poor country.
Q133 John Battle: I am tempted to
be off the wall Chairman, but the poet Thomas Hardy said that
the test of how we become human beings is our capacity to look
the worst in the face and still develop forward. Could you give
me some kind of vision where despite all the problems—security,
political, the warlords and all the rest of it—where Afghanistan
is the most advanced country in the world in bringing in development
in a new way, with new patterns for personal and economic development,
trying new methodologies locally, and the rest of it? Is that
thinking even going on, would you suggest, within the Department
and within the Government of Afghanistan, or is it really survival
and trying to get on their feet day-to-day after a bombing and
the hotels being blown up and the rest of it? Are we anywhere
near having Afghanistan, which is bottom of the league, as the
test-bed for development policies in the 21st century?
Mr Alexander: I was appointed
Development Secretary in July and Afghanistan was one of my earliest
visits. Together with the Defence Secretary and the Foreign Secretary,
who of course had taken up his post at the same time, we resolved
that all of us would ensure that in the course of those summer
months we would go to Afghanistan quickly. I think few would doubt
the priority or significance that we attach to Afghanistan. That
was reflected in the statement that the Prime Minister made on
behalf of the Government at the dispatch box before the turn of
the year, so I can assure you that there is an ambition for the
people of Afghanistan. Significant numbers of refugees have returned
since 2001. People have braved the threat of bombs, bullets and
intimidation to vote in the country's elections. There is a determination
and an ambition on the part of the British Government. It is right
to recognise that that however is balanced by a very clear-headed
sense as to the scale of the challenges that we face. That is
why the Prime Minister was so clear in saying that this is a long-term
objective. I think we owe it to the people of Afghanistan to be
candid as to the scale of the challenge, while at the same time,
as I sought to do at the beginning of this session, be very clear
that our resolve and determination to work with others to find
the way forward is undiminished by the kind of attack that we
saw on the Serena Hotel. I think it is also important though,
in discourse such as this, to have the humility to say all of
those efforts, ambitious though they are, and although we have
committed British troops and they are in harm's way on a daily
basis in Helmand in their endeavour of supporting the Government
of Afghanistan, and in light of the fact that we are raising the
money—all of that should not diminish the fact that this
needs to be an Afghan-led development strategy. In that sense
we have to recognise the scale of the challenge, the need for
Afghan leadership and also the fact that we are a significant
player but by no means the only player. The Americans for example
account for about 50% of the civilian effort and 70% of the military
effort of the international community in Afghanistan, which is
why it is so critical, as we have been doing, that we work closely
with our American counterparts, our counterparts from NATO and
our counterparts from the EU. I think the international community's
resolve is undiminished that this must be one of the successes.
Q134 John Battle: In the jargon of
bottom-line politics you see then the ODA[5]
increasing funding over the three, five, ten years in the future,
so ODA money is in there to get that development shifted?
Mr Alexander: Yes of course we
want to see an increase in development spending, but at the same
time, as I sought to reflect earlier, part of what we are trying
to do is to spend the money as wisely as we can to increase the
revenue base of the Government of Afghanistan itself.
Q135 Chairman: Just on a clarification
of that, before I bring in Hugh Bayley, on the figures you gave
us before the development spend by DFID in 2006-09 was £330
million. On the 2009-12 figures it increases to £345 million,
in other words of the £120 million £105 million is going
to the Stabilisation-Aid Fund. I know the Prime Minister has said
that he would regard some of that as development but, in the light
of John Battle's questions, is there not capacity for more resources
to go into development funding specifically? I guess what we are
saying to you, Secretary of State, is might you be arguing for
further funds specifically to your Department or an allocation
within your budget for the work that you do for that purpose?
Mr Alexander: The easy point is
to say of course I am always looking for more resources for the
Department.
Q136 Chairman: What I mean is £15
million is not a big increase on the development figure.
Mr Alexander: With respect, this
was a point I was going to come back to you on in terms of seeing
the Stabilisation Fund as somehow not being development, in the
sense that it is not ODA-scorable SAF money, and in that sense
I would not want the impression to be left that it is only if
it is coming straight out of DFID budget lines that it is real
development. I think the figures that the Prime Minister announced,
almost half a billion pounds, reflects the priority we do attach.
It is not for me to prescribe where we will be in terms of either
future Comprehensive Spending Reviews or further year-on-year
budgets. I do assure you that this is a very high priority for
my Department, as it is for the whole of the Government and in
that sense we will continue to look very carefully at what are
the development needs of the country. The scale of spend of the
British Government reflects in large measure the security challenge
that is faced, along with the development effort. I cannot at
this stage predict what the security environment will be in the
future and, in turn, the capacity for more money to be spent effectively,
but it would be wrong to ignore the extent to which we are already
contributing very significant additional funds as well as budgets
specifically badged as development funds to the effort to secure
an environment in which the Millennium Development Goals can be
reached, and that is part of the work that is being taken forward
by the MoD and the FCO.
Q137 Hugh Bayley: I want to ask you
not about the volume of funds committed but the impact that development
spending has on the ground. Marshall Elliott and his team, who
work in a very difficult environment, as you know, went to great
lengths to get the group of us who went to Helmand out in the
field, away from the military umbrella, if I can put it like that,
talking to farmers, getting in the countryside, getting our shoes
dirty. I would like very briefly to share two development stories
which made a great impact on me. We visited the state-run and
funded hospital in Lashkar Gar. I was extremely impressed to find
that they were providing services not just for people in the areas
controlled by the Government of Afghanistan but in insurgent-held
areas. Patients were coming in from the insurgent-held areas to
be treated and some of the staff trained at the hospital would
go out and be allocated to work as peripatetic midwives in the
insurgent areas. If the idea is to get development through to
the people, doing it through the Government is extremely important.
By contrast, we saw a fabulous road, built with stone sets, which
you have obviously seen yourself, which is great for four-wheel
drive vehicles but you see local people who are walking or cycling
or going with animals walking on the dirt beside the road because
the stone sets that the road is made out of twist the ankles of
people and animals. That was provided by USAID without co-operation
with the local government. The lesson I draw from that is that
directing money wherever possible through the Government of Afghanistan
creates a better local impact. We have had evidence from the Peace
Dividend Trust that suggests that although the United States spends
six times as much on aid in Afghanistan as we do, the impact in
local terms is only twice that. In other words, the impact of
their aid is a third dollar-for-dollar of the impact that our
aid has. Given that the outcome in Afghanistan hangs so finely
in the balance, what representations are you making, Secretary
of State, to your counterparts in the United States to try to
persuade them to put more of their enormous aid spend through
the Government of Afghanistan?
Mr Alexander: You are right of
course in recognising the scale of the development assistance
being offered by the Americans. I think the figure is about US
$1.4 billion, but the majority of that does not go through the
Government of Afghanistan in the way that, as I said, 80% of ours
does. In terms of the specific contacts that we have had, obviously
when I was there at the end of August I held quite a long useful
discussion with the American Ambassador on the ground in Kabul.
I have also had the opportunity when I was in Washington to meet
with Henrietta Fore, who is the USAID head. I had a further discussion
with her about Afghanistan in the margins of the Donors' Conference
in Paris at the beginning of December for the Middle East peace
process, and Afghanistan was one of the key issues that we discussed.
That reflects some specific contact I have had with my counterparts.
One of the challenges as Development Secretary is there is no
obvious counterpart in the United States Administration, in the
sense that some of the work is undertaken by the State Department,
some of the work is undertaken by USAID, and some by others. There
is minister level contact on that issue from DFID. Of course Marshall
and Sherard, our Ambassador in Kabul, have regular dialogue with
the Americans on a range of different issues, including the nature
of the development challenge. There is also clearly strong military
co-operation, as you would expect, at the highest levels of government.
At every level of government there is engagement in these issues.
It is ultimately of course for the Administration to explain and
account for the actions that they are taking, but I would also
observe that I am optimistic in terms of the discussions around
a new United Nations Secretary-General's Special Representative
that there is a genuine willingness on the part of the Americans
to look and see how we can work together effectively as an international
community. It is sometimes suggested that the Americans are not
really involved with government funding of course, but that is
not wholly true. They are part of the ARTF and part of their funding
does go through the ARTF, but this is an issue which we continue
to work on at every level. Marshall, is there anything else you
would add from a country perspective?
Mr Elliott: I would just like
to add that it is easy to knock the US for not channelling money
through the government system but, as has already been mentioned
by the Chairman, there is a capacity issue within government.
In that context what is more important is that that support is
aligned to Government priorities, doing what the Government is
wanting us to do, rather than necessarily channelling all of the
international effort at a point where capacity is a constraint
through government systems. The US is putting some of their support
through government systems and, as those strengthen, the indications
they have given to me in country are that they will put more through
those systems. They have also indicated that with the development
of the ANDS,[6]
which sets out government strategy and its requirements much more
clearly than in the past, they will align their support to the
ANDS, so dialogue on the ground is positive in this respect.
Q138 Hugh Bayley: I am reassured by those
answers. Aligning development activity with the Government's priorities,
if not doing it through the Government, would be a big step forward.
One of the reasons why the Peace Dividend Trust believes that
the impact of American development assistance is lower than it
might be is because a great volume of their money is spent on
US contractors. When we met General McNeill we were told about
I think it was called the Afghanistan Engineering Division, but
I forget the precise name of the unit, a US military division
with a budget of $1 billion over a period of time to spend on
infrastructure, roads, schools and so on, and they had taken a
policy decision to spend all of that through Afghan building firms.
I believe it would be worth exploring with the State Department
whether they can follow a lead which the Department of Defense
appears to be taking in contracting more from Afghan companies.
After all, if you want to develop the Afghan economy you do that
by providing business opportunity for Afghan entrepreneurs.
Mr Alexander: I take the point
and I would be happy to ensure that those points are brought to
the attention of the State Department. A couple of points on that.
One is we have just received a jointly funded study from the World
Bank looking at the issue of the alternative economics of non-poppy
production, which perhaps we will touch on later in the session,
and one of the recommendations in the course of that report is
the capacity for international forces and international bodies
working within Afghanistan to source produce locally, which is
in some ways an analogue of what you describe in terms of contractors
building roads, to say can we ensure that in terms of fruit and
vegetables and dairy products there is a means by which we can
support the nascent Afghan economy in the work that we are doing.
We are giving consideration to the report, as perhaps we will
touch on in due course, but there is a lot of thinking on exactly
these issues. The only other point that I would make, echoing
Marshall's point about it being easy to knock the Americans, it
is my slight fear in terms of making that representation to the
State Department that they would, while no doubt listening to
us, observe that they are not the only actors on the stage, in
the sense that much of the US aid is earmarked by Congress, and
in that sense it is an argument that would need to be won on the
Hill as much as in Foggy Bottom.
Hugh Bayley: We must take that on board
and as parliamentarians we will.
Q139 Sir Robert Smith: On the co-ordination
of aid, I appreciate that decisions are taken in extremely difficult
environments, but one of the things we did see in Lashkar Gar
at the hospital was the very impressive new accommodation block
built with British aid money for midwives in training. However,
in terms of the co-ordination, that was built on the assumption
the Americans were going to fund the training of the midwives.
By the time the block was built with the British money, it was
empty because the Americans had not got the money to pay for the
training of the midwives. There was hope expressed while we were
there that because the block was now there the Americans might
find the money. I wondered a) if you could give us an update on
whether that block is now in use and b) what can be done to improve
things, because obviously if both sides are involved it is important
to make sure that the follow-through is there?
Mr Alexander: Marshall, are you
aware of anything on the ground?
Mr Elliott: I am afraid I am not
but we can get that information to you.[7]
Mr Alexander: Frankly, the example
you cite makes the case, whether it be at Helmand level in terms
of the need for effective co-ordination, or in terms of the donor
community. We would like to be in a position—and this reflects
at a higher level the work that we did initially both in terms
of working with the Government of Afghanistan to establish the
National Development Strategy but also co-ordinating donors' responses
to the National Development Strategy, to see that as a way that
we should be working at every level, which is Afghanistan Government-led,
them being clear as to development priorities, but then a co-ordinated
donor response, which would avoid exactly the kind of example
that you describe.
1 Commander of the International Stability Assistance
Force (ISAF) Back
2
HC Deb 12 December 2007, cols 303-307 Back
3
Provincial Reconstruction Team Back
4
Development Assistance Committee of the Organisation for the
Economic Co-operation and Development Back
5
Official Development Assistance Back
6
Afghan National Development Strategy Back
7
Ev 61 Back
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