Examination of Witnesses (Questions 140-159)
RT HON
DOUGLAS ALEXANDER
MP, MR MARSHALL
ELLIOTT AND
MS PHILIPPA
ROGERS
17 JANUARY 2008
Q140 Mr Singh: Secretary of State,
you referred earlier to the Stabilisation-Aid Fund and it is my
understanding that the stabilisation money has taken over from
the Post-Conflict Reconstruction money and that the Stabilisation-Aid
Fund is a replacement for the Global Conflict Prevention Pool.
What is different with the new set-up from the old set-up and
what is the reasoning behind this new set-up?
Mr Alexander: I think there is
a growing recognition within government, and that has been the
case over a period of time, as to how distinctive the challenge
of post-conflict reconstruction stabilisation actually is. I think
the PCRU was a significant and important start to the Government's
joint working on that issue, but the Prime Minister has already
made speeches about what he terms the "stabilisation gap".
This is not a challenge distinctive to the United Kingdom. I cited
the State Department a couple of minutes ago and, similarly, there
is already a public debate in the United States as to whether
in terms of their institutions of governance having one department
that basically leads on defence, the Department of Defense, and
one department that leads on diplomacy, is sufficient when actually
there is a key element between diplomacy and defence which is
actually that reconstruction work. It is an evolution and a step
change from where we were previously. We will now be in a position
where there are dedicated staff who will work to the Stabilisation
Unit. I will ask Marshall to say a word or two in a moment about
what that opens up in terms of, for example, the duty of care
that we owe to the staff and the way that the staff can work,
because obviously we have obligations as the Department for International
Development which are long-standing, as do the Foreign Office
for their own staff. Given that we are establishing this new unit,
there is an opportunity for us to look at how we can get staff
into environments where they can do the work that has been described.
There has been mention of getting out of the British military
facility in Lashkar Gar to see in those other requirements. In
order to do stabilisation work, we need people qualified and protected
to be able to do work outside of secure environments. In that
sense, I think it reflects a number of things: firstly, a dedicated
budget, which has been increased, some of which is ODA-scorable
but not all, reflecting the three departments involved, the FCO,
MoD and DFID; secondly, new opportunities to reappraise the skills
mix and capabilities we need of the staff to do this vital but
distinctive job; and thirdly, it reflects the higher priority
that is attached to this work, not least given the progress that
has been made by British military forces in the south and what
that has taught us collectively as to the work that needs to be
done. The other example that I would cite, before I ask Marshall
to say another word or two, would be we are already beginning
to see, I think, that closer working relationship taking hold
in terms of the work that is being done in Musa Qala following
the success of British military forces, working with the Afghans,
in terms of the conflict with the insurgents there, where already
work is happening on the ground, whether it be in terms of rebuilding
mosques, rebuilding high schools, rebuilding the town centre in
that community. There is a stabilisation effort which has moved
in very rapidly after the kinetic phase of that particular campaign.
Mr Elliott: The Stabilisation-Aid
Fund does represent a very significant scaling-up of effort in
terms of stabilisation and reconstruction activity in these volatile
and hostile environments. Although the actual division of the
total amount of money has not yet been decided, and will be done
shortly, bids are under process, so planning is underway, and
the expectation is a major expansion of both activity and staffing
in Helmand. I think those who visited would have commented that
the size of the civilian presence in relation to the military
presence meant that there was a challenge on the civilian side
to keep up with and have a comparable effort with regard to what
we are trying to achieve in Helmand. Thus there will be a scaling-up
and the proposal is that the majority of staffing, as part of
the increase of staffing in the south, would be managed by the
Stabilisation Unit. One of the benefits of doing that for DFID
and the FCO is that the Stabilisation Unit could take on new terms
and conditions and duty of care arrangements which would enable
staff to get out alongside the military in a way that they are
not currently able to do on the current duty of care arrangements.
Again, I think you would have noted when you visited that current
arrangements limit the movement of DFID and FCO staff.
Q141 Mr Singh: I might be the only
person on this Committee who feels this but quite often I am bewildered
by the terminology that comes out from the development industry.
Mr Alexander: Do not worry, I
am the Secretary of State and I feel the same way!
Q142 Mr Singh: We went to see a school
just outside Kabul which I think was a new school and that was
called "development", but if you rebuild a school or
reconstruct a school that is called "stabilisation".
I am not quite sure where the difference lies between development
and stabilisation. The Prime Minister, for example, said the funds
would be "used to drive forward reconstruction projects and
provide expert civilian support to rebuild basic services."
That sounds like development to me.
Mr Alexander: I think there is
a key distinction which can be drawn which is not so much is a
brick laid outside Kabul different from a brick laid outside Lashkar
Gar, or anywhere else in Helmand, it is the context which is different,
in the sense that in these environments which are often hostile,
and certainly volatile, in circumstances immediately post the
kinetic phase of a campaign, then the skills of the staff that
you need to be able to work in that environment are often different.
The urgency and the need for immediate change can be different.
In that sense, in effective stabilisation work there is a clear
alignment between the military effort that has been expended and
the capacity to secure and sustain consent following that. In
that sense, I do think the more we have worked in Afghanistan
the clearer it is. In certain parts of the country—perhaps
the school that you visited—there is conventional development
work which would be recognisable in many other countries of relative
stability albeit desperate poverty. The skills mix that you need
to work in Helmand in immediate post-conflict circumstances are
different from running a conventional development project in a
country such as Tanzania. In that sense, there is a growing awareness
within government that we need to recognise the distinctiveness
not of the projects but of the skills that are required, the context
in which the work happens and sometimes the timescale in which
that work needs to be undertaken.
Q143 Mr Singh: So would you say that
this is a DFID rapid response unit?
Mr Alexander: I do not think it
would be for DFID alone to claim the credit for this thinking.
As I say, both internationally and within the British Government
in every department directly involved there is a recognition that
this is an area in which there needs to be competence and strength
developed. Conventional humanitarian support is familiar, we have
done it for many years, and conventional development work, whilst
challenging, is also familiar to us. However, given the growing
coincidence of conflict and poverty, this has to become part of
DFID's core business in the years to come because we will be called
on to continue to work in challenging environments.
Q144 Mr Singh: The Stabilisation-Aid
Fund can be drawn upon by other countries, such as Iraq for example.
Would money for Afghanistan be ring-fenced then or will it be
up for grabs for each country to draw on?
Mr Alexander: Allocations have
not yet been made by Ministers but I think there is a clear expectation
that, given the significance of Afghanistan in terms of our development
efforts and also the fact that the stabilisation needs are very
clear, not least in our own PRT area, that there will be a significant
call on those resources from Afghanistan. However, the allocations
have not yet been made.
Q145 Richard Burden: On that same
issue really, the way that both of you have described the Stabilisation-Aid
Fund its significance really should not be under-stated, but there
do appear to be an awful lot of potential calls on it, both in
terms of some of the physical projects that it could be being
used for plus the very major commitment, important though it is,
as far as building up staffing and support for staffing in places
like Helmand. I know exactly the kind of thing that Marsha was
talking about there. I do have something of a nervousness about
the quantity there. I understand that the allocations have not
been made but if we are talking about a £260 million fund
globally and you have got Iraq coming out of it as well, can we
be confident that there will be sufficient to meet the various
different objectives that we have been talking about?
Mr Alexander: I would start by
drawing quite a clear conceptual difference between Iraq and Afghanistan.
Iraq is a potentially much richer country than Afghanistan in
the immediate term. If you look at the oil reserves that are being
accumulated by the Government of Iraq, the principal stabilisation/development
challenge in Iraq is the capacity to spend the money, there is
not an absence of resource, and in that sense I think it is in
a different category from Afghanistan, albeit that there may be
specific calls on specific resources. I visited Basra and Iraq
late last year and on the basis of the conversations I had with
the Prime Minister and others, my sense is that there is a recognition
there that the challenge is to have resources to spend equally.
It is fair to acknowledge—given we have discussed the Americans
in the context of Afghanistan—that in the context of Iraq
through the commanders' resources there are very significant American
resources available for expenditure within Iraq. The real challenge
is to make sure that that money is contracted and that the money
is used wisely. In that sense, I would not regard the matrix of
the commitment to stabilisation in Iraq as being the size of the
Stabilisation-Aid Fund because it is in quite a different place
from Afghanistan in terms of resources.
Q146 Sir Robert Smith: In these military
engagements there is also a military compensation fund for damage
done during the military engagement phase. How is that integrated?
If a school is damaged by military action do you just get on with
it and then sort out whether it comes out of military compensation
or Quick Impact?
Mr Elliott: My understanding is
that the compensation fund remains completely separate from the
Stabilisation-Aid Fund, so it serves a different purpose.
Q147 Sir Robert Smith: But does that
have to be sorted out first before you get on with it?
Mr Alexander: With respect, if
it is helpful, I can get one of my colleagues in the MoD to write
to you on it. In the sense of where we are with the Stabilisation-Aid
Fund, we have not made the commitment of resources across country
or within projects. The governance arrangements are well advanced
across government. Ultimately the alignment of our respective
departmental expenditure lines with the Stabilisation-Aid Fund
rests with the host department and, in that sense, whilst you
raise a perfectly legitimate point, it will more likely be a matter
that will be being addressed by officials and ministers within
the MoD in the first instance to ensure that there is alignment
between what the MoD does, in the same way that our responsibility
is to ensure that the development piece sits comfortably and without
gaps alongside the stabilisation work from a different point of
view.
Q148 James Duddridge: I think we
all had great admiration for the DFID staff and particularly the
conditions under which they operated down in Helmand, but on a
professional level, one of the massive challenges was their inability
on a regular basis to get out and about. As someone who has worked
in developing countries before, you tend to only find out about
what is happening when you go and try and buy some fruit and veg
or you go into a shop and see what problems they have and what
is in the shop, or by wandering between places, understanding
security arrangements. The staff down in Helmand cannot do that,
it is absolutely impossible, so it is inevitable that there is
going to be a disconnect between what the community want and what
we are giving them, particularly over Quick Impact Projects where
decisions are having to be made incredibly rapidly. Whilst we
were in Helmand there were question-marks over some decisions
that had been taken. Invariably some of the decisions are going
to be wrong because they are quick and based on limited information
in difficult circumstances. How are you improving the Helmand
Executive Group's decision-making processes and ability to spend
money as effectively as possible in the way the community want,
given the constraints that you have talked about and I have noted?
Mr Alexander: It is right, of
course, as you say, to acknowledge the security constraints under
which DFID staff have to operate. It is also right to acknowledge
that there can be projects, the worth of which are disputed. I
was challenged by the BBC correspondent when I was there in terms
of money that had been committed to improving a local park in
Lashkar Gah. That being said, that is one of the consequences
of country-led development and local decision-making. If the decision
was reached by those within Helmand in authority, in discussion
with the local population, that this was what they wanted and
some work that needs to be done to facilitate markets for fruit
and vegetables to take place, then it maybe makes it a bit tougher
for the Development Secretary when he is in front of the BBC,
but ultimately the logic of that is true. I would not see the
biggest challenge as being simply the Quick Impact Projects ensuring
that there is strengthening within Helmand of provincial decision-making
and that is why we are supporting the idea in terms of saying,
"What can we do to strengthen local governance and accountability"
because consistent with a country-led approach I do not want to
be in a position where in the future the optimal circumstance
is that DFID staff are able to get out and about and meet people
at the market, although of course we want to see that, but to
be in a position where DFID staff can be talking to locally empowered
citizens who are deciding for themselves what are their priorities.
Do you want to say a little more in terms of the strengthening
of the provincial administration?
Mr Elliott: I would just say that
perhaps in the past decisions about where to spend Quick Impact
money may not have involved fully those who represent government
in that particular location but that is definitely not happening
now. Wherever decisions are taken about QIPs they are led by either
the local shura or the governor if it is within Lashkar Gah itself.
It is government, and there the governor advised by the provincial
council, making the decision. It is the appropriate representative
body for that particular body which is making the choices and
we are following through on those with regard to QIPs. Working
from that immediate reconstruction and what is the current arrangement
of QIPs, which will become the new SAF,[8]
beyond that, moving into obviously trying to get the national
government to outreach as quickly as possible and deliver some
of its national programmes into these locations, again establishing
some systems like CDCs[9]
through the NSP[10]
but making the decisions themselves about where the development
effort should go.
Q149 James Duddridge: You did mention
the ladies' park, which we did see, and in retrospect I personally
would say that probably was not good spend but at the time I am
not convinced that the wrong decision was made. Governor Wafa
made it very clear that was the project that he wanted, however
Governor Wafa was appointed by the President and does not come
from the Helmand area and does not have the credibility of a directly
elected individual. I cannot remember his exact words but I got
the impression that Governor Wafa felt that the provincial council
were there to do his bidding rather than listening to the provincial
council. Perhaps the Department will consider casting the net
wider and maybe beyond the provincial council, certainly beyond
the governor.
Mr Alexander: Your observation
reflects the historic and still contemporary weakness of sub-national
governance and that was why I mentioned the Independent Directorate
of Local Government. We are working continuously to try and strengthen
the capacity of sub-national governance, for example the provincial
councils that you describe. Having provincial councils does mark
a step forward, but I would not underestimate the work and challenge
on the fact that frankly their power, accountability and strength
is lumpy depending on where they are operating in different parts
of the country and we have got a long way to go.
Q150 James Duddridge: We met Mr Popal,
who talks a good game, but I am not sure how much credibility
he had. Certainly when we met with Governor Wafa he was quite
dismissive of restructuring sub-national governance. Are you optimistic?
Mr Alexander: As I say, there
is a long way to go but we recognise that it is one of the key
elements for the kind of future that the Government of Afghanistan
has identified. If you look at the work that is underway on the
Afghanistan National Development Strategy there is no doubt that
the capacity not just to deliver national programmes but actually
to align the service provision of the Government of Afghanistan
in the future with local needs is in part going to be contingent
on strengthening provincial councils and sub-national governance.
As I say, I would not deny that there are real challenges there
but it is important, and I am heartened by the recognition there
has been up until now of the importance. There is also a review
underway in terms of sub-national governance and looking at these
issues over the longer term, so we will see where we get to.
Chairman: As you know, the Committee
was in Afghanistan and we all visited Kabul and around Kabul,
but the Committee divided with four members going to Helmand and
three members going to Mazar-e-Sharif, which gave a somewhat different
perspective, and that raises a question from Ann McKechin.
Q151 Ann McKechin: Just before that,
I have one question I would like to raise about the importance
of getting out on the ground and finding the views and opinions
of local people. I was deeply concerned that DFID has no access
to female translators in their staffing. In one case when we visited
a project outside Kabul to speak to the local CDC we were completely
unable to communicate with the women involved in that CDC because
we did not have a translator. This seems to me an exceptionally
serious gap in our current resources and I wonder what attention
the Secretary of State could give to it.
Mr Alexander: The Prime Minister
himself recognised the need for there to be more translators and
tribal experts in the statement that he made to the House of Commons
towards the end of the year, and that is work which is underway
in alignment with the work that is also being done by the FCO.
More broadly, gender is an issue on which we have a very strong
focus within the Department for International Development in Afghanistan
but, frankly, it remains a contested issue and there is a great
deal of work to be done. I had the opportunity, and requested
the opportunity, to meet with a group of female parliamentarians
when I was in Afghanistan and heard directly the very harrowing
stories that they told me, for example their difficulty in returning
to their home districts from the capital, Kabul. I left my own
visit from Afghanistan with a very clear sense as to the importance
of us continuing to stay engaged on this issue of gender. On the
specific issue of interpreters, there is work underway and I note
what you say in terms of female interpreters. On the other hand,
it is a long but vital road that we are walking in terms of the
gender issue more generally in development.
Q152 Ann McKechin: Thank you. Perhaps
I could suggest it is given better priority. Coming on to the
position regarding the PRTs, the position in the north is certainly
not the same as in areas such as Helmand or Kandahar and when
we visited Mazar-e-Sharif, as the Chairman mentioned, most of
the primary security function has been largely fulfilled by the
PRT there. There seems to be a great lack of clarity about what
the role of the PRT should be in the north of Afghanistan once
their security objective has been fulfilled and how the civilian
aspects of reconstruction work can then be transferred to the
local state authorities. I just wonder to what extent there has
been any degree of discussion with the Afghan Government and with
the international donor community as a whole about what the plans
should be to cover this transition phase.
Mr Alexander: In terms of our
own PRT, of course, in Helmand it is civilian-led. The establishment
of PRTs was originally an American innovation and there are now
25 across the country led by 13 nations. They reflect the different
characters and challenges of the different areas in which they
work. I do not see PRTs existing forever, they are there to reflect
the particular circumstances that were encountered. What we are
essentially trying to do, and our partner nations are doing the
same, is to create the conditions in which government-led development
can happen. The rate at which that capacity develops will vary
from region to region in Afghanistan, not least because there
are very different security situations. At this stage I would
not want to prescribe how long the PRTs will continue in their
present form, that might be an issue to which the new UN Secretary-General's
Special Representative in the co-ordinating role we anticipate
they will undertake might turn their mind.
Q153 Sir Robert Smith: In Helmand
there was one other decision that was highlighted to us as maybe
a concern that is being addressed by increasing staffing and the
new arrangements. There was a school built in Sangin where the
concern from the development side was it probably was not the
right priority. There were two concerns and the education minister
lectured us at quite great length on the need to put money into
paying for teachers rather than building more schools. We wondered
if you knew how that school had turned out? Is the school now
active and are there teachers in place or have the worst fears
come to fruition?
Mr Elliott: I am afraid you have
asked another difficult question about a particular programme
that I do not have the answer to.
Mr Alexander: We will find out
and I will ensure a reply is forthcoming to you.[11]
Can I make a general point from your specific example, which is
I think we have to work harder to ensure that the recurrent costs
to which we are contributing as an international community and
as the UK Government through the ARTF is understood on the ground
in the sense that the risk of Quick Impact Projects is you lose
the impact of the other development spend that you are undertaking.
We have certainly found circumstances elsewhere where we have
had to explain to governors that in addition to specific identifiable
projects, like the building of a school, the teachers or doctors
or education salaries are actually being paid in large measure
because of international contributions. That is as true in Helmand
as anywhere else and it is one of our challenges, because I encountered
similar issues when I was there, to ensure that people understand
that in addition to the work that is being taken forward on Quick
Impact Projects there are also these recurrent costs being met
whether in that school or elsewhere.
Q154 Sir Robert Smith: We did visit
a very popular project which was the new wells that DFID had funded
and the water was extremely good, nothing happened to me from
drinking from the well.
Mr Alexander: I can vouch for
the same thing. I am not sure whether the presence of about eight-plus
protection officers from the Met inhibited the local population
from coming out and thanking me personally.
Q155 Sir Robert Smith: The local
population were quite enthusiastic but the next phase feeding
back was they were hoping something could be done about the irrigation
system because historically there was quite a good irrigation
system.
Mr Alexander: Actually, this World
Bank report that we jointly commissioned and undertook with the
World Bank that has just come on to my desk identifies irrigation
as being one of the key challenges in terms of building sustainable
agricultural alternatives to poppy. You are right, historically
there has been effective irrigation in parts of the country and
it was specifically identified by the World Bank study as being
an issue that we should look at.
Chairman: People are creating their own
demand. We were told in a school we visited that they were very
glad there was a school but they wished there were more science
teachers and immediately they were looking for a wider curriculum
and that creates pressure as well to deliver a better quality
rather than just numbers.
Q156 Hugh Bayley: I would like to
return to the private sector. In his statement to the House in
December the Prime Minister announced the creation of a new growth
fund which was a joint initiative between the British Government,
the Government of Afghanistan and the Aga Khan Development Network
with an initial £30 million capital and he announced an additional
£10 million for small loans to help women to start up or
expand businesses. My question is when will this money come on-stream?
Will it be part of the 2006-09 DFID spend or will its introduction
be delayed until 2009?
Mr Alexander: It is due to start
mid-2008.
Q157 Hugh Bayley: What is the intended
relationship between the fund and the investment window of the
ARTF?
Mr Alexander: The ARTF, as you
know, is one of the recurrent costs basically dealing with salaries
for teachers, doctors and others, the investment window being
for specific projects. More of the money that we are looking at
in terms of the Afghanistan Growth Fund will operate outside the
ARTF but will link closely to it, the Microfinance Project, and
also government spending itself. We need to build the capacity
of the Government of Afghanistan to create an environment in which
the private sector can work, and in that sense we are looking
at technical advice to the ministries of commerce and finance
and training of civil servants specifically out of the Growth
Fund and also working to see how we can secure further direct
investment.
Q158 Hugh Bayley: The culture within
the civil service I would say still draws a lot from the Soviet
command economy days.
Mr Alexander: Is this in DFID
or Afghanistan? I will pay a heavy price for that comment!
Q159 Hugh Bayley: I forget when the
Soviet occupation of London ended, it was much before my time
and yours, Secretary of State! How are you going to do this? Can
you give us some examples of ways in which you could actually
get the government looking at the private sector as a delivery
agent and in what fields might this be possible?
Mr Alexander: Firstly, it might
be helpful if I say why we alighted on the Growth Fund as being
necessary. Obviously economic growth is one of the three priority
areas identified for our work within Afghanistan as well as capacity
and livelihoods. That reflects the fact that although we have
seen very significant economic growth since 2001, present projections
are that the growth rate will fall from somewhere around 14% this
year down to 6 or 7% in the medium term. It has been 10% for the
last three years. Clearly, if we want to see both the capability
for jobs to be generated and, indeed, revenue to be generated
for basic services we need to do what we can to sustain economic
growth coming through. You are right in recognising quite how
difficult an environment it is for the private sector to work,
not just the security channels that we have discussed but also
the regulatory environment that is presently operating and also,
candidly, the private sector is under-developed. Although we are
in a position where your average rural Afghanistan citizen is
holding down a number of different positions in the course of
a year, and therefore has an entrepreneurial capability, this
is not a developed economy and has not been as a consequence of
more than 30 years of conflict. One of the key challenges, therefore,
is to help the government to understand what a government should
do to create an environment in which the private sector can operate.
It is not particularly glamorous to be paying for technical advice
for the Ministry of Commerce but if we want to ensure there are
people with sufficient capability to make the right judgments,
and informed judgements, about best practice as to what should
a regulatory environment look like, and what should a fiscal environment
look like, then we have to start with the basics and in that sense
part of this is building up the capacity of the government itself.
Secondly, and this bears on Ann's earlier point in terms of women
in Afghanistan, there is a huge amount of research indicating
that spending money on women not just within the economy will
yield stronger results over the longer term and in that sense
we are confident that micro-financing has a key role to play in
terms of stimulating basic economic growth, so creating an environment
in which the private sector can take hold, trying to fill that
investment gap at a local level, and looking at what we can do
to facilitate inward investment from international private sectors
and international sources of capital. The difficulty, not least
given the kind of headlines we have discussed about the insurgency,
is that potentially mobile international capital which could otherwise
find its way into Afghanistan simply will not for the time being.
We have got to help the Government of Afghanistan get a regulatory
and fiscal environment in which they are able to attract that
kind of capital in the future.
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Community Development Councils Back
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National Solidarity Programme Back
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