Examination of Witnesses (Questions 160-180)
RT HON
DOUGLAS ALEXANDER
MP, MR MARSHALL
ELLIOTT AND
MS PHILIPPA
ROGERS
17 JANUARY 2008
Q160 Hugh Bayley: Secretary of State,
do you agree with me that the private sector, and especially the
Afghan grown private sector rather than inward investment, is
necessary not just to drive endogenous growth, which aid will
never do, but also to provide goods and services which will be
likely to be less of a target to the insurgents than services
provided by the Government of Afghanistan, because there is conflict
over the legitimacy of the government from the insurgents' point
of view, in the same way that the Government of Afghanistan could
get health services out to contested areas of Helmand which a
USAID programme or a British aid programme could not? Do you not
think that there are some areas where services provided by private
entrepreneurs would be less of a target for attack by insurgents
than services provided by government agencies?
Mr Alexander: I was just trying
to reconcile my British commitment to public service ethos in
the National Health Service with advocating the privatisation
of services in Afghanistan. The point that you make in terms of
the centrality of endogenous growth—one should be careful
of using that phrase—jobs created in Afghanistan by the
Afghan population themselves, is absolutely right. It is right
because it is vital both for generating wealth and prosperity
and the provision of those services in and of themselves, but
it is also right, as you suggest, in giving people a stronger
stake in the future. I was reading a book over Christmas which
talked about what were the attributes of stability in countries
and one of them was a burgeoning middle class and it said middle
class is not actually determined by level of income but by whether
a significant proportion of your population lives in rational
hope. I think that is quite a good description of what we are
trying to do in development in a number of different countries,
which is to grow the proportion of the population who rationally
see that they have a future in the country and, therefore, are
less likely to be persuaded that future insurgency or violence
holds any real future for them. That has a very practical effect
in the immediate term in terms of the stabilisation work that
we are doing because when you were talking about the need to create
those jobs within Afghanistan what came to my mind was the fact
that in Musa Qala one of the immediate stabilisation priorities
is to provide work within that community, and I think the figure
is 10,000 jobs that are being looked at immediately. Whether it
is immediate in terms of the challenge of stabilisation, whether
it is giving a broader share of the population a sense of stake
in the future, or whether it is simply the wealth that will create,
for all of those reasons the creation of those jobs in Afghanistan
is absolutely key.
Q161 Richard Burden: The issue of
sub-national governance has been a recurring theme today and,
as we have already told you, we met Jelani Popal, the head of
the newly formed Directorate of Local Government. I would just
like to explore that issue a little further. First of all, when
the Prime Minister made his statement to Parliament recently he
announced UK support from existing funds for two new programmes
in support of stronger provincial and local government. One of
those was building up that Directorate and the other was support
for the National Solidarity Programme, the Community Development
Councils and so on. Could you first of all perhaps clarify for
us if you have the information available today and, if not, perhaps
let us have it in writing, the amount of funding that has been
allocated to the two programmes and also how it is split between
the two.
Mr Alexander: I have the IDLG
figure for you. We are providing in 2007-08 £1.5 million
to the IDLG, initially via the ESA Foundation which is working
closely with donors to see how collectively the IDLG can be best
supported. This initiative, as I recollect, is one from the President's
office and is looking at the issues we have already been discussing,
which is, notwithstanding the progress that has been made in establishing
18,000 CDCs funded through the National Solidarity Programme,
what is the future for sub-national governance. I certainly left
Afghanistan at the end of August with a very clear sense that
this was one of the key areas of vulnerability for the government
in the medium term, never mind the long-term, in the sense that
the capacity of Kabul to be identified with service provision
at a local level was contingent upon effective sub-national governance,
of which there was very little history. In that sense the alignment
of the shuras, the traditional mechanisms of accountability at
community or district level, with the model that was devised of
establishing CDCs funded through the National Solidarity Programme,
has made a lot of progress, but it is right given the weight of
expectation there is on the ability of sub-national governance
to be the principal service deliverer of those services delivered
from national government but at local level that the IDLG is looking
at. Do we have figures in terms of the National Solidarity Programme?
That would be part of the 80% of the money we are spending but
I am not clear how much of our funding of the National Solidarity
Programme finds its way directly to the 18,000 CDCs part of its
spending.
Mr Elliott: Just before finishing
on IDLG, although we are giving £1.5 million support to their
central national programme of developing first of all a national
plan, whilst you were there you will have recognised that the
IDLG has just been established with the mandate of formulating
a plan for sub-national governance and its roll-out. In the first
year it is a kind of planning phase for which we have given £1.5
million support. We have also given £2.4 million new support
as local government support in Helmand which is the provincial
council strengthening programme. There are two elements to the
beginning of our new phase of support to governance. We would
expect to do more once we have got the plan from ILDG later this
year.
Mr Alexander: The National Solidarity
Programme we fund through the Afghan Government. We should probably
give the Committee under the national programmes as to how much
we are funding through the National Solidarity Programme which
is the internal funding source for the 18,000 Community Development
Councils.
Mr Elliott: This is future support
that we are planning to put through.
Q162 Richard Burden: You could let
us have those figures in writing.[12]
Mr Elliott: We have not decided
new allocations under the new CSR[13]
period because the ANDS is being produced currently and as part
of the ANDS there is obviously a budget for supporting the Afghan
Government's development priorities and that is yet to be finalised.
The ANDS is due in March of this year and they will need to submit
to their own cabinet and parliament the budget for that and then
we, together with other donors, will need to determine how much
of our future allocation ought to go to specific elements of support
of the ANDS, including putting further allocation through the
trust fund instruments, of which the prime one is the ARTF which
in turn then gives money to the NSP. The budgeting for that is
not something for the future which has been completed yet.
Mr Alexander: As you can probably
tell by the answer—
Q163 Richard Burden: I think I am
following but in the next five minutes I will have lost that.
Mr Alexander: The expectation
is the National Solidarity Programme, which we contribute to through
the ARTF, will probably end in about 2009/2010, although that
is unresolved, but the expectation is that the National Solidarity
Programme will end. The issue of these 18,000 CDCs is itself contested.
In part, the IDLG established in the President's office is to
help clarify what will be either the successor or the evolution
of both the National Solidarity Programme, which itself has been
the funding stream to the CDCs, and where does the President see
that sub-national governance going. So, as Marshall's comments
reflected, it is a contested issue within the Afghan Government
at the moment which is why we can not be specific on how we are
funding the mechanism that will resolve it, but not yet, quite
what we will be doing in terms of the CDCs in the future. All
that being said, the evidence already from the CDCs, while it
varies from area to area, is that this is one of the key areas
that there needs to be progress on from the Government in Kabul
because it is the principal service deliverer of those national
programmes at a local level.
Q164 Richard Burden: Could I finally
ask you to say a little bit more about that. Whilst ultimately
the development of the plan for sub-national governance will be
a decision of the Afghans, and that is absolutely right, there
are contradictions there, are there not? As you say, the whole
role of CDCs is contested, about how they fit in the overall framework.
At one level we want to build up Kabul's writ in the provinces
to strengthen central government and its role, but at the same
time that has got to be responsive to forms of governance that
arise locally, whether it be through the shura system or through
the provincial councils or whatever. Presumably all around that
there are particular issues where those tensions could easily
come out of one particular element of that equation being criticised
for, say, talking to the Taliban and upsetting another bit of
it in doing that. What is your sense of the goals in all of that?
Accepting that it is ultimately their decision, do you have any
sense of the kind of framework you would like to see developing
out of this?
Mr Alexander: I think your last
point is where I will start and this needs ultimately to be a
decision in Kabul by the Afghan Government. In terms of the constitution
that was established in 2004, the only institution of sub-national
governance that was identified was the provincial councils. That
being said, we have already had one example cited of disagreement
between the governor and the provincial council in terms of relative
priorities of spending. We have been encouraged by some of the
examples we have seen, whether it be at provincial, district or
village level, of what can exist at a lower level, and in that
sense part of the conversation that I encountered when in Kabul,
and is still taking place, is how best to align the traditional
structures of authority at a local level, the shura principally,
with the CDCs which were invented and funded as a part of the
National Solidarity Programme. In that sense I think the real
issue of resolution in the months to come will be how best to
align the legitimacy and authority in the minds of the local community
with the shura, mindful all the time of the need for genuine accountability
and inclusivity there with having the reach of Kabul continue
to be extended into the provinces in terms of basic service delivery.
As I say, these are discussions that are ongoing, it is not a
matter that is resolved within the Afghan Government itself. We
hope in part through the funding that we are providing to the
IDLG that there will be an informed and useful conversation on
it and we certainly stand ready to participate, at the invitation
of the Afghans, in those ongoing conversations.
Chairman: One of the things that I think
it was Adib Farhadi, the Director of ANDS, said to us, was that
the problem with Afghanistan was that everything was a problem,
everything was a priority and everything was broken. We have a
problem ourselves with time constraints. There are still a lot
of areas which we hope to look at and I am going to ask colleagues
if they can be brief.
Q165 Mr Singh: Secretary of State,
one of the most important institutions in a democracy is a proper
functioning and accountable police force. Whereas we heard in
Afghanistan very positive things about the Afghan National Army,
we heard exactly the reverse about the Afghan National Police
Force. In fact, we heard that they were part of the problem rather
than part of the solution, and the President said as much to us.
One of the issues is about training and trainers, and the EU police
mission is being fairly slow in getting to grips with this or
in beginning to implement training programmes. What accounts for
that and should we be pushing more to get trainers in place and
get that EU mission moving more quickly? Secondly, there are divergent
views about the nature of the Afghan National Police Force. The
Germans are the lead donors on this and believe it should be a
civilian law enforcement institution, whereas the Americans think
it should have a counter-insurgency role and be part of the security
forces. Where does the British Government stand on that?
Mr Alexander: You are right to
recognise that there has been a lack of co-ordination and not
full alignment between the Germans, who were the G8 lead and then
the key partner of the Afghan Government on the police role, and
the Americans, so the Americans have put in very significant amounts
of resource and have a division in terms of having a paramilitary
force and significant numbers being trained to take that role.
I will ask Philippa to say a word or two in a moment about the
way forward on that. In terms of your specific question on EUPOL
and why the slow start, first I would say that there were issues
in terms of lack of procurement which slowed them down in terms
of security equipment, and also, candidly, a lack of effective
leadership. That is why we are determined, while respectful of
others' roles, to have a key role in EUPOL looking forward. I
think the Deputy Head is a UK appointee and we hope that, given
that a new mission head was appointed in October, just two or
three months ago, we will see a significant degree of progress
in terms of EUPOL. The target is to have 200 EUPOL international
personnel in place by next March.
Q166 Mr Singh: This March?
Mr Alexander: Yes, March 2008.
Ms Rogers: In terms of where we
go next or in terms of what the UK Government is doing, clearly,
as has already been announced by the Secretary of State, the problem
is that there is no coherent vision from the international community
and from the Government of Afghanistan as to what a police force
should look like. We in the UK have focused our efforts very much
on trying to drive towards some Afghan-owned strategy for that
police force which recognises that one size does not fit all and
that you need to have police that are ready and able to work in
permissive and less permissive environments, but I think you have
to retain a degree of realism. We are not the key partner nation
in this and in terms of our priorities, in terms of our resources,
this is perhaps, whilst a really important priority, slightly
lower than all the other very important priorities that are there.
Mr Alexander: Ultimately, in terms
of our vision, we would like to see the police being law enforcement
officers rather than soldiers with policing skills. To answer
your specific question, in terms of the way forward I think we
are pretty broadly aligned with our colleagues in EUPOL on that
but this is a matter of trying to align where we are with the
Americans who historically have had a somewhat different vision
in terms of the way forward.
Q167 Ann McKechin: The Ministry of
Interior has been described by one report as "corrupt, factionalised
and criminalised", and it was very difficult to get any good
opinion of that particular ministry when we visited Afghanistan.
How could donor governments collectively encourage the President
to fundamentally reform the ministry and is it possible that conditions
on donor assistance are an option, given the current remit of
most of the funds through the trust fund mechanism?
Mr Alexander: We are not the lead
partner nation in terms of the MOI and we do not have a bilateral
project working on MOI, although, as I have just said, we are
involved in EUPOL who are engaged on the issue of MOI. It was
an issue that I raised directly with President Karzai on one of
the occasions that I met him, and in that sense you are right
to recognise that there have been concerns expressed in terms
of the Ministry of Interior. Given the substantial American resources
that go into that particular ministry, I think it is important
that there are approaches made directly to the Government of Afghanistan
but also that we maintain a strong dialogue with the Americans,
given that they have been very central to the work in terms of
the security environment within Afghanistan, and in that sense
those discussions are under way as well.
Q168 Ann McKechin: I wonder if I
could clarify for the record—we are now coming to the justice
sector rather than policing per se—what contribution
has DFID made towards reform of the justice sector?
Ms Rogers: The FCO and DFID work
together to drive reforms in the national justice sector. We went
together, as you know, to Rome where both DFID and the FCO at
that stage pledged £2 million to drive national justice sector
reform. That is mainly to leverage other support from the rest
of the international community. Our stance on the justice sector
in Afghanistan has been that it is for the Afghanistan Government
to take this forward, to understand it. Like everything in Afghanistan,
it started off at a very low level, so it is going to take time
to get this to work, but we are very much of the view that we
do not make mistakes that we might have made in other areas. We
need to keep a focused international effort and the way to do
that is by supporting the Afghan Government in developing their
own justice sector strategy.
Mr Alexander: So, as the Government
committed £2 million back in July, that justice strategy
will in turn inform the Afghanistan National Development Strategy
which is due out in March.
Q169 Ann McKechin: I am sure you
appreciate that, given that the police act under domestic law,
the justice sector needs to be seen as key, but it did strike
me when we visited Afghanistan that people were very unclear as
to where the reforms in the justice system were going to go. There
is a formal state justice system which is incredibly patchy and
there are many allegations of corruption, and there is also the
traditional justice system used in communities based on sharia
law, and I have to say that we spoke to a number of parties in
the international community who kept mentioning words such as
"culture" and tradition", and seemed to fail to
recognise that the current system of law as operated is grossly
discriminatory to both women and children, who combined represent
70% of the population, and there seemed to be a failure of trying
to consider how Afghanistan is going to square its domestic law
with its obligations under international law, which it already
has contributed to. In that regard, in terms of the UK's contribution
to the justice sector, what are you trying to contribute to the
debate within Afghanistan about how they go forward on what are
clearly fundamental reforms which are required?
Mr Alexander: First, it is important
to give a sense of the nature of access to justice in Afghanistan
at the moment.
Q170 Ann McKechin: Yes, practically
none.
Mr Alexander: Approximately 80%
of access to justice is delivered through the informal system
and therefore one of the challenges the Government of Afghanistan
faces is how to align access to the informal justice system with
the international commitments that it has itself signed up to.
We have made clear our support for the UN articulated position,
which is to say that access to justice, particularly for those
in remote rural areas often who are reliant on the informal system
at the moment, can really be achieved by trying to combine the
best practices of the traditional existing institutions, that
is, their accessibility to the local public, with the modern justice
system as envisaged in the kinds of documents that we have been
describing. At a national level the donor assistance to which
we have contributed a small amount is aimed at strengthening the
formal systems and reconciling those tensions, although I do not
dispute that they are there, whether it be with the international
human rights instruments to which the Government of Afghanistan
is now a signatory, or Sharia Islamic law and Afghan customary
law, so I do not diminish the challenge, I do not diminish the
need to find a way forward. I do say we are very alive to these
issues. That is why, as I say, in part we assisted the Government
of Afghanistan in entering into its international commitments
and why we have in turn contributed a limited amount of resource
in terms of support, because we are not the lead partner agency
on it.
Q171 Ann McKechin: Secretary of State,
I got the impression from government elected officials and others
that this was a very long-term process which they saw as 20 to
30 years away, but I would ask you, particularly bearing in mind
the fact that over half the population are women and children,
how long the donor community and the people they represent in
turn are going to support funding a government which still allows
women to be put in jail for years simply because they did not
marry the person their family chose for them or they ran away
from home? It would appear to me that it does not get a sufficient
level of priority in terms of the international community's attention
to this matter. It seems to me that it has been downplayed at
every opportunity but yet it is an utterly appalling human rights
abuse which is occurring in this country but yet we are supporting
the government with millions of pounds of aid.
Mr Alexander: As I say, the Government
of Afghanistan has itself entered into international commitments
in terms of human rights and we welcome the fact that it has done
so. That being said, it seems to me that we do face real challenges
in terms of the commitment that we show to an Afghan-led approach
if we are at every juncture seeking to prescribe their processes
and the timescales by which the Government of Afghanistan operates.
We are ourselves determined in the efforts we are making as a
government and as a department to improve the lot of many desperately
poor women in Afghanistan, whether that be through improving the
security environment, whether that be through provision of basic
health services (and if you look at infant and maternal mortality
there are still desperately poor figures), or whether through
the provision of education, as I say, where more than two million
girls are now in school who were denied that previously in 2001.
I do not diminish the scale of the challenge but I do say that
this is one issue where we need to recognise that this is an issue
which has to be worked out with the Government of Afghanistan
rather than being in a position where we would be able to impose
a justice system on a government, or indeed a country, which historically
has seen the kind of discrimination that you describe.
Q172 Chairman: May I just reaffirm
what Ms McKechin has said, that we had a very robust exchange
of views with President Karzai on this matter. A slightly disturbing
thing he said was that the last leader of Afghanistan that tried
to take up the rights of women ended up dead. What Ms McKechin
is saying is something the committee feels quite strongly about.
The international community does have a right to say that there
are standards which there has to be real aspiration towards, not
hiding behind, "We have a different culture and it will take
for ever". I just would reinforce that.
Mr Alexander: I think that is
true. King Amanullah was who I was quoted when I asked the same
question in terms of rule in 1918, but it is also fair to recognise
that there was very significant resistance to the Communist regime
when they implemented changes, which I am sure at least many in
the international community would welcome in terms of procedural
equality. I think it is important to recognise that there have
historically been significant moves against the interests of the
position of women in Afghan society after there have been significant
advancements over the last century, and in that sense we need
to continue to engage in this vital dialogue with the Government
of Afghanistan to recognise that international standards do need
to be adhered to, but equally to be mindful that this has been
a very troubled road for Afghanistan to walk over a number of
decades.
Q173 Sir Robert Smith: The Prime
Minister talked about tackling the policing problem by increasing
"our support for community defence initiatives where local
volunteers are recruited to defend homes and families". What
is the thinking behind the communities self-defence programme?
Mr Alexander: First, I would not
in any way wish, and you would not expect me to, to resile from
the Prime Minister's statement, but, notwithstanding its presence
within the statement, I think it is important to recognise that
we are simply proposing a small-scale pilot project at this stage
that recognises the case for giving those local shuras the ability
to recruit members of their own community to assist with security.
It reflects the challenging security environment in which it works
and it really is an attempt to respond to the request we have
in turn received from the Afghan Government to work more closely
with the grain of Afghanistan society in combating insecurity.
It is being developed in full co-operation with the Government
of Afghanistan and international partners such as ISAF, but we
are at a fairly early stage in terms of developing exactly how
this will operate.
Q174 Sir Robert Smith: Is the idea
that they would be armed?
Mr Alexander: It is potentially
that they would be armed but we certainly would not be paying
for weapons or paying salaries to those bearing arms. In reality,
if you look at somewhere like Musa Qala, there are a number of
people, all of whom have weapons at the moment, who are part of
family or planned systems who could be persuaded by the shuras
to protect the community now that it has effectively been retaken
from the insurgents. This is a complex area but, as I say, we
are very clear that this needs to be led by the Government of
Afghanistan. We ourselves would not pay for the purchase of arms
for CDVs, nor would we pay the salaries of people to bear arms,
but on the other hand we do think it is necessary to explore how
we can secure the communities who are looking to be protected
from the kind of violence that is still prevalent in society.
Q175 Mr Singh: Does this idea of
community self defence have its roots in any way in the "awakening"
in Iraq and that kind of model of self-defence that it seems to
me is happening?
Mr Alexander: Actually, discussions
that we had with the Government of Afghanistan reflected an older
experience within Afghanistan itself of the Arbakai, which was
in one particular part of Afghanistan a more traditional form
of defence of communities, so no, it is more indigenous to Afghanistan
rather than being imported from elsewhere.
Q176 John Battle: A topic that I
want to raise is the poppy production, the heroin trade. I think
as a topic drugs and development almost merit a separate session;
it is a crucial area. I want to also connect it to heroin in Afghanistan
but also, of course, coca in Latin America, particularly Colombia,
and I wonder if we are joining up the script there. I might invite
you to qualify rather than resile from the Prime Minister's statement
that the route forward should be eradication. Crop spraying did
not work in Colombia at all, nor does spraying and burning necessarily
work. I just think with the strategy we keep going backwards and
forwards. The language of alternative livelihoods is there and
welcome but we have to suggest what it might mean in practice
and route it. One of the things that has happened, I think, in
the efforts to do that is that there has been a single crop replacement
solution. In Latin America, to draw the analogy, it was palm oil.
Can we go there? Will they get as much money for that as they
will for the coca? It is the same in Afghanistan. I understand
in Balkh province melons were one of the options as an alternative,
but it was not joined up because there was not the water supply
for the irrigation. In Colombia at the local level there are suggestions
now for what is called building a sustainable village, so you
build all the parts in of the economic rural alternative to displace
the crop. I am just asking can we start to push down that line
so it is not short-term one-crop replacement that a few wealthy
farmers benefit from? It might include looking at the Colombian
best examples where you grow the whole village which includes
the clinic and the education as part of the full package. I am
really encouraged by the World Bank's report on it because the
phrase in there is that "integrated programmes for rural
development are now proposed". Can we get on with them and
can we include agricultural extension services?
Mr Alexander: First, in terms
of was the Prime Minister suggesting aerial spraying or a variation
thereof, no, he was not. The position of the British Government
is again led by the Afghan Government but I am glad to say that
they are in the same places. Our view has been that aerial spraying
does not offer the way forward. Secondly, terminologically is
"alternative livelihoods" the optimal description of
what we are trying to do? No. I agree with you; I do not think
it is. It suggests a kind of binary, one in, one out, when in
fact it is a multi-faceted problem that needs to be engaged with.
Thirdly, have we yet reached a definitive view in terms of the
World Bank/DFID study that you reflected upon? No, we have not,
although I have had the opportunity to look at it, and in the
coming days and weeks we will be making policy determinations
on that basis. It will be quite quick though. There is a meeting
due in February, and by that point we will be in a position to
offer a formal policy position in relation to the paper, but I
have to say that it is no great secret that we have a great deal
of sympathy with the comprehensive vision of challenging opium
production that is articulated quite effectively within the document
that you cite. It is a complex problem, it is a long term challenge.
If you look at countries like Pakistan or Thailand we are talking
15 to 20 years for those countries to make themselves opium-free,
but at the heart of that complexity I think there is still quite
a simple calculation, which is that the task of eradicating opium
production is inherently more difficult where you lack security
and the rule of law, and in that sense how do you reconcile the
fact that we have seen an uplift in opium production in Helmand
while seeing a welcome move from six to 13 provinces opium-free
over the course of the last year in Afghanistan? I would say at
the heart of that complexity is the fact that if you have space
which is either ungoverned or contested it is much more difficult
to implement the kind of comprehensive approach identified in
the World Bank/DFID document.
Q177 John Battle: Eradication is
not just helicopters spraying from the sky, is it? What happened
when we had eradication in Latin America was that it was pushed
out of Peru but into Bolivia; it was pushed out of Bolivia and
is now in Colombia, so we keep going round, and I know security
is an issue but all our soldiers are there and, as was reported,
if they are on the front line in the Afghan poppy war, unless
we are getting on with the other bits --- I am just asking and
pleading for a bit of joining up with what is going on experimentally
on the ground in places like Colombia with communities to look
at new forms of integrated development to really displace it in
the longer term. We have still got the problem of people buying
it in Britain and in my neighbourhood, and that is another matter.
It is complex, but we seem to be permanently getting stuck in
the short term is what I am saying, in terms of it being a security
issue, not a displacement/redevelopment issue, and I am hoping
we can get to there quickly.
Mr Alexander: I agree and I do
not think there is perhaps as much divergence as the question
implies. I will maybe ask Philippa, because she leads on these
issues within the FCO at the moment, to say a word or two in terms
of the multi-pillar approach of the Afghan Government itself in
respect of which an announcement was made by the British Government
back in August 2007, but that does reflect exactly the multi-dimensional
nature of the development challenge that we face.
Ms Rogers: That is right. The
National Drug Control Strategy, which is the Afghanistan's Government's
own strategy, is just that. It is an eight-pillared full strategic
priority approach that recognises that in order to achieve a sustainable
reduction you need to bring those things together. You need to
enhance risk, you need to target people that are the traffickers,
the narco-traders, but you also need to enhance reward so people
that do not grow poppy understand that they have other forms of
supporting their families, and that is exactly the approach that
the UK Government is behind.
Mr Alexander: We will look carefully
at the recommendations, whether it is infrastructure, irrigation,
expertise in terms of agricultural produce. We are giving consideration
to that at the moment with our other international partners.
Q178 Chairman: Can I press you a
little bit further on that, Secretary of State? Those of us who
were in Balkh saw some of the practicalities there. We were in
a village which had a drinking water extension and, although they
did not tell us, we gathered they had switched from poppy to melons.
The melons, however, were not very successful, partly because
they were diseased, but they said that there was nobody advising
them on how to grow melons, how to treat them, in addition to
which they were not given the irrigation, which actually was not
to supply their crops; it was to feed the animals, which were
therefore dying. So having gone out of poppy they found themselves
in a worse state and the point that was made to us was that Balkh
may be poppy-free now but not for very long, and it was specifically
pointed out to us—is that not something DFID could do, work
with the Ministry of Agriculture in Afghanistan to help develop
an agricultural extension service that would enable those communities
that have come out of poppy to get real benefit from alternatives
that would give them an alternative income?
Mr Alexander: Your example seems
to reflect two challenges. One is production, as in can sustainable
irrigation and decent crops be provided as a means of sustaining
livelihoods, but also the distribution and sale of those goods
in turn: is there a functioning market? One of the consequences
of the profits that can be secured from drugs is that it is made
fairly easy for opium producers to sell their goods. The drug
dealers turn up, they purchase them at the site of production,
and in that sense that was really a lot of the thinking behind
the World Bank report which was how do we facilitate alternatives
and make it easier? In that regard we will, of course, study very
carefully the terms of the report. It would be wrong of me if
I were not to recognise that actually the Americans have been
the principal lead in terms of the Ministry of Agriculture and
in that sense it has not been one of our identified priorities.
The Afghans themselves asked for donors to prioritise three areas
a number of years ago but we will certainly study the terms of
the report very carefully.
Q179 Sir Robert Smith: I want to
join with the others on the committee in paying tribute to the
staff on the ground in DFID and the other civilian staff in Afghanistan
because the commitment they are making on the work to be done
and on what needs to be achieved there is great. To that end should
we not wherever possible be making sure that where barriers can
be got out of the way they are? The nature of Afghanistan is,
as we saw, an awful lot of mountain ranges and an awful lot of
difficulty in travel and the fact that DFID staff are reliant
on hitching lifts with the military puts that easy operation at
a disadvantage because, obviously, the military have sudden priorities
that mean that the best laid plans get thrown out of the window.
I understand there was a bid in from DFID and the FCO for a dedicated
civilian aircraft that would be at their disposal, and we had
the benefit of a borrowed aircraft from Customs & Revenue
when we were there, but the ability to get around in their own
time and at their own behest and the ability to take senior Afghan
officials with them would make their job a lot easier. I understand
the Treasury balked at the idea of this aircraft. What plans are
there to get it?
Mr Alexander: First, just let
me concur with your pride in the work that DFID does on behalf
of the British people in Afghanistan. You are absolutely right.
I think I have got, if not the best job, definitely one of the
best jobs in the country in terms of the privilege that you have
of seeing these staff, often in quite challenging circumstances,
doing extraordinary work. It just makes you incredibly proud so
I am grateful for those comments and I will make sure that they
are passed on. In terms of the aircraft specifically, you are
right: it has kind of rumbled around the system for some time.
There have been developments, though. First, the Foreign Secretary
agreed to the lease of the aircraft which I think some of you
at least used in 2007. In addition to that there is now consideration
being given to the Stabilisation Aid Fund funding of a fixed wing
aircraft for the future, though we have not reached the allocation
decision as we speak, but we will consider it. Also, in the Prime
Minister's statement at the beginning of December he mentioned
the fact that there will be additional Sea King helicopters provided
which will be available for use as well and potentially could
improve the civilian transportation. So at least the fixed wing
aircraft was put in place; you have used it yourself, and we are
actively considering whether the Stabilisation Aid Fund provides
a single basis on which a fixed wing aircraft can be there, and
even since your visit there is also the additional Sea King capacity
there.
Q180 Mr Singh: I am sure we were
all shocked to the core on Boxing Day when we learned about the
murder of Benazir Bhutto and the impact of that will continue
to unfold in Pakistan with elections coming. However, is there
likely to be any impact in terms of stability and security in
Afghanistan from Benazir Bhutto's murder? Has any assessment been
made?
Mr Alexander: Obviously, these
are issues which are under constant review, not least given the
presence of the scale of British forces that we have in Helmand
at the moment. The tragic death of Benazir Bhutto reflects the
continuing serious threat that is posed by extremism in South
Asia and we are mindful of that. One of the points that was made
to me by the force commanders that I met in Helmand was the inter-related
nature of the challenges in the Federally Administered Tribal
Areas of Pakistan, Balochistan and Waziristan, where there continue
to be real extremism challenges. However, that being said, we
should recognise that before Benazir Bhutto's tragic death there
had been some real progress made in Afghan/Pakistan relations
in terms of the Joint Peace Jirga that took place in Kabul in
August. That had just taken place when I visited, actually, and
there was a degree of cautious optimism at that point that that
held out a better prospect. I would simply make this observation,
looking forward, that while, of course, we continue to monitor
the situation and its potential impact on the cross-border activities
of those involved in the insurgency it is vital that we find a
way forward, both for Afghanistan and for Pakistan. When I first
visited the Pakistan/Afghan border three years ago in my capacity
as a then Foreign Office minister, it was demonstrated to me very
graphically that this is not a border that is widely recognised
by the local community. Quite often people have fields on one
side of the border and live on the other. There is a shared pasturing
heritage. In that sense we have a very strong interest in ensuring
not only that we bring stabilisation and development, working
with the Afghan Government on one side of the border, but also
that we are not in a position where the vulnerability of the other
side of the border continues to impact in the way it has in recent
years, so we are working very closely with our colleagues in the
FCO while events unfold in Pakistan. We, of course, monitor the
border very closely in terms of not least the protection of our
own troops, but we are clear that this is an inter-related challenge
and are trying to work on both sides of the border to address
it.
Chairman: Thank you, Secretary of State,
and your team for coming in to give us evidence. The evidence
we have had today and our own visit and previous evidence reinforce
the fact that it is a hugely complex problem. There is a huge
number of issues of every dimension but, as we said in our interim
letter to you, and we have not produced our report, the committee
recognises that Afghanistan is a place where the UK and the international
community should be and that we should recognise that it is for
the long term. We want the British people to understand the positive
reason for doing it and that it is a partnership with the Afghan
people and the Afghan Government. Without getting into anything
contentious, it is different from other arenas in which we operate.
I hope our report will reflect that and I hope it will make not
too many but worthwhile and constructive recommendations that
will help your department and the teams with their work. I think
we would all like to repeat very much the appreciation we have
of everybody that we have worked with in the preparation of this
report, in the Foreign Office and in the department, and indeed
the ancillary services, not least the close protection teams as
well. I think all of us would concur that it has been a fascinating
inquiry. The visit to Afghanistan itself for all of us was a much
more confused in some ways but positive experience than I think
many of us anticipated. It is a fascinating country. It deserves
to have a future, and anything we can do to contribute to that
we hope will be a positive contribution. That is certainly our
objective.
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