Examination of Witnesses (Questions 1-19)
RT HON
DOUGLAS ALEXANDER
MP, MR MARK
CANNING AND
MS SUE
WARDELL
9 July 2008
Q1 Chairman: As you can see, Secretary
of State, there is considerable interest in this evidence session.
Can I thank you very much for agreeing to come and give us an
update. I understand the pressures that were involved in this,
so we do very much appreciate the fact that you have been able
to agree to give evidence at this stage. For the record I wonder
if you could introduce your colleagues.
Mr Alexander: Of
course, and thank you, Chairman, for the opportunity to update
the Committee in terms of our work in Burma. If I could introduce
Sue Wardell, who is our Director of Europe, Middle East, Americas,
Central and East Asia Division—an extraordinary title—and
Mark Canning who, rather worryingly as our serving Ambassador
in Rangoon, just intimated to me this was his first ever appearance
before a select committee; I hope it will not prove to be his
last.
Q2 Chairman: Thank you. Obviously
we undertook, when we produced our report on the situation particularly
in relation to refugees and displaced persons a year ago, to update
that evidence, but in the intervening period of course we have
had significant civilian unrest and some very sharp repression
of that, and of course we have had Cyclone Nargis which has caused
a great deal of concern and, indeed, put the spotlight on the
regime in Burma. To some extent it has gone slightly off the headlines
and yet at the time it was in the headlines there were indications
of hundreds of thousands of people who we really did not know
anything about trapped in that Delta area, difficulties with access,
difficulties with visas et cetera. I wonder Secretary of State,
or Ambassador (or both of you) if you could perhaps bring us up
to date on what you currently see the situation as in terms of
casualties, in terms of how people are being are reached—if
they are being reached—and what is the situation on the
ground.
Mr Alexander: Of course; let me
begin and then I will ask Mark to follow up with his observations
from in country. Firstly let me assure the Committee that while
the glare of publicity may have moved on from Burma regrettably
to Zimbabwe and elsewhere it is very much at the forefront of
our continuing efforts in the Department and continues to consume
a significant portion of the time of officials and indeed the
engagement of ministers. I do not think the publicity at the time
of Cyclone Nargis was overstated or inappropriate given the scale
of the humanitarian crisis that afflicted Burma; it is easily
one of the worst humanitarian crises and disasters since the 2004
tsunami in South-East Asia. The International Red Cross estimates
that between 69,000 and 128,000 people died as a result of the
cyclone; the Burmese Government's figures now state that 84,537
people died and still 53,836 people are missing according to those
figures. According to UN figures some 2.4 million people were
affected with the loss of homes, livestock, crops, infrastructure,
health and other services and livelihoods; whole communities were
quite literally swept away in the Irrawaddy Delta region, families
were destroyed, children were orphaned, so there was undoubtedly
a need for a significant effort both within and beyond the country
and indeed those efforts continue, not least due to the structures
and mechanisms that have now been put in place. Only yesterday
evening I took the opportunity to speak again to John Holmes of
OCHA[1]
who is based in New York but will shortly be travelling to the
region, both to meet with ASEAN[2]
ministers and also again to visit the country himself. In light
of those conversations and what he was able to tell me in relation
to the latest flash appeal which will be launched by the United
Nations tomorrow, I am announcing today that we will be contributing
another £17.5 million in response to the disaster, which
means that over two months since Cyclone Nargis the British contribution
will be £45 million to the relief effort, which is the largest
single contribution of any donor. Perhaps, Mark, you would like
to add to that.
Mr Canning: I came back on Friday
and I was in the Delta a week before that, so fairly recently.
It has been nine weeks since the disaster or thereabouts and about
six weeks since the pledging conference which the Secretary of
State attended in Rangoon. We had that really frustrating initial
three weeks of obstruction and delay by the regime but we are
now in a significantly better place than we were. Relief is getting
into the Delta in more substantial quantities, WFP[3]
have been able to establish a pipeline to get supplies in. Access
to the Delta which was a key point, the ability to get international
workers in as well as Burmese workers in, has eased both for UN
staff and for international NGO staff. Many more are getting there
and they are able to get the necessary permissions considerably
more easy than was the case at one stage. You had the UN/ASEAN
mechanism established, what is called a Tripartite Core Group
(TCG), and that has helped to move forward a number of difficult
issues—the matter of the WFP helicopters, overturning the
really unhelpful guidelines that the government established for
permissions and organising and conducting a very thorough assessment
of the situation in the Delta. There are still huge scale needs
down there; the village that we visited by helicopter had had
little bits of assistance, they had had rice and oil from the
World Food Programme, they had been visited by MSF[4]
Holland and those who needed it given medical treatment, but the
shelter situation was very, very bad, living in extremely tough
conditions and bearing out the assessment that there is a long
way to go in terms of meeting that need. I was able to see also
when I was down there a lot of the work that DFID has been doing.
So overall we are in a better place than we were or we feared
we might be, but there is plenty to be done still.
Q3 Chairman: Thank you for that. Obviously
at the time there was real concern about the lack of co-operation
from the Burmese Government. There were many people who literally
had nothing—no food, no safe drinking water—and there
were real concerns that people would suffer from starvation, disease,
particularly the vulnerable, the young and the old. Are you saying
that that has not materialised on the scale which was feared if
at all, or are there significant areas of the Delta that are still
not really being accessed? Indeed, is there still potentially
significant bad news to come out of the Delta or, conversely,
do you feel that the situation is under control? In that context,
perhaps, is the co-operation from the regime now at such a level
that you feel you can reach people, that access is being provided
and the information as well as the aid and assistance is actually
getting through both ways?
Mr Alexander: Perhaps we could
divide the answer. Let me speak in terms of our latest assessment
of the situation on the ground and then ask the Ambassador to
speak in terms of the engagement of the regime through the TCG
mechanism.[5]
Clearly, cyclone survivors do remain at risk weeks after the cyclone;
thousands remain homeless with basic shelter and no certainty
of being able to regain any sort of livelihood. The tarpaulin
sheets that we were distributing, I was heartened to hear when
I was briefed by the Ambassador, are now very visible in many
parts of the Delta and can be seen when over-flying in a helicopter
or visiting on land. As far as we are aware there have not been
further widespread deaths or outbreaks of disease, which is clearly
one of the factors we were most concerned about given the limited
access immediately following the cyclone. Many of those who survived
by and large still survive, thanks to the inbuilt coping capacity
of those local communities: the Irrawaddy Delta was itself a very
marginal community and was a very deprived community prior to
Cyclone Nargis. The interim joint assessment by the government,
by ASEAN and by the UN team reports that 33 % have no food reserves,
22 % of the population have one day's worth and 23 % have two
to seven days' worth of food. In terms of health almost 23 % of
households have reported psychological stress, 11 % have received
support for that; in relation to water and sanitation 74 % of
households report inadequate access to clean water; and open defecation
has more than doubled following the cyclone. In relation to shelter
more than 57 % of houses have been severely damaged and in relation
to agriculture 75 % say they do not have enough seeds, this of
course being the planting season; 57 % of arable land was not
flooded and so can be planted, but 76 % say they do not have access
to credit to allow them to purchase seeds, so the needs are very
considerable. As I say, I discussed the situation with John Holmes
of OCHA last night and to draw out the headline messages from
that conversation there are continuing concerns in relation to
the food pipeline and in particular the capacity to sustain the
level of food that will be necessary in light of the type of figures
that are described and, secondly, there are continuing concerns
in terms of logistics, the capacity to be able to provide both
a land and water-based bridge to access the level of support that
is actually required. There have been significant improvements
since we got the WFP helicopters in, there is a greater movement
towards water-based access now but talking to the experts on the
ground and to John's team there is continuing concern in terms
of logistics. In terms of what the £17.5 million that I will
be announcing today will actually purchase, we would expect that
that would principally be focused on logistics and on food.
Mr Canning: On the regime's attitude
and approach you had that initial period up to the UN donor conference
which was characterised by delay, denying there was a problem,
obstruction in many cases. The situation since the Tripartite
Core Group became operational has got much better, there is now
a system for processing these permissions. There have always been,
since near the beginning, a considerable number of national NGO
staff going into the Delta but the key issue was always the international
staff and the UN staff and that was very difficult, but it has
improved considerably. I would characterise it as fragile, I do
not think we should take it for granted, but at the moment the
system is working reasonably well. You are still getting anomalies,
one is still hearing reports in particular of Burmese people being
turned back at roadblocks, for example, and occasionally you will
get examples of international staff being refused permission,
but overall it has improved.
Mr Alexander: Perhaps I could
just make a couple of other points given your specific query in
relation to access, which was very much the focus of a great deal
of concern in the international community, of which I was part
and which formed the basis of the remarks that I made at the conference
that I attended at the invitation of the Secretary-General. Prior
to the cyclone we are aware of only two international NGOs working
in the Delta region and as of 7 July the latest OCHA estimate
is that more than 270 United Nations international staff and at
least as many international staff from NGOs have travelled to
affected areas, the vast majority of which have obviously travelled
since that conference took place. In terms of the speed and volume
of visas that are now being granted by the regime to international
aid workers, during the past five weeks over 400 visas have been
approved by the TCG mechanism that Mark described, the delays
of a few weeks have in many cases now been reduced to three days
and we have of course those 10 WFP helicopters which have been
allowed to enter the country between 22 May and 10 June. We were
categorical in our condemnation of the regime's unwillingness
to allow free and unfettered access immediately both for aid and
aid workers, while we would of course continue and do continue
to press the regime to address all of the anomalies that Mark
describes and for further progress to be made. It is right to
recognise that there has been a significant change post the conference
that took place, which I attended on behalf of the Government.
Q4 Chairman: Supplementary to that,
the Evening Standard yesterday said that the State newspaper
said the government issued 1,670 visas to foreigners of the UN
and NGOs, half to work in storm-hit areas. Is that in accordance
with your information, and perhaps related to that if you think
of other disaster areas that is still not a huge number, is it,
in relation to what is required?
Mr Alexander: The obvious benchmark
that I was using, given that I was a serving minister in the Foreign
Office at the time of the tsunami, was the scale and pace of the
international response to the tsunami, and there was simply no
comparison in the immediate days and weeks following Cyclone Nargis
with the willingness, the openness and the effectiveness of the
international response following the tsunami. That being said
I do not know the genesis or the authenticity of the Evening
Standard's figures but certainly I am very happy to look into
the matter that you describe. The figures as I say that I have
are OCHA figures as of 7 July which was 270 UN international staff
and at least as many international staff from NGOs operating within
the affected areas.
Chairman: It is comparable but it is
not the sort of numbers you would normally expect.
Q5 Mr Crabb: In terms of how well
aid and humanitarian supplies are being distributed to the people
who need it most in the areas most affected what evidence have
you seen of members of ethnic groups being disadvantaged in receiving
that aid. Is there active systematic discrimination going on?
Mr Canning: We have seen no evidence
of it. I am not saying it has not happened, but we have not seen
any evidence of it and we have been making fairly exhaustive efforts
to try and chase down the many stories that one reads about the
diversion of X and Y. I have to say we have not got any of those
stories so far to stand up but, as I say, this stuff is likely
to be happening somewhere but we have not picked up that particular
element.
Mr Alexander: One of the other
features perhaps distinctive to Burma is that there is no reliable
data on the ethnic composition of the population in the Delta
with which we can work while assessing these stories, but we know
that there is a substantial Karen population, particularly in
the worst-hit townships. Suffice to say that the aid which we
give both the United Nations and the international NGOs funded
by DFID is distributed according to the principles of impartiality
and that is one of the jobs that our teams working with Mark have
been doing, they have been assessing it and if we find any stories
of where aid has been diverted they are examined. Again, one of
the encouraging points in the briefing I had with Mark on his
return to London was the fact that he had been chasing down any
suggestions that there were materials to be found in markets or
elsewhere. Happily, that has not proved to be the case.
Q6 John Bercow: Should the UN concept
of "responsibility to protect" have been invoked in
Burma, Secretary of State, to "impose" assistance despite
the resistance of the regime?
Mr Alexander: There was a judgment
which had to be made by the British Government and in turn by
other members of the international community. The right basis
for that judgment was what would save the maximum number of lives
in circumstances of the humanitarian disaster that had afflicted
that affected country. While we were supportive of all steps being
taken at the United Nations to bring the maximum degree of pressure
on the regime to allow that free and unfettered access, it is
equally right to recognise that in the conversations and dialogues
we had, for example with the NGOs who were operating on the ground,
they were not convinced of the case for aid to be either air-dropped
or for an international force to fight its way into Burma because
they judged that that would itself divert the very significant
efforts of the regime towards the defence of their own sovereignty
and away from what we were determined to do, which was to focus
as much of the international effort, allied to whatever we could
garner from the Burmese population, towards the efforts to save
lives.
Q7 John Bercow: I listen to that
with the greatest of interest and I wonder whether in this context,
Secretary of State, you agree with the Foreign Secretary—I
feel sure that you must but it is as well to have it on the record—that
the concept can be applicable in the context of natural disasters
and does not apply only to situations of armed conflict.
Mr Alexander: The responsibility
to protect is limited in scope to four criteria, as I am sure
you are fully aware and I am certainly sure the Foreign Secretary
is aware: genocide, war crimes, ethnic cleansing and crimes against
humanity. That does not preclude the possibility that those circumstances
could emerge in circumstances involving a natural disaster.
Q8 John Bercow: I understand that
notwithstanding the representations of Bernard Kouchner and others
a judgment is made, a pragmatic judgment—I am sure you are
not laughing at Bernard Kouchner, I cannot believe that for a
moment, Secretary of State.
Mr Alexander: Not for a moment.
Q9 John Bercow: I am sure you would
not dream of doing any such thing—he has been a considerable
force on this matter—but I am interested to try to draw
you just a little bit on what if any representations you made
directly or indirectly to the Burmese regime following some of
those earlier incidents of outrageous behaviour in the immediate
aftermath of the cyclone. Those of us who cast our minds back,
including members of this Committee, to your Parliamentary statement
to the House—on a Thursday if I remember rightly—will
recall that you were in statesmanlike mode—we do not always
as backbenchers have to be quite so statesmanlike because we do
not occupy your high office, Secretary of State—but for
the avoidance of doubt do you not share the view that following
the agreement with Secretary-General Ban Ki Moon it was quite
outrageous that for some period after that, for at least a week
after that, European aid workers were still having their visas
turned down?
Mr Alexander: Yes. Let us cut
to the chase, with the greatest of respect, Chairman. I am unyielding
in the condemnation that I have offered to the Burmese regime
in terms of their unwillingness to allow immediate unfettered
access for aid and aid workers. In that I stand four-square not
simply with the Secretary-General or Bernard Kouchner, but with
my own Foreign Secretary, Prime Minister and others in the international
community. Equally, I look back on those tense and difficult judgments
with a degree of pride as to the role that the United Kingdom
played because we were clear—I can well recollect the telephone
conference calls I had with the Prime Minister, with the Foreign
Secretary and others in reaching this judgment—that we needed
to ensure the maximum degree of unanimity amongst the international
community in our condemnation of the regime and clarity as to
what the international community expected of the regime in these
circumstances. Equally, simply to condemn the regime for conduct
that we regarded as wholly unacceptable was not itself sufficient,
given that lives were at stake and every day that was lost to
the international community's efforts would potentially involve
the spike in mortality that we wanted to avoid. That is why quite
early on, indeed in the days immediately following the cyclone,
we essentially developed a strategy which said we will be united,
along with our colleagues in France, in the United States and
elsewhere, in seeking to bring the maximum degree of pressure
to bear on the regime through whatever bodies are available to
us. I sought the Presidency of the European Union to convene a
meeting of development ministers with the specific intention of
ensuring that Europe's voice was heard speaking with rigour and
clarity on this issue, through our permanent representative at
the United Nations we were party to conversations with our colleagues
in P5[6]
and the other members of the Security Council, we were from the
outset determined to ensure a strong and unequivocal message of
condemnation, making clear the international community's expectations
but, equally, we were also working to say how can we best facilitate
immediate access in a way that will yield the results that we
all want to see in terms of lives being saved. That is why, perhaps
even to a greater extent than our colleagues in France or the
United States, we were immediately engaged with our colleagues
within the ASEAN network, the regional partners, urging and imploring
them to take a lead in providing a mechanism whereby the international
community's efforts could effectively be harnessed along with
the United Nation's capabilities to ensure that access. Really
from the outset that was what we worked towards, unanimity of
view in the international community, the emergence of an ASEAN
solution which would allow the kind of figures that we are now
describing of international aid workers with access to the Delta.
I can assure you that Britain was as active in working with the
ASEAN countries as we were in our condemnation along with other
countries including France and the United States of the actions
of the regime.
Q10 John Bercow: Secretary of State,
the last one if I may on this with the indulgence of the Chairman.
I absolutely accept that denunciation is not enough; it has to
be accompanied by effective action, so we are at one on that and
you have every right to trumpet the steps that you have taken.
I was a little concerned when Mark Canning said a few moments
ago that it had been quite difficult to stand up some of the reports
about diversion of aid and so on, and I hope that that difficulty
in standing things up does not apply more widely. Therefore, for
the avoidance of doubt it would be quite helpful if you would
place on the record today—whether you have done so before
or not—your acceptance of the point that has been made,
for example by the Burma Campaign, that in the immediate aftermath
the regime set up show camps to try to give the impression to
the world that they were taking action. Cyclone survivors were
brought to those camps in advance of visits by international visitors
such as EU officials or the UN Secretary-General, but as soon
as the visitors left survivors were forced back to their devastated
villages. I should hope that it will be possible in broad terms
either to confirm that charge or to seek to repudiate it. I hope
it is in fact wrong, but I have a suspicion on the strength of
the Burma Campaign's rather good record of recording evidence
on these matters that it is right.
Mr Alexander: I cannot speak in
relation to individual camps but certainly we were receiving reports
prior to the conference of the fact that international visitors
were being taken to very specific villages to evidence a scale
of response which was not reflected widely across the other parts
of the Delta. It was in part for that reason that I resisted the
invitation, which was extended to others who were attending the
conference in Rangoon, to participate in a government-sponsored
visit to the region because it did not seem to me appropriate
for a Secretary of State for the United Kingdom to be party to
the kind of vulnerability of propaganda that was being offered.
Mark, you were in the country at the time.
Mr Canning: I do not mean to suggest
that things did not go on, they did, but what I do say is that
in many cases we made very active efforts to go to particular
markets or shops where we were assured that items were on sale
such as WFP high energy biscuits. There was one story that Australian
roofing products were on sale somewhere—this was before
they even arrived in the country. So it is a complex mix of fact
and in some cases fiction. It almost certainly went on but perhaps
not in all the cases that one has read about.
Ms Wardell: If I could just add
to this, because I was one of the people taken on one of these
tours when I got to Burma the weekend after the cyclone hit to
go and see how things were going. I was taken to a camp in Bogolay—it
was in a football field—and what was absolutely striking
to me was that it was pouring with rain and very, very muddy but
there were no footprints and no worn paths where refugees had
been walking about. I looked inside the tents and there was no
mud in the tents; I went to the water point and there were no
footprints around the water point so it was obvious that if people
had been there they had not got there long before we had because
we made the first footprints in that camp. As the Ambassador says,
it is impossible to know the extent of these camps being set up,
but certainly some were although we do not know the full details.
John Bercow: Thank you very much indeed.
Q11 Hugh Bayley: Whose authority
would be required in a case like this to invoke the responsibility
to protect?
Mr Alexander: It is ultimately
a matter for the Security Council. Because, if I recollect, Burma
is not a signatory to the International Criminal Court, it would
need a chapter 7 resolution in the Security Council; ultimately
it would be a matter for discussion in the Security Council.
Q12 Hugh Bayley: So it would be vetoable
by the vetoing powers. Were there any conversations with other
members of the Security Council about whether it was necessary
to gain a Security Council Resolution in favour of, shall we say,
air drops on this particular occasion?
Mr Alexander: There were continued
discussions sometimes at the initiation of the French, sometimes
at our request with the partners within the Security Council,
but I think in diplomatic parlance there was no consensus in the
Security Council in terms of this action being taken.
Q13 Hugh Bayley: Looking back at
your experience of those conversations or your officials' or the
Ambassador's conversations, do you think that part of the problem
is that the definition of what represents a crisis of a kind that
demands a responsibility to protect response is too narrow? Should
there be for instance a specific reference to "failure to
meet immediate humanitarian needs"? In other words, should
the definition be amended?
Mr Alexander: I think my training
as a lawyer in Scotland makes me hesitant to seek to rewrite the
legal definition of "responsibility to protect" on the
basis of this single experience.
Q14 John Bercow: Go on, Minister!
Mr Alexander: What I would say
is this: there was clearly divided opinion on a range of different
matters. There is of course an issue as to whether the response
of the regime, the denial of access to aid workers and to aid,
fell comfortably on all fours within the four defined categories
set out on responsibility to protect. Secondly, there are issues
in relation to whether the Security Council itself was the appropriate
body to discuss these matters, and there are differences of view
within the Security Council on that. Thirdly, there were honest
discussions and divergences of view as to what would be most effective.
Even if there was legal surety in terms of its applicability,
there was still a second judgment to be made as to whether in
the circumstances the invocation of responsibility to protect
and the consequent action that would follow would save more lives
or cost more lives. I have not got the minutes of the conversations
between the Permanent Representatives in New York in front of
me, but I think it is only fair to recognise that it was not simply
a question of the applicability, be it too narrow or too broad,
it is a broader issue as to in what circumstances can you get
the maximum degree of aid to the maximum number of victims of
the cyclone.
Q15 Mr Singh: Secretary of State,
you mentioned in your introduction the pending launch of a flash
appeal but could I take you back to the appeal launched by the
World Food Programme in early May, which was urgent and critical
and in Times Online the country director of the
WFP in Burma said: "The use of helicopters, trucks and boats
will grind to a halt by the end of this month"—that
is June—"unless we get the additional funding now."
I understand that only 60 % of that funding has been pledged,
which is about $30 million, of which £10 million has been
given by DFID. What are the consequences of the other 40 % not
being pledged? Who is not putting their hands in their wallets?
Mr Alexander: You can imagine
that this is a question I have asked both colleagues within the
Department and discussed with the United Nations. In fact I understand
that 60 % by comparison with other previous flash appeals is not
by any measure the lowest level of funding that has been received
and the 60 % itself, although we would wish the figure was higher,
does allow for further responses to be received. Our principal
concern, as I have sought to reflect in my earlier answer, is
that the food pipeline which is presently in place and continuing
to function would be imperilled unless there are further donations
towards the flash appeal. After discussions with John Holmes,
I have only this morning written to a range of like-minded development
ministers urging them to offer generous support to the flash appeal
that will be launched in New York tomorrow, which incorporates
and folds in the continuing requirements of the WFP. Whether that
is in direct food aid or whether that, as we have described it,
will be continuing support for logistics, we are actively working
on our international networks to encourage other countries to
step up to the plate. As I say, we are comfortably at the moment
the largest single donor. I think there has been historically,
for very understandable reasons, a caution and concern in terms
of being able to supply support effectively to Burma. One of the
challenges on the basis of the operation of the TCG is to convince
other international donors that they can have confidence in the
WFP distribution systems and the mechanisms that the aid they
will commit is received by people affected directly by the cyclone.
Q16 Mr Singh: In terms of the $50
million that is required, humanitarian aid, it seems to me, is
going to be long term or longish term to the people of Burma.
How long will that $50 million last or the 60 % of $50 million?
How long will it support the programme?
Mr Alexander: Josette Sheeran
is a very effective director of the WFP, and she has sustained
operations to date by effectively borrowing internally within
the WFP to make sure that the food supply continues. In terms
of logistics unless there are further efforts made there, those
will grind to a halt in August, so it is fairly imminent, and
in that sense that explains the urgency of letters going out from
us and the lobbying that is being directed. There will be a further
meeting involving development ministers this coming Friday and
Saturday in the Netherlands at the invitation of Bert Koenders,
the development minister there, and we will take that opportunity
to further lobby European partners to ensure that both in terms
of logistics and in terms of food we do not see a break in the
pipeline that needs to continue to flow.
Q17 Mr Singh: And how much is the
new flash appeal by the UN intended to raise? Will that also be
used to support the logistics of the World Food Programme or does
it have a much wider remit?
Mr Alexander: Yes, essentially
the flash appeal is a revised appeal which incorporates the continuing
funding requirements of WFP. As I say, we have committed £17.5
million today on the basis of the flash appeal. I do not have
the exact figure as to what John Holmes is looking for tomorrow.
It is probably more appropriate for John to announce it, but his
request to me was "Please act effectively as a cheerleader.
If you are able to make a commitment quickly, it will act as an
incentive for other donors to join us once the appeal is launched
tomorrow."
Q18 Richard Burden: When we wrote
a report on Burma last year the DFID budget for the country was
about £8.8 million and one of the points that we made there
was that even though that was a substantial amount of money, if
you compared it to other countries with similar levels of poverty
and appalling human rights records, it was just a fraction, about
a fifth of the total that is allocated to Zimbabwe for instance,
so we came to the conclusion before Cyclone Nargis or anything
like that that what was required was a quadrupling of assistance.
The good news is that DFID doubled the budget but why did you
feel it appropriate not to quadruple it in the way we suggested,
given the comparisons elsewhere?
Mr Alexander: I will resist the
immediate temptation to answer a question with a question—I
will come to my question in a moment. Firstly, you are right to
recognise the extent to which Burma is under-aided and that was
drawn out fairly forcefully in the report that was written with
comparisons being made in the region with Laos and more broadly
with Zimbabwe, but it is important to recognise this did not just
happen; this was a consequence of the very particular political
and historical context of the international community's view of
Burma. There was a very forcible campaign led to ensure that aid
was not provided to Burma in the early 1990s which meant that
there was an effective drying up of international support. When
this Government came to power, if I recollect, the level of aid
was approximately £250,000 from the UK's point of view. Indeed,
the Burma Campaign's statement of 2006 made clear that there was
a fundamental change taking place in terms of a previous position
of saying aid would potentially support the regime to a position
where there was a recognition of the humanitarian requirement.
Therefore when I came to the Department last July very carefully
and respectfully, as you would anticipate, I read your report
and discussed it with officials. I have to say I looked carefully
to establish the basis on which the recommendation had been made
that there should be a quadrupling between now and 2013. The terms
of the report, if I recollect them from memory, indicated that
there had been a quadrupling in recent years, therefore we should
quadruple the number again. With the greatest of respect to this
Committee, that is not the basis on which I generally make funding
decisions.
Q19 Chairman: To be fair, Secretary
of State, Mr Burden has made the point that we were looking at
Zimbabwe and making the comparison of saying if we applied the
same criteria that it would be four times as much. It was not
just a random calculation
Mr Alexander: Yes but, with respect
we do not generally use Zimbabwe as our benchmark in terms of
determining levels of aid or assessment of aid.
1 UN Office for the Co-ordination of Humanitarian
Affairs Back
2
Association of South East Asian Nations Back
3
World Food Programme Back
4
Me«de«cins sans Frontie«res Back
5
The Tripartite Core Group Back
6
The Permanent Five-China, France, Russia the United Kingdom and
the United States Back
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