Examination of Witnesses (Questions 20-39)
RT HON
DOUGLAS ALEXANDER
MP, MR MARK
CANNING AND
MS SUE
WARDELL
9 July 2008
Q20 Chairman: No, all I was saying
is I think there was a little more of an argument.
Mr Alexander: Our assessment of
aid is based on a range of criteria, for example the absorptive
capacity of the country, our ability to be sure that the money
will be used effectively, and in that sense I accepted the Committee's
argument that said that this is a country which is desperately
poor where, by any measure, the level of deprivation is a great
concern to all of us far beyond the country: a third of the population
living on less than 30 cents a day and with TB, malaria and HIV
as very serious public health concerns. We had already in the
Department anticipated prior to the publication of the report
an increase in DFID's programme expenditure within Burma. I took
a view that the responsible course was to make that significant
uplift in the period during the Spending Review, to take the opportunity
to visit the country myself, or at least the cross-border areas
which had been the subject of much commentary in the report, which
was an opportunity which I took in January, and to keep the situation
under review. Frankly, in purely political terms it would have
been easier for me to tick the box and say we have quadrupled
to 2013. It would have been an opportunity to deny the Opposition
the opportunity to say this Government is doubling, we are quadrupling,
when in fact on a straight line projection doubling takes you
to quadrupling, if we were to continue the rate of increase that
we have started. I simply say to you that the rationale for me
taking the decision to double under this Spending Review period
rather than quadruple to 2013 was based on what I judged to be
the best advice I was receiving in terms of the ability to take
forward an increase in expenditure in a way which gave us the
best assurance that the money would be spent properly. I have
to say that of course in terms of the money that we have now committed,
in addition to the anticipated £18 million (compared to the
approximately £9 million we were spending before) that is
now dwarfed by the humanitarian support that is being offered,
and I would fully anticipate, in light of the undertakings that
I gave in the House, that we would consider increasing the scale
of money and keep the situation under review, and that we may
well be in a position where we seek to move even quicker than
I anticipated when I spoke in the House given the reconstruction
needs of Burma following the cyclone. In that sense I think we
are at risk of turning a relatively small distinction as to whether
there is a commitment to reach a figure over a longer period or
a trend has been set into a bigger divide between us than actually
exists. As I say, I would fully anticipate that in light of the
continuing assessment work which will be taken forward not simply
in terms of an OCHA assessment of humanitarian need, which is
being carried out at the moment, but also a longer term view as
to the reconstruction needs, in the months ahead I will give consideration
as to its implications in terms of how best we can expand our
work within Burma. The final point that I would make—although
I am conscious colleagues want to come in and I would ask Mark
to speak on this issue—is that there has been a significant
change in Burma in terms of the engagement of the international
community and the international donor community as a consequence
of Cyclone Nargis and that itself potentially, although it is
as he says a fragile situation, would be a material consideration
in terms of the rate at which we could increase our programme
expenditure in Burma. Hear me when I say that I have no prejudice
against increasing our rate of expenditure in Burma more quickly
if we can be confident that we can do so in an effective manner,
and I have to say that the signs since Cyclone Nargis would argue
that we may be in a more benign environment in terms of the assurance
that we would want than we were even three, four or five months
ago.
Mr Canning: One of the interesting
long-term effects of this is going to be what it does to the humanitarian
space in Burma which has been very constrained; it has been a
difficult environment in which to work. For all the difficulties
at the outset of this particular episode, the fact is now that
a lot of international NGO workers and a lot of NGOs are doing
good work down in the Delta, people like MSF, CARE, Save the Children,
many of them are down there, and I think that may have a number
of effects. I think it may perhaps build trust in terms of the
regime's view of foreign NGOs and what they are doing. I think
it may perhaps give them a sharper sense of what they are capable
of delivering themselves and not capable of delivering. I think
we need to be cautious. It is not going to be clear exactly how
this plays out but I think there is an opportunity to perhaps
expand a little that space in which they have to operate.
Q21 Richard Burden: I fully understand
that it is only wise to take account of issues such as absorptive
capacity and the environment in which you are operating, and clearly
Cyclone Nargis has provided a very tragic but new dimension to
the situation since then. But taking your point about reviewing
matters, could I perhaps press you a little more on the form that
will take and when it will take place because the current programme,
excluding the Cyclone Nargis money, goes through to 2011, as I
understand it, in three tranches. In the meantime the other thing
that we need to take into account is the massive rise in food
prices, commodity prices and so on, which itself will be reducing
some of the purchasing power and monetary effectiveness of the
increases that have taken place. When is the review going to happen?
You mentioned within months; is that the kind of timescale you
envisage?
Mr Alexander: Let me answer in
three parts. Firstly, if there needs to be immediate action taken
in the light of rising food prices we will act, and that is why
we have already increased for example the support to TBBC.[7]
We have increased funding by 30 % in light of continuing concerns
that were put to us in terms of cross-border work. Secondly, and
I say this with the greatest of respect to the Committee, it is
not a comfortable position to be in where there is a recommendation
for the quadrupling of aid to say we are simply going to double
it. I ask you simply to hear my views in terms of why we made
the decision. It is hard to overstate—perhaps Zimbabwe is
the best example—a more challenging, riskier or complex
environment in which we attempt to deliver UK aid than in Burma
given the very clear politics of the situation that we know. There
are inevitably limitations on the ability of potential partners
to absorb funds, but we are used to dealing with absorptive capacity,
and I think, to be fair, it is probably the very peculiarities
of Burma which mean that it is necessary that we act decisively
but also tread carefully. We work around central government in
Burma whereas in many other environments we work more directly
with governments, and even within Zimbabwe we work directly through
the United Nations, and again it is analogous, and it is a difficult
and challenging environment in which to work. We also need to
work extraordinarily carefully to ensure there are not unintended
benefits to the regime as a consequence of how we spend our aid
money. It was that combination of circumstances that made me weigh
in the balance the ability to say listen, as an incoming Secretary
of State I will simply quadruple the money, but not in my own
mind have the degree of assurance I wanted from officials that
we were not inadvertently supporting the regime, we were not in
a position where resources were being diverted, where often it
is extremely difficult to monitor how aid is being used effectively
within particular countries and where, as in every country in
which we operate, there needs to be a degree of rigour, so in
that sense it would seem to me that to double the aid over the
Spending Review period in the context which, happily, as the Ambassador
has suggested, has changed somewhat in the last two or three months,
was the right course to set. In terms of whether this is a vague
undertaking from the Secretary of State that we will review it
at some point and somehow seek to fob off the Committee, I promise
you that is not the case. Partly we are awaiting a more comprehensive
assessment of the reconstruction needs of the country. Given the
fact that the regime was keen to assert that they were already
in the recovery phase when we were categorical, on the basis of
the limited access that we had, that there was still urgent humanitarian
need. We need to be respectful of the fact that there is a sequence
there where there is a stage for looking at issues of reconstruction
but it was not at the time of the conference. That work will happen
fairly quickly and Sue and the Deputy Director will be visiting
Burma in August and I would expect that we would be in a position
in the autumn to be able to set out the judgments that we have
reached in terms of the potential additional funding that may
be allowed in light of both greater need and the greater humanitarian
space for action that the Ambassador describes.
Ms Wardell: I think the other
development which has happened over the last year is that one
of the difficulties and challenges facing us was what are the
modalities with which you can spend money and really have an impact.
I know one of the pieces of work which this Committee talked about
last time was the Three Diseases Fund. That was a very, very novel
initiative aimed at trying to scale up not just our assistance
but get other donors involved in tackling some of the major killer
diseases in Burma. The first annual review has taken place. It
is seen to be working and to be having impact and it is therefore
a model that we are now thinking we are going to try in the livelihood
sector. We have also got some modalities which mean that the potential
is there and we could possibly scale up faster. Clearly we are
going to look at what we need to do for the recovery, but also
we need to look at other parts of the country which have not been
directly affected which also are incredibly poor.
Q22 Chairman: Can I say as Chairman
of the Committee, Secretary of State, that I think you have given
us a very fair explanation and response, which we appreciate,
and in reality the end game may well be exactly what we hoped
it to be. The only thing I would say is that we did take evidence
to test whether or not our recommendation could be absorbed and
the information we had from various sources was that it could
be. I just want to stress that we believed that it was an achievable
objective and not just a random idea to put a lot more aid in.
I think you have also given us a very fair and detailed explanation—
Mr Alexander: And that may prove
to be the case.
Chairman: --- which I think is both reassuring
and helpful and I would suggest we should be encouraged by that.
I am going to bring Robert Smith in.
Q23 Sir Robert Smith: Just following
on to pin down beyond 2010 when you are looking to increase the
funding. There is the general trend of funding to do with the
whole of Burma and the operations in Burma, the Three Diseases
fund, building on your experience with that, and then there is
the funding for the reconstruction from the cyclone. Do you see
those as two separate streams and will the cyclone eat up the
money that would have been coming in for the growth of general
support across Burma?
Mr Alexander: As I hope myself
and Sue have managed to communicate, firstly of course our standard
programme expenditure moving from £9 million to £18
million is wholly separate from the additional £17.5 million
that I have announced today and the humanitarian resources that
we have committed, but you are right in recognising that if you
are an impoverished villager in Burma the fact that you have now
got reconstruction needs on top of basic health or education needs
is little comfort if the same money is being used twice. We would
certainly be looking both at reconstruction needs and whether
there is scope to increase our existing programmes, with the focus
on livelihoods and education and on health.
Q24 Sir Robert Smith: Secondly on
the reconstruction, a recent NAO Report on the UK response to
the South Asia earthquake suggested that DFID should be planning
better the transition from support for relief to support for reconstruction
following disasters. Have you had a chance to take on board the
NAO's concerns? Are you able to apply those lessons that were
learned from South Asia to Burma?
Mr Alexander: I was in Pakistan
last week and took the opportunity to visit the areas affected
by the earthquake there, and in many ways that is at the front
of my mind at the moment as we anticipate the transition from
humanitarian to reconstruction phase in Burma, not least because
the Pakistan experience is now widely seen as an exemplar in terms
of managing that transition. Indeed, the Pakistan Government were
telling me that they are already sending staff to China in terms
of what lessons can be learned. As I say, the distinctiveness
in Burma has been the determination of the regime at a very early
stage to assert that they were already in the reconstruction phase.
We took that as being indicative of the fact that they wanted
to somehow present to the international community that they had
been capable and willing to address the immediate humanitarian
concerns of the population on their own. We simply did not accept
that suggestion by the regime and indeed that has been borne out
by the assessments that have been taken forward by OCHA since
they have had greater degrees of access. In that sense there is
a different transition under way but we are of course mindful
of NAO Reports and in that sense the work that we will be doing
as a Department in the months ahead will reflect the lessons and
insights that were gained.
Chairman: Can I just say, Secretary of
State, there is a letter from me to you about the situation in
Pakistan raising one or two concerns about the position there.
I just say that for the record because you will probably get it
tomorrow and wonder why I did not mention it. I think some people
do not see it as quite as exemplary as you suggest.
Q25 Mr Crabb: A few moments ago Mark
Canning mentioned the changing humanitarian space is I think how
you described it, in Burma. You spoke of a growing building of
trust between the NGOs and the regime. In that context, are you
able to say how many NGOs operating in Burma have signed a memorandum
of understanding with the regime? To what extent do you get sight
of those memoranda of understanding before they get signed off
on the part of UK NGOs? Have there been any memoranda of understanding
that have caused you any concern before they have been signed?
Mr Alexander: Perhaps before the
Ambassador answers, there is one point I would be very keen to
get on the record before we leave the conversation on reconstruction,
which I hope would find sympathy with the Committee, which is
a distinctive feature again in terms of Burma. We will have certain
very clear red lines when it comes to the reconstruction effort,
in the sense that I would not want British taxpayers' money being
spent on roads which facilitate the ability of Burmese troops
to oppress their own population. Whether it is roads, whether
it is bridges, whether it is major infrastructure projects likes
dams, we will not be in a market for them regardless of what assessment
is provided. On the other hand, in relation to livelihoods and
the ability of farmers to be able to start planting seeds or basic
health and education, those are issues that we will give consideration
to. Sorry, Ambassador.
Mr Canning: The only honest answer
is I am not sure. It is a requirement that NGOs have MoUs. Whether
we have got a comprehensive list, do you know, Sue?
Ms Wardell: No.
Mr Canning: I can try and find
out for you.
Ms Wardell: We can write to the
Committee.[8]
Q26 Mr Crabb: As a matter of course would
you get to see any of these draft memoranda of understanding before
they are signed off where they relate to UK NGOs?
Mr Canning: Not unless an NGO
came to us to ask if it was the same as others had signed.
Q27 John Bercow: Perhaps it would
be a good thing if there were an attitude of willingness to engage
with you on that matter so that one could see whether some sort
of common standard was being observed. I confess I am slightly
perturbed by the answer to Mr Crabb and we might want to take
that further. Leaving aside, Secretary of State, the specific
issue of doubling versus quadrupling, your explanation for your
judgment on which has been extremely clear and forthcoming, and
recognising that people do not always get what they want and have
to settle for a share of the cake, can I put it to you, as I think
I have done in private exchanges before, that there does seem
to be a nagging gulf between the welcome commitment that you yourself
display at every turn, on the one hand, and the sense on the part
of a number of the Burmese organisations operating for example
on the border, but also exiled groups operating from the UK, that
on the ground officials frequently remain at best indifferent
to their representations and at worst hostile. The review document
has been produced that you have kindly circulated to the Committee,
which we did receive only yesterday, and I am advised, Secretary
of State, that the TBBC and Christian Aid (rather significant
players in the field) were not allowed sight of the draft, which
is arguably a little unfriendly, and we could pursue that. I am
also advised that these people on the border describe the attitude
of the consultants working for DFID, and in some cases I think
DFID staff as "arrogant", "rude", "patronising",
"not really listening", "not interested in what
we had to say", "came with their own agenda" and
"just going through the motions because of the MPs' report".
I know some of these characters operating on the border. They
are very robust, they put up with no end of privations, and they
are not unduly sensitive flowers, although they are people of
passion and commitment who I greatly respect. Why do you think
that they have got such a negative view of DFID staff on the ground
and of consultants hired to act for your Department?
Mr Alexander: With the greatest
of respect, I am reminded by the tenor of your question of a very
interesting book that I read called Don't think of an Elephant!
which is written by a very eminent Californian psychologist and
is about the psychology of the electorate, and it says that once
a psychological frame is established, once facts are offered which
are counter to the psychological frame, the facts are rejected
rather than the psychological frame. I say simply that I am clear
in my direction to the officials in the Department that I lead
as to what I expect them to do. In light of the report that this
Committee issued, we have moved decisively. I have myself travelled
to the camps. We have increased significantly the frequency with
which visits are undertaken to the camps, both by DFID staff and
by Foreign Office staff. We have moved decisively to fund a range
of particular organisations which previously did not receive funding.
I myself have met both on the Thai-Burma border and in London
with these groups and in that sense I feel that one needs a sense
of proportion in recognising the relative gains that have been
made in the course of the last year relative to regrettable, but
perhaps continuing, concerns in relation to relationships. I simply
give you my word that I could not be clearer with my own officials
as to the priority I attach to this. It was not a comfortable
report to read last July nor was your article in The Independent,
and in that sense I moved decisively to take the requisite action.
That being said, when I read for example the statements that you
made in the House in the debate in which you said: "I know
that people will suggest it is only 100,000 people who can be
reached by cross-border aid; numbers do not matter when people
are suffering to that degree of privation", with the greatest
of respect, I would disagree in the sense that for me to be able
to do the job, numbers do matter, and in that sense we are constantly
in circumstances in DFID where need is greater then resource,
and where on a daily basis in London, never mind on the Thai-Burma
border, we are encountering worthwhile, decent, honourable organisations
which are seeking to secure greater levels of financial support
than we are in a position to be able to provide, and in that sense
I can assure you that there is a genuine willingness on behalf
of myself as the Secretary of State to take forward the work which
we have begun in the course of the last 12 months. I will ask
Sue to say a word in terms of the particular circumstances of
the timing of the review that has been produced because there
are very particular reasons why it only came to the Committee
yesterday.
Ms Wardell: We do apologise for
that. There were two circumstances there. The first was we did
commit to do the review in the last quarter of last year but unfortunately,
because of the September uprisings, our staff were obviously focused
on that and so it was not an appropriate time to do it. Eventually,
we got the teams out there in February/March and the first draft
of the report out. Then we had the cyclone, and so again I had
to divert staff from finalising the review to finish off the report.
We have written to TBBC and others today— we wanted to get
it out to you and send it out to them—inviting them to meet
and to come and discuss the report. We see the report as the start
of a conversation. I think I should make this clear. A report
by the EU was issued at about the same time. The conclusions are
fairly similar, which we think is quite helpful. What we want
to do now is use that report to move the dialogue forward, based
on facts, and to try and build a much better relationship than
there is. I know that since September my staff have visited Thailand
at least once a month and had meetings with groups that work in
the Thai border areas. I think there has been an improvement in
the relationship. It is something I myself have been trying to
encourage. My Deputy Director has visited three times. We are
in a different place to where we were last year. Certainly, in
my view, this report was delayed because of those circumstances,
but the key thing now is to use the report as the basis for a
constructive dialogue so that we can try to improve the situation
for the refugees. It is very clear from that report that we cannot
continue the situation as it is.
Q28 John Bercow: Chairman, I welcome
what Sue Wardell has said, complementing what the Secretary of
Sate has said. One does not want to personalise this but I am
bound to say that (a) I accept that there has been some progress;
and (b) I think I am probably the last Conservative Member of
Parliament who could possibly be accused of being excessively
hard on the Government of the day; indeed I have been criticised
as being too accommodating of the Government's position and too
willing to recognise its point of view.
Mr Alexander: I would say "hear,
hear".
Q29 John Bercow: I think we agree
on that, Secretary of State. Could I put this to you: do you at
least accept, without committing to any particular decision today
and recognising that you support your staff—you would be
a strange Cabinet Minister if you did not—that where the
well has been poisoned in terms of personal relations between
significant players on the ground, in terms of officials on the
one hand and organisations bidding for support and active in the
territory on the other, it would at least be politic to consider
whether, for example, a given highly experienced, talented and
long-serving official might usefully be asked to apply his experience
and talents and commitment to serve in another location, if it
is manifestly clear that he does not enjoy the trust of the people
on the ground?
Mr Alexander: Firstly, we have
talented and experienced staff who are women as well as men. You
said "he".
Q30 John Bercow: Or she; that was
just my grammar.
Mr Alexander: I would certainly
put Sue in that category and in that sense I will ask her to speak
to the management challenges. I think it would be an invidious
circumstance for a Secretary of State to be in.
Q31 John Bercow: It was not a she
I had in mind, as you know, Secretary of State.
Mr Alexander: Let me finish the
point I am making. You simply will not tempt me or draw me into
condemnation of individual officials; it is not my style and it
will not be my style. That being said, I think again one needs
to move beyond assertions of wells being poisoned and look at
some of the facts. Since the IDC report, we have received six
requests for funding from exile groups and we have agreed to four
of them. Three proposals, by the Shan Women's Action Network,
the Mae Tao Clinic and the teaching training college for Burmese
teachers, have been funded directly, and we followed up a fourth
with an implementer in country; the fifth proposal was for cyclone
assistance, which we have not funded because we want to concentrate
our cyclone funding on groups closer to the most affected areas.
In terms funding, there has been a step change since the IDC report.
As I say, I myself have visited; the number of visits that have
been taken forward by staff speak for themselves. Whether it is
in programme expenditure, work cross-border, in terms of moving
to ensure that there is a staff member based in Bangkok, which
was a judgment I reached following my visit to the camps in January
to be able to take forward exactly the relationships that you
describe, I think DFID has done all the right things in recent
months in terms of the actions that were anticipated by the committee
last year. Given the perilous waters of management issues rather
than political issues, I will let Sue conclude this part of our
conversation.
Ms Wardell: Could I add that I
recognise that there was an issue last year. I think we have moved
to a different space; I think there is still work to be done and
a bit of hangover that still needs to be worked through. One of
the things that I am proposing to do when I go out in August is
spend some time talking to the groups in Bangkok, just to get
their views on how the relationship has changed: is it any better,
what are the problems, if there are still issues let us try to
work on a practical solution. We are very conscious of this, but
I do not think that moving on certain individuals is the answer,
particularly because we have some really dedicated, high quality
staff. I think I know the member of staff you are referring to
and I rate that person extremely highly, as I think do some of
your colleagues.
Mr Alexander: For completeness,
may I just say that if you look at the work that our staff have
done, particularly in country following Cyclone Nargis, they are
quite simply the best of British, and it is a privilege for me
as Secretary of State to work with people of that ability.
John Bercow: Thank you for that and may
I say I am most grateful to you.
Q32 Mr Crabb: One of the very appalling
aspects of the behaviour of the regime in the immediate aftermath
of the cyclone was their decision obviously to press ahead with
the referendum. It was exactly at that time that you, Secretary
of State, were very concerned that there should be no restrictions
on access to humanitarian workers going into Burma. Is there any
truth in the observation that there was almost an exercise of
self-restraint on the part of your colleagues in the Foreign Office
in not speaking out strongly against the decision to press ahead
with that referendum to ensure that you could maximise the chances
of access for the workers? Do you follow the point I am making?
Mr Alexander: No.
Q33 Mr Crabb: Concern was expressed
that there was an inhibition on the part of Ministers to condemn
in strong enough language the decision to press ahead with the
referendum at a time when obviously they were seeking to ensure
minimum restrictions on workers going in.
Mr Alexander: No, I do not accept
that at all. I will allow Mark to speak to that for the Foreign
Office. David Miliband was equally robust in his condemnation
of the idea that a referendum should take place. I attended the
conference which took place in Rangoon the day following the referendum
having been conducted in large parts of the country. I had met
the Secretary-General of the United Nations the previous evening
in Bangkok, and indeed had desisted from travelling to Bangkok
until there was a personal conversation between the Secretary-General
and the Prime Minister at which the Secretary-General said that
it would make a material difference to his mission if the British
Government was represented at Cabinet level. On the basis of a
personal invitation from the Secretary-General, I travelled to
Bangkok, and so it was not coincidental that the Secretary-General
was out of country on the day that a referendum was taking place,
which the whole international community regarded as being not
just illegitimate and inappropriate but wholly wrong in the circumstances
that were still afflicting the country. As it turns out, and Mark
knows Rangoon far better than I, of course on the only occasion
on which I visited Rangoon I gave BBC interviews standing on the
steps of the hotel where the conference was taking place and over
my left shoulder you could see Aung San Sui Kyi's house in University
Avenue. Even while I was in country, I was taking the opportunity
to make the case that we felt needed to be made for not simply
the humanitarian progress that we wanted to see, but a recognition
that the reason Burma has been so impoverished in recent decades
is not because it need be a fundamentally poor country but because
of the gross mismanagement and mis-governance that the regime
has visited on it. Mark can speak on that for the Foreign Office.
Mr Canning: I would only add that
our views of the referendum and the so-called road map of which
it is part are a matter of record. We believe it is not going
to achieve progress; it is not going to achieve national dialogue;
it is a divisive rather than a healing experience. No, it is a
sham.
Mr Alexander: I have some form
in this, having served in the Foreign Office at the time of the
tsunami. I took the opportunity to call on the ASEAN ambassadors
at the time because I had responsibility for South-East Asia and
implored them to speak out. It is formulaic but true that whether
it be in relation to Burma or Zimbabwe, often regional players
have more influence than countries, however concerned we are,
at a distance from the immediate conditions in the country. I
have to say I made very little progress at the time. That was
back in 2004. I took the opportunity on that Friday evening, as
well as meeting with the Secretary-General of the United Nations,
to meet with Dr Surin, the Secretary-General of ASEAN. That reflects
a continued dialogue that is taking place between the British
Government and regional partners. I do think it is significant
that no ASEAN country has taken the opportunity to acknowledge
and congratulate the Burmese regime on the conduct of the referendum.
I simply pose the question as to whether, had it not been for
the level of international engagement and unanimity of purpose
that there has been in recent months, regrettably we might otherwise
have been in a position where at least some within the region
were willing to accept an exercise which we regard entirely as
a sham as being somehow legitimate.
Q34 Mr Crabb: Can I come back for
a moment to the funding point? Do you detect on the part of any
donors still a reluctance to provide aid, even through the NGO
route, into Burma because of the political situation there?
Mr Alexander: I think it is difficult
to make sense of the level of under-aiding that Burma has suffered
over decades, without reference to the particular political circumstances
in the country. I do think that real progress has been made in
recent years, thanks in part to the work of DFID and also to Mark's
work in the Three Diseases Fund, because that has proved to be
and is proving to be an effective mechanism by which not simply
the United Kingdom but other international partners have come
to feel a greater degree of confidence as to their ability that
aid money can be spent effectively in country in a way that does
not bring unintended benefits for the regime itself. Perhaps the
most glaring example is the United States who have not fundamentally
changed their position in relation to longer term development
for Burma as a result of taking a robust position, which we share
in terms of our foreign policy objectives towards Burma, but they
have taken a different course than we have taken in terms of seeking
in recent years to increase development expenditure at the same
time.
Mr Canning: I would only add that
we do believe it is possible to work within the country within
clearly defined red lines, which we have always respected. We
would like to see, particularly within the Three Diseases Fund,
us broaden the number of donors that are on board for that.
Q35 Hugh Bayley: Unlike you, Secretary
of State, and unlike many members of this committee, I have never
been to Thailand or to Burma. You have explained why you took
the decision that it was necessary to put staff back into Bangkok.
I am sure the committee approves of that decision. Without having
been up to the border, if the idea is to ensure that your Department
knows what is going on, what is being said, what the conditions
are, how British aid is being used on the border, what consideration
has been given to basing your officer on the border rather than
miles away in Bangkok? Maybe it is a practical matter which the
ambassador should answer.
Mr Alexander: It is quite a long
border, and in that sense simply having a presence on a border
is not itself a guarantee, given that the border straddles China,
India and Thailand and elsewhere. In that sense, even if you were
physically located at one point of the border, that of itself
would not be a guarantee. Secondly, of course, Bangkok is itself
a regional hub in terms of transportation. We should not forget
that Rangoon is only about an hour away on a plane, and in that
sense our Head of Office in Rangoon has been a regular visitor
to both Bangkok and also to the border regions. Thirdly, given
the responsibilities that I directed our staff to undertake out
of our embassy in Bangkok, I think those are better done in Bangkok
than elsewhere, because it is not simply to establish relationships
with those organisations that are working cross-border; it is
not simply to be in a position where you can facilitate visits
from people travelling from within country or further afield,
like Sue going in the autumn, but it is also to ensure that there
is more effective co-ordination of the international donor community
response, most of those organisations being based in Bangkok rather
themselves being based on the border.
Q36 Hugh Bayley: One other staffing
question: in response to the cyclone, you had to deploy staff
quickly to Rangoon, your staff, and assemble a team based here
in London to respond to the crisis. How successful to you believe
your Department was in deploying staff at short notice and are
there human resources lessons that need to be learnt from that.?
Mr Alexander: Firstly, we were
very keen to get started in the country as quickly as possible
and the constraint was not internal to the Department but was
actually our ability to secure visas and access for an assessment
team. The first visas for the team were secured by Friday, 9 May
and the team flew out on Saturday, 10th. My recollection is that
that was a team of three who went out immediately. Again, if you
compare that with the Pakistan earthquake or the tsunami or elsewhere,
if anything, we would have anticipated a larger UK-based presence
going to the region more quickly. That being said, of course we
will in the longer time review the work that we have undertaken
in terms of how we manage our response to these crises. I would
make the following observations. I would say, firstly, we did
staff up very quickly our operations as we were able to access
visas in terms of a humanitarian team getting on the ground, who
incidentally are still there supporting the ongoing programme
work within Rangoon itself. Secondly, even before we were able
to get access to the country, we were looking at what we could
do to support OCHA and others. When I flew out to the conference
in Rangoon, as I say, I had had a day's meetings in Bangkok when
I was briefed by OCHA because at that point they were still based
in Bangkok and were able to give me an assessment there. Within
the office itself, it was the first major humanitarian crisis
with which I had dealt as Secretary of State. In some ways therefore
my analogue was not previous humanitarian crises but the experience
that I had in the Department for Transport as Secretary of State
around the alleged terrorist plot of 10 August 2006. I have to
say that it is something the Civil Service does extraordinarily
well; the ability to staff up a team quickly, for people to work
far beyond the expectations of their contract and to be able to
draw staff from across the organisation as required were strengths
which I had seen within the Department for Transport but I saw
again within the Department for International Development. Because
we have a unit within the Department that specialises in humanitarian
response, we have a standing facility which can obviously be staffed
up but whose core business it is to be able to put in place these
responses. What was distinctive, and I think something that we
do need to consider as we look to the longer term, was the interplay
of politics and humanitarian response. This was not a classic
humanitarian response in the extent to which it was "political"
from day one. In the sense the ability to secure access from the
regime, the judgments we were making as to the relative balance
of priority between getting food stocks on to the ground or getting
shelter on to the ground and putting pressure on the regime to
allow for greater access for aid workers were judgments that were
being made in real time. Actually that involved not simply CHASE,
the humanitarian bit of the Department for International Development;
it also involved Sue's team that has experience and knowledge
of working with the regime; critically, it also involved the Foreign
Office. Again, one of the positive aspects of the very difficult
and challenging circumstances that we encountered was the immediacy
of the co-operation between the two Secretaries of State, between
the Foreign Secretary and myself, ensuring that we were locked
into conversations that were happening in New York, Bangkok and
here in London in terms of ensuring that we had a fully joined
up and co-ordinated response. That being said, I am sure of course
we will seek to learn whatever lessons we can but, not withstanding
the obligations of appearing before this committee today, there
are still people who are working flat out in relation to Burma.
In that sense, now is not the point for us to be undertaking the
lessons learnt exercise that as a matter of course we would undertake.
Q37 Hugh Bayley: Can I push you a
little further? I am pleased to hear you say that you have a flexible,
responsive and dedicated workforce, but that you will also learn
lessons from your response so that your preparations, your level
of readiness, is as complete as it can be. I think you are right
to focus on the fact that you had the huge added complexity of
political overlay on top of a natural disaster, but I can think
of the other places where politics plays into the disaster. There
are two places at least in Africa where it may not have been a
single cataclysmic event; it has been a sort of slow burn humanitarian
disaster but politics in Darfur and Zimbabwe have hugely impeded
the ability of the donor community and others to respond to humanitarian
needs. How, as you learn the lessons and tease out changes that
you might make to your humanitarian response unit and protocols,
will you share them with this committee? To what extent do you
think major changes are needed, too?
Mr Alexander: Let me deal with
your first observation and then come on to your second. I think
what was distinctive about this circumstance was obviously that
it was precipitated by a natural disaster but was against a backdrop
of continuing political crisis. In that sense, the run-in to this
crisis was significantly shorter than the two other examples that
you cite whereby in relation to Darfur, which was the first foreign
visit that I made to Africa as Development Secretary, we actually
have a standing joint unit between the Foreign Office and the
Department for International Development, which is a somewhat
bespoke solution to the particular challenges that are faced both
in terms of the CPA[9]
in Darfur, and in relation to Zimbabwe where we have known for
some time that we were looking towards the elections and that
that would be a moment of potential opportunity but also of potential
political crisis as well with humanitarian consequences, notwithstanding
the refugee problem and all the difficulties that have been affected
as a result. In that sense, the structures of government that
we have sought to use to respond to those are themselves different
from where we were on Burma. As I say, we have a standing unit
in the Foreign Office and in DFID, the Sudan Unit, which deals
with Darfur along with other challenges. In relation to Zimbabwe,
we have through the NSID committee which is the National Security
International Development Africa Sub-Committee which I chair,
been anticipating the issues in relation to Zimbabwe for some
time, and in that sense there have been regular meetings involving
myself, David, Mark Malloch Brown and others. In relation to Burma,
broadly I would never be complacent on behalf of the Department
but I would judge that our humanitarian response has been successful,
given all of the constraints that have been put in its way by
the regime and by others. That is not to say we yet have the level
of international aid access that we would ideally have wished,
but in terms of the response of the Department, broadly I feel
that we have had a positive experience. One point that I emphasise
in my mind—and perhaps I would say this, would I not—is
the enduring influence of ministers in the sense that to get to
a position whereby there was frequent and easy communication between
myself and the Foreign Secretary, between ourselves and the Prime
Minister, in terms of the public messaging, that was critical,
given the vulnerability to the regime hearing divergent signals.
It would have been impossible for us to marshal the international
coalition, whether in New York or in ASEAN, without the expertise
of the Foreign Office. Equally, it is not the Foreign Office's
core business to understand how to access a country in terms of
a major humanitarian crisis. In that sense, there was, I would
argue, quite effective ministerial working across the Departments.
So I would not suggest that major structural changes are needed.
I would certainly be happy to share with the committee my reflections
and the work of officials in terms of what lessons we can learn
from the experience of working in Burma in recent months. With
the respect to the committee, given the extent to which even preparation
for this committee has taken officials who would otherwise still
be working full-time on the humanitarian response off that to
prepare for this committee, I would think we would probably be
talking towards the end of the year both to have a clearer line
of sight following on from the immediate humanitarian response
to the reconstruction effort but also to be confident that it
would not be impeding the work of the Department.
Q38 John Bercow: Secretary of State,
you mentioned earlier in this session the approval of the funding
application by the Shan Women's Action Network. In similar vein
you made such a statement about approved funding in your written
parliamentary answer of 10 June: "DFID also recently agreed
funding of £102,780 for the Shan Women's Action Network for
its work to improve health, education, livelihoods and women's
rights among displaced Shan people in camps in Burma and Thailand."
My understanding is that SWAN, with whom I have been in correspondence,
signed the final grant agreement last Wednesday, 2 July. I gather
that that was to be precisely three months into the start of the
project. Could you advise me, because you will be aware that SWAN,
though an outstanding organisation is a relatively small one,
why it has not been possible to provide advance funding to it?
Mr Alexander: From my recollection,
I met SWAN when I was on the border. There are some unique challenges,
notwithstanding the excellence of it as an organisation, in terms
of capacity-building.
Ms Wardell: Part of the issue
with SWAN is, as you know, that while being a fantastic organisation,
they do not have that much capacity. We spent quite a bit of time
working with them to develop their ideas and to get to a point
where we could fund it. We have now agreed the funding, and certainly
there was another issue around the bank account, that they did
not have a bank account to transfer the funds to. Then we had
to set up an arrangement to be able to get the money across to
them. That has been the cause of the delay. I know that my officials
are trying to sort out getting funding through as soon as possible.
Q39 John Bercow: For the avoidance
of doubt, the failure or unwillingness or impossibility to register
with the Thai authorities will not continue to be invoked as a
block on advance payment, will it?
Ms Wardell: I will have to get
back to you on that because I am not quite sure what the legal
situation is there.
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