Conclusions and Recommendations
1. The Environment Agency set a target to
maintain 63% of flood defence systems in target condition by March
2007, but only managed to maintain 57% of all systems and 46%
of high risk systems at target level by that date. The
Secretary of State for Environment, Food and Rural Affairs announced
on 2 July 2007 that the total annual budget for flood risk management
would rise to £800 million by 2010-11 from £483 million
received in 2006-07. The Agency needs to target its
resources based on thorough assessments of the priority areas.
It should categorise the state of each group of flood defences,
according to whether they are high, medium or low risk systems,
and estimate the increased risk of flooding where they are not
in target condition.
2. There are significant shortcomings in the
Agency's ability to prioritise expenditure on the highest risk
areas and assets. The risk to life and
damage to property were well illustrated by the floods in summer
2007, but the Agency has not targeted high risk flood defence
systems adequately, and two areas spent less than 40% of maintenance
funds on such assets. The Agency should allocate maintenance funds
to each of its areas on the basis of the estimated risk of flooding
and the potential cost if a flood were to occur.
3. Too much of the Agency's construction funding
in 2005-06 (£76 million) was spent
on programme and project development. The Agency spends a
significant percentage of its funding for improvements on development,
some of which goes on schemes which are unlikely to go ahead.
Since most funding is already committed to existing projects and
relatively little is available in any one year for new project
starts, such development can put scarce resources into schemes
which have little prospect of being built while raising false
hopes in the affected communities. Detailed planning work on each
proposed scheme should only be undertaken once the Agency is reasonably
confident that the project is likely to go ahead.
4. The Agency is unlikely to meet its earlier
commitment to complete Catchment Flood Management plans by 31
December 2007. These plans should be reviewed
to identify structures most at risk: some of the worst damage
in the summer floods affected structures in areas where plans
had been completed but the structures not identified as at risk.
The plans are designed to set out the policy for managing flood
risk in a catchment over the next 50 to 100 years, taking into
account various factors over the long term, such as climate change
and property development, so that decisions about construction
and maintenance can be made in the context of the catchment as
a whole. In the face of the heavy costs and disruption from recent
flooding this delay is unsatisfactory, and any further delay beyond
the Agency's new estimate for completion of the work by December
2008 would be unacceptable.
5. The different bodies involved in water
management appeared quick to absolve themselves of any responsibility
for the floods in 2007 and there is little evidence of collaborative
working with the Agency to minimise the risks of such events.
Developers, local authorities, drainage boards and water companies
are involved in enhancing drainage to handle rising demand, whether
from rainfall or new development, but proposals to improve drainage
to hold excess water have been held up by discussions over the
responsibility for subsequent maintenance work. The Agency should
lead in preparing and agreeing local drainage plans which set
out the specific responsibilities of all relevant parties. It
should seek new powers if the deadlock cannot otherwise be broken.
6. The Agency's asset database should provide
a national picture of the state of flood defences, but it is cumbersome
to use and the difficulties in extracting timely performance data
are hindering efforts to keep these defences in their target condition.
The Agency's inspectors use the database to record their inspection
results, but local managers were unable to use the computer system
to subsequently check whether faults identified had been remedied.
The system can fail when users seek to extract large volumes of
data, and only 80 local authorities have used the database to
monitor the state of their non-main river defences. The Agency
should establish whether the technical problems can be overcome
to allow users' ready access to the data. If not, the Agency should
prepare a business case for developing a new computer system more
suited to user requirements.
7. The Agency does not routinely notify third
party owners of flood defences of any defects found.
The Agency should formally notify all third party owners of the
remedial action needed to maintain defences in appropriate condition
and follow up whether necessary action has been taken. In the
wake of the floods this summer, the Agency should also consider
whether there is a case for extending its powers to compel third
party owners to take action.
8. The Agency's warning system to notify residents
of the imminent risk of flooding relied on email and telephone
messages, but such warnings may not be appropriate late at night
or early in the morning if residents are asleep.
As part of its lessons learned review, the Agency should establish
whether residents received adequate warning of the risk of flooding
and whether existing methods of communication were sufficient.
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