Select Committee on Public Accounts Minutes of Evidence


Examination of Witnesses (Questions 120-139)

HM REVENUE AND CUSTOMS

28 JANUARY 2008

  Q120  Dr Pugh: If we had a boom in 2006/2007 and the amount of tax-take did not increase, does that not suggest that there is some serious evasion going on or that you are getting less capable of identifying it?

  Mr Hartnett: I think there were policy changes, which either Melanie or Freda may want to comment on, that affected the tax take.

  Q121  Dr Pugh: It was an odd year!

  Mr Hartnett: No, I think it was just a year when there was some change, and you see this; but I think both corporates in the UK and their advisors, were you to go and talk to them quietly, would say that the Large Business Service in HMRC and our specialists are a pretty determined bunch and very good at driving down tax avoidance.

  Ms Dawes: Perhaps it would be helpful to clarify corporation tax receipts on large business. There was indeed a small fall in real terms between 2005 and 2006, but there was a very large rise in 2005 compared to the year before. It was a 33% in real terms rise. That is the broad context. The very small fall can be entirely explained and indeed reversed by the fact that there was a change in the instalments regime for North Sea taxation and we effectively collected an extra quarter's worth of tax in 2005/2006 which raised the figures, and that was not repeated the following year. There was not that falling-off that—

  Q122  Dr Pugh: For the moment I will accept your explanation. Can I go to the two big ideas in the NAO report? One is that you should concentrate on the big fish rather than the minnows. Is there a dilemma here, because I would be very happy, as a minnow, to have my tax affairs rather loosely looked at and for you to go after the bigger fish; but there is a principle of equality here, is there not, a principle of zero tolerance? How do you balance things out?

  Mr Hartnett: In this way: when we started taking forward our response to what is described in the report as the review of links with business, and modernising the approach of the Large Business Service, as I have said on a number of occasions, we wanted to match resource-to-risk. We thought that we would have a very low engagement level with what seemed to us to be low-risk corporates. The corporates did not want it like that; the corporates said to us: "No, we need an engagement with you; we need to be able to talk to you about issues." It is not zero engagement, if I can pick up your term with smaller corporates, and no-one is getting away with anything that we are aware of. We will always collect tax that is there to be collected. What we will not do is pursue very small risks when there are very big risks to be pursued.

  Q123  Dr Pugh: The second big idea is a more client-centred approach; we get rid of tax inspectors and we have client relationship managers. Is there any real evidence that that makes any significant difference?

  Mr Hartnett: I think it does make a very real difference. We have not got rid of the tax inspectors; they are still there and some of them have become client relationship managers. We have two tasks to balance out, Dr Pugh. We need to help and support business in relation to the tax system and we need to be pursuing tax liabilities and tax risks as well. For a very big corporate, it may have stamp duty, corporation tax, PAYE, National Insurance—I will not go further—to pay, and what we are doing through our case relationship managers is saying, "Here is one person who will manage your relationship with HMRC"[10]—


  Q124 Dr Pugh: I know what you are saying and I know the proposition you are putting forward and what you are suggesting you are going to do; what is your evidence for thinking this works any better than any prior system? Have you got any evidence?

  Ms Dawes: We have got lots of evidence of individual cases, when actually having somebody going in as the client relationship manager across all the taxes has allowed them to—

  Q125  Dr Pugh: You have evidence of the general trend as well as the individual cases, have you?

  Ms Dawes: I think the general trend is the progress we have made by re-prioritising our work over the past year. We could not have done that without the client relationship managers in place who knew the business inside out.

  Q126  Dr Pugh: If you have any general evidence, can you submit it, please? I came across the expression in this report, "intervention yield"; that is your public sector target, is it not? There is a public sector target as a whole of £3.5 billion under-payment of tax to be sorted out and obtained. Intervention yield though, which you are marked on, is really money you get when you have to go looking for it; you have to knock on the door of a firm and insist that they pay it. Is it a good indicator of how well you are doing; and can you give me a general picture of what you think the corporation tax element will be in that £3.5 billion of underpaid tax that we are looking at?

  Mr Hartnett: Let me unpack it a bit by saying this. Our yield in relation to big business comes in three forms. It comes from investigation and inquiry, and this is a straightforward amount of money. It comes from looking at issues and perhaps seeing that big corporates are taking a tax relief a year or two earlier than they should, and so we reverse that. The big issue where we have got good evidence about improvement is that a lot of our work, more and more every year, is happening in real time before tax returns are sent in, before accounts are signed off; and we are able now to measure the impact of our work there, and it is growing.

  Q127  Dr Pugh: It is a fair indication of the progress you are making; the question you did not answer is that if we are going to get £3.5 billion from under-payment of tax which we did not get before, what percentage of that will be corporation tax?

  Mr Hartnett: I do not think we targeted a percentage, but perhaps we could give you an answer in writing when we have got to the end of the period, when we can break it down. [11]


  Q128 Keith Hill: Mr Hartnett, I was a bit worried that you were not able to complete the answer that you were giving to Angela Browning when you were describing a company where you were meeting regular obfuscation difficulty from tax advisers. Do you want to tell us a little bit more about that? You implied that this was part of a pattern.

  Mr Hartnett: It can be a pattern, Mr Hill, sometimes. Again, a quick illustration: if a firm of advisers has sold a scheme to a corporate, and we believe the scheme does not work, then we will invite the corporate to agree that and pay the tax. It will not surprise you that sometimes they do not do that and we are forced to litigate. We then see the firm of advisers maybe appear in support of the litigation, and work really very hard to slow that litigation up as much as they can. We use all the powers and techniques available to us to try and move things along faster. Have we got perfect powers to put in what I describe as jet propulsion behind that? No. We are constantly looking at our powers to see if there are ways to improve them, and the review of powers that is going on could lead to further modernisation of information powers. We are determined. If we think there is something improper about the approach taken by the tax advisers, we will not hesitate to go and see the chairman or someone else at a major firm. Not very long ago, probably 12 months ago, we went to see the vice chairman of a major firm to say that we were very concerned about what they were selling to clients—they had sold it about a dozen times—and how they were defending it. That vice chairman agreed with us and wrote to all the clients to say that that scheme did not work. We welcome that.

  Q129  Keith Hill: There is a pattern.

  Mr Hartnett: There is a pattern of those who have devised a scheme and sold it, of wanting to defend it. They have got a big skin in the game, as they say; they have got a big investment in it.

  Q130  Keith Hill: How many cases do you take to litigation in a year?

  Mr Hartnett: Quite a lot. We developed a litigation strategy, which is referred to in the NAO report, where we will not negotiate if we are confident that our interpretation of the law is right, and we will take them to litigation. Can we move them all ahead as fast as we would like? Not often.

  Q131  Keith Hill: That is why you are looking for new powers, or possibly looking for new powers. How many cases will you have in court at any one time?

  Mr Hartnett: I cannot give you at the moment a precise figure. We can drop you a line.[12]


  Q132 Keith Hill: That would be helpful—and also for a year.

  Mr Hartnett: Sure.

  Q133  Keith Hill: On the whole, is it worth it, taking companies to court?

  Mr Hartnett: I think it is. Sometimes we lose. More often recently we have won and demonstrated that our interpretation of the law is right. Yes, it is well worthwhile.

  Q134  Keith Hill: The Large Business Service deals with 700 companies. How many of these will get their returns wrong in an average year?

  Ms Chaloner: It probably depends what you mean by "wrong". A large proportion of them—there will be issues that we will need to question, to look at to understand whether or not our interpretation of the tax treatment is the same as the company's interpretation of the tax treatment. Some of the companies' systems may be faulty, and therefore what comes out in the computations is wrong. Clearly, in those circumstances we want to work closely with the company to get them to a point where their systems are right. The other big area is the avoidance schemes, where they would say very clearly that in their view their computations are right; and we would say that we do not agree with the interpretation. It is hard to say it is black or white.

  Q135  Keith Hill: Are both of those cases of the company making an innocent mistake?

  Mr Hartnett: You can certainly see that, Mr Hill. Again, a quick example: I remember being, frankly, fascinated by the tax implications when I first saw a satellite leasing arrangement by a major bank. We did not think the bank had got it right but we did not think they had got it wrong deliberately in any sense. This was really the cutting edge in telecommunications and taxation and we worked together to get to a right answer. It was very difficult.

  Q136  Keith Hill: How many of these 700 do you reckon are deliberately trying to dodge their tax liabilities in any given year?

  Mr Hartnett: It is very hard to give you an answer. We see now much fewer schemes than we have seen before, but they would regard themselves under an obligation to reduce their tax liability, and it is a question of how they go about doing it.

  Q137  Keith Hill: If you look at figure 10 on page 23, which analyses the additional yield resulting from your compliance activities, leaving aside accelerated yield, the pre-return—I would take that to be an example of your good practice; you are working with the company in advance and trying to advise them how to make an accurate return and all the rest of it. By contrast, direct yields is when you think it has gone wrong, and you have actually gone in there, intervened and said, "Now look here, this is a serious mistake". You might say that the yield of pre-return work is the correction of innocent errors and misconceptions and all the rest of it, but that does not seem to produce very much, only 6% of the overall return, whereas 79%, which is the direct yield, is when you have had to go in there and say, "Your self-assessment is inadequate; we want to look at this more seriously." That suggests to me that there is perhaps more deliberation in inaccurate returns than innocence in inaccurate returns, but I may have got it wrong.

  Mr Hartnett: With great respect, one might draw that conclusion just from one year, but if one went backwards over a period, I think the pre-return work—one would be able to trace back to a point—I do not know where the point is—where there is almost nothing because those pre-return discussions with corporates did not happen. It is a much more effective use of our time to look at an issue in real time with a corporate and resolve the issue if we can, than to have to put a big team together to undertake an investigation that could take—

  Q138  Keith Hill: I am sure you are absolutely right, that it is the best way to do it. It seems to me co-operation is the best way of handling these things. Let me just ask my final two questions—we are under tremendous pressure from our Chairman here! Let us go back to the £8.5 billion of corporation tax under consideration each year. What kind of things does that under-payment result from or putative under-payment?

  Mr Hartnett: It is not necessarily the same amount each year. That is the amount of corporation tax that our people have registered as at risk in the 12 months to February 2007. It could be any of the things we have discussed this afternoon. It could be because maybe we were concerned about a scheme of tax avoidance, about how capital allowances have been claimed; and even perhaps about deduction for pensions, as Angela Browning was talking about earlier on and whether or not it fitted with the rules. It could be literally anything.

  Q139  Keith Hill: One final observation: if £8.5 billion is the figure that you kind of estimate for one year, looking back what is the total, do you think? Is it possible to arrive at an estimate of what may be the under-payment under consideration?

  Mr Hartnett: I do not think we can give you an estimate with any accuracy. The only thing I can say with certainty, Mr Hill, is that some of that £8.5 billion will turn out to be not actually tax that we should be collecting—we have seen a risk and examined a risk and we agree it has been treated properly. Some of it will be tax that we absolutely do need to collect and may end up fighting our way through the courts to do so.


10   Note by Witness: During 2007 HMRC commissioned research on the experience of our large business customers. The findings identify what is important to business and where improvements have been made. The introduction of the Client Relationship Manager role is seen as both important and as having had a positive impact on LBS customer experience. Across the large business population as a whole, 1 in 5 customers have noticed an improvement over the last year, with the perception of improvement significantly higher (31%) for customers dealt with wholly by LBS, reflecting the impact of the CRM. Back

11   Note by Witness: This information is not yet available. We will send the Committee a further note following the end of the financial year. Back

12   Ev 17 Back


 
previous page contents next page

House of Commons home page Parliament home page House of Lords home page search page enquiries index

© Parliamentary copyright 2008
Prepared 21 October 2008