Select Committee on Public Accounts Minutes of Evidence


Examination of Witnesses (Questions 100-119)

DEPARTMENT FOR TRANSPORT

9 JUNE 2008

  Q100  Chairman: You mention these bonuses but can you give us an idea what a bonus might be in terms of monetary terms? What has been the punishment? What have they lost?

  Mr Devereux: The bonuses would be of the order of low tens of thousands, as a top bonus.

  Q101  Chairman: So somebody running this Programme could have got a bonus of how much? What are the consequences for senior managers?

  Mr Devereux: I am doing this from memory now. I doubt if any of the senior managers in the Department earn bonuses in excess of 20 grand.

  Q102  Chairman: So they have potentially lost, at the very top level, £20,000. Nobody has lost their job, of course.

  Mr Devereux: As I tried to answer earlier I am not prepared to go into the territory of exactly what has happened to individuals.

  Q103  Chairman: I am not asking you to name and shame particular individuals but £81 million has gone down the drain and we would like to know, without naming names, what has happened to those involved. Nobody has lost their job, have they?

  Mr Devereux: I am not answering the question. What I am saying is that there are relatively few senior officials on this Programme and if you invite me to anonymously quantify how many of the relatively few have or have not lost their role I end up in a position where I am hung either way.

  Q104  Chairman: All right, you are not going to answer that question.

  Mr Devereux: That is correct.

  Q105  Mr Williams: Can I turn to the NAO for a moment? Bearing in mind our scepticism of the Gershon figures when we first came across them, did anyone ask the Cabinet Office how they arrived at these figures? It is interesting that there is no witness from the Cabinet Office here. How do we know what hard evidence gave rise to these figures of potential savings?

  Mr Burr: Do you mean the Gershon savings?

  Q106  Mr Williams: The savings of the Cabinet Office, the £1.4 billion as a result of this exercise across the whole of local government and central government.

  Mr Burr: We have produced a couple of reports on the Gershon savings.

  Q107  Mr Williams: I am talking about these particular savings. Is the £1.4 billion better founded than some of the Gershon figures originally had been?

  Mr Burr: I do not think so, no.

  Mr Devereux: Are you talking about the Cabinet Office assessment of the total potential savings from shared services which is not the same as £785 million that we would set as a target ourselves?

  Q108  Mr Williams: They have set a target of £1.4 billion—the whole of central and local government we are talking about—is that a modest, a realistic or an ambitious programme, do you think?

  Mr Burr: I do not know if I would be able to qualify it in that way but I think those savings are in much the same position as the wider efficiency savings we have commented on on Gershon, some of them are harder than others.

  Q109  Mr Williams: Coming to your figures at the Department for Transport, there is a slight variation in the briefing that we have from the figures that Mr Davidson used, but with the total cost originally estimated at £55 million and now it is £121 million, there is a £66 million loss and with a savings estimate of £112 million now down to £40 million there is another £70 million loss, how on earth did you achieve a turnaround of £136 million from your original estimates?

  Mr Devereux: As the way you have described it demonstrates, there are two halves to that question. There is an answer in respect of the cost first of all, and the reasons which the National Audit Office describe that we have been discussing this afternoon, an estimate of the cost of delivering this service that we embarked on originally that was clearly optimistic. We have ended up spending more on this project than we expected. Some of that is undoubtedly additional cost and we have ended up doing it in a rush where, had we planned it perhaps, we could have got better savings out of it. On the benefits side, as I have tried to illustrate a couple of times, this is still a "to a point in time estimate", the £40 million net savings by the end of it. I am not expecting that to be the position by the time we have finished.

  Q110  Mr Williams: Are you expecting to redeem this loss?

  Mr Devereux: I am, yes.

  Q111  Mr Williams: In what sort of timescale?

  Mr Devereux: All the figure work you see in front of you presupposes a timeline out to 2015. If I can finally encourage the Committee to look at page 47 that is the alternative version which the National Audit Office has put down which shows what might be possible in the event that we would secure, in particular, substantial savings out of procurement. The only reason for drawing your attention to it is that on certain assumptions you can make this quite strongly positive. The commitment I need to make to you as a Committee is that it is very much my intention that we will not leave this project as delivering a loss to the tax payer; I cannot see how that can possibly be acceptable and we will change it round.

  Q112  Mr Williams: I see from another part of our briefing that the Department has identified significant potential savings from adding routine procurement. In fact I am rather surprised that routine procurement is a late add-on. Would that not have been one of the most obvious places to start and one of the most reliable places to start rather than a desperate last cast around for something that you will get right?

  Mr Devereux: When the Board originally thought about what it was going to put into the Shared Service Centre one potential was to embark immediately on the procurement as well because it is a standard thing to put in procurement. We consciously wrote a business case which relied only on head count savings from doing standard processes like invoice payment et cetera. We are now in a position where actually I think we can make some progress on that. We have quite a good track record of procurement across the piece within the Department as a whole and having now made some more re-organisation myself to use the skills that we have brought in who are actually very experienced in this, I believe it is possible to make procurement savings now and I am more confident about that than I would have been two years ago.

  Q113  Mr Williams: With hindsight you now accept it would have been better if you had held a competition in the first place rather than just relying on the IBM existing arrangement. It would at least have made you focus on precisely what it was that you as a Department needed and it might have tightened your analysis in various other areas. Do you regret that you did not do that at that stage? I am not saying that in a critical way.

  Mr Devereux: Sitting here today I think that is a very reasonable question. We have taken two years rather than one year to deliver even the first implementation, to get the first businesses live. As we have observed in terms of performance, even after that we have actually managed to damage the standing of shared services by rushing something out. So from where I am sitting now, with the benefit of hindsight, it probably would have been better to take longer and to potentially contract it out but, for the reasons I have been through previously, on the best analysis we could do at the time, we believed it was possible to make faster progress and make quicker savings for the tax payer. We embarked on this in order to make savings.

  Q114  Mr Williams: Whitehall at the moment proliferates Gateway Reviews. Where were yours? Why did you not introduce a full range of external gateway reviews as one might have expected?

  Mr Devereux: If you turn to appendix three on page 36 you will find a long catalogue of different gateway reviews, the conclusions of which were that in February 2005, when we decided to embark on this, the review concluded that was a sensible thing to do. By the time we get to April 2006, the review is essentially saying that there are a number of things which are time critical. We had a conversation earlier where I was saying that at that point it became increasingly obvious in the April to July period that the things that are in these contracts that were signed were not being delivered. The April 2006 gateway review was saying, "You may proceed but only if you fix these things". It is very clear that those things were not fixed. Subsequent to that, though, we did have a gateway review; it was called a health check and it was held in February 2007 before the system was turned on. That health check came back on an amber rating rather than a red rating, and an amber rating essentially says that (subject to doing the things we say) you ought to proceed. So we had had a succession of gateway reviews, and then as soon as we had the Shared Service Centre open and had stabilised the position early in 2007, we then embarked on another one. It is those reviews which are now consistently recording this Programme as being in what I think they call "strong recovery".

  Q115  Mr Williams: We are told that you set 18 performance targets for yourselves but you have only achieved four of the 18. Why so few? Have you prioritised those targets? Are the four high priority or low priority; are they easy ones or difficult ones to attain?

  Mr Devereux: I think in retrospect the list of indicators which you see on page 20 was not as well thought through as it should have been. The fact that I have several of these that say I cannot measure them even today does not demonstrate that the thought that went into them was satisfactory, certainly for the system we delivered. In terms of priorities I am very clear that making sure that invoices are paid properly on time (we have a target of 98% to be paid within 30 days) is the most important external facing one. You will see in the top two lines of page 20/21 that in April—which goes just beyond the Report—the DVLA got to 96%. I regard that as a very important one. It is also important, to be honest, to make sure that the payroll works out well to make sure that people are being paid properly; they have an absolute right to expect that. There are two things in there that are important. Some of the other ones that have been measured here are, if you like, more internal processing ones, the one that you identified earlier on about creating customer details, the numbers of transactions going through are relatively few, and it is not in the same league as the invoice payments.

  Q116  Mr Williams: Figure seven shows average private sector comparators. Do you think you will ever get to those levels?

  Mr Devereux: I am not sure we will get to average private sector levels for so long as the Government requires us to do a variety of reporting which is not done in the same way within the private sector. In particular there are some quite complex arrangements to ensure that we properly account to the Treasury and through them to Parliament for the way things are spent which are simply of a different nature to the way in which subsidiaries would simply aggregate up their accounts. There are things going on in the process which actually make the system more difficult to operate. That said, when it comes to whether we ought to be capable of processing invoices properly that is probably going to turn simply, by the time we have finished with the process of improvements that we are embarked on, on the question of scale. As is observed again in the early work you did on shared services across government, there are very different levels of scales of operation going on here. It will always be a struggle for a department of around 18,000 people to actually make these become as attractive a position as it would be in the private sector.

  Miss Moorhouse: It is a scale issue. That fundamentally is the key issue for us, and about the policy of our own internal work, to streamline and improve on the base we have today which, as you have heard, we are very committed to doing.

  Q117  Mr Williams: We are told that you are not directing chief executives to implement the business changes that are needed to achieve savings. Why not?

  Mr Devereux: The chief executives are looking at the performance of the system, and not least the unit costs which you have just alerted us to, and are very clear where we have to make improvements on this system. It is clear that there are things that can be done in each of these agencies as the system beds in, and as we develop it. I am not intending to continue in a position where chief executives have a free vote as to whether to participate in this. The only question we have to be careful of is to make sure that in making any transfers in improvement in the business processes we do not undermine the service delivery to customers at the same time. It seems to me that we are being asked to do both of those and that is what we are going to try to do.

  Chairman: I think Mr Bacon has a supplementary.

  Q118  Mr Bacon: Geraldine Smith referred to the consulting firm who told you it was possible within the timetable, though it was not and you did not have the figure for how much had been spent on them to hand. Which consulting firm was it?

  Mr Devereux: It was Deloittes.

  Q119  Mr Bacon: Could you send us a note with how much has been paid to Deloittes in total and what it was for, if necessary broken down into different components.

  Mr Devereux: Certainly.



 
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