Memorandum from the Association of Train
Operating Companies (ATOC) (TS 11)
INTRODUCTION
The Association of Train Operating Companies
(ATOC) is an association owned by the train operating companies
that provide franchised rail passenger services throughout Great
Britain, as well as the EWS Railway and certain non-franchised
operators, like Eurostar. It is the official voice of the passenger
rail industry, it also provides its members with a range of services
that enable them to comply with conditions laid on the in their
franchise agreements and operating licences.
The safety and well-being of passengers is the
primary concern of train operators although the role of agencies
such as Transec, the British Transport Police and Network Rail
is crucial in terms of creating and maintaining a safe travelling
environment. The role of train operators focuses on training of
staff to be alert to the terrorist threat, and how to deal with
a range of situations from suspect packages to station evacuation.
Train operators also raise awareness of their passengers and encourage
vigilance through posters and security announcements at stations
and on trains. Processes and procedures are also agreed with security
agencies to ensure that station or train searches can be carried
out effectively and in a timely manner, and that the effect of
hoax calls can be minimised.
Two of the inquiries questions raised in the
Committee's remit are specifically for Government to answer. On
the question of international experience, information is shared
informally through the International Union of Railways, the World
wide organisation drawing together train and infrastructure operators.
This paper therefore sets out how train operators
fit into the structures that are in place in Britain.
TERRORISM AND
THE RAILWAYS
Railways are obvious terrorist targets as they
combine predictable concentrations of people at stations, or on
trains, with easy public access. Disruption of the railways also
causes wide-spread disruption to the cities they serve. As well
as the tragic events of 7 July 2005 Britain's rail network was
subject to regular terrorist attacks, and also to disruptive threats,
during the IRA campaigns of the 1970s, 80s and 90s.
The railways have clear and simple objectives
in respect of terrorism: preventing or minimising the threat;
responding to an attack in order to minimise the loss of life
and other consequences and restoring service as quickly as possible
following an attack. There is also an important role for these
agencies in cooperating to ensure that terrorist objectives of
disruption are not fulfilled through threats and hoax calls.
The principle structures currently in place
are those provided by the Transec directorate of the Department
for Transport (DfT) and the British Transport Police.
PREVENTATIVE SECURITY
MEASURES
The Transec directorate of the DfT took over
setting and enforcing security standards on the railways from
Railtrack in February 2000 in response to the concern that arranging
the security of the railway was not a matter that should be left
to a private company. It has developed the National Rail Security
Programme (NRSP) which is followed by Network Rail, all train
operators and the British Transport Police.
The NRSP deals specifically with preventative
security, it is a restricted document, and so we refer to its
provisions only in general terms. However, its provisions attempt
to provide an appropriate level of preventative security for the
level of threat as assessed by the Security Service. Each station
on the network is categorised, and appropriate security arrangements
are described according to the category. The level of security
is increased in accordance with the assessed level of threat.
Similarly security procedures for trains, depots and other installations
are described.
Responsibilities of companies and individuals
down to the level of station manager are described along with
the training requirement for other staff. This includes a requirement
for contingency planning and the need to understand the roles
of other organisations through joint exercises.
The NRSP gives a clearly understood framework
for responding to security threats and is informed by the Security
Service's assessment of the level of threat. Response to incidents
is a matter for the industry and the BTP.
The Transec directorate checks compliance with
the framework, all train operators comply.
RAILWAY INDUSTRY
RESPONSE
The requirement for infrastructure controllers,
station operators and train operators to have response procedures
in place are set out in Rail Safety & Standards Board's Railway
Group Standard 3600. Compliance with group standards is mandatory
for all railway group members.
Network Rail is responsible for producing documented
security arrangements, including the arrangements for operational
response to incidents. It must also keep these arrangements under
review and update them annually, or after any major security incident.
The arrangements are produced in consultation with the railway
group members, the BTP, Transec, the Department for Trade and
Industry, the Home Office, the Ministry of Defence, and the Department
for Transport.
Through these procedures the railway industry
has a clearly understood structure for responding to security
incidents, and Network Rail is the single point of accountability
for ensuring that the arrangements are in place and kept under
review.
The industry also has the professional support
of the BTP which provide expert advice in respect of threat assessment,
prevention and response planning and expert operational support
in the event of an incident.
THE ROLE
OF THE
BRITISH TRANSPORT
POLICE
The BTP is responsible for policing the railways
in Great Britain. There are close working relationships between
the BTP and the railway industry, and the BTP and other police
forces. British Transport Police is funded by Train Operating
Companies, Network Rail and Transport for London. In recent years
the industry's expenditure on policing has increased reflecting
the importance attached to the reduction of crime on the railway
(including terrorism).
It has substantial knowledge and capability
in counter-terrorist policing, which have developed over a number
of years, and provides the railway industry with additional expertise
and intelligence to that provided by Transec. The BTP can also
co-ordinate its activities with counter-terrorist policing in
the rest of the country through its membership of the Association
of Chief Police Officers (ACPO) and particularly through its engagement
with the ACPO Terrorism and Allied Matters Committee (ACPO-TAM).
Development of its counter-terrorism capability
is a key strategic priority for the BTP, and its plans are set
out in its Strategic Plan for the years 2005-08. The measures
it intends to take include both use of its powers and developing
its own capabilities and working in partnership with the railway
industry and its security staff.
The BTP has increased the resources deployed
on counter-terrorism activities since 7 July.
CONCLUSIONS
1. Currently there are no formal international
arrangements in place between railways for sharing counter-terrorism
expertise. This would best be coordinated by DfT.
2. There are clear and well understood mandatory
structures and requirements in place for preventative security
led by the Transec directorate of DfT.
3. There are clear and well understood mandatory
structures and requirements in place for operational response
to security incidents led by Network Rail.
4. These arrangements are kept under regular
review.
5. The railway industry has a valuable additional
resource in the counter-terrorism expertise of the BTP.
6. The events of 7 July 2005 confirm that
there is no room for complacency.
December 2005
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