Memorandum from the Transport Salaried
Staffs' Association (TSSA) (TS 12)
1. TSSA welcome the opportunity to submit
comments to the Transport Committee on this matter.
2. TSSA is an independent trade union with
approximately 32,000 members throughout the United Kingdom and
Republic of Ireland, most of whom work in the rail industry and
Transport for London/London Underground. We are recognised for
collective bargaining purposes for various groups of staff by
all the major companies in the rail industry.
3. We are not privy to information on much
of what the Government are doing on the matters under consideration
by the Committee, but we would nonetheless like to take this opportunity
to advise the Committee of TSSA's policy in this area.
4. TSSA's policy is incorporated in the
TUC General Council statement on the consequences of the terrorist
attacks in London that received the unanimous support of Congress
on 8 September 2005. The full General Council statement that runs
to almost 3,300 words covers a wide range of issues that are beyond
the remit of the Transport Committee. We would, however, suggest
that the Committee familiarises itself with the full text with
a view to working with other Committees and Government Departments
in developing a more holistic approach to tackle the serious underlying
social and economic problems that give rise to terrorism. It is
our view that as long as these problems persist the threat of
terrorism will remain and society will probably continue to respond
to the events as they develop.
5. The relevant parts of the TUC General
Council Statement are set out below and are a comprehensive reflection
of TSSA's policy:
"Drawing practical lessons from the attacks
Whilst accepting that total security cannot be
guaranteed, Congress calls on the Government to undertake a thorough
review of the threat of terrorism to public transport safety and
implement measures to improve this without delay. In particular,
Congress urges the Government to ensure that appropriate training,
equipment and back-up is provided for all workers who are likely
to have to deal with such incidents in the course of their work.
The General Council welcomed the invitation issued to union representatives
by Rt Hon Tessa Jowell, a minister charged with important responsibilities
in the aftermath of the attacks. The meeting held a few days after
the attacks provided a means for unions to have an input into
the Government's analysis of the lessons which need to be learned
following the attacks and we are continuing to ensure that unions
draw on the experience of their members and that the results of
our work are fed into the Government's own analysis.
It is clear that working people and their unions
have a vital role to play in determining the proper response to
the attacks.
At a time when there is increasing pressure on
public bodies, as well as private companies, to maximise levels
of efficiency and return on investment, management will always
be counting the cost of any improvements in worker and passenger
safety. Workers who are in the front line, through their day-to-day
experience, are able to provide a unique and invaluable insight.
They can give their own perspective into what safety measures
are necessary; where the threats are at the greatest; and what
support is needed in an emergency. It is essential that their
experience is drawn on and that they have the opportunity to act
collectively and independently through representative trade unions.
In addition to the discussions with government,
we therefore welcome the talks that have taken place following
7 July through London Transport, through the individual organisations
and companies and at workplace level. These should continue and
we are looking to them to achieve the common goal of minimising
the risk of further attack, whilst preparing thoroughly for the
worst if it happens.
Whilst lessons can be learned and proposals implemented
at workplace and organisational level, it is also clear that there
are some key principles that apply more generally. In part these
are drawn out of our extensive experience of dealing with health
and safety in the workplace.
We would identify the following key points:
Safety and protection measures must be introduced
in consultation with the staff and their unions.
Training for front line staff in coping with
emergency situations should be reviewed in light of the increased
threat of terrorist attacks and improvements made, in consultation
with staff, as necessary.
Effective communications systems are essential
in emergencies, particularly when, as on 7 July, multiple attacks
are staged with the aim of maximising confusion and panic. Communication
systems should be reviewed and improvements made as necessary.
There will also be scope for improvements to
be made in the equipment available to deal with emergencies and
risk assessments need to undertaken to ensure that adequate funding
is available for necessary safety measures.
Whilst equipment and devices such as cctv can
assist, experience shows that there is no substitute for trained
staff at times of emergency and any considerations of staffing
numbers need to take this into account.
The 7 July attacks demonstrated clearly what
we had all been aware of for some time, namely that there are
people who have both the means and determination to attack us
at our most vulnerable.
Within all workplaces, particularly those at
greatest risk, management should be co-operating with union representatives,
including safety representatives, in assessing risks to individual
workers, to members of the public and to the organisation itself.
Where there are safety representatives and safety committees in
place they form a good starting point for this enhanced risk assessment.
Where such representative structures do not exist they should
be established as the most effective means of providing the appropriate
levels of protection.
Congress welcomes the steps taken by the TUC
to better co-ordinate the experience of affiliates and calls for
this to work to be stepped up both within the UK and with sister
organisations in the EU."
6. Following the announcement by the Committee
of this inquiry, we wrote to the Secretary of State for Transport
on 4 November. We expressed the view that in light of the Committee's
assessment as to the degree of the threat currently being posed
we were stunned that there continues to be no obvious attempt
by the Government or employers to brief the representatives of
transport workers who face this threat on a daily basis. On 26
October, we along with other trade unions and the TUC had a meeting
with the Secretary of State for Transport to discuss a broad range
of railway issues. This included the need to develop a strategy
for dealing with terrorist attacks and major accidents and the
possibility of joint discussions on this important issue with
ATOC. In our letter of 4th November in an attempt to move the
matter forward, we suggested that there may be some value in arranging
a joint briefing on UK transport security for Network Rail, ATOC
and the trade unions. If, however, this did not prove feasible,
we suggested that as a bare minimum arrangements be put in place
to brief the trade unions on this matter. To date, we have received
no response from the Secretary of State.
7. From the above it will be appreciated
that TSSA has very serious concerns about the lack of an industry-wide
forum for dealing with this matter. Any involvement of staff currently
appears to be piecemeal and is being dealt with on an individual
company basis. This in our view is unsatisfactory and there should
be an industry-wide forum involving amongst others, government,
law enforcement and security agencies, emergency services, employers
and organisations representing workers. It is our strongly held
view that not to involve employees would effectively disenfranchise
many thousands of people who have a massive front line contribution
to make in the fight against terrorism both strategically and
practically. We would endorse fully Mike Brown (LUL's Chief Operating
Officer) who was reported last month to have said "... One
of the best technologies we have is the eyes and ears of our staff".
8. With regard to the use of technology,
testing of various anti-terror systems on the railways including
X-ray screening and body scanners have been widely reported recently.
TSSA is broadly in agreement with the views of the Secretary of
State for Transport who was reported to have said that "You
cannot have a completely closed system on the underground or railways—it
just wouldn't work" and "No single security measure
is either foolproof or mitigating every threat".
9. However, we do not consider that anything
should be ruled out at this stage and the need for closed system
on parts of the network should certainly be considered. In Spain,
for example, the inter-city railway network is subject to airport
style security measures and the feasibility of this in the UK
should certainly be investigated for parts of the network.
10. In conclusion we would say that approaching
this matter strategically, genuinely involving the people working
in the industry, training them properly and providing them with
proper technology, equipment and back-up will play a major part
in dealing with the threat of terrorism on public transport. With
regard to back-up we consider that the Government should put in
place a national strategy (for dealing with the aftermath of major
accidents, terrorist attacks and natural disasters) for effective
crisis support. This will require the provision of multi-agency
support mechanisms needed to address the immediate and long-term
practical and emotional needs of victims, their families and workers
who have to deal with the aftermath of such events.
December 2005
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